- Higher-Order Defeat is Object-Independent.Joshua DiPaolo - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (2):248-269.details
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Knowing what things look like.Matthew McGrath - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (1):1-41.details
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Cretan Deductions.Rachel Elizabeth Fraser & John Hawthorne - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):163-178.details
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Falsehood and Entailment.Juan Comesaña - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):82-94.details
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No Need for Excuses: Against Knowledge-First Epistemology and the Knowledge Norm of Assertion.Joshua Schechter - 2017 - In J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin W. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 132-159.details
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(2 other versions)Perceptual Justification and the Cartesian Theater.David James Barnett - 2019 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 6. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-34.details
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Contextualism about Evidential Support.Jessica Brown - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):329-354.details
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Coherentism via Graphs.Selim Berker - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):322-352.details
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Epistemic Modesty Defended.David Christensen - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 77.details
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Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.details
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What’s the matter with epistemic circularity?David James Barnett - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (2):177-205.details
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Justified Inference.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):273-295.details
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Rational Reflection.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):121-140.details
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Explaining Higher-order Defeat.Marco Tiozzo - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (3):453-469.details
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Aesthetic Higher-Order Evidence for Subjectivists.Luis Oliveira & Chris Mag Uidhir - 2023 - British Journal of Aesthetics 63 (2):235-249.details
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Goodness, availability, and argument structure.Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2021 - Synthese 198:10395-10427.details
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A Dilemma for Higher-Level Suspension.Eyal Tal - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (4):685-699.details
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Self-Knowledge Requirements and Moore's Paradox.David James Barnett - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (2):227-262.details
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Normative Indeterminacy in the Epistemic Domain.Nicholas Leonard & Fabrizio Cariani - 2020 - In Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. New York: Routledge.details
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Higher-Order Evidence and the Normativity of Logic.Mattias Skipper - 2020 - In Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. New York: Routledge.details
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Epistemic Closure Violation and Doxastic Modellability: Infallibilism and Fallibilism through the Eyes of Doubt.Iñaki Xavier Larrauri Pertierra - manuscriptdetails
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Higher-Order Evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2020 - Analysis 80 (4):789-807.details
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How can necessary facts call for explanation.Dan Baras - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11607-11624.details
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Formulating Independence.David Christensen - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 13-34.details
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Misleading higher-order evidence, conflicting ideals, and defeasible logic.Aleks Https://Orcidorg Knoks - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8:141--74.details
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Evidence and Inductive Inference.Nevin Climenhaga - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 435-449.details
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Self-Intimation, Infallibility, and Higher-Order Evidence.Eyal Tal - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (3):665-672.details
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Early 2012 Dissertation Draft - 'Respect for Truth and the Normativity of Epistemic Rationality'.Kurt Sylvan - 2012 - Dissertation, details
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Is higher-order evidence evidence?Eyal Tal - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3157-3175.details
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Williamson, closure, and KK.Daniel Immerman - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3349-3373.details
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Sceptical Theism and the Paradox of Evil.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (2):319-333.details
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A Puzzle About Knowledge, Blame, and Coherence.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (4):493-503.details
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Disagreement and easy bootstrapping.Eyal Tal - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):46-65.details
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Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules?Darren Bradley - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.details
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How Moral Uncertaintism Can Be Both True and Interesting.Andrew Sepielli - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 7.details
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Defeaters and Disqualifiers.Daniel Muñoz - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):887-906.details
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Higher-Order Defeat and the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence.Mattias Skipper - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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On the Normativity of Epistemic Rationality.Kurt Sylvan - 2014 - Dissertation, New Brunswick Rutgersdetails
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On Divorcing the Rational and the Justified in Epistemology.Kurt Sylvan - manuscriptdetails
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Second best epistemology: fallibility and normativity.Joshua DiPaolo - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2043-2066.details
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In defence of single-premise closure.Weng Hong Tang - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):1887-1900.details
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Believing epistemic contradictions.Beddor Bob & Simon Goldstein - 2018 - Review of Symbolic Logic (1):87-114.details
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Defeaters in current epistemology: introduction to the special issue.Luca Moretti & Tommaso Piazza - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2845-2854.details
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Inferential Justification and the Transparency of Belief.David James Barnett - 2016 - Noûs 50 (1):184-212.details
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Two Notions of Epistemic Risk.Martin Smith - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (5):1069-1079.details
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Luck, Rationality, and Explanation.Joshua Schechter - manuscriptdetails
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How Infallibilists Can Have It All.Nevin Climenhaga - 2023 - The Monist 106 (4):363-380.details
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Extremists are more confident.Nora Heinzelmann & Viet Tran - 2022 - Erkenntnis (5).details
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Can Arbitrary Beliefs be Rational?Mattias Skipper - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):377-392.details
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Epistemic Consequentialism, Veritism, and Scoring Rules.Marc-Kevin Daoust & Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (4):1741-1765.details
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