- The Conclusion of Practical Reasoning.John Brunero - 2021 - The Journal of Ethics 25 (1):13-37.details
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Misinformation, subjectivism, and the rational criticizability of desire.Jay Jian - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):845-866.details
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How Do Reasons Transmit to Non-Necessary Means?Benjamin Kiesewetter & Jan Gertken - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (2):271-285.details
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A “Good” Explanation of Five Puzzles about Reasons.Stephen Finlay - 2019 - Philosophical Perspectives 33 (1):62-104.details
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The Epistemic and the Zetetic.Jane Friedman - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (4):501-536.details
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So why can’t you intend to drink the toxin?Fernando Rudy-Hiller - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (3):294-311.details
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An Instrumentalist Account of How to Weigh Epistemic and Practical Reasons for Belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Mattias Skipper - 2019 - Mind 129 (516):1071-1094.details
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Cognitivism about Practical Rationality.John Brunero - 2014 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 9:18-44.details
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Respect and the reality of apparent reasons.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3129-3156.details
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Trying Cognitivism: A Defence of the Strong Belief Thesis.Avery Archer - 2018 - Theoria 84 (2):140-156.details
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On not getting out of bed.Samuel Asarnow - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1639-1666.details
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Is there a liberal principle of instrumental transmission?Jan Gertken & Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2018details
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(1 other version)The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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What is (In)coherence?Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13:184-206.details
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Why cognitivism?Yair Levy - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):223-244.details
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Knowledge-how is the Norm of Intention.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1703-1727.details
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Incommensurability, incomparability, and practical reason.Ruth Chang (ed.) - 1997 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard.details
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Does the normative question about rationality rest on a mistake?Yair Levy - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2021-2038.details
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Intention, Expectation, and Promissory Obligation.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2016 - Ethics 127 (1):88-115.details
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Intending, Settling, and Relying.Facundo M. Alonso - 2017 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 50-74.details
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Agentive Modals.Matthew Mandelkern, Ginger Schultheis & David Boylan - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (3):301-343.details
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Reasoning under Scarcity.Jennifer M. Morton - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):543-559.details
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Practical Reasoning.Antti Kauppinen - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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You ought to ϕ only if you may believe that you ought to ϕ.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):760-82.details
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I Believe I Can φ.Matthew Mandelkern, Ginger Schultheis & David Boylan - 2015 - In Thomas Brochhagen, Floris Roelofsen & Nadine Theiler (eds.), Proceedings of the 20th Amsterdam Colloquium. pp. 256-265.details
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Instrumental reasons.Niko Kolodny - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Moral reasons, epistemic reasons, and rationality.Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (263):341-361.details
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Narrow-Scoping for Wide-Scopers.Alex Worsnip - 2015 - Synthese 192 (8):2617-2646.details
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Instrumental Normativity: In Defense of the Transmission Principle.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2015 - Ethics 125 (4):921-946.details
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Towards a convincing account of intention.Niel Henk Conradie - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Stellenboschdetails
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How to derive a narrow-scope requirement from wide-scope requirements.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):535-542.details
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Minimalism about Intention: A Modest Defense.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (3):384-411.details
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Instrumental Rationality.John Brunero & Niko Kolodny - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Instrumental Rationality.Jonathan Way - 2013 - In Tim Crane (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philsophy. Routledge.details
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Meta‐normative Realism, Evolution, and Our Reasons to Survive.Jeff Behrends - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):486-502.details
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(1 other version)The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2013 - Dissertation, Princeton Universitydetails
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Intellectual Flourishing as the Fundamental Epistemic Norm.Berit Brogaard - 2013 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 11-31.details
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Knowing How.Kieran Setiya - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (3pt3):285-307.details
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Changing Direction on Direction of Fit.Alex Gregory - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (5):603-614.details
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Instrumental Rationality.Markos Valaris - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):443-462.details
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The Normativity of Rationality.Jonathan Way - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1057-1068.details
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(2 other versions)Subjective rightness.Holly M. Smith - 2010 - Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2):64-110.details
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Self‐governance, means‐ends coherence, and unalterable ends.John Brunero - 2010 - Ethics 120 (3):579-591.details
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Intention.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Reasons with rationalism after all.Michael Smith - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):521-530.details
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Setiya on intention, rationality and reasons.Michael E. Bratman - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):510-521.details
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Intention, practical rationality, and self‐governance.Michael E. Bratman - 2009 - Ethics 119 (3):411-443.details
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Decisions, Reasons and Rationality.Garrett Cullity - 2008 - Ethics 119 (1):57-95.details
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How to be a Cognitivist about Practical Reason.Jacob Ross - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:243-281.details
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What ought probably means, and why you can’t detach it.Stephen Finlay - 2009 - Synthese 177 (1):67 - 89.details
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