- Does knowledge secure warrant to assert?E. J. Coffman - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (2):285 - 300.details
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The Epistemic Norm of Blame.D. Justin Coates - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (2):457-473.details
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Are hard choices cases of incomparability?Ruth Chang - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):106-126.details
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Revisionary intellectualism and Gettier.Yuri Cath - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):7-27.details
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Moral Encroachment and Positive Profiling.Lisa Cassell - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (5):1759-1779.details
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The Collapse of Logical Pluralism has been Greatly Exaggerated.Colin R. Caret - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):739-760.details
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Trust and Trustworthiness.J. Adam Carter - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):377-394.details
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On the Epistemology of the Precautionary Principle.J. Adam Carter & Martin Peterson - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):1-13.details
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Not Knowing a Cat is a Cat: Analyticity and Knowledge Ascriptions.J. Adam Carter, Martin Peterson & Bart van Bezooijen - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):817-834.details
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Norms of Assertion: The Quantity and Quality of Epistemic Support.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (4):615-635.details
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Meta-epistemic defeat.J. Adam Carter - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2877-2896.details
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Degrees of Assertability.Sam Carter - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):19-49.details
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Belief without credence.J. Adam Carter, Benjamin W. Jarvis & Katherine Rubin - 2016 - Synthese 193 (8):2323-2351.details
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Pluralistic skepticism: Advertisement for speech act pluralism.Herman Cappelen - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):15–39.details
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A Pragmatic Argument for a Pragmatic Theory of Truth.John Capps - 2017 - Contemporary Pragmatism 14 (2):135-156.details
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Faultless Disagreement, Assertions and the Affective-Expressive Dimension of Judgments of Taste.Filip Buekens - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (4):637-655.details
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Non-Traditional Factors in Judgments about Knowledge.Wesley Buckwalter - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (4):278-289.details
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Knowledge Isn’t Closed on Saturday: A Study in Ordinary Language.Wesley Buckwalter - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):395-406.details
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Knowledge, Stakes, and Mistakes.Wesley Buckwalter & Jonathan Schaffer - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):201–234.details
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Intuition Fail: Philosophical Activity and the Limits of Expertise.Wesley Buckwalter - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):378-410.details
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Epistemic Injustice in Social Cognition.Wesley Buckwalter - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):294-308.details
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Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.details
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Practical reasons, theoretical reasons, and permissive and prohibitive balancing.John Brunero - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-23.details
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Looking beyond reductionism and anti-reductionism.Felix Bräuer - 2020 - Episteme 17 (2):230-248.details
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The knowledge Norm for assertion.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):89-103.details
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Shifty talk: knowledge and causation.Jessica Brown - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):183-199.details
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Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):167-189.details
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Knowledge and practical reason.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1135-1152.details
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Introduction to Relative Truth.Berit Brogaard - 2009 - Synthese 166 (2):215-229.details
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Impurism, Practical Reasoning, and the Threshold Problem.Jessica Brown - 2012 - Noûs 48 (1):179-192.details
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Intuitions, evidence and hopefulness.Jessica Brown - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2021-2046.details
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In defence of a perspectival semantics for 'know'.Berit Brogaard - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):439 – 459.details
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Experimental Philosophy, Contextualism and SSI.Jessica Brown - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):233-261.details
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Assertion and Practical Reasoning: Common or Divergent Epistemic Standards?Jessica Brown - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):123-157.details
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Feminist epistemology, contextualism, and philosophical skepticism.Evelyn Brister - 2009 - Metaphilosophy 40 (5):671-688.details
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Evidentielle Einzigkeit in klassischer und formaler Erkenntnistheorie.Jochen Briesen - 2017 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 71 (2):183-222.details
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Knowledge, Achievement, and Manifestation.Gwen Bradford - 2014 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):97-116.details
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How to lose your memory without losing your money: shifty epistemology and Dutch strategies.Darren Bradley - 2024 - Synthese 203 (4):1-15.details
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Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemically Responsible Action.Kenneth Boyd - 2016 - Synthese 193 (9).details
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Epistemic Judgement and Motivation.Cameron Boult & Sebastian Köhler - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):738-758.details
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Knowledge and Presuppositions.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):241 - 294.details
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Advice for Infallibilists: DIVORCE and RETREAT!Anthony Robert Booth - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3773-3789.details
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The indexicality of 'knowledge'.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (1):29 - 53.details
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Moderate pragmatic invariantism and contextual implicature cancellation.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2021 - Analysis 81 (1):3-8.details
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Knowledge and implicatures.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2013 - Synthese 190 (18):4293-4319.details
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Impurism, pragmatic encroachment, and the Argument from Principles.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):975-982.details
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Contextualism, Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism, and the Interaction of ‘Knowledge’‐Ascriptions with Modal and Temporal Operators.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):315-331.details
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Contextualism and the Knowledge Norms.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):89-100.details
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Epistemic justification and the ignorance excuse.Nathan Biebel - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3005-3028.details
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The open future, bivalence and assertion.Corine Besson & Anandi Hattiangadi - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):251-271.details
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