- Religious Belief and the Wisdom of Crowds.Jack Warman & Leandro De Brasi - 2023 - Sophia 62 (1):17-31.details
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Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2014 - Noûs 48 (2):193-218.details
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When does self‐interest distort moral belief?Nicholas Smyth - 2022 - Wiley: Analytic Philosophy 2 (4):392-408.details
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The Aptness of Envy.Jordan David Thomas Walters - 2023 - American Journal of Political Science 1 (1):1-11.details
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Religious Beliefs and Philosophical Views: A Qualitative Study.Helen De Cruz - 2018 - Res Philosophica 95 (3):477-504.details
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Religious Conversion, Transformative Experience, and Disagreement.Helen De Cruz - 2018 - Philosophia Christi 20 (1):265-276.details
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Melioristic genealogies and Indigenous philosophies.Helen De Cruz & Johan De Smedt - 2022 - Philosophical Forum (4):1-18.details
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Etiological challenges to religious practices.Helen De Cruz - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (4):329–340.details
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How Gene–Culture Coevolution Can—but Probably Did Not—Track Mind-Independent Moral Truth.Nathan Cofnas - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (2):414-434.details
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A debunking explanation for moral progress.Nathan Cofnas - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3171-3191.details
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Big History, Value, and the Art of Continued Existence.Brendan Cline - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (3):901-930.details
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Skepticism Motivated: On the Skeptical Import of Motivated Reasoning.J. Adam Carter & Robin McKenna - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):702-718.details
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“That’s Unhelpful, Harmful and Offensive!” Epistemic and Ethical Concerns with Meta-argument Allegations.Hugh Breakey - 2020 - Argumentation 35 (3):389-408.details
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Is Epistemic Permissivism Intuitive?Nathan Ballantyne - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (4):365-378.details
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Meditations on Beliefs Formed Arbitrarily.Miriam Schoenfield - 2022 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler, John Hawthorne & Julianne Chung (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology 7. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 278-305.details
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By Which We May Be Judged: Moral Epistemology, Mind-Independent Truth Conditions And Sources Of Normativity.Maarten Van Doorn - 2022 - Dissertation, Central European Universitydetails
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Explanatory Challenges in Metaethics.Joshua Schechter - 2017 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 443-459.details
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Five Kinds of Epistemic Arguments Against Robust Moral Realism.Joshua Schechter - 2023 - In Paul Bloomfield & David Copp (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism. Oxford University Press. pp. 345-369.details
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Recalibrating evolutionary debunking.Justis Koon - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (2):456-478.details
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Problems of Religious Luck, Chapter 6: The Pattern Stops Here?Guy Axtell - 2019 - In Problems of Religious Luck: Assessing the Limits of Reasonable Religious Disagreement. Lanham, MD, USA & London, UK: Lexington Books/Rowman & Littlefield.details
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Evolutionary Debunking and the Folk/Theoretical Distinction.M. Scarfone - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-19.details
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Problems of Religious Luck: Assessing the Limits of Reasonable Religious Disagreement.Guy Axtell - 2019 - Lanham, MD, USA & London, UK: Lexington Books/Rowman & Littlefield.details
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The Arbitrariness Objection Against Permissivism.Ru Ye - 2019 - Episteme:1-20.details
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On the Practical Significance of Irrelevant Factors.Seyed Mohammad Yarandi - 2023 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):156-171.details
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Suspiciously Convenient Beliefs and the Pathologies of (Epistemological) Ideal Theory.Alex Worsnip - 2023 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 47:237-268.details
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Higher-Order Evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2021 - Analysis 80 (4):789-807.details
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After Pascal’s Wager: on religious belief, regulated and rationally held.Jack Warman & David Efird - 2021 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 90 (1):61-78.details
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The Limits of Rational Belief Revision: A Dilemma for the Darwinian Debunker.Katia Vavova - 2021 - Noûs 55 (3):717-734.details
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Moral disagreement and moral skepticism.Katia Vavova - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):302-333.details
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Genealogy, Epistemology and Worldmaking.Amia Srinivasan - 2019 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119 (2):127-156.details
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A moral critique of psychological debunking.Nicholas Smyth - 2021 - Journal of Social Philosophy 53 (2):255-272.details
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Can Arbitrary Beliefs be Rational?Mattias Skipper - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):377-392.details
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XII—Deferring to Doubt.Miriam Schoenfield - 2022 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 122 (3):269-290.details
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An Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence.Miriam Schoenfield - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):690-715.details
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The Significance of Significant Fundamental Moral Disagreement.Richard Rowland - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):802-831.details
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Local Evolutionary Debunking Arguments.Richard Rowland - 2019 - Philosophical Perspectives 33 (1):170-199.details
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Anxiety as a Positive Epistemic Emotion in Politics.Antonia Rosati, Florencia Guglielmetti & Leandro De Brasi - 2021 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 33 (1):1-24.details
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On the Epistemic Costs of Friendship: Against the Encroachment View.Catherine Rioux - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):247-264.details
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Debunking Concepts.Matthieu Queloz - 2023 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 47 (1):195-225.details
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Circular and question-begging responses to religious disagreement and debunking arguments.Andrew Moon - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):785-809.details
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Normative Standards and the Epistemology of Conceptual Ethics.Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett - 2022 - Inquiry.details
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Irrelevant Cultural Influences on Belief.Robin McKenna - 2018 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 36 (5):755-768.details
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The Epistemic Benefits of Ideological Diversity.Justin P. McBrayer - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-16.details
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The Surprising Truth About Disagreement.Neil Levy - 2020 - Acta Analytica 36 (2):137-157.details
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The epistemology of evolutionary debunking.Justis Koon - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12155-12176.details
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What are the chances you’re right about everything? An epistemic challenge for modern partisanship.Hrishikesh Joshi - 2020 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 19 (1):36-61.details
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The Epistemic Significance of Social Pressure.Hrishikesh Joshi - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (4):396-410.details
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Debunking creedal beliefs.Hrishikesh Joshi - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-18.details
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Extremists are more confident.Nora Heinzelmann & Viet Tran - 2022 - Erkenntnis.details
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The Right Side of History and Higher-Order Evidence.Adam Green - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):1-15.details
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