- Dilemmic Epistemology.Nick Hughes - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):4059-4090.details
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Consistency and evidence.Nick Hughes - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):333-338.details
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Compassionate phenomenal conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.details
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New foundations for counterfactuals.Franz Huber - 2014 - Synthese 191 (10):2167-2193.details
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One Desire Too Many.Nathan Robert Howard - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2):302-317.details
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Know-how-first anti-intellectualism: Williamson against Williamson.M. Hosein & M. A. Khalaj - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-30.details
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Understanding as a Source of Justification.Joachim Horvath - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):509-534.details
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Philosophical Analysis: The Concept Grounding View.Joachim Horvath - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):724-750.details
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Ordering effects, updating effects, and the specter of global skepticism.Zachary Horne & Jonathan Livengood - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1189-1218.details
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Levity.Leon Horsten - 2009 - Mind 118 (471):555-581.details
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Is Epistemic Competence a Skill?David Horst - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):509-523.details
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How Reasoning Aims at Truth.David Horst - 2021 - Noûs 55 (1):221-241.details
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Actions and accidents.David Horst - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):300-325.details
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An argument concerning the unknowable.Leon Horsten - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):240-242.details
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Uttering Moorean Sentences and the pragmatics of belief reports.Frank Hong - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1879-1895.details
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Thinking, Guessing, and Believing.Ben Holguin - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22 (1):1-34.details
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Facts, Factives, and Contrafactives.Richard Holton - 2017 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1):245-266.details
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Indicative conditionals without iterative epistemology.Ben Holguín - 2019 - Noûs 55 (3):560-580.details
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Information dynamics and uniform substitution.Wesley H. Holliday, Tomohiro Hoshi & Thomas F. Icard Iii - 2013 - Synthese 190 (1):31-55.details
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Epistemic Closure and Epistemic Logic I: Relevant Alternatives and Subjunctivism.Wesley H. Holliday - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (1):1-62.details
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What should relational egalitarians believe?Anne-Sofie Greisen Hojlund - 2022 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 21 (1):55-74.details
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Justification, excuse, and proof beyond reasonable doubt.Hock Lai Ho - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):146-166.details
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Two Norms of Intention: a Vindication of Williamson’s Knowledge-Action Analogy.Frank Hofmann - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (4):1-10.details
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Three kinds of reliabilism.Frank Hofmann - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):59 - 80.details
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Knowledge norms of belief and belief formation: When the time is ripe to actualize one's epistemic potential.Frank Hofmann - 2021 - Ratio 34 (4):277-285.details
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Is Evidence Normative?Frank Hofmann - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (2):667-684.details
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The Fall of “Adams' Thesis”?Alan Hájek - 2012 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 21 (2):145-161.details
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A Tale of Two Epistemologies?Alan Hájek & Hanti Lin - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):207-232.details
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On Virtue, Credit and Safety.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (1):98-120.details
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Justification and the knowledge-connection.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1973-1995.details
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How to stay safe while extending the mind.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2020 - Synthese 197 (9):4065-4081.details
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Does the unity of reason imply that epistemic justification is factive?Jaakko Hirvelä - 2023 - Analysis 83 (4):691-700.details
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Understanding Why.Alison Hills - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):661-688.details
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Hawthorne’s Lottery Puzzle and the Nature of Belief.Christopher S. Hill & Joshua Schechter - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):120-122.details
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From Isolation to Skepticism.Scott Hill - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (3):649-668.details
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Rosenkranz’s Logic of Justification and Unprovability.Jan Heylen - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (6):1243-1256.details
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Modal-Epistemic Arithmetic and the problem of quantifying in.Jan Heylen - 2013 - Synthese 190 (1):89-111.details
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Factive knowability and the problem of possible omniscience.Jan Heylen - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (1):65-87.details
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Closure of A Priori Knowability Under A Priori Knowable Material Implication.Jan Heylen - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (2):359-380.details
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Counterfactual theories of knowledge and the notion of actuality.Jan Heylen - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1647-1673.details
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Being in a Position to Know and Closure.Jan Heylen - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):63-67.details
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Anti-Realism and Modal-Epistemic Collapse: Reply to Marton.Jan Heylen - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (1):397-408.details
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The redundancy problem: From knowledge-infallibilism to knowledge-minimalism.Stephen Hetherington - 2018 - Synthese 195 (11):4683-4702.details
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The Significance of Fallibilism Within Gettier’s Challenge: A Case Study.Stephen Hetherington - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):539-547.details
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Technological Knowledge-That As Knowledge-How: a Comment.Stephen Hetherington - 2015 - Philosophy and Technology 28 (4):567-572.details
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The importance of being Ernie.Marcela Herdova - 2021 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (4):257-263.details
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Meta Logou in Plato’s Theaetetus.Boris Hennig - 2020 - Apeiron 54 (1):109-128.details
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Higher‐order evidence and losing one's conviction.Leah Henderson - 2022 - Noûs 56 (3):513-529.details
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An epistemic modal norm of practical reasoning.Tim Henning - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6665-6686.details
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There it is.Benj Hellie - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):110-164.details
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