- Misleading Evidence and the Dogmatism Puzzle.Ru Ye - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):563-575.details
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Why There are No Epistemic Duties.Chase B. Wrenn - 2007 - Dialogue: The Canadian Philosophical Review 46 (1):115-136.details
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Cryptonormative Judgments.Alex Worsnip - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (1):3-24.details
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Belief, Credence, and the Preface Paradox.Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):549-562.details
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What Williamson's anti-luminosity argument really is.Wai-Hung Wong - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):536-543.details
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Cook Wilson on knowledge and forms of thinking.Simon Wimmer & Guy Longworth - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-22.details
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Vagueness: A Global Approach, by Kit Fine.Timothy Williamson - 2022 - Mind 131 (522):675-683.details
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The Cognitive Role of Fictionality.J. Robert G. Williams & Richard Woodward - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
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Reply to Yli-Vakkuri.Timothy Williamson - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (4-5):839-851.details
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Rational Illogicality.J. Robert G. Williams - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):127-141.details
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One philosopher's modus ponens is another's modus tollens: Pantomemes and nisowir.Jon Williamson - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 53 (2-3):284-304.details
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Mechanistic reasoning and the problem of masking.Michael Wilde - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):1-16.details
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Gibbard on meaning and normativity.Timothy Williamson - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (7):731-741.details
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Direct inference and probabilistic accounts of induction.Jon Williamson - 2023 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 54 (3):451-472.details
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Defending Conditional Excluded Middle.J. Robert G. Williams - 2010 - Noûs 44 (4):650-668.details
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Calibration for epistemic causality.Jon Williamson - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (4):941-960.details
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A Bayesian Account of Establishing.Jon Williamson - 2022 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (4):903-925.details
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Three moments in the theory of definition or analysis: Its possibility, its aim or aims, and its limit or terminus.David Wiggins - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt1):73-109.details
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True lies and Moorean redundancy.Alex Wiegmann & Emanuel Viebahn - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13053-13066.details
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What is the Normativity of Meaning?Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (3):219-238.details
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Truth is (Still) the Norm for Assertion: A Reply to Littlejohn.Daniel Whiting - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (6):1245-1253.details
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Stick to the Facts: On the Norms of Assertion.Daniel Whiting - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (4):847-867.details
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Higher-Order Evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2021 - Analysis 80 (4):789-807.details
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Right in some respects: reasons as evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2191-2208.details
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One wage of unknowability.Dennis Whitcomb - 2013 - Synthese 190 (3):339-352.details
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Leave Truth Alone: On Deflationism and Contextualism.Daniel Whiting - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):607-624.details
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Keep Things in Perspective: Reasons, Rationality, and the A Priori.Daniel Whiting - 2014 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8 (1):1-22.details
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No Surprises.Ian Wells - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (2):389-406.details
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Must we know what we say?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.details
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The Pitfalls of ‘Reasons’.Ralph Wedgwood - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):123-143.details
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The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.details
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Tolerating Gluts.Zach Weber, David Ripley, Graham Priest, Dominic Hyde & Mark Colyvan - 2014 - Mind 123 (491):813-828.details
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Memory, belief and time.Brian Weatherson - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):692-715.details
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Margins and Errors.Brian Weatherson - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (1):63-76.details
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Interests, evidence and games.Brian Weatherson - 2018 - Episteme 15 (3):329-344.details
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Epistemicism, parasites, and vague names.Brian Weatherson - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):276 – 279.details
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Perspectivism and the Argument from Guidance.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (2):361-374.details
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If you justifiably believe that you ought to Φ, you ought to Φ.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1873-1895.details
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A puzzle about enkratic reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3177-3196.details
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Epistemology versus Non-Causal Realism.Jared Warren - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5).details
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Defending Understanding-Assent Links.Jared Warren - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):9219-9236.details
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Multi-Path vs. Single-Path Replies to Skepticism.Wen-Fang Wang - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (2):383-412.details
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Knowledge first, stability and value.Barnaby Walker - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3833-3854.details
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Information, Epistemic Luck and Generality.Abel Wajnerman Paz - 2017 - Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad Del Norte 26:326-354.details
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Certainty and Assertion.Jacques-Henri Vollet - 2022 - Dialectica 999 (1).details
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Understanding the selective realist defence against the PMI.Peter Vickers - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3221-3232.details
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Non-sceptical Infallibilism.Nuno Venturinha - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):186-195.details
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Empathy, Motivating Reasons, and Morally Worthy Action.Elizabeth Ventham - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-13.details
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Book symposium: Nuno venturinha. Description of situations: An essay in contextualist epistemology.Nuno Venturinha, Marcelo Carvalho, Marcos Silva, João V. G. Cuter & Darlei Dall’Agnol - 2020 - Manuscrito 43 (3):164-258.details
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A different kind of dream-based skepticism.Michael Veber - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1827-1839.details
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