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Factive phenomenal characters.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.details
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Delusional Evidence-Responsiveness.Carolina Flores - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6299-6330.details
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Consciousness and Knowledge.Berit Brogaard & Elijah Chudnoff - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Externalism Explained.Clayton Littlejohn - 2023 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira (ed.), Externalism about Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Practical Knowledge and Luminosity.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2019 - Mind 129 (516):1237-1267.details
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Intentional action first.Yair Levy - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):705-718.details
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Action as a form of temporal unity: on Anscombe’s Intention.Douglas Lavin - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):609-629.details
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Prospects for evidentialism.Bob Beddor - 2019 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. Routledge.details
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Whither Evidentialist Reliabilism?Juan Comesaña - 2018 - In McCain Kevin (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. Cham: Springer Verlag. pp. 307-25.details
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On Metaepistemological Scepticism.Duncan Pritchard & Chris Ranalli - 2016 - In Brett Coppenger & Michael Bergmann (eds.), Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Evaluating Google as an Epistemic Tool.Thomas W. Simpson - 2013-12-13 - In Harry Halpin & Alexandre Monnin (eds.), Philosophical Engineering. Wiley. pp. 97–115.details
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Explanationist Plasticity and the Problem of the Criterion.Ted Poston - 2011 - Philosophical Papers 40 (3):395-419.details
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Standing in a Garden of Forking Paths.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In McCain Kevin (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. Cham: Springer Verlag.details
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Intuitions for inferences.Sinan Dogramaci - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):371-399.details
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Intuitions are inclinations to believe.Joshua Earlenbaugh & Bernard Molyneux - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (1):89 - 109.details
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Looks and Perceptual Justification.Matthew McGrath - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):110-133.details
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On justifications and excuses.B. J. C. Madison - 2017 - Synthese 195 (10):4551-4562.details
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The Intertwinement of Propositional and Doxastic Justification.Giacomo Melis - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):367-379.details
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Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification.Richard Fumerton & Ali Hasan - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The moral evil demons.Ralph Wedgwood - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic Contextualism and the Sociality of Knowledge.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2024 - In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.details
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Intuitive Closure, Transmission Failure, and Doxastic justification.Matthew Jope - 2022 - In Duncan Pritchard & Matthew Jope (ed.), New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure. Routledge.details
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Epistemic Paradise Lost: Saving What We Can with Stable Support.Anna-Maria A. Eder - 2021 - In Nick Hughes (ed.), Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.details
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Moore's Paradox and Assertion.Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - In Goldberg Sanford (ed.), Oxford Handbook on Assertion. Oxford University Press.details
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The Psychological Dimension of the Lottery Paradox.Jennifer Nagel - 2021 - In Igor Douven (ed.), The Lottery Paradox. Cambridge University Press.details
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Extended minds and prime mental conditions: probing the parallels.Zoe Drayson - 2018 - In Carter Joseph Adam, Clark Andy, Kallestrup Jesper, Palermos Spyridon Orestis & Pritchard Duncan (eds.), Extended Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 147-161.details
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Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications.John MacFarlane - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Safety and Dream Scepticism in Sosa’s Epistemology.J. Adam Carter & Robert Cowan - 2024 - Synthese.details
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Kripke and the dogmatism paradox.Kaave Lajevardi - manuscriptdetails
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The Problem of Massive Deception for Justification Norms of Action.Arturs Logins - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (4):457-468.details
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Knowledge-first believing the unknowable.Simon Wimmer - 2021 - Synthese 198 (4):3855-3871.details
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Contrastive knowledge.Jonathan Schaffer - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 235.details
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Truthmaking, Satisfaction and the Force-Content Distinction.Friederike Moltmann - 2022 - In Gabriele Mras & Michael Schmitz (eds.), Force, Content and the Unity of the Proposition. New York: Routledge.details
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Force, content and the varieties of unity.Michael Schmitz - 2022 - In Gabriele Mras & Michael Schmitz (eds.), Force, Content and the Unity of the Proposition. New York: Routledge. pp. 71-90.details
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Concepts, Belief, and Perception.Alex Byrne - 2020 - In Christoph Demmerling & Dirk Schroder (eds.), Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion: New Essays. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Epistemological Aspects of Hope.Matthew A. Benton - 2019 - In Claudia Blöser & Titus Stahl (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Hope: An Introduction (The Moral Psychology of the Emotions). Rowman & Littlefield International. pp. 135-151.details
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Assertion and Modality.Fabrizio Cariani - 2018 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press. pp. 505-528.details
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Hedged Assertion.Matthew A. Benton & Peter Van Elswyk - 2018 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press. pp. 245-263.details
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Assertion and the Future.Corine Besson & Anandi Hattiangadi - 2018 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-504.details
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Conceptual Ethics and The Methodology of Normative Inquiry.Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett - 2019 - In Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen & David Plunkett (eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 274-303.details
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Conceptual evaluation: epistemic.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2019 - In Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen & David Plunkett (eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 304-332.details
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Perception, Evidence, and our Expressive Knowledge of Others' Minds.Anil Gomes - 2019 - In Anita Avramides & Matthew Parrott (eds.), Knowing Other Minds. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Divine Hiddenness and Other Evidence.Charity Anderson & Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2013 - In L. Kvanvig Jonathan (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press.details
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Pluralism about Knowledge.Robin McKenna - 2017 - In Coliva Annalisa & Pedersen Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding (eds.), Epistemic Pluralism. Londra, Regno Unito: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 171-198.details
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Decision-making under moral-uncertainty.Andrew Sepielli - 2018 - In Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology. New York: Routledge.details
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Epistemic Reductionism and the Moral-Epistemic Disparity.Chris Heathwood - 2018 - In Christos Kyriacou & Robin McKenna (eds.), Metaepistemology: Realism & Antirealism. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 45-70.details
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Skepticism and the principle of sufficient reason.Robert C. Koons & Alexander R. Pruss - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (4):1079-1099.details
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Mathematical Knowledge, the Analytic Method, and Naturalism.Fabio Sterpetti - 2018 - In Sorin Bangu (ed.), Naturalizing Logico-Mathematical Knowledge: Approaches From Psychology and Cognitive Science. New York: Routledge. pp. 268-293.details
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Testimony and Children’s Acquisition of Number Concepts.Helen De Cruz - 2018 - In Sorin Bangu (ed.), Naturalizing Logico-Mathematical Knowledge: Approaches From Psychology and Cognitive Science. New York: Routledge. pp. 172-186.details
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