- The Boltzmann Brains Puzzle.Ron Avni - 2022 - Noûs 57 (4):958-972.details
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Finding Excuses for J=K.Roman Matthaeus Heil - 2022 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 11 (1):32-40.details
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Merely statistical evidence: when and why it justifies belief.Paul Silva - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2639-2664.details
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Deepfakes, Fake Barns, and Knowledge from Videos.Taylor Matthews - 2023 - Synthese 201 (2):1-18.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge-Action Principles and Threshold-Impurism.Ru Ye - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (6):2215-2232.details
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Closure, Underdetermination, and the Peculiarity of Sceptical Scenarios.Guido Tana - 2022 - Theoria 89 (1):73-97.details
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Valuable Ignorance: Delayed Epistemic Gratification.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (1):363–84.details
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Real Fakes: The Epistemology of Online Misinformation.Keith Raymond Harris - 2022 - Philosophy and Technology 35 (3):1-24.details
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Accurate Updating.Ginger Schultheis - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science.details
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The Knowledge Norm for Inquiry.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2023 - Journal of Philosophy 120 (11):615-640.details
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Unifying Epistemic and Practical Rationality.Mattias Skipper - 2023 - Mind 132 (525):136-157.details
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Blocking Kripke’s Argument Against the Type-Identity Theory of Mind.Simone Gozzano - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (3):371-391.details
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Hallucination and Its Objects.Alex Byrne & Riccardo Manzotti - 2022 - Philosophical Review 131 (3):327-359.details
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In defence of the modal account of legal risk.Duncan Pritchard - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-16.details
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Ethical Evidence.Steven Diggin - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-24.details
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The Problem of Morally Repugnant Beliefs.Declan Smithies - 2023 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 18. Oxford University Press. pp. 218-241.details
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The evidence in perception.Ali Hasan - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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(1 other version)A Modal Criterion for Epistemic Argumentation.Job de Grefte - 2022 - Informal Logic 42 (2):389-415.details
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Why Double-Check?Elise Woodard - forthcoming - Episteme:1-24.details
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Familiarity inferences, subjective attitudes and counterstance contingency: towards a pragmatic theory of subjective meaning.Christopher Kennedy & Malte Willer - 2022 - Linguistics and Philosophy 45 (6):1395-1445.details
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Cook Wilson on knowledge and forms of thinking.Simon Wimmer & Guy Longworth - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-22.details
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Two accounts of assertion.Martin Smith - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-18.details
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A‐Rational Epistemological Disjunctivism.Santiago Echeverri - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):692-719.details
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Perceptual capacitism: an argument for disjunctive disunity.James Openshaw & Assaf Weksler - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (11):3325-3348.details
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Lying, hedging, and the norms of assertion.Noah Betz-Richman - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2).details
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Obsessive-compulsive disorder and recalcitrant emotion: relocating the seat of irrationality.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Somogy Varga - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (3):658-683.details
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The Explanationist and the Modalist.Dario Mortini - 2022 - Episteme:1-16.details
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Justification and being in a position to know.Daniel Waxman - 2022 - Analysis 82 (2):289-298.details
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Justification as ignorance and epistemic Geach principles.Julien Dutant - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):1-7.details
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Acting on Knowledge.Timothy Williamson - 2017 - In J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin W. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 163-181.details
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Neutrality and Force in Field's Epistemological Objection to Platonism.Ylwa Sjölin Wirling - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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A Philosophically Neutral Semantics for Perception Sentences.Samuele Iaquinto & Giuseppe Spolaore - 2022 - Theoria 88:532-544.details
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Safety, Evidence, and Epistemic Luck.Michael J. Shaffer - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):121-134.details
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Science, assertion, and the common ground.Corey Dethier - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-19.details
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In defense of ordinary language philosophy.Herman Cappelen & Matthew McKeever - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 53 (2-3):221-237.details
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Disagreement and epistemic improvement.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & Mona Simion - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14641-14665.details
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Introspective knowledge by acquaintance.Anna Giustina - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-23.details
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Responsibility for Collective Epistemic Harms.Will Fleisher & Dunja Šešelja - 2023 - Philosophy of Science 90 (1):1-20.details
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(Almost) all evidence is higher-order evidence.Brian Hedden & Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Analysis 82 (3):417-425.details
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How should your beliefs change when your awareness grows?Richard Pettigrew - forthcoming - Episteme:1-25.details
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Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
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Illness Narratives and Epistemic Injustice: Toward Extended Empathic Knowledge.Seisuke Hayakawa - 2021 - In Karyn L. Lai (ed.), Knowers and Knowledge in East-West Philosophy: Epistemology Extended. Springer Nature. pp. 111-138.details
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The pragmatic foundations of non-derivative pluralism about reasons for belief.Andrew Reisner - manuscriptdetails
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Knowledge and Legal Proof.Sarah Moss - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.details
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Deference Done Better.Kevin Dorst, Benjamin A. Levinstein, Bernhard Salow, Brooke E. Husic & Branden Fitelson - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):99-150.details
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Justification and the knowledge-connection.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1973-1995.details
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Multi-Path vs. Single-Path Replies to Skepticism.Wen-Fang Wang - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (2):383-412.details
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P, but you don’t know that P.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14667-14690.details
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Assertion is weak.Matthew Mandelkern & Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22.details
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Probing the Mind of God: Divine Beliefs and Credences.Elizabeth Jackson & Justin Mooney - 2022 - Religious Studies 58 (1):S61–S75.details
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