- Knowledge is the Norm of Assertion.Matthew A. Benton - 2024 - In Blake Roeber, Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 329-339.details
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The Knowledge Norm for Inquiry.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2023 - Journal of Philosophy 120 (11):615-640.details
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Valuable Ignorance: Delayed Epistemic Gratification.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (1):363–84.details
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Curiosity was Framed.Dennis Whitcomb - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):664-687.details
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A logic for factive ignorance.Ekaterina Kubyshkina & Mattia Petrolo - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5917-5928.details
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Questioning and addressee knowledge.Eliran Haziza - 2023 - Synthese 201 (4):1-23.details
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Peer disagreement and higher order evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.details
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Justification and being in a position to know.Daniel Waxman - 2022 - Analysis 82 (2):289-298.details
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Believing Things Unknown.Aidan McGlynn - 2011 - Noûs 47 (2):385-407.details
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Assertion, Telling, and Epistemic Norms.Charlie Pelling - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):335-348.details
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Knowledge and credit.Jennifer Lackey - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (1):27 - 42.details
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Second-hand knowledge.Elizabeth Fricker - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):592–618.details
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The Fundamental Problem of Logical Omniscience.Peter Hawke, Aybüke Özgün & Francesco Berto - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (4):727-766.details
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Who’s afraid of common knowledge?Giorgio Sbardolini - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (4):859-877.details
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Epistemic modals and credal disagreement.Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):987-1011.details
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Disagreement and Intellectual Scepticism.Andrew Rotondo - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):251-271.details
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Welfarist Pluralism: Pluralistic Reasons for Belief and the Value of Truth.Andrew Reisner - forthcoming - Philosophical Topics.details
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Epistemic Deontology and Voluntariness.Conor McHugh - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (1):65-94.details
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The Ethics of Conceptualization: A Needs-Based Approach.Matthieu Queloz - forthcoming - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Reasons and Theoretical Rationality.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Reasons for Belief and Normativity.Glüer-Pagin Kathrin & Wikforss Åsa - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 575-599.details
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Probability and nonclassical logic.Robert Williams - 2016 - In Alan Hájek & Christopher Hitchcock (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Realism and Objectivity.Billy Dunaway - 2017 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 135-150.details
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Obsessive-compulsive disorder and recalcitrant emotion: relocating the seat of irrationality.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Somogy Varga - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (3):658-683.details
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Perspectival Skeptical Theism.Jonathan Curtis Rutledge - 2019 - Faith and Philosophy 36 (2):244-264.details
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You just believe that because….Roger White - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):573-615.details
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Contextualism and intellectualism.Matthew McGrath - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):383-405.details
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Not enough there there evidence, reasons, and language independence.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):477-528.details
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Unreasonable Knowledge.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):1-21.details
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Is reflective equilibrium enough?Thomas Kelly & Sarah McGrath - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):325-359.details
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Evidentialism.Giada Fratantonio - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.details
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Knowing the Answer.Jonathan Schaffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):383-403.details
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Impossible Worlds.Franz Berto & Mark Jago - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Awareness.Paul Silva - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.details
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Perceiving events.Matthew Soteriou - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):223-241.details
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Factive phenomenal characters.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.details
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Schroeder on reasons, experience, and evidence.Susanna Schellenberg & Juan Comesaña - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (2):607-616.details
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Delusional Evidence-Responsiveness.Carolina Flores - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6299-6330.details
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Epistemic akrasia and higher-order beliefs.Timothy Kearl - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2501-2515.details
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A puzzle about epistemic akrasia.Daniel Greco - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.details
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Consciousness and Knowledge.Berit Brogaard & Elijah Chudnoff - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge, Evidence, and Naked Statistics.Sherrilyn Roush - 2023 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira (ed.), Externalism about Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Intentional action first.Yair Levy - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):705-718.details
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Action as a form of temporal unity: on Anscombe’s Intention.Douglas Lavin - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):609-629.details
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Agency and Reasons in Epistemology.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherstdetails
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Perception and conceptual content.Alex Byrne - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 231--250.details
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Reconsidering authority.Michael Strevens - 2007 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Volume 3. Oxford University Press UK. pp. 294-330.details
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On Metaepistemological Scepticism.Duncan Pritchard & Chris Ranalli - 2016 - In Brett Coppenger & Michael Bergmann (eds.), Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Explanation in Good and Bad Experiential Cases.Matthew Kennedy - 2013 - In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 221-254.details
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Explanationist Plasticity and the Problem of the Criterion.Ted Poston - 2011 - Philosophical Papers 40 (3):395-419.details
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