Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. [REVIEW]D. Gene Witmer - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):459.
    This slim volume is sure to provoke. The topics include physicalism, the theory of color, and metaethics, but the primary focus is metaphilosophical: Jackson aims to defend the use of conceptual analysis as a tool for doing “serious metaphysics.”.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   97 citations  
  • Direction of Fit and Normative Functionalism.Nick Zangwill - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 91 (2):173-203.
    What is the difference between belief and desire? In order to explain the difference, recent philosophers have appealed to the metaphor of.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   50 citations  
  • Constructivism and Three Forms of Perspective‐Dependence in Metaethics.Karl Schafer - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):68-101.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • A Third Way in Metaethics.Laura Schroeter & François Schroeter - 2009 - Noûs 43 (1):1-30.
    What does it take to count as competent with the meaning of a thin evaluative predicate like 'is the right thing to do'? According to minimalists like Allan Gibbard and Ralph Wedgwood, competent speakers must simply use the predicate to express their own motivational states. According to analytic descriptivists like Frank Jackson, Philip Pettit and Christopher Peacocke, competent speakers must grasp a particular criterion for identifying the property picked out by the term. Both approaches face serious difficulties. We suggest that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • How Expressivists Can and Should Solve Their Problem with Negation.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Noûs 42 (4):573-599.
    Expressivists have a problem with negation. The problem is that they have not, to date, been able to explain why ‘murdering is wrong’ and ‘murdering is not wrong’ are inconsistent sentences. In this paper, I explain the nature of the problem, and why the best efforts of Gibbard, Dreier, and Horgan and Timmons don’t solve it. Then I show how to diagnose where the problem comes from, and consequently how it is possible for expressivists to solve it. Expressivists should accept (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   50 citations  
  • Relativism and Disagreement.John MacFarlane - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):17-31.
    The relativist's central objection to contextualism is that it fails to account for the disagreement we perceive in discourse about "subjective" matters, such as whether stewed prunes are delicious. If we are to adjudicate between contextualism and relativism, then, we must first get clear about what it is for two people to disagree. This question turns out to be surprisingly difficult to answer. A partial answer is given here; although it is incomplete, it does help shape what the relativist must (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   215 citations  
  • Why We Need A - Intensions.Frank Jackson - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):257-277.
    I think recent discussions of content and reference have not paid enough attention to the role of language as a convention-governed system of communication. With this as a background theme, I explain the role of A-intensions in elucidating one important notion of content and correlative notions of reference.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations  
  • Radical Interpretation.David Lewis - 1974 - Synthese 27 (July-August):331-344.
    What knowledge would suffice to yield an interpretation of an arbitrary utterance of a language when such knowledge is based on evidence plausibly available to a nonspeaker of that language? it is argued that it is enough to know a theory of truth for the language and that the theory satisfies tarski's 'convention t' and that it gives an optimal fit to data about sentences held true, Under specified conditions, By native speakers.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   207 citations  
  • Semantic Challenges to Normative Realism.Tristram McPherson - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (2):126-136.
    Normative realists might be assumed to have few worries about semantics. After all, a realist might initially hope to simply adopt the best semantic theory about ordinary descriptive language. However, beginning with the non‐cognitivist appropriation of the open question argument, a number of philosophers have posed serious objections to the realist’s ability to offer a plausible semantic theory. This paper introduces the two most influential semantic challenges to normative realism: the open question argument, and the Moral Twin Earth argument. It (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • How to Be a Moral Realist.Richard Boyd - 1988 - In G. Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays on Moral Realism. Cornell University Press. pp. 181-228.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   398 citations  
  • How Expressivists Can and Should Explain Inconsistency.Derek Clayton Baker & Jack Woods - 2015 - Ethics 125 (2):391-424.
    Mark Schroeder has argued that all reasonable forms of inconsistency of attitude consist of having the same attitude type towards a pair of inconsistent contents (A-type inconsistency). We suggest that he is mistaken in this, offering a number of intuitive examples of pairs of distinct attitudes types with consistent contents which are intuitively inconsistent (B-type inconsistency). We further argue that, despite the virtues of Schroeder's elegant A-type expressivist semantics, B-type inconsistency is in many ways the more natural choice in developing (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • The Rule-Following Considerations.Paul Boghossian - 1989 - Mind 98 (392):507-49.
    I. Recent years have witnessed a great resurgence of interest in the writings of the later Wittgenstein, especially with those passages roughly, Philosophical Investigations p)I 38 — 242 and Remarks on the Foundations of mathematics, section VI that are concerned with the topic of rules. Much of the credit for all this excitement, unparalleled since the heyday of Wittgenstein scholarship in the early IIJ6os, must go to Saul Kripke's I4rittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. It is easy to explain why. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   236 citations  
  • Wise Choices, Apt Feelings.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Ethics 102 (2):342-356.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   529 citations  
  • Why Be Rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
    Normativity involves two kinds of relation. On the one hand, there is the relation of being a reason for. This is a relation between a fact and an attitude. On the other hand, there are relations specified by requirements of rationality. These are relations among a person's attitudes, viewed in abstraction from the reasons for them. I ask how the normativity of rationality—the sense in which we ‘ought’ to comply with requirements of rationality—is related to the normativity of reasons—the sense (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   387 citations  
  • Verbal Disputes.David Chalmers - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (4):515-566.
    The philosophical interest of verbal disputes is twofold. First, they play a key role in philosophical method. Many philosophical disagreements are at least partly verbal, and almost every philosophical dispute has been diagnosed as verbal at some point. Here we can see the diagnosis of verbal disputes as a tool for philosophical progress. Second, they are interesting as a subject matter for first-order philosophy. Reflection on the existence and nature of verbal disputes can reveal something about the nature of concepts, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   140 citations  
  • Disagreement and the Semantics of Normative and Evaluative Terms.David Plunkett & Timothy Sundell - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13 (23):1-37.
    In constructing semantic theories of normative and evaluative terms, philosophers have commonly deployed a certain type of disagreement -based argument. The premise of the argument observes the possibility of genuine disagreement between users of a certain normative or evaluative term, while the conclusion of the argument is that, however differently those speakers employ the term, they must mean the same thing by it. After all, if they did not, then they would not really disagree. We argue that in many of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   155 citations  
  • Intentional Systems.Daniel C. Dennett - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (February):87-106.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   443 citations  
  • Principia Ethica.Evander Bradley McGilvary - 1904 - Philosophical Review 13 (3):351.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   575 citations  
  • The Metaethical Insignificance of Moral Twin Earth.Janice Dowell, J. L. - 2016 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics volume 11. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-27.
    What considerations place genuine constraints on an adequate semantics for normative and evaluative expressions? Linguists recognize facts about ordinary uses of such expressions and competent speakers’ judgments about which uses are appropriate. The contemporary literature reflects the widespread assumption that linguists don’t rely upon an additional source of data—competent speakers’ judgments about possible disagreement with hypothetical speech communities. We have several good reasons to think that such judgments are not probative for semantic theorizing. Therefore, we should accord these judgments no (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • Meaning and Normativity.Allan Gibbard - 1994 - Philosophical Issues 5:95-115.
    The concepts of meaning and mental content resist naturalistic analysis. This is because they are normative: they depend on ideas of how things ought to be.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   99 citations  
  • Moral Beliefs.Philippa Foot - 1959 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59:83 - 104.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   51 citations  
  • Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 1970 - In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (eds.). Clarendon Press. pp. 207-224.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   670 citations  
  • Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.Paul Horwich - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (1):163-171.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   376 citations  
  • New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth.Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Research 16:447-465.
    There have been times in the history of ethical theory, especially in this century, when moral realism was down, but it was never out. The appeal of this doctrine for many moral philosophers is apparently so strong that there are always supporters in its corner who seek to resuscitate the view. The attraction is obvious: moral realism purports to provide a precious philosophical good, viz., objectivity and all that this involves, including right answers to moral questions, and the possibility of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   90 citations  
  • V—Moral Beliefs.Philippa Foot - 1959 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1):83-104.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • The Normativity of Meaning Defended.Daniel Whiting - 2007 - Analysis 67 (2):133-140.
    Meaning, according to a significant number of philosophers, is an intrinsically normative notion.1 For this reason, it is suggested, meaning is not conducive to a naturalistic explanation. In this paper, I shall not address whether this is indeed so. Nor shall I present arguments in support of the normativity thesis (see Glock 2005; Kripke 1982). Instead, I shall examine and respond to two forceful objections recently (and independently) raised against it by Boghossian (2005), Hattiangadi (2006) and Miller (2006). Although I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations  
  • The Nature of Normativity.Chris Alen Sula - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (2):227-228.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   208 citations  
  • Thinking How to Live.Garrett Cullity - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):308-311.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • Normative Functionalism and Direction of Fit.Nick Zangwill - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 91 (2):173-203.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • The Normativity of Rationality.Jonathan Way - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1057-1068.
    This article is an introduction to the recent debate about whether rationality is normative – that is, very roughly, about whether we should have attitudes which fit together in a coherent way. I begin by explaining an initial problem – the “detaching problem” – that arises on the assumption that we should have coherent attitudes. I then explain the prominent “wide-scope” solution to this problem, and some of the central objections to it. I end by considering the options that arise (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • Incoherence and Irrationality.Donald Davidson - 1985 - Dialectica 39 (4):345-54.
    * [Irrationality]: ___ Irrationality, like rationality, is a normative concept. Someone who acts or reasons irrationally, or whose beliefs or emotions are irrational, has departed from a standard.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   64 citations  
  • Is Meaning Normative?Anandi Hattiangadi - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (2):220-240.
    Many people claim that semantic content is normative, and that therefore naturalistic theories of content face a potentially insuperable difficulty. The normativity of content allegedly undermines naturalism by introducing a gap between semantic 'ought's and the explanatory resources of naturalism. I argue here that this problem is not ultimately pressing for naturalists. The normativity thesis, I maintain, is ambiguous; it could mean either that the content of a term prescribes a pattern of use, or that it merely determines which pattern (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   82 citations  
  • The Normativity of Meaning and Content.Kathrin Glüer & Asa Wikforss - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    There is a long tradition of thinking of language as conventional in its nature, dating back at least to Aristotle De Interpretatione ). By appealing to the role of conventions, it is thought, we can distinguish linguistic signs, the meaningful use of words, from mere natural ‘signs’. During the last century the thesis that language is essentially conventional has played a central role within philosophy of language, and has even been called a platitude (Lewis 1969). More recently, the focus has (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   48 citations  
  • Against Content Normativity.Kathrin Glüer & Åsa Wikforss - 2009 - Mind 118 (469):31-70.
    As meaning's claim to normativity has grown increasingly suspect the normativity thesis has shifted to mental content. In this paper, we distinguish two versions of content normativism: 'CE normativism', according to which it is essential to content that certain 'oughts' can be derived from it, and 'CD normativism', according to which content is determined by norms in the first place. We argue that neither type of normativism withstands scrutiny. CE normativism appeals to the fact that there is an essential connection (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   130 citations  
  • Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing and Discursive Commitment.Brandom Robert - 1995 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 68 (3):83-84.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   169 citations  
  • Donald Davidson's Theory of Mind is Non-Normative.Timothy Schroeder - 2003 - Philosophers' Imprint 3:1-14.
    Donald Davidson's theory of mind is widely regarded as a normative theory. This is a something of a confusion. Once a distinction has been made between the categorisation scheme of a norm and the norm's force-maker, it becomes clear that a Davidsonian theory of mind is not a normative theory after all. Making clear the distinction, applying it to Davidson's theory of mind, and showing its significance are the main purposes of this paper. In the concluding paragraphs, a sketch is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Why Be Rational&Quest.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   168 citations  
  • A Theory of Content II: The Theory.Jerrold A. Fodor - 1990 - In A Theory of Content and Other Essays. MIT Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   80 citations