- Voluntary Belief on a Reasonable Basis.Philip J. Nickel - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):312-334.details
|
|
Structural Irrationality.Thomas Scanlon - 2007 - In Geoffrey Brennan, Robert Goodin, Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), Common minds: themes from the philosophy of Philip Pettit. Clarendon Press.details
|
|
On Reasons and Epistemic Rationality.Eleonora Cresto - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (6):326-330.details
|
|
Doxastic transparency and prescriptivity.Andrei Buleandra - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (3):325-332.details
|
|
Knowledge and practical reason.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1135-1152.details
|
|
Practical reasoning and acceptance in a context.Michael E. Bratman - 1992 - Mind 101 (401):1-16.details
|
|
What is inference?Paul Boghossian - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):1-18.details
|
|
Epistemic Rules.Paul A. Boghossian - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):472-500.details
|
|
Blind reasoning.Paul A. Boghossian - 2003 - Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 77 (1):225-248.details
|
|
Weighing Aims in Doxastic Deliberation.C. J. Atkinson - 2019 - Synthese (5):4635-4650.details
|
|
Defending Exclusivity.Sophie Archer - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):326-341.details
|
|
Does belief (only) aim at the truth?Daniel Whiting - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300.details
|
|
Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.details
|
|
What Do We Aim At When We Believe?Conor Mchugh - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (3):369-392.details
|
|
Against the Taking Condition.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):314-331.details
|
|
Against Boghossian, Wright and Broome on inference.Ulf Hlobil - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):419-429.details
|
|
Movin' on up: higher-level requirements and inferential justification.Chris Tucker - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (3):323-340.details
|
|
The Motivational Role of Belief.D. S. Neil Van Leeuwen - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (2):219-246.details
|
|
The Motivational Role of Belief.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (2):219 - 246.details
|
|
Why believe the truth? Shah and Velleman on the aim of belief.José L. Zalabardo - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (1):1 - 21.details
|
|
The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.details
|
|
The normative force of reasoning.Ralph Wedgwood - 2006 - Noûs 40 (4):660–686.details
|
|
Can we do without pragmatic encroachment.Brian Weatherson - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):417–443.details
|
|
The Possibility of Practical Reason.J. David Velleman - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):263-275.details
|
|
What reasoning might be.Markos Valaris - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6).details
|
|
The transparent failure of norms to keep up standards of belief.Ema Sullivan-Bissett & Paul Noordhof - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1213-1227.details
|
|
Implicit bias, confabulation, and epistemic innocence.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 33:548-560.details
|
|
Explaining doxastic transparency: aim, norm, or function?Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3453-3476.details
|
|
Aims and Exclusivity.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):721-731.details
|
|
A defence of Owens' exclusivity objection to beliefs having aims.Ema Sullivan-Bissett & Paul Noordhof - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):453-457.details
|
|
Weighing the aim of belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (3):395-405.details
|
|
No Norm needed: On the aim of belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):499–516.details
|
|
Against essential normativity of the mental.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (2):263 - 283.details
|
|
Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory.Dan Sperber - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (2):57.details
|
|
Distinguishing Belief and Imagination.Neil Sinhababu - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2):152-165.details
|
|
Nothing but the Evidential Considerations?Nathaniel P. Sharadin - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):1-19.details
|
|
Nothing but the Evidential Considerations?Nathaniel P. Sharadin - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):343-361.details
|
|
How truth governs belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.details
|
|
Doxastic deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.details
|
|
A new argument for evidentialism.Nishi Shah - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498.details
|
|
The Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society, and Politics.Philip Pettit - unknowndetails
|
|
Does belief have an aim?David John Owens - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (3):283-305.details
|
|
Imagination and the motivational view of belief.L. O'Brien - 2005 - Analysis 65 (1):55-62.details
|
|
Believe what you want.Paul Noordhof - 2001 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):247-265.details
|
|
How to be a Normativist about the Nature of Belief.Kate Nolfi - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):181-204.details
|
|
Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes.Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson - 1977 - Psychological Review; Psychological Review 84 (3):231.details
|
|
Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes.Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson - 1977 - Psychological Review 84 (3):231-59.details
|
|
Treating something as a reason for action.Ram Neta - 2009 - Noûs 43 (4):684-699.details
|
|
What is an inference.Ram Neta - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):388-407.details
|
|
The role of imagination in decision-making.Bence Nanay - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (1):126-142.details
|
|