- Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1984 - MIT Press.details
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Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes.Fred I. Dretske - 1988 - MIT Press.details
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(5 other versions)What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (4):435-50.details
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Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - MIT Press.details
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The representational character of experience.David Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The future for philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.details
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Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.details
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A Theory of Content and Other Essays.Jerry A. Fodor - 1990 - MIT Press.details
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Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories.Ruth Millikan - 1984 - Behaviorism 14 (1):51-56.details
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Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and Their Relations.Christopher Peacocke - 1983 - Oxford University Press.details
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(5 other versions)What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1979 - In Mortal questions. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 435 - 450.details
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(4 other versions)The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.details
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The Significance of Consciousness.Charles P. Siewert - 1998 - Princeton University Press.details
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The emotions: a philosophical introduction.Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2008 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Fabrice Teroni.details
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(2 other versions)Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - Philosophy 72 (279):150-154.details
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Inverted earth.Ned Block - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:53-79.details
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(2 other versions)Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1997 - Noûs 31 (4):528-537.details
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(5 other versions)What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge and the Flow of Information.Fred I. Dretske - 1981 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 175 (1):69-70.details
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(1 other version)The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 2002 - In David John Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 520--533.details
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The Phenomenology of Cognition, Or, What Is It Like to Think That P?David Pitt - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1-36.details
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(1 other version)Consciousness, color, and content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233-235.details
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The Sources of Intentionality.Uriah Kriegel - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Biosemantics.Ruth Millikan - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (6):281-97.details
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Mental paint and mental latex.Ned Block - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:19-49.details
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Color as a secondary quality.Paul A. Boghossian & J. David Velleman - 1989 - Mind 98 (January):81-103.details
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Critical Notice.Michael Tye - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):245-247.details
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(1 other version)The refutation of idealism.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Mind 12 (48):433-453.details
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(1 other version)Consciousness, Color and Content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):619-621.details
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(4 other versions)The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - In Phenomenal Intentionality. , US: Oxford University Press. pp. 1–26.details
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(1 other version)Intentionality as the mark of the mental.Tim Crane - 1998 - In Tim Crane (ed.), Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press. pp. 229-251.details
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Mental paint.Ned Block - 2003 - In Martin Hahn & Björn T. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press. pp. 165--200.details
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(1 other version)The Refutation of Idealism.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Philosophical Review 13:468.details
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Biosemantics.Ruth Millikan - 2007 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Sense and Content: Experience, Thought & Their Relations.Christopher Peacocke - 1983 - Mind 94 (375):480-487.details
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Phenomenal intentionality as the basis of mental content.Brian Loar - 2003 - In Martin Hahn & Björn T. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press. pp. 229--258.details
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(1 other version)Intentionalism.Tim Crane - 2007 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 474-93.details
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Pure Intentionalism About Moods and Emotions.Angela Mendelovici - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. New York, New York: Routledge. pp. 135-157.details
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Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content?Adam Pautz - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program. , US: Oxford University Press. pp. 194-234.details
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(1 other version)Supervenience.Karen Bennett & Brian McLaughlin - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Intentional inexistence and phenomenal intentionality.Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):307-340.details
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Imperative content and the painfulness of pain.Manolo Martínez - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):67-90.details
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Philosophical Papers.Alice Ambrose, G. E. Moore & C. D. Broad - 1961 - Philosophical Review 70 (3):408.details
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A representational theory of pains and their phenomenal character.Michael Tye - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:223-39.details
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The Experience of Emotion: An Intentionalist Theory.Michael Tye - 2008 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 62 (1):25--50.details
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(5 other versions)What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 2014 - In Josh Weisberg (ed.), Consciousness (Key Concepts in Philosophy). Cambridge, UK: Polity.details
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Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and Their Relations.Kim Sterelny - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (4):581.details
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Knowing what I see.Alex Byrne - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. , US: Oxford University Press.details
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Another Look At Representationalism About Pain.M. Tye - 2005 - In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. MIT Press. pp. 99-120.details
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