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  1. The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    1 Knowledge and Justification This book is an investigation of one central problem which arises in the attempt to give a philosophical account of empirical ...
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  • (4 other versions)Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund L. Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.
    Edmund Gettier is Professor Emeritus at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. This short piece, published in 1963, seemed to many decisively to refute an otherwise attractive analysis of knowledge. It stimulated a renewed effort, still ongoing, to clarify exactly what knowledge comprises.
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  • Emotions, Value, and Agency.Christine Tappolet - 2016 - Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.
    The emotions we experience are crucial to who we are, to what we think, and to what we do. But what are emotions, exactly, and how do they relate to agency? The aim of this book is to spell out an account of emotions, which is grounded on analogies between emotions and sensory experiences, and to explore the implications of this account for our understanding of human agency. The central claim is that emotions consist in perceptual experiences of values, such (...)
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  • (1 other version)Contemporary theories of knowledge.John L. Pollock - 1986 - London: Hutchinson.
    This new edition of the classic Contemporary Theories of Knowledge has been significantly updated to include analyses of the recent literature in epistemology.
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  • Empiricism and the philosophy of mind.Wilfrid Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
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  • The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2003 - Cambridge University Press.
    Epistemology has for a long time focused on the concept of knowledge and tried to answer questions such as whether knowledge is possible and how much of it there is. Often missing from this inquiry, however, is a discussion on the value of knowledge. In The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding Jonathan Kvanvig argues that epistemology properly conceived cannot ignore the question of the value of knowledge. He also questions one of the most fundamental assumptions in epistemology, (...)
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  • Achieving knowledge: a virtue-theoretic account of epistemic normativity.John Greco - 2010 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    When we affirm that someone knows something, we are making a value judgment of sorts - we are claiming that there is something superior about that person's opinion, or their evidence, or perhaps about them. A central task of the theory of knowledge is to investigate the sort of evaluation at issue. This is the first book to make 'epistemic normativity,' or the normative dimension of knowledge and knowledge ascriptions, its central focus. John Greco argues that knowledge is a kind (...)
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  • Skepticism and the Veil of Perception.Michael Huemer - 2001 - Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
    This book develops and defends a version of direct realism: the thesis that perception gives us direct awareness, and non-inferential knowledge, of the external..
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  • The skeptic and the dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
    Consider the skeptic about the external world. Let’s straightaway concede to such a skeptic that perception gives us no conclusive or certain knowledge about our surroundings. Our perceptual justification for beliefs about our surroundings is always defeasible—there are always possible improvements in our epistemic state which would no longer support those beliefs. Let’s also concede to the skeptic that it’s metaphysically possible for us to have all the experiences we’re now having while all those experiences are false. Some philosophers dispute (...)
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  • Content preservation.Tyler Burge - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.
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  • Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology.Robert Campbell Roberts - 2003 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Life, on a day to day basis, is a sequence of emotional states: hope, disappointment, irritation, anger, affection, envy, pride, embarrassment, joy, sadness and many more. We know intuitively that these states express deep things about our character and our view of the world. But what are emotions and why are they so important to us? In one of the most extensive investigations of the emotions ever published, Robert Roberts develops a novel conception of what emotions are and then applies (...)
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  • (1 other version)Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (3):247-279.
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  • The nature and value of knowledge: three investigations.Duncan Pritchard - 2010 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock.
    The value problem -- Unpacking the value problem -- The swamping problem -- fundamental and non-fundamental epistemic goods -- The relevance of epistemic value monism -- Responding to the swamping problem I : the practical response -- Responding to the swamping problem II : the monistic response -- Responding to the swamping problem III : the pluralist response -- Robust virtue epistemology -- Knowledge and achievement -- Interlude : is robust virtue epistemology a reductive theory of knowledge? -- Achievement without (...)
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  • Emotional Insight: The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience.Michael Brady - 2013 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
    Michael S. Brady offers a new account of the role of emotions in our lives. He argues that emotional experiences do not give us information in the same way that perceptual experiences do. Instead, they serve our epistemic needs by capturing our attention and facilitating a reappraisal of the evaluative information that emotions themselves provide.
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  • Knowledge as Credit for True Belief.John Greco - 2003 - In Michael Raymond DePaul & Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual virtue: perspectives from ethics and epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 111-134.
    The paper begins by reviewing two problems for fallibilism: the lottery problem, or the problem of explaining why fallible evidence, though otherwise excellent, is not enough to know that one will lose the lottery, and Gettier problems. It is then argued that both problems can be resolved if we note an important illocutionary force of knowledge attributions: namely, that when we attribute knowledge to someone we mean to give the person credit for getting things right. Alternatively, to say that a (...)
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  • (1 other version)Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification.Susanna Siegel - 2011 - Noûs 46 (2).
    In this paper I argue that it's possible that the contents of some visual experiences are influenced by the subject's prior beliefs, hopes, suspicions, desires, fears or other mental states, and that this possibility places constraints on the theory of perceptual justification that 'dogmatism' or 'phenomenal conservativism' cannot respect.
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  • (1 other version)A coherence theory of truth and knowledge.Donald Davidson - 1986 - In Ernest LePore (ed.), Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Blackwell. pp. 307-319.
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  • Reflective knowledge.Ernest Sosa - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    The second part of the book presents an alternative beyond the historical positions of Part I, one that defends a virtue epistemology combined with epistemic ...
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  • Contemporary Theories of Knowledge.John Pollock - 1986 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (1):131-140.
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  • What's wrong with Moore's argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.
    Something about this argument sounds funny. As we’ll see, though, it takes some care to identify exactly what Moore has done wrong. Iwill assume that Moore knows premise (2) to be true. One could inquire into how he knows it, and whether that knowledge can be defeated; but Iwon’t. I’ll focus instead on what epistemic relations Moore has to premise (1) and to his conclusion (3). It may matter which epistemic relations we choose to consider. Some philosophers will diagnose Moore’s (...)
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  • Perception and Basic Beliefs: Zombies, Modules and the Problem of the External World.Jack C. Lyons - 2009 - New York, US: Oxford University Press. Edited by Jack Lyons.
    This book offers solutions to two persistent and I believe closely related problems in epistemology. The first problem is that of drawing a principled distinction between perception and inference: what is the difference between seeing that something is the case and merely believing it on the basis of what we do see? The second problem is that of specifying which beliefs are epistemologically basic (i.e., directly, or noninferentially, justified) and which are not. I argue that what makes a belief a (...)
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  • Skepticism and the Veil of Perception.Michael Huemer - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):234-237.
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  • (1 other version)Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification.Richard Fumerton & Ali Hasan - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 2017 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.
    In this concise book, one of the world's leading epistemologists provides a sophisticated, revisionist introduction to the problem of knowledge in Western philosophy. Modern and contemporary accounts of epistemology tend to focus on limited questions of knowledge and skepticism, such as how we can know the external world, other minds, the past through memory, the future through induction, or the world’s depth and structure through inference. This book steps back for a better view of the more general issues posed by (...)
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  • The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding.Michael Huemer - 2004 - Mind 113 (452):763-766.
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  • Emotions and Reasons: An Enquiry Into Emotional Justification.Patricia S. Greenspan - 1988 - New York: Routledge.
    In Emotions and Reasons, Patricia Greenspan offers an evaluative theory of emotion that assigns emotion a role of its own in the justification of action. She analyzes emotions as states of object-directed affect with evaluative propositional content possibly falling short of belief and held in mind by generalized comfort or discomfort.
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  • (1 other version)Why we don’t deserve credit for everything we know.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):345-361.
    A view of knowledge—what I call the "Deserving Credit View of Knowledge" —found in much of the recent epistemological literature, particularly among so-called virtue epistemologists, centres around the thesis that knowledge is something for which a subject deserves credit. Indeed, this is said to be the central difference between those true beliefs that qualify as knowledge and those that are true merely by luck—the former, unlike the latter, are achievements of the subject and are thereby creditable to her. Moreover, it (...)
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  • Why open-minded people should endorse dogmatism.Chris Tucker - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):529-545.
    Open-minded people should endorse dogmatism because of its explanatory power. Dogmatism holds that, in the absence of defeaters, a seeming that P necessarily provides non-inferential justification for P. I show that dogmatism provides an intuitive explanation of four issues concerning non-inferential justification. It is particularly impressive that dogmatism can explain these issues because prominent epistemologists have argued that it can’t address at least two of them. Prominent epistemologists also object that dogmatism is absurdly permissive because it allows a seeming to (...)
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  • The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge.Ernest Sosa - 1980 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):3-26.
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  • (1 other version)A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge.Donald Davidson - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: readings in contemporary epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Contemporary Theories of Knowledge.Hilary Kornblith - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (1):167-171.
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  • Seeing What to Do: Affective Perception and Rational Motivation.Sabine A. Döring - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (3):363-394.
    Theories of practical reason must meet a psychological requirement: they must explain how normative practical reasons can be motivationally efficacious. It would be pointless to claim that we are subject to normative demands of reason, if we were in fact unable to meet those demands. Concerning this requirement to account for the possibility of rational motivation, internalist approaches are distinguished from externalist ones. I defend internalism, whilst rejecting both ways in which the belief‐desire model can be instantiated. Both the Humean (...)
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  • The nature of ability and the purpose of knowledge.John Greco - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):57–69.
    The claim that knowledge is a kind of success from ability has great theoretical power: it explains the nature of epistemic normativity, why knowledge is incompatible with luck, and why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. This paper addresses objections to the view by wedding it with two additional ideas: that intellectual abilities display a certain structure, and that the concept of knowledge functions to flag good information, and good sources of information, for use in practical reasoning.
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  • Emotional Justification.Santiago Echeverri - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3):541-566.
    Theories of emotional justification investigate the conditions under which emotions are epistemically justified or unjustified. I make three contributions to this research program. First, I show that we can generalize some familiar epistemological concepts and distinctions to emotional experiences. Second, I use these concepts and distinctions to display the limits of the ‘simple view’ of emotional justification. On this approach, the justification of emotions stems only from the contents of the mental states they are based on, also known as their (...)
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  • How competence matters in epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):465-475.
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  • The Epistemology of Emotional Experience.Jonathan Mitchell - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):57-84.
    This article responds to two arguments against ‘Epistemic Perceptualism’, the view that emotional experiences, as involving a perception of value, can constitute reasons for evaluative belief. It first provides a basic account of emotional experience, and then introduces concepts relevant to the epistemology of emotional experience, such as the nature of a reason for belief, non-inferentiality, and prima facie vs. conclusive reasons, which allow for the clarification of Epistemic Perceptualism in terms of the Perceptual Justificatory View. It then challenges two (...)
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  • Emotion and Understanding.C. Z. Elgin - 2008 - In Georg Brun, Ulvi Doğuoğlu & Dominique Kuenzle (eds.), Epistemology and Emotions. Ashgate Publishing Company.
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  • (1 other version)The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.Paul K. Moser - 1985 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (4):670-673.
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  • Explaining action by emotion.Sabine Döring - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):214-230.
    I discuss two ways in which emotions explain actions: in the first, the explanation is expressive; in the second, the action is not only explained but also rationalized by the emotion's intentional content. The belief-desire model cannot satisfactorily account for either of these cases. My main purpose is to show that the emotions constitute an irreducible category in the explanation of action, to be understood by analogy with perception. Emotions are affective perceptions. Their affect gives them motivational force, and they (...)
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  • Phenomenal Conservatism and Cognitive Penetration: The Bad Basis Counterexamples.Matthew McGrath - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 225–247.
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  • Emotions, perceptions, and emotional illusions.Christine Tappolet - 2012 - In Calabi Clotilde (ed.), The Crooked Oar, the Moon’s Size and the Kanizsa Triangle. Essays on Perceptual Illusions. pp. 207-24.
    Emotions often misfire. We sometimes fear innocuous things, such as spiders or mice, and we do so even if we firmly believe that they are innocuous. This is true of all of us, and not only of phobics, who can be considered to suffer from extreme manifestations of a common tendency. We also feel too little or even sometimes no fear at all with respect to very fearsome things, and we do so even if we believe that they are fearsome. (...)
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  • The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.Terry J. Christlieb - 1987 - Noûs 21 (3):427-429.
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  • Epistemic perceptualism and neo-sentimentalist objections.Robert Cowan - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):59-81.
    Epistemic Perceptualists claim that emotions are sources of immediate defeasible justification for evaluative propositions that can sometimes ground undefeated immediately justified evaluative beliefs. For example, fear can constitute the justificatory ground for a belief that some object or event is dangerous. Despite its attractiveness, the view is apparently vulnerable to several objections. In this paper, I provide a limited defence of Epistemic Perceptualism by responding to a family of objections which all take as a premise a popular and attractive view (...)
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  • Cognitive Mobile Homes.Daniel Greco - 2017 - Mind 126 (501):93-121.
    While recent discussions of contextualism have mostly focused on other issues, some influential early statements of the view emphasized the possibility of its providing an alternative to both coherentism and traditional versions of foundationalism. In this essay, I will pick up on this strand of contextualist thought, and argue that contextualist versions of foundationalism promise to solve some problems that their non-contextualist cousins cannot. In particular, I will argue that adopting contextualist versions of foundationalism can let us reconcile Bayesian accounts (...)
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  • The mystery of direct perceptual justification.Peter Markie - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (3):347-373.
    In at least some cases of justified perceptual belief, our perceptual experience itself, as opposed to beliefs about it, evidences and thereby justifies our belief. While the phenomenon is common, it is also mysterious. There are good reasons to think that perceptions cannot justify beliefs directly, and there is a significant challenge in explaining how they do. After explaining just how direct perceptual justification is mysterious, I considerMichael Huemers (Skepticism and the Veil of Perception, 2001) and Bill Brewers (Perception and (...)
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  • Immediate justification and process reliabilism.Alvin I. Goldman - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: new essays. New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press. pp. 63-82.
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  • Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin Earth.Jesper Kallestrup & Duncan Pritchard - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):335-357.
    A popular form of virtue epistemology—defended by such figures as Ernest Sosa, Linda Zagzebski and John Greco—holds that knowledge can be exclusively understood in virtue-theoretic terms. In particular, it holds that there isn't any need for an additional epistemic condition to deal with the problem posed by knowledge-undermining epistemic luck. It is argued that the sustainability of such a proposal is called into question by the possibility of epistemic twin earth cases. In particular, it is argued that such cases demonstrate (...)
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  • Why (Wittgensteinian) Contextualism Is Not Relativism.Michael Williams - 2007 - Episteme 4 (1):93-114.
    This article distinguishes Wittgensteinian contextualism from epistemic relativism. The latter involves the view that a belief ’s status as justified depends on the believer’s epistemic system, as well as the view that no system is superior to another. It emerges from the thought that we must rely, circularly, on our epistemic system to determine whether any belief is justified. Contextualism, by contrast, emerges from the thought that we need not answer a skeptical challenge to a belief unless there is good (...)
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  • Explaining Action by Emotion.Sabine A. D.Öring - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):214-230.
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  • (1 other version)Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification.Erik J. Olsson - 2012 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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