- Algorithm and Parameters: Solving the Generality Problem for Reliabilism.Jack C. Lyons - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (4):463-509.details
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Epistemic Perceptualism, Skill, and the Regress Problem.J. Adam Carter - 2019 - Philosophical Studies:1-26.details
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Varieties of Inference?Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):221-254.details
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Towards a phenomenological conception of experiential justification.Philipp Berghofer - 2020 - Synthese 197 (1):155-183.details
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Husserl’s Conception of Experiential Justification: What It Is and Why It Matters.Philipp Berghofer - 2018 - Husserl Studies 34 (2):145-170.details
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The Publicity of Meaning and the Perceptual Approach to Speech Comprehension.Berit Brogaard - 2017 - ProtoSociology 34:144-162.details
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Is coherentism inconsistent?Roche William - 2011 - Southwest Philosophical Studies 33:84-90.details
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Bootstrapping and dogmatism.Tim Butzer - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):2083-2103.details
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Consciousness and Knowledge.Berit Brogaard & Elijah Chudnoff - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Experiences, Seemings, and Perceptual Justification.Michael Pace - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (2):226-241.details
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The real epistemic problem of cognitive penetration.Harmen Ghijsen - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1457-1475.details
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Basic beliefs and the perceptual learning problem: A substantial challenge for moderate foundationalism.Bram Vaassen - 2016 - Episteme 13 (1):133-149.details
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Inferentialism and cognitive penetration of perception.Jack C. Lyons - 2016 - Episteme 13 (1):1-28.details
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Nonconceptual Content.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - In Modest Nonconceptualism: Epistemology, Phenomenology, and Content. Cham: Springer.details
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Critical Notice: Seemings and Justification, ed. Chris Tucker. [REVIEW]Jack Lyons - 2014 - Analysis 75 (1):153-164.details
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Acquaintance and Fallible Non-Inferential Justification.Chris Tucker - 2016 - In Brett Coppenger & Michael Bergmann (eds.), Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 43-60.details
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(1 other version)Phenomenal Conservatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):296-309.details
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Epistemic Internalism, Justification, and Memory.B. J. C. Madison - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (1):33-62.details
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The Epistemology of Religion.Martin Smith - 2014 - Analysis 74 (1):135-147.details
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(2 other versions)Seemings and Justification: An Introduction.Chris Tucker - 2013 - In Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 1-29.details
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A verisimilitudinarian analysis of the Linda paradox.Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa - 2012 - VII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosphy of Science.details
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Direct Realism and Immediate Justification.Gianfranco Soldati - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (1pt1):29-44.details
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Against Phenomenal Conservatism.Nathan Hanna - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (3):213-221.details
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The Nature of Intuitive Justification.Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):313 - 333.details
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Emotion-enriched moral perception.James Hutton - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.details
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Methodological worries for humean arguments from evil.Timothy Perrine - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (5).details
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Perceptual experience and perceptual justification.Nicholas Silins - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Imagination as a source of empirical justification.Joshua Myers - 2024 - Philosophy Compass 19 (3):e12969.details
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Against the Phenomenal View of Evidence: Disagreement and Shared Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2023 - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 54–62.details
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Goodness, availability, and argument structure.Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2021 - Synthese 198:10395-10427.details
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Evaluative experiences: the epistemological significance of moral phenomenology.Philipp Berghofer - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5747-5768.details
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Weak Non-Evidentialism.Tommaso Piazza - 2021 - In Luca Moretti & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), Non-Evidentialist Epistemology. Leiden: Brill.details
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Expert Knowledge by Perception.Madeleine Ransom - 2020 - Philosophy 95 (3):309-335.details
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The Epistemic Role of Core Cognition.Zoe Jenkin - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):251-298.details
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(1 other version)Phenomenal Conservatism.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification: how appearances justify beliefs. Cham: Springer.details
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(1 other version)Experience Does Justify Belief.Nicholas Silins - 2014 - In Ram Neta (ed.), Current Controversies In Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 55-69.details
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Cognitive Penetration and the Epistemology of Perception.Nicholas Silins - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (1):24-42.details
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If Dogmatists Have a Problem with Cognitive Penetration, You Do Too.Chris Tucker - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (1):35-62.details
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Externalist justification and the role of seemings.Michael Bergmann - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):163-184.details
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Defeating the self-defeat argument for phenomenal conservativism.John M. DePoe - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (3):347-359.details
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The epistemic insignificance of phenomenal force.Lu Teng - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (1):55-76.details
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Moral Theory.Douglas W. Portmore - manuscriptdetails
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Schellenberg’s Capacitism about Phenomenal Evidence and the Alien Experience Problem.Zijian Zhu - 2022 - Philosophia 51 (2):1019-1040.details
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How to Supplement Mentalist Evidentialism: What Are the Fundamental Epistemological Principles?Philipp Berghofer - 2022 - Theoria 88 (3):679-700.details
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Reading the bad news about our minds.Nicholas Silins - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):293-310.details
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On Some Arguments for Epistemic Value Pluralism.Timothy Perrine - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (1):77-96.details
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Phenomenal Conservatism and the Subject’s Perspective Objection.Logan Paul Gage - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (1):43-58.details
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Rational intuition and understanding.Peter J. Markie - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):271-290.details
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Intuitional Epistemology in Ethics.Matthew S. Bedke - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1069-1083.details
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Toward a theory of the empirical tracking of individuals: Cognitive flexibility and the functions of attention in integrated tracking.Nicolas J. Bullot - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (3):353-387.details
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