Reflective practice in general, and the views of Carr and Kemmis on ‘action research’ in particular, have become the settled orthodoxy of much educational thinking, but can they take the load that they are being asked to bear? An analysis of ‘reflection’ is offered, which reveals what can be achieved by the operation and what cannot. This is then used to assess the coherence of Kemmis's views on the concept—the basis of Carr and Kemmis's widely-cited theoretical proposals, which they use (...) to justify their approach to action research. I then turn to an examination of the adequacy of these proposals themselves. (shrink)

Reflective practice in general, and the views of Carr and Kemmis on ‘action research’ in particular, have become the settled orthodoxy of much educational thinking, but can they take the load that they are being asked to bear? An analysis of ‘reflection’ is offered, which reveals what can be achieved by the operation and what cannot. This is then used to assess the coherence of Kemmis's views on the concept—the basis of Carr and Kemmis's widely-cited theoretical proposals, which they use (...) to justify their approach to action research. I then turn to an examination of the adequacy of these proposals themselves. (shrink)

Educational research is being subject to damaging criticism from both outside and within the research community. The external critics are impatient of research which does not give evidence‐based answers to the questions they ask. The internal critics condemn the very research which seeks to provide those answers. These differences are reflected in the rigid distinction between quantitative and qualitative research. This paper questions the philosophical positions on which such a distinction relies.

Educational research is being subject to damaging criticism from both outside and within the research community. The external critics are impatient of research which does not give evidence-based answers to the questions they ask. The internal critics condemn the very research which seeks to provide those answers. These differences are reflected in the rigid distinction between quantitative and qualitative research. This paper questions the philosophical positions on which such a distinction relies.

Educational research is being subject to damaging criticism from both outside and within the research community. The external critics are impatient of research which does not give evidence-based answers to the questions they ask. The internal critics condemn the very research which seeks to provide those answers. These differences are reflected in the rigid distinction between quantitative and qualitative research. This paper questions the philosophical positions on which such a distinction relies.

This symposium begins with a critique by Paul Hirst of Wilfred Carr's ‘Philosophy and Education’(Journal of Philosophy of Education, 2004, 38.1), where Carr argues that philosophy of education should be concerned with ‘practical philosophy’ rather than ‘theoretical philosophy’. Hirst argues that the philosophy of education is best understood as a distinctive area of academic philosophy, in which the exercise of theoretical reason contributes critically to the development of rational educational practices and their discourse. While he acknowledges that these practices and (...) their discourse must of their nature be directly developed in the exercise of practical reason, or phronesis, the notion of ‘practical philosophy’ is rejected as ultimately incoherent and illusory. In his reply to Hirst's critique, Carr identifies three central claims in Hirst's argument and takes issue with each of these. He reaffirms the need to draw upon the resources afforded by the Aristotelian tradition of practical philosophy in order to identify inadequacies in our present understanding of how philosophy is related to education. He suggests that it is only through bringing their own ‘prejudices’ into critical confrontation with this tradition that philosophers of education will be able to assess whether practical philosophy is incoherent and illusory, as Hirst claims, or whether it is indispensable to the future development of their discipline. In a rejoinder to Carr, Hirst, defends the claim that philosophy of education is a social practice concerned with developing justifiable propositional accounts of the conceptual relations, justificatory procedures and presuppositions of educational practices. He rejects the argument that this ‘theoretical philosophy’ approach must be replaced by that of a new ‘practical philosophy’. (shrink)

This symposium begins with a critique by Paul Hirst of Wilfred Carr’s ‘Philosophy and Education’(Journal of Philosophy of Education, 2004, 38.1), where Carr argues that philosophy of education should be concerned with ‘practical philosophy’ rather than ‘theoretical philosophy’. Hirst argues that the philosophy of education is best understood as a distinctive area of academic philosophy, in which the exercise of theoretical reason contributes critically to the development of rational educational practices and their discourse. While he acknowledges that these practices and (...) their discourse must of their nature be directly developed in the exercise of practical reason, or phronesis, the notion of ‘practical philosophy’ is rejected as ultimately incoherent and illusory. In his reply to Hirst’s critique, Carr identifies three central claims in Hirst’s argument and takes issue with each of these. He reaffirms the need to draw upon the resources afforded by the Aristotelian tradition of practical philosophy in order to identify inadequacies in our present understanding of how philosophy is related to education. He suggests that it is only through bringing their own ‘prejudices’ into critical confrontation with this tradition that philosophers of education will be able to assess whether practical philosophy is incoherent and illusory, as Hirst claims, or whether it is indispensable to the future development of their discipline. In a rejoinder to Carr, Hirst, defends the claim that philosophy of education is a social practice concerned with developing justifiable propositional accounts of the conceptual relations, justificatory procedures and presuppositions of educational practices. He rejects the argument that this ‘theoretical philosophy’ approach must be replaced by that of a new ‘practical philosophy’. (shrink)

This article offers a Weberian perspective on philosophy's relationship to social science research in education. Two key areas where it can make an important contribution are discussed: methodology, and the clarification of value principles that necessarily frame inquiries. In relation to both areas, it is claimed that some researchers underestimate philosophy's contribution, while others exaggerate it. Thus, in methodological work, there are those who effectively suppress philosophical issues, producing ‘methodology-as-technique’; at the same time, others generate ‘methodology-as-philosophy’, often denying the possibility (...) of knowledge, the regulative ideal of truth, and the desirability of objectivity. It is argued that both these tendencies are counterproductive: neither enables research on education to flourish. In relation to the second area, it is shown that philosophy is needed to clarify the value principles that educational researchers use to frame their inquiries; but, at the same time, that it cannot provide a value framework to govern social science. The concept of equity is discussed as an example. In summary, it is argued that while philosophy plays an essential role in social and educational inquiry, there are important limits to its contribution. (shrink)

This article offers a Weberian perspective on philosophy's relationship to social science research in education. Two key areas where it can make an important contribution are discussed: methodology, and the clarification of value principles that necessarily frame inquiries. In relation to both areas, it is claimed that some researchers underestimate philosophy's contribution, while others exaggerate it. Thus, in methodological work, there are those who effectively suppress philosophical issues, producing ‘methodology-as-technique’; at the same time, others generate ‘methodology-as-philosophy’, often denying the possibility (...) of knowledge, the regulative ideal of truth, and the desirability of objectivity. It is argued that both these tendencies are counterproductive: neither enables research on education to flourish. In relation to the second area, it is shown that philosophy is needed to clarify the value principles that educational researchers use to frame their inquiries; but, at the same time, that it cannot provide a value framework to govern social science. The concept of equity is discussed as an example. In summary, it is argued that while philosophy plays an essential role in social and educational inquiry, there are important limits to its contribution. (shrink)

Educational Research is commonly regarded as a rational pursuit aimed at the production of objective knowledge. Researchers are expected to avoid value bias by detaching themselves from the normative conceptions of education that shape practice in schools and classrooms, and by casting themselves in the role of the impartial spectator. It is assumed that, as a rational pursuit, educational research is not directly concerned with changing practice but simply with discovering facts about it.This paper claims that it is possible to (...) construct a view of educational research as a form of rational and disciplined inquiry that does not depend on any underpinning spectator theory of knowledge. Nor, the paper claims, does it imply any underpinning foundational principles of rational action and choice. Rather it implies a form of disciplined conversation in which reasons for action are scrutinised, critiqued and modified without resort to foundational principles of rationality. Drawing particularly on the work of John Dewey, Richard Rorty and Amartya Sen, the paper casts educational research as a practical science—a form of action research—that is underpinned by a democratic conception of rationality. In doing so, it contrasts educational research, shaped by a pragmatic theory of knowledge, with research on education that is shaped by a spectator theory. (shrink)

Educational Research is commonly regarded as a rational pursuit aimed at the production of objective knowledge. Researchers are expected to avoid value bias by detaching themselves from the normative conceptions of education that shape practice in schools and classrooms, and by casting themselves in the role of the impartial spectator. It is assumed that, as a rational pursuit, educational research is not directly concerned with changing practice but simply with discovering facts about it.This paper claims that it is possible to (...) construct a view of educational research as a form of rational and disciplined inquiry that does not depend on any underpinning spectator theory of knowledge. Nor, the paper claims, does it imply any underpinning foundational principles of rational action and choice. Rather it implies a form of disciplined conversation in which reasons for action are scrutinised, critiqued and modified without resort to foundational principles of rationality. Drawing particularly on the work of John Dewey, Richard Rorty and Amartya Sen, the paper casts educational research as a practical science—a form of action research—that is underpinned by a democratic conception of rationality. In doing so, it contrasts educational research, shaped by a pragmatic theory of knowledge, with research on education that is shaped by a spectator theory. (shrink)

Charles Clark; Why Teachers Need Philosophy, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 23, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 241–252, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-.

This paper argues that the anxieties being expressed in the UK and elsewhere about the lack of impact that philosophy now has on education are nothing other than the inevitable manifestation of a fundamental intellectual disorder deeply rooted in our contemporary understanding of the philosophy of education. In trying to substantiate this claim, the paper offers an historically informed philosophical analysis of how philosophy is related to education and education to philosophy that concludes by clarifying how any debates about the (...) current problems and future development of the philosophy of education ought to proceed. (shrink)

This paper argues that the anxieties being expressed in the UK and elsewhere about the lack of impact that philosophy now has on education are nothing other than the inevitable manifestation of a fundamental intellectual disorder deeply rooted in our contemporary understanding of the philosophy of education. In trying to substantiate this claim, the paper offers an historically informed philosophical analysis of how philosophy is related to education and education to philosophy that concludes by clarifying how any debates about the (...) current problems and future development of the philosophy of education ought to proceed. (shrink)

This article is centrally concerned with the sort of knowledge that can and should inform educational policy—and it treats this as an epistemological question. It distinguishes this question from the more extensively explored question of what sort of knowledge in what form policy-makers do in fact commonly take into account.The article examines the logical and rhetorical character of policy and the components of policy decisions and argues that policy demands a much wider range of information than research typically provides. Either (...) the research task or commission has to be substantially extended or the gap will be filled by information or thinking that is not derived from research.One of the gaps between research of an empirical kind and policy is the normative gap. In the final section the article points to the inescapably normative character of educational policy. Of course the values that inform policy can be investigated empirically, but this kind of enquiry cannot tell us what we should do. There is a role for research/scholarship and more rather than less intelligent and critical argumentation in addressing these normative questions as well as the empirical questions that underpin policy. (shrink)

This article outlines and appraises the considerable criticism of educational research, both in the United Kingdom and in North America, and shows how it has pointed to a narrowing of what counts as good or worthwhile research in the policy discourse. In particular, this involved prioritising research that purports to show clearly and unmistakably ‘what works’, and institutionalising this view of research in a range of centres that receive official approval. The article, though recognising the fruit of such centres, challenges (...) the epistemological basis of such a narrowing of what counts as research, and, in doing so, analyses what is meant by evidence, the different kinds and strengths of evidence and the consequent need to democratise the search and appraisal of evidence in the constant refinement and criticism of the evidence. (shrink)

This paper attempts to take seriously the claim that we can look for causes in order to understand the reality we live (in), and focuses therefore primarily on ‘the natural world’. It will be argued that even if we were to fully endorse the programme of looking for antecedents, a dominant driver for many educational researchers, this would still not solve the problems they commonly set out to address. It will illustrate the problem of contextualisation in using an example of (...) educational research that uses the methodology of the randomised field trial. In these kind of studies the paradigm of causality and its experimental laboratory approach is modified to incorporate the exigencies of real life situations. The claim that these studies too do not put one in a position to derive straightforward conclusions for policy makers or more generally for educational practitioners will be substantiated. Finally, some concluding remarks will be offered that indicate what may be expected from large-scale population studies and what their epistemological basis is. (shrink)

Much current educational research shows the influence of two powerful but potentially pernicious lines of thought. The first, which can be traced at least as far back as Francis Bacon, is the ambition to formulate precise techniques of research, or ‘research methods’, which can be applied reliably irrespective of the talent of the researcher. The second is the recognition that in the social sciences we—humankind—are ourselves the objects of our study. The first line of thought threatens to cut educational research (...) free of the wider range of ideas and theories that should govern or at least inform it. The second tends to turn it into an absorption with self, particularly when allied to what its practitioners like to think of as the postmodern turn. (shrink)

This paper sets out Peter Winch’s central ideas about the nature of the social sciences, and reappraises their potential for educational research. It is argued that the dichotomy between ‘reasons’ and ‘causes’ has done much harm, and that the important matter of understanding ‘what is real for us’ has recently been neglected. Winch’s philosophy suggests a more adequate framework for educational research: one that embraces a pluralistic interpretive position, accommodating various methods and various kinds of understanding of the social, and (...) that views educational science as involving opportunity for reflection and a degree of distance from the world of practice, yet at the same time as essentially part of the political debate about education. (shrink)

Much current educational research shows the influence of two powerful but potentially pernicious lines of thought. The first, which can be traced at least as far back as Francis Bacon, is the ambition to formulate precise techniques of research, or ‘research methods’, which can be applied reliably irrespective of the talent of the researcher. The second is the recognition that in the social sciences we—humankind—are ourselves the objects of our study. The first line of thought threatens to cut educational research (...) free of the wider range of ideas and theories that should govern or at least inform it. The second tends to turn it into an absorption with self, particularly when allied to what its practitioners like to think of as the postmodern turn. (shrink)

This paper sets out Peter Winch's central ideas about the nature of the social sciences, and reappraises their potential for educational research. It is argued that the dichotomy between ‘reasons’ and ‘causes’ has done much harm, and that the important matter of understanding ‘what is real for us’ has recently been neglected. Winch's philosophy suggests a more adequate framework for educational research: one that embraces a pluralistic interpretive position, accommodating various methods and various kinds of understanding of the social, and (...) that views educational science as involving opportunity for reflection and a degree of distance from the world of practice, yet at the same time as essentially part of the political debate about education. (shrink)

This paper attempts to take seriously the claim that we can look for causes in order to understand the reality we live (in), and focuses therefore primarily on 'the natural world'. It will be argued that even if we were to fully endorse the programme of looking for antecedents, a dominant driver for many educational researchers, this would still not solve the problems they commonly set out to address. It will illustrate the problem of contextualisation in using an example of (...) educational research that uses the methodology of the randomised field trial. In these kind of studies the paradigm of causality and its experimental laboratory approach is modified to incorporate the exigencies of real life situations. The claim that these studies too do not put one in a position to derive straightforward conclusions for policy makers or more generally for educational practitioners will be substantiated. Finally, some concluding remarks will be offered that indicate what may be expected from large-scale population studies and what their epistemological basis is. (shrink)

This article outlines and appraises the considerable criticism of educational research, both in the United Kingdom and in North America, and shows how it has pointed to a narrowing of what counts as good or worthwhile research in the policy discourse. In particular, this involved prioritising research that purports to show clearly and unmistakably 'what works', and institutionalising this view of research in a range of centres that receive official approval. The article, though recognising the fruit of such centres, challenges (...) the epistemological basis of such a narrowing of what counts as research, and, in doing so, analyses what is meant by evidence, the different kinds and strengths of evidence and the consequent need to democratise the search and appraisal of evidence in the constant refinement and criticism of the evidence. (shrink)

Special Issue: What is Analytic Philosophy.

It is my view that one essential difference between persons and other creatures is to be found in the structure of a person's will. Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, men may also want to have certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are. Many animals appear to have the capacity for what I shall call "first-order desires" or "desires of the (...) first order," which are simply desires to do or not to do one thing or another. No animal other than man, however, appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires. (shrink)

This article is centrally concerned with the sort of knowledge that can and should inform educational policy—and it treats this as an epistemological question. It distinguishes this question from the more extensively explored question of what sort of knowledge in what form policy-makers do in fact commonly take into account. The article examines the logical and rhetorical character of policy and the components of policy decisions and argues that policy demands a much wider range of information than research typically provides. (...) Either the research task or commission has to be substantially extended or the gap will be filled by information or thinking that is not derived from research. One of the gaps between research of an empirical kind and policy is the normative gap. In the final section the article points to the inescapably normative character of educational policy. Of course the values that inform policy can be investigated empirically, but this kind of enquiry cannot tell us what we should do. There is a role for research/scholarship and more rather than less intelligent and critical argumentation in addressing these normative questions as well as the empirical questions that underpin policy. (shrink)

This article defends methodological and theoretical pluralism in the social sciences. While pluralistic, such a philosophy of social science is both pragmatic and normative. Only by facing the problems of such pluralism, including how to resolve the potential conflicts between various methods and theories, is it possible to discover appropriate criteria of adequacy for social scientific explanations and interpretations. So conceived, the social sciences do not give us fixed and universal features of the social world, but rather contribute to the (...) task of improving upon our practical knowledge of on-going social life. After arguing for such a thorough-going pluralism based on the indeterminacy of social action, I defend it from the post-modern and hermeneutic objections by suggesting the possibility of an epistemology of interpretive social science as a form of practical knowledge. (shrink)