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Moral and epistemic open-question arguments.Chris Heathwood - 2009 - Philosophical Books 50 (2):83-98.details
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Agency, shmagency: Why normativity won't come from what is constitutive of action.David Enoch - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (2):169-198.details
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How truth governs belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.details
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Moral relativism defended.Gilbert Harman - 1975 - Philosophical Review 84 (1):3-22.details
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