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Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics.David Owen Brink - 1989 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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A justificationist view of disagreement’s epistemic significance.Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - In Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 145-154.details
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Moral testimony and moral epistemology.Alison Hills - 2009 - Ethics 120 (1):94-127.details
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Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1996 - New York: Routledge.details
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Moral realism.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):163-207.details
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Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.details
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Nominalism, Naturalism, Epistemic Relativism.William G. Lycan, Penelope Maddy, Gideon Rosen & Nathan Salmon - 2001 - Philosophical Perspectives 15:69–91.details
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Belief in the Face of Controversy.Hilary Kornblith - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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The moral evil demons.Ralph Wedgwood - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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What is constructivism in ethics and metaethics?Sharon Street - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (5):363-384.details
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In defense of moral testimony.Paulina Sliwa - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):175-195.details
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Skepticism about Moral Expertise as a Puzzle for Moral Realism.Sarah McGrath - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (3):111-137.details
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Acting for the right reasons.Julia Markovits - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (2):201-242.details
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Deriving Ethics from Action: A Nietzschean Version of Constitutivism.Paul Katsafanas - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (3):620-660.details
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Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.details
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Justice for hedgehogs.Ronald Dworkin - 2011 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.details
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Autonomy and the Asymmetry Problem for Moral Expertise.Julia Driver - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (3):619-644.details
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Foundations for Moral Relativism.James David Velleman - 2013 - Cambridge, UK: OpenBook Publishers.details
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Self-constitution: agency, identity, and integrity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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How We Get Along.James David Velleman - 2009 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by J. David Velleman.details
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Second-hand moral knowledge.Karen Jones - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):55-78.details
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Moral disagreement and moral expertise.Sarah McGrath - 2008 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 3. Oxford University Press. pp. 87-108.details
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Vagueness, Borderline Cases and Moral Realism.Russ Shafer-Landau - 1995 - American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1):83 - 96.details
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