- Normative scorekeeping.Robin McKenna - 2014 - Synthese 191 (3):607-625.details
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Salience and Epistemic Egocentrism: An Empirical Study.Joshua Alexander, Chad Gonnerman & John Waterman - 2014 - In James R. Beebe (ed.), Advances in Experimental Epistemology. New York: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 97-117.details
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Lay Denial of Knowledge for Justified True Beliefs.Jennifer Nagel, Valerie San Juan & Raymond A. Mar - 2013 - Cognition 129 (3):652-661.details
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Knowledge, Stakes, and Mistakes.Wesley Buckwalter & Jonathan Schaffer - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):201–234.details
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The Mystery of Stakes and Error in Ascriber Intuitions.Wesley Buckwalter - 2014 - In James R. Beebe (ed.), Advances in Experimental Epistemology. New York: Bloomsbury Academic.details
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Empirical tests of interest-relative invariantism.Chandra Sekhar Sripada & Jason Stanley - 2012 - Episteme 9 (1):3-26.details
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Epistemic Focal Bias.Mikkel Gerken - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):41-61.details
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Mindreading in Gettier Cases and Skeptical Pressure Cases.Jennifer Nagel - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Contrastive Knowledge Surveyed.Jonathan Schaffer & Joshua Knobe - 2010 - Noûs 46 (4):675-708.details
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Some Recent Work in Experimental Epistemology.Nestor Ángel Pinillos - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (10):675-688.details
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Epistemic anxiety and adaptive invariantism.Jennifer Nagel - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):407-435.details
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Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.details
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Knowledge and Presuppositions.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):241 - 294.details
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Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(2 other versions)The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions.John MacFarlane - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 197--234.details
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Knowledge ascriptions and the psychological consequences of changing stakes.Jennifer Nagel - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):279-294.details
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The irrelevance of the subject: Against subject-sensitive invariantism.Jonathan Schaffer - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):87-107.details
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(3 other versions)Elusive knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.details
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Contextualism and warranted assertibility manoeuvres.Jessica Brown - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (3):407 - 435.details
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Knowledge, assertion, and practical reasoning.Stewart Cohen - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):482–491.details
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Knowledge ascriptions and the psychological consequences of thinking about error.Jennifer Nagel - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):286-306.details
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Epistemic Invariantism and Contextualist Intuitions.Alexander Dinges - 2015 - Dissertation, Humboldt-University, Berlindetails
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Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.details
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Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2006 - Critica 38 (114):98-107.details
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Epistemic invariantism and contextualist intuitions.Alexander Dinges - 2016 - Episteme 13 (2):219-232.details
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Epistemic Contextualism: An Idle Hypothesis.John Turri - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (1):141-156.details
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Knowledge and Presuppositions.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Unassertability and the Appearance of Ignorance.Geoff Pynn - 2014 - Episteme 11 (2):125-143.details
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Facts versus fears.Paul Slovic, B. Fischoff & Sarah Lichtenstein - 1982 - In Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.), Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press. pp. 463--489.details
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Knowledge and Social Roles: A Virtue Approach.Sarah Wright - 2011 - Episteme 8 (1):99-111.details
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Do You Know More When It Matters Less?Adam Feltz & Chris Zarpentine - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):683–706.details
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Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1973 - Cognitive Psychology 5 (2):207-232.details
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In defense of subject-sensitive invariantism.Brian Kim - 2016 - Episteme 13 (2):233-251.details
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Contextualism, subject-sensitive invariantism, and knowledge of knowledge.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):213–235.details
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The indexicality of 'knowledge'.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (1):29 - 53.details
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(2 other versions)The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions.John MacFarlane - 2006 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1.details
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How to Do Things with Knowledge Ascriptions.Mikkel Gerken - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):223-234.details
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Experimental Philosophy, Contextualism and SSI.Jessica Brown - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):233-261.details
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Time constraints and pragmatic encroachment on knowledge.Joseph Shin - 2014 - Episteme 11 (2):157-180.details
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Advances in Experimental Epistemology. [REVIEW]Jie Gao - 2015 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 29 (1):101-105.details
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(3 other versions)Elusive Knowledge.David Lewis - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: readings in contemporary epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(2 other versions)Précis of Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):168-172.details
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Replies to Nagel, Ludlow, and Fantl and McGrath. [REVIEW]Keith Derose - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):703-721.details
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