- Disabled – therefore, Unhealthy?Sean Aas - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (5):1259-1274.details
|
|
Must, knowledge, and (in)directness.Daniel Lassiter - 2016 - Natural Language Semantics 24 (2):117-163.details
|
|
(1 other version)Knowledge, Time, and Paradox: Introducing Sequential Epistemic Logic.Wesley Holliday - 2018 - In Hans van Ditmarsch & Gabriel Sandu (eds.), Outstanding Contributions to Logic: Jaakko Hintikka. Springer.details
|
|
Contextualism and radical scepticism.Duncan Pritchard - 2018 - Synthese 195 (11):4733-4750.details
|
|
Extended Cognition and Propositional Memory.J. Adam Carter & Jesper Kallestrup - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):691-714.details
|
|
Phenomenal conservatism and the problem of reflective awareness.Luca Moretti - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):267-280.details
|
|
Advice for fallibilists: put knowledge to work.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (1):55-66.details
|
|
Moorean Facts and Belief Revision, or Can the Skeptic Win?Thomas Kelly - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):179-209.details
|
|
Two kinds of a priori infallibility.Glen Hoffmann - 2011 - Synthese 181 (2):241-253.details
|
|
Contextualism and the Skeptic: Comments on Engel.Gilbert Scharifi - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):233-244.details
|
|
Testimony and Value in the Theory of Knowledge.Leandro De Brasi - 2015 - Ideas Y Valores 64 (159):87-107.details
|
|
Defending the Ignorance View of Sceptical Scenarios.Tim Kraft - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (4):269-295.details
|
|
Iteration Principles in Epistemology II: Arguments Against.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (11):765-771.details
|
|
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology.Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief.Martin Smith - 2016 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
|
|
Perceptual knowledge and relevant alternatives.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):969-990.details
|
|
Hawthorne’s might-y failure: a reply to “Knowledge and epistemic necessity”.Nick Colgrove & Trent Dougherty - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1165-1177.details
|
|
Cognitive Mobile Homes.Daniel Greco - 2017 - Mind 126 (501):93-121.details
|
|
(1 other version)No Exception for Belief.Susanna Rinard - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):121-143.details
|
|
Disjunctivism and the Ethics of Disbelief.Marc Champagne - 2015 - Philosophical Papers 44 (2):139-163.details
|
|
Epistemic Contrastivism, Knowledge and Practical Reasoning.Peter Baumann - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (1):59-68.details
|
|
Skepticism and Epistemic Agency.Jill Claudia Rusin - 2002 - Dissertation, The Johns Hopkins Universitydetails
|
|
2 Radical Indeterminism and Top--Down Causation.Helen Beebee - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (3):537-545.details
|
|
How you know you are not a brain in a vat.Alexander Jackson - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2799-2822.details
|
|
The New and Old Ignorance Puzzles: How badly do we need closure?Brent G. Kyle - 2015 - Synthese 192 (5):1495-1525.details
|
|
Epistemic contextualism defended.Robin McKenna - 2015 - Synthese 192 (2):363-383.details
|
|
(1 other version)Contrastive self-knowledge and the McKinsey paradox.Sarah Sawyer - 2015 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism: New Essays. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. pp. 75-93.details
|
|
Epistemic closure, assumptions and topics of inquiry.Marcello Di Bello - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):3977-4002.details
|
|
Knowledge and Luck.John Turri, Wesley Buckwalter & Peter Blouw - 2015 - Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 22 (2):378-390.details
|
|
Justification is potential knowledge.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (2):184-206.details
|
|
Asking for Reasons as a Weapon: Epistemic Justification and the Loss of Knowledge.Ian Werkheiser - 2014 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 2 (1):173-190.details
|
|
Solving the Moorean Puzzle.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):493-514.details
|
|
No longer true.Luca Barlassina & Fabio Del Prete - manuscriptdetails
|
|
Uncertainty Without All the Doubt.Aaron Norby - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (1):70-94.details
|
|
(1 other version)Skeptical Appeal: The Source‐Content Bias.John Turri - 2014 - Cognitive Science 38 (5):307-324.details
|
|
The cognitive act and the first-person perspective: an epistemology for constructive type theory.Maria van der Schaar - 2011 - Synthese 180 (3):391 - 417.details
|
|
Against Contextualism: Belief, Evidence, & the Bank Cases.Logan Paul Gage - 2013 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 17 (1):57-70.details
|
|
Epistemic Pragmatism: An Argument Against Moderation.Juan Comesaña - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (2):237-260.details
|
|
Normative scorekeeping.Robin McKenna - 2014 - Synthese 191 (3):607-625.details
|
|
Re-enchanting Realism in Debate with Kyle Stanford.Emma Ruttkamp-Bloem - 2013 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 44 (1):201-224.details
|
|
Fallibilism and the flexibility of epistemic modals.Charity Anderson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):597-606.details
|
|
Against Magnetism.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (1):17-36.details
|
|
The Problem of ESEE Knowledge.John Turri - 2014 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 1:101-127.details
|
|
The open future, bivalence and assertion.Corine Besson & Anandi Hattiangadi - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):251-271.details
|
|
Sceptical Scenarios Are Not Error-Possibilities.Tim Kraft - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (1):59-72.details
|
|
(1 other version)Epistemic Contextualism: A Normative Approach.Robin Mckenna - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):101-123.details
|
|
Centrality and marginalisation.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (3):517-533.details
|
|
Knowledge as a thick concept: explaining why the Gettier problem arises.Brent G. Kyle - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):1-27.details
|
|
(1 other version)Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension.Robert D. Rupert - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):304-308.details
|
|
The Mystery of Stakes and Error in Ascriber Intuitions.Wesley Buckwalter - 2014 - In James R. Beebe (ed.), Advances in Experimental Epistemology. New York: Bloomsbury Academic.details
|
|