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Intention as a Model for Belief.Richard Holton - 2014 - In Manuel Vargas & Gideon Yaffe (eds.), Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of Michael Bratman. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
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Chilling out on epistemic rationality: A defense of imprecise credences.Miriam Schoenfield - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):197-219.details
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Must rational intentions maximize utility?Ralph Wedgwood - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup2):73-92.details
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(2 other versions)On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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‘Ought’ and Resolution Semantics.Fabrizio Cariani - 2011 - Noûs 47 (3):534-558.details
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Is Incommensurability Vagueness?John Broome - 1997 - In Ruth Chang (ed.), Incommensurability, incomparability, and practical reason. Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard.details
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Figures in a Probability Landscape.Bas van Fraassen - 1990 - In J. Dunn & A. Gupta (eds.), Truth or Consequences: Essays in Honor of Nuel Belnap. Boston, MA, USA: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 345-356.details
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Statistical Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities.Peter Walley - 1991 - Chapman & Hall.details
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A defense of imprecise credences in inference and decision making1.James M. Joyce - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):281-323.details
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(1 other version)A Treatise on Probability.John Maynard Keynes - 1921 - London,: Macmillan & co..details
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Conflicting reasons in the small-improvement argument.Johan E. Gustafsson & Nicolas Espinoza - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (241):754-763.details
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Slaves of the passions.Mark Andrew Schroeder - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)A treatise on probability.John Maynard Keynes - 1921 - Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications.details
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(2 other versions)Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - New York: Routledge.details
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The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)I. deontic logic.G. H. von Wright - 1951 - Mind 60 (237):1-15.details
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A gradable approach to dispositions.David Manley & Ryan Wasserman - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):68–75.details
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The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief.James Hawthorne - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 49--74.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.details
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(1 other version)Deontic logic.G. H. von Wright - 1951 - Mind 60 (237):1-15.details
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Should the numbers count?John Taurek - 1977 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (4):293-316.details
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(1 other version)Counterexamples to the transitivity of better than.Stuart Rachels - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):71 – 83.details
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(1 other version)How to define theoretical terms.David Lewis - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (13):427-446.details
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On indeterminate probabilities.Isaac Levi - 1974 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):391-418.details
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(1 other version)Defending transitivity against zeno’s paradox.Ken Binmore & Alex Voorhoeve - 2003 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (3):272–279.details
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Thinking, Guessing, and Believing.Ben Holguin - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22 (1):1-34.details
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(1 other version)Perception and probability.Alex Byrne - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):1-21.details
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The Case for Comparability.Cian Dorr, Jacob M. Nebel & Jake Zuehl - 2023 - Noûs 57 (2):414-453.details
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The Rational Mind.Scott Sturgeon - 2020 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Three Paradoxes of Supererogation.Daniel Muñoz - 2021 - Noûs 55 (3):699-716.details
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(1 other version)Imprecise Probabilities.Seamus Bradley - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Comparative Probabilities.Jason Konek - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 267-348.details
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Precise Credences.Michael Titelbaum - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 1-55.details
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Betterness of permissibility.Benjamin Ferguson & Sebastian Köhler - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2451-2469.details
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All or Nothing, but If Not All, Next Best or Nothing.Theron Pummer - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (5):278-291.details
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Angst, Indeterminacy and Conflicting Values.Robert Williams - 2016 - Ratio 29 (4):412-433.details
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‘Ought’-contextualism beyond the parochial.Alex Worsnip - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (11):3099-3119.details
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Rational Credence Through Reasoning.Sinan Dogramaci - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18.details
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Spectrum arguments and hypersensitivity.Theron Pummer - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1729-1744.details
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Confidence Reports.Fabrizio Cariani, Paolo Santorio & Alexis Wellwood - manuscriptdetails
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Incommensurability as vagueness: a burden-shifting argument.Luke Elson - 2017 - Theoria 83 (4):341-363.details
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Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options.Douglas W. Portmore - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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Decision Theory with a Human Face.Richard Bradley - 2017 - Cambridge University Press.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
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The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Synthese 11 (1):86-89.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.details
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(1 other version)Taking Rights Seriously.Ronald Dworkin - 1979 - Mind 88 (350):305-309.details
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The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1956 - Philosophy of Science 23 (2):166-166.details
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