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  1. Studies in the way of words.Herbert Paul Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
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  • A Theory of Conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1968 - In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory. Oxford,: Blackwell. pp. 98-112.
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  • (4 other versions)Causation.David Lewis - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.
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  • Bayesian Philosophy of Science.Jan Sprenger & Stephan Hartmann - 2019 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
    How should we reason in science? Jan Sprenger and Stephan Hartmann offer a refreshing take on classical topics in philosophy of science, using a single key concept to explain and to elucidate manifold aspects of scientific reasoning. They present good arguments and good inferences as being characterized by their effect on our rational degrees of belief. Refuting the view that there is no place for subjective attitudes in 'objective science', Sprenger and Hartmann explain the value of convincing evidence in terms (...)
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  • The Stability of Belief: How Rational Belief Coheres with Probability.Hannes Leitgeb - 2017 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
    In everyday life we either express our beliefs in all-or-nothing terms or we resort to numerical probabilities: I believe it's going to rain or my chance of winning is one in a million. The Stability of Belief develops a theory of rational belief that allows us to reason with all-or-nothing belief and numerical belief simultaneously.
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  • The Connectives.Lloyd Humberstone - 2011 - MIT Press. Edited by Lloyd Humberstone.
    It will be an essential resource for philosophers, mathematicians, computer scientists, linguists, or any scholar who finds connectives, and the conceptual issues surrounding them, to be a source of interest.This landmark work offers both ...
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  • Nonmonotonic reasoning, preferential models and cumulative logics.Sarit Kraus, Daniel Lehmann & Menachem Magidor - 1990 - Artificial Intelligence 44 (1-2):167-207.
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  • A counterexample to modus ponens.Vann McGee - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (9):462-471.
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  • Probability for Epistemic Modalities.Simon Goldstein & Paolo Santorio - 2021 - Philosophers' Imprint 21 (33).
    This paper develops an information-sensitive theory of the semantics and probability of conditionals and statements involving epistemic modals. The theory validates a number of principles linking probability and modality, including the principle that the probability of a conditional If A, then C equals the probability of C, updated with A. The theory avoids so-called triviality results, which are standardly taken to show that principles of this sort cannot be validated. To achieve this, we deny that rational agents update their credences (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Logic of Conditionals.Ernest Adams, Ernest W. Adams, Jaakko Hintikka & Patrick Suppes - 1965 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 39 (3):609-611.
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  • Conditionals.Angelika Kratzer - 1986 - Chicago Linguistics Society 22 (2):1–15.
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  • A Defense of Conditional Excluded Middle.Robert Stalnaker - 1981 - In William Leonard Harper, Robert Stalnaker & Glenn Pearce (eds.), Ifs. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. pp. 87-104.
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  • Two Recent Theories of Conditionals.Allan Gibbard - 1981 - In William Leonard Harper, Robert Stalnaker & Glenn Pearce (eds.), Ifs. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. pp. 211-247.
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  • What Is Logical Validity.Hartry Field - 2015 - In Colin R. Caret & Ole T. Hjortland (eds.), Foundations of Logical Consequence. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    What are people who disagree about logic disagreeing about? The paper argues that (in a wide range of cases) they are primarily disagreeing about how to regulate their degrees of belief. An analogy is drawn between beliefs about validity and beliefs about chance: both sorts of belief serve primarily to regulate degrees of belief about other matters, but in both cases the concepts have a kind of objectivity nonetheless.
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  • (4 other versions)Causation.David Lewis - 1986 - In David K. Lewis (ed.), Philosophical Papers Vol. II. Oxford University Press. pp. 159-213.
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  • Probabilities of conditionals: Updating Adams.Ivano Ciardelli & Adrian Ommundsen - 2024 - Noûs 58 (1):26-53.
    The problem of probabilities of conditionals is one of the long-standing puzzles in philosophy of language. We defend and update Adams' solution to the puzzle: the probability of an epistemic conditional is not the probability of a proposition, but a probability under a supposition. -/- Close inspection of how a triviality result unfolds in a concrete scenario does not provide counterexamples to the view that probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities: instead, it supports the conclusion that probabilities of conditionals violate (...)
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  • Path Semantics for Indicative Conditionals.Paolo Santorio - 2022 - Mind 131 (521):59-98.
    The literature on indicative conditionals contains two appealing views. The first is the selectional view: on this view, conditionals operate by selecting a single possibility, which is used to evaluate the consequent. The second is the informational view: on this view, conditionals don’t express propositions, but rather impose constraints on information states of speakers. Both views are supported by strong arguments, but they are incompatible on their standard formulations. Hence it appears that we have to choose between mutually exclusive options. (...)
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  • (1 other version)Methods of Logic.W. V. Quine - 1952 - Critica 15 (45):119-123.
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  • On assertion and indicative conditionals.Frank Jackson - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):565-589.
    I defend the view that the truth conditions of the ordinary indicative conditional are those of the material conditional. This is done via a discussion of assertability and by appeal to conventional implicature rather than conversational implicature.
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  • Do conditionals have truth conditions?Dorothy Edgington - 1986 - Instituto de Investigaciones Filosófica, Unam.
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  • On truth-conditions for if (but not quite only if ).Anthony S. Gillies - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (3):325-349.
    What we want to be true about ordinary indicative conditionals seems to be more than we can possibly get: there just seems to be no good way to assign truth-conditions to ordinary indicative conditionals. Some take this argument as reason to make our wantings more modest. Others take it to show that indicative conditionals don't have truth-conditions in the first place. But we have overlooked two possibilities for assigning truth-conditions to indicatives. What's more, those possibilities deliver what we want and (...)
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  • Cancellation, Negation, and Rejection.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen, Peter Collins, Karolina Krzyżanowska, Ulrike Hahn & Karl Christoph Klauer - 2019 - Cognitive Psychology 108:42-71.
    In this paper, new evidence is presented for the assumption that the reason-relation reading of indicative conditionals ('if A, then C') reflects a conventional implicature. In four experiments, it is investigated whether relevance effects found for the probability assessment of indicative conditionals (Skovgaard-Olsen, Singmann, and Klauer, 2016a) can be classified as being produced by a) a conversational implicature, b) a (probabilistic) presupposition failure, or c) a conventional implicature. After considering several alternative hypotheses and the accumulating evidence from other studies as (...)
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  • The Adams family.Igor Douven & Sara Verbrugge - 2010 - Cognition 117 (3):302-318.
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  • On Indicative And Subjunctive Conditionals.Justin Khoo - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.
    At the center of the literature on conditionals lies the division between indicative and subjunctive conditionals, and Ernest Adams’ famous minimal pair: If Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy, someone else did. If Oswald hadn’t shot Kennedy, someone else would have. While a lot of attention is paid to figuring out what these different kinds of conditionals mean, significantly less attention has been paid to the question of why their grammatical differences give rise to their semantic differences. In this paper, I articulate (...)
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  • The propositional logic of ordinary discourse.William S. Cooper - 1968 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 11 (1-4):295 – 320.
    The logical properties of the 'if-then' connective of ordinary English differ markedly from the logical properties of the material conditional of classical, two-valued logic. This becomes apparent upon examination of arguments in conversational English which involve (noncounterfactual) usages of if-then'. A nonclassical system of propositional logic is presented, whose conditional connective has logical properties approximating those of 'if-then'. This proposed system reduces, in a sense, to the classical logic. Moreover, because it is equivalent to a certain nonstandard three-valued logic, its (...)
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  • (1 other version)Do Conditionals Have Truth-Conditions.Dorothy Edgington - 1986 - Cr'itica 18 (52):3-30.
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  • Modus Ponens Defended.Justin Bledin - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (2):57-83.
    Is modus ponens valid for the indicative conditional? McGee [1985] famously presents several alleged counterexamples to this inference rule. More recently, Kolodny and MacFarlane [2010] and Willer [2010] argue that modus ponens is unreliable in certain hypothetical contexts. However, none of these attacks undermines an informational conception of logic on which modus ponens is valid.
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  • Conditional assertion and restricted quantification.Nuel D. Belnap - 1970 - Noûs 4 (1):1-12.
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  • Probabilities of conditionals — revisited.Alan Hájek - 1989 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 18 (4):423 - 428.
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  • Indicative Conditionals and Graded Information.Ivano Ciardelli - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (3):509-549.
    I propose an account of indicative conditionals that combines features of minimal change semantics and information semantics. As in information semantics, conditionals are interpreted relative to an information state in accordance with the Ramsey test idea: “if p then q” is supported at a state s iff q is supported at the hypothetical state s[p] obtained by restricting s to the p-worlds. However, information states are not modeled as simple sets of worlds, but by means of a Lewisian system of (...)
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  • Chancy Modus Ponens.Sven Neth - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):632-638.
    Chancy modus ponens is the following inference scheme: ‘probably φ’, ‘if φ, then ψ’, therefore, ‘probably ψ’. I argue that Chancy modus ponens is invalid in general. I further argue that the invalidity of Chancy modus ponens sheds new light on the alleged counterexample to modus ponens presented by McGee. I close by observing that, although Chancy modus ponens is invalid in general, we can recover a restricted sense in which this scheme of inference is valid.
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  • Two Sides of Modus Ponens.Stern Reuben & Hartmann Stephan - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (11):605-621.
    McGee argues that it is sometimes reasonable to accept both x and x-> without accepting y->z, and that modus ponens is therefore invalid for natural language indicative conditionals. Here, we examine McGee's counterexamples from a Bayesian perspective. We argue that the counterexamples are genuine insofar as the joint acceptance of x and x-> at time t does not generally imply constraints on the acceptability of y->z at t, but we use the distance-based approach to Bayesian learning to show that applications (...)
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  • If-Clauses and Probability Operators.Paul Égré & Mikaël Cozic - 2011 - Topoi 30 (1):17-29.
    Adams’ thesis is generally agreed to be linguistically compelling for simple conditionals with factual antecedent and consequent. We propose a derivation of Adams’ thesis from the Lewis- Kratzer analysis of if-clauses as domain restrictors, applied to probability operators. We argue that Lewis’s triviality result may be seen as a result of inexpressibility of the kind familiar in generalized quantifier theory. Some implications of the Lewis- Kratzer analysis are presented concerning the assignment of probabilities to compounds of conditionals.
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  • Capturing the relationship between conditionals and conditional probability with a trivalent semantics.Daniel Rothschild - 2014 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 24 (1-2):144-152.
    (2014). Capturing the relationship between conditionals and conditional probability with a trivalent semantics. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics: Vol. 24, Three-Valued Logics and their Applications, pp. 144-152. doi: 10.1080/11663081.2014.911535.
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  • (1 other version)A preservation condition for conditionals.Richard Bradley - 2000 - Analysis 60 (3):219-222.
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  • Matter-of-Fact Conditionals.Richard Jeffrey & Dorothy Edgington - 1991 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 65 (1):161 - 209.
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  • What we can learn from how trivalent conditionals avoid triviality.Daniel Lassiter - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (9-10):1087-1114.
    ABSTRACT A trivalent theory of indicative conditionals automatically enforces Stalnaker's thesis – the equation between probabilities of conditionals and conditional probabilities. This result holds because the trivalent semantics requires, for principled reasons, a modification of the ratio definition of conditional probability in order to accommodate the possibility of undefinedness. I explain how this modification is motivated and how it allows the trivalent semantics to avoid a number of well-known triviality results, in the process clarifying why these results hold for many (...)
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  • The Strongest Possible Lewisian Triviality Result.Branden Fitelson - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):69-74.
    The strongest possible Lewisian triviality result for the indicative conditional is proven.
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  • Four probability-preserving properties of inferences.Ernest W. Adams - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (1):1 - 24.
    Different inferences in probabilistic logics of conditionals 'preserve' the probabilities of their premisses to different degrees. Some preserve certainty, some high probability, some positive probability, and some minimum probability. In the first case conclusions must have probability I when premisses have probability 1, though they might have probability 0 when their premisses have any lower probability. In the second case, roughly speaking, if premisses are highly probable though not certain then conclusions must also be highly probable. In the third case (...)
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  • On indeterminate conditionals.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1963 - Philosophical Studies 14 (3):37 - 43.
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  • (1 other version)Probabilistic Semantics for First‐Order Logic.Hugues Leblanc - 1979 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 25 (32):497-509.
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  • (1 other version)Probabilistic Semantics for First-Order Logic.Hugues Leblanc - 1979 - Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 25 (32):497-509.
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  • The Probability of Iterated Conditionals.Janneke van Wijnbergen-Huitink, Shira Elqayam & David E. Over - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (4):788-803.
    Iterated conditionals of the form If p, then if q, r are an important topic in philosophical logic. In recent years, psychologists have gained much knowledge about how people understand simple conditionals, but there are virtually no published psychological studies of iterated conditionals. This paper presents experimental evidence from a study comparing the iterated form, If p, then if q, r with the “imported,” noniterated form, If p and q, then r, using a probability evaluation task and a truth‐table task, (...)
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  • The laws of non-bivalent probability.John Cantwell - 2006 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 15 (2):163-171.
    Non-bivalent languages (languages containing sentences that can be true, false or neither) are given a probabilitistic interpretation in terms of betting quotients. Necessary and sufficient conditions for avoiding Dutch books—the laws of non-bivalent probability—in such a setting are provided.
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  • Implication and presupposition.Robert J. Farrell - 1986 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 27 (1):51-61.
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  • Conditionals, truth and assertion.Dorothy Edgington - 2009 - In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
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  • Propositional Commitment and Presuppositions.Ruth Manor - 1975 - American Philosophical Quarterly 12 (2):141 - 149.
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