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Free believers.Pascal Engel - 2002 - Manuscrito 25 (3):155-175.details
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Volitionism and Voluntarism about Belief.Pascal Engel - 2002 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):265-281.details
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Deciding to Believe.Carl Ginet - 2001 - In Matthias Steup (ed.), Knowledge, truth, and duty: essays on epistemic justification, responsibility, and virtue. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 63-76.details
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`Ought' conversationally implies `can'.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (2):249-261.details
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How truth governs belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.details
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What Happens When Someone Acts?J. David Velleman - 1992 - Mind 101 (403):461-481.details
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Responsibility for believing.Pamela Hieronymi - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):357-373.details
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Modest deontologism in epistemology.Richard Feldman - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):339 - 355.details
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The ethics of belief.Richard Feldman - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.details
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What the tortoise said to Achilles.Lewis Carroll - 1895 - Mind 4 (14):278-280.details
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The deontological conception of epistemic justification.William P. Alston - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:257-299.details
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The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.details
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Mental Action and Self-Awareness.Christopher Peacocke - 2023 - In Jonathan Cohen & Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.details
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Controlling attitudes.Pamela Hieronymi - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):45-74.details
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On the aim of belief.David Velleman - 1996 - In J. David Velleman (ed.), The Possibility of Practical Reason. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo). pp. 244--81.details
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The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.details
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An Essay on Belief and Acceptance.Laurence Jonathan Cohen - 1992 - New York: Clarendon Press.details
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Problems of the Self.Bernard Williams - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 37 (3):551-551.details
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Hobartian Voluntarism: Grounding a Deontological Conceptionof Epistemic Justification.Mark Heller - 2000 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2):130-141.details
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Mental actions and the no-content problem.Lucy O'Brien - 2009 - In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental actions. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Reason and the first person.Tyler Burge - 1998 - In C. Macdonald, Barry C. Smith & C. J. G. Wright (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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The Wrong Kind of Reason.Pamela Hieronymi - 2018 - In Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary epistemology: an anthology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.details
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What The Tortoise Said To Achilles.Lewis Carroll - 1895 - Mind 104 (416):691-693.details
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Belief and normativity.Pascal Engel - 2007 - Disputatio 2 (23):179-203.details
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Why Is Belief Involuntary?Jonathan Bennett - 1990 - Analysis 50 (2):87 - 107.details
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Mental actions.Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.) - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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