- Justification and the Truth-Connection.Clayton Littlejohn - 2012 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
(2 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
|
|
Enkrasia or evidentialism? Learning to love mismatch.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):597-632.details
|
|
Responsibility for believing.Pamela Hieronymi - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):357-373.details
|
|
Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):317-370.details
|
|
(1 other version)Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (3):331-340.details
|
|
The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.details
|
|
Vice Epistemology.Quassim Cassam - 2016 - The Monist 99 (2):159-180.details
|
|
Responsibility for attitudes: Activity and passivity in mental life.Angela M. Smith - 2005 - Ethics 115 (2):236-271.details
|
|
How truth governs belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.details
|
|
Rationality’s Fixed Point.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.details
|
|
(1 other version)Anti-exceptionalism about logic.Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):631-658.details
|
|
Unreasonable Knowledge.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):1-21.details
|
|
(2 other versions)Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Studia Logica 48 (2):260-261.details
|
|
On the aim of belief.David Velleman - 1996 - In J. David Velleman (ed.), The Possibility of Practical Reason. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo). pp. 244--81.details
|
|
Ideal rationality and logical omniscience.Declan Smithies - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2769-2793.details
|
|
Logic isn’t normative.Gillian Russell - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):371-388.details
|
|
Dilemmic Epistemology.Nick Hughes - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):4059-4090.details
|
|
What is Epistemic Blame?Jessica Brown - 2018 - Noûs 54 (2):389-407.details
|
|
The Normative Role of Knowledge.Declan Smithies - 2011 - Noûs 46 (2):265-288.details
|
|
Normativity without Cartesian privilege.Amia Srinivasan - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):273-299.details
|
|
Three Ways in Which Logic Might Be Normative.Florian Steinberger - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (1):5-31.details
|
|
Does thought imply ought?Krister Bykvist & Anandi Hattiangadi - 2007 - Analysis 67 (4):277–285.details
|
|
Posthumous Writings.Gottlob Frege - 1982 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 172 (1):101-103.details
|
|
Truth and correct belief.Allan Gibbard - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):338–350.details
|
|
Are We Luminous?Amia Srinivasan - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):294-319.details
|
|
The paradox of knowability.Dorothy Edgington - 1985 - Mind 94 (376):557-568.details
|
|
Epistemic responsibility and doxastic agency.Conor McHugh - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):132-157.details
|
|
Stick to what you know.Jonathan Sutton - 2005 - Noûs 39 (3):359–396.details
|
|
Does belief (only) aim at the truth?Daniel Whiting - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300.details
|
|
Epistemic Utility and the Normativity of Logic.Richard Pettigrew - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (4):455-492.details
|
|
Logical Pluralism and Logical Normativity.Florian Steinberger - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.details
|
|
(2 other versions)Do the Laws of Physics State the Facts?Nancy Cartwright - 1980 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61 (1-2):75-84.details
|
|
Consequence and Normative Guidance.Florian Steinberger - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):306-328.details
|
|
Natural laws and the problem of provisos.Marc Lange - 1993 - Erkenntnis 38 (2):233Ð248.details
|
|
What logical pluralism cannot be.Rosanna Keefe - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7):1375-1390.details
|
|
Immodest inductive methods.David Lewis - 1971 - Philosophy of Science 38 (1):54-63.details
|
|
Ambiguous rationality.Timothy Williamson - 2017 - Episteme 14 (3):263-274.details
|
|
Explosion and the Normativity of Logic.Florian Steinberger - 2016 - Mind 125 (498):385-419.details
|
|
The Normative Autonomy of Logic.Diego Tajer - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2661-2684.details
|
|
Monism: The One True Logic.Stephen Read - 2006 - In David DeVidi & Tim Kenyon (eds.), A Logical Approach to Philosophy: Essays in Memory of Graham Solomon. Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.details
|
|
Taking control of belief.Miriam McCormick - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):169-183.details
|
|
Excuses, exemptions, and derivative norms.Cameron Boult - 2019 - Ratio 32 (2):150-158.details
|
|
Two dogmas of quineanism.Graham Priest - 1979 - Philosophical Quarterly 29 (117):289-301.details
|
|
Counterfactual knowability revisited.Julian J. Schlöder - 2019 - Synthese (2):1-15.details
|
|
1. the concept of apriority.Hartry Field - 2000 - In Paul Artin Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 117.details
|
|
Is Logic Distinctively Normative?Ivar Labukt - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (4):1025-1043.details
|
|
The love of truth.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (4):422-432.details
|
|
The Value of Rationality. [REVIEW]Ralph Wedgwood - 2019 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 73 (1):153-157.details
|
|
The value and normative role of knowledge.Julien Dutant - 2014 - Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel.details
|
|