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Knowledge, assertion and lotteries.Keith DeRose - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):568–580.details
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How to be a fallibilist.Stewart Cohen - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:91-123.details
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Elusive Knowledge.David Lewis - 1999 - In Keith DeRose & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Skepticism: a contemporary reader. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Probabilistic Proofs and the Collective Epistemic Goals of Mathematicians.Don Fallis - 2011 - In Collective Epistemology. pp. 157-175.details
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What Else Justification Could Be1.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10-31.details
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Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
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Epistemology and probability.John L. Pollock - 1983 - Synthese 55 (2):231-252.details
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Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2009 - In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford, GB: Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 140--160.details
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Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1961 - Middletown, CT, USA: Wesleyan University Press.details
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Probabilistic proofs and transferability.Kenny Easwaran - 2009 - Philosophia Mathematica 17 (3):341-362.details
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Randomized arguments are transferable.Jeffrey C. Jackson - 2009 - Philosophia Mathematica 17 (3):363-368.details
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Probability and the logic of rational belief.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1961 - Middletown, Conn.,: Wesleyan University Press.details
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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The epistemic virtues of consistency.Sharon Ryan - 1996 - Synthese 109 (2):121-141.details
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The lottery paradox, knowledge, and rationality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):373-409.details
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Elusive knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.details
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Philosophical Explanations. [REVIEW]Robert Nozick - 1981 - Ethics 94 (2):326-327.details
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Tracking truth: knowledge, evidence, and science.Sherrilyn Roush - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemology and Probability.John L. Pollock - 1983 - Noûs 17 (1):65.details
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Philosophical Explanations. [REVIEW]Robert Nozick - 1981 - Philosophy 58 (223):118-121.details
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Tracking, closure, and inductive knowledge.Jonathan Vogel - 1987 - In Luper-Foy Steven (ed.), The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 197--215.details
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Epistemology and probability.John L. Pollock - 1983 - Noûs 17 (1):65-67.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.details
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A defense of stable invariantism.Baron Reed - 2010 - Noûs 44 (2):224-244.details
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Knowledge of Mathematics without Proof.Alexander Paseau - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (4):775-799.details
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Philosophical Explanations. [REVIEW]Robert Nozick - 1982 - Critica 14 (41):87-93.details
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Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Mind 93 (371):450-455.details
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The Reliability of Randomized Algorithms.D. Fallis - 2000 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (2):255-271.details
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Epistemic luck, naturalistic epistemology and the ecology of knowledge or what the frog should have told Dretske.Carolyn R. Morillo - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 46 (1):109-129.details
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Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.details
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Thought.Gilbert Harman & Laurence BonJour - 1975 - Philosophical Review 84 (2):256.details
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Knowledge, Inference, and Explanation.Gilbert Harman - 1968 - American Philosophical Quarterly 5 (3):164 - 173.details
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Mad, bad and dangerous to know.Rachael Briggs & Daniel Nolan - 2012 - Analysis 72 (2):314-316.details
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A Pragmatic Dissolution of Harman’s Paradox.Igor Douven - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):326-345.details
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