- The No Guidance Argument.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2012 - Theoria 79 (3):279-283.details
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Normativity without Cartesian privilege.Amia Srinivasan - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):273-299.details
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Are We Luminous?Amia Srinivasan - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):294-319.details
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Using moral principles to guide decisions.Holly Smith - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):369-386.details
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The epistemic role of consciousness.Declan Smithies - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):778-780.details
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Having reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):57 - 71.details
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Scepticism and Implicit Bias.Jennifer Saul - 2013 - Disputatio 5 (37):243-263.details
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Epistemic norms.John L. Pollock - 1987 - Synthese 71 (1):61 - 95.details
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Treating something as a reason for action.Ram Neta - 2009 - Noûs 43 (4):684-699.details
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We Have No Positive Epistemic Duties.Mark T. Nelson - 2010 - Mind 119 (473):83-102.details
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Agents' abilities.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - Noûs 37 (3):447–470.details
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The Normativity of Rationality, by Benjamin Kiesewetter.Conor McHugh - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):1245-1253.details
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Précis zu Determined by Reasons: A Competence Account of Acting for a Normative Reason.Susanne Mantel - 2018 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 72 (3):410-415.details
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Acting for the Right Reasons, Abilities, and Obligation.Errol Lord - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 10.details
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The Russellian Retreat.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):293-320.details
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Guidance, epistemic filters, and non‐accidental ought‐doing.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):172-183.details
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Rationality, Justification, and the Internalism/Externalism Debate.Harold Langsam - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (1):79-101.details
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The Uniqueness Thesis.Matthew Kopec & Michael G. Titelbaum - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (4):189-200.details
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Impossible Obligations are not Necessarily Deliberatively Pointless.Christopher Jay - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):381-389.details
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How knowledge works.John Hyman - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):433-451.details
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Uniqueness, Rationality, and the Norm of Belief.Nick Hughes - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (1):57-75.details
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No Excuses: Against the Knowledge Norm of Belief.Nick Hughes - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):157-166.details
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Luminosity Failure, Normative Guidance and the Principle ‘Ought-Implies-Can’.Nick Hughes - 2018 - Utilitas 30 (4):439-457.details
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Is knowledge the ability to ϕ for the reason that p?Nick Hughes - 2014 - Episteme 11 (4):457-462.details
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Guidance, Obligations and Ability: A Close Look at the Action Guidance Argument for Ought-Implies-Can.Nick Hughes - 2018 - Utilitas 30 (1):73-85.details
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Epistemic feedback loops (or: how not to get evidence).Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (2):368-393.details
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Dilemmic Epistemology.Nick Hughes - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):4059-4090.details
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Skepticism and the Veil of Perception.Michael Huemer (ed.) - 2001 - Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.details
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The Impossibility of Skepticism.Daniel Greco - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (3):317-358.details
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Internalism exposed.Alvin I. Goldman - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (6):271-293.details
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The Truth Norm and Guidance: a Reply to Steglich-Petersen: Discussions.Kathrin Glüer & åsa Wikforss - 2010 - Mind 119 (475):757-761.details
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Against Content Normativity.Kathrin Glüer & Åsa Wikforss - 2009 - Mind 118 (469):31-70.details
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Revisiting the Argument from Action Guidance.Philip Fox - 2019 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 15 (3).details
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The Ethics of Belief.Richard Feldman - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.details
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The ethics of belief.Richard Feldman - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.details
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Do we really need a knowledge-based decision theory?Davide Fassio & Jie Gao - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7031-7059.details
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Having False Reasons.Juan Comesaña & Matthew McGrath - 2014 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms. Oxford University Press. pp. 59-80.details
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Skepticism and the Veil of Perception.Michael Huemer - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):234-237.details
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The Norm of Belief.John Gibbons - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Without Justification.Jonathan Sutton - 2007 - MIT Press.details
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Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action.Maria Alvarez - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology.Earl Brink Conee & Richard Feldman - 2004 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Edited by Richard Feldman.details
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Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology.Earl Conee & Richard Feldman - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):147-149.details
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Justifications, Excuses, and Sceptical Scenarios.Timothy Williamson - forthcoming - In Fabian Dorsch & Julien Dutant (eds.), The New Evil Demon. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
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Implicit bias.Michael Brownstein - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Imprecise Probabilities.Seamus Bradley - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Cognitive science and naturalized epistemology: A review of Alvin I. Goldman's Epistemology and Cognition. [REVIEW]Gerald W. Glaser - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (2):161-164.details
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Alvin I. Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition. [REVIEW]Darryl Bruce - 1989 - Synthese 79 (1):165-169.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.details
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