- How Important Are Possessed Reasons?Jonathan Way - 2021 - Analysis 81 (1):156-167.details
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Which Reasons? Which Rationality?Daniel Fogal & Alex Worsnip - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8.details
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Suspension of Judgment, Rationality's Competition, and the Reach of the Epistemic.Errol Lord - 2020 - In Sebastian Schmidt & Gerhard Ernst (eds.), The Ethics of Belief and Beyond: Understanding Mental Normativity. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. pp. 126-145.details
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The Real Myth of Coherence.Wooram Lee - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1211-1230.details
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Rational Requirements and the Primacy of Pressure.Daniel Fogal - 2020 - Mind 129 (516):1033-1070.details
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Cognitivism about Practical Rationality.John Brunero - 2014 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 9:18-44.details
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Intending is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism.Berislav Marušić & John Schwenkler - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):309-340.details
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Inquiry and Belief.Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 53 (2):296-315.details
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(1 other version)The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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What is (In)coherence?Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13:184-206.details
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What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.details
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On What Matters: Volume Three.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press UK.details
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Rationality Through Reasoning.John Broome (ed.) - 2013 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.details
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(1 other version)The normativity of rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2013 - Dissertation, Humboldt University of Berlindetails
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Impassioned Belief.Michael Ridge - 2014 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
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Question‐directed attitudes.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):145-174.details
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Reasoning in Stages.Nishi Shah & Matthew Silverstein - 2013 - Ethics 124 (1):101-113.details
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Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.details
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(1 other version)The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2013 - Dissertation, Princeton Universitydetails
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Intentions, akrasia, and mere permissibility.Jonathan Way - 2013 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (4):588-611.details
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Reasons and Rationality.Jonathan Way - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Akrasia and Uncertainty.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (4):483–505.details
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On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Wide and narrow scope.Sam Shpall - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):717-736.details
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Rationality and Reasons.Derek Parfit - unknowndetails
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(1 other version)``The Paradox of the Preface".D. C. Makinson - 1964 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.details
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The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Ethics 122 (3):457-488.details
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The symmetry of rational requirements.Jonathan Way - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (2):227-239.details
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Structural Irrationality.Thomas Scanlon - 2007 - In Geoffrey Brennan (ed.), Common minds: themes from the philosophy of Philip Pettit. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.details
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Putting logic in its place: formal constraints on rational belief.David Phiroze Christensen - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Motivation and agency.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.details
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(2 other versions)Practical reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1997 - In Alfred R. Mele (ed.), The philosophy of action. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 431--63.details
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(1 other version)The Wrong Kind of Reason.Pamela Hieronymi - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.details
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Normativity, commitment and instrumental reason.R. Jay Wallace - 2001 - Philosophers' Imprint 1:1-26.details
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The scope of instrumental reason.Mark Schroeder - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):337–364.details
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Means-end coherence, stringency, and subjective reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (2):223 - 248.details
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(1 other version)Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.details
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Practical Reflection.David Velleman - 1989 - Princeton University Press.details
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(1 other version)The Wrong Kind of Reason.Pamela Hieronymi - 2018 - In Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary epistemology: an anthology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.details
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Instrumental Rationality: The Normativity of Means-Ends Coherence.John Brunero - 2020 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Wanting and Intending: Elements of a Philosophy of Practical Mind.Neil Roughley - 2016 - Dordrecht: Springer Verlag.details
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(1 other version)The paradox of the preface.David Makinson - 1965 - Analysis 25 (6):205.details
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Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior.Albert R. MELE - 1992details
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Content-Related and Attitude-Related Reasons for Preferences.Christian Piller - 2006 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 59:155-182.details
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Transmission and the Wrong Kind of Reason.Jonathan Way - 2012 - Ethics 122 (3):489-515.details
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Outright Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.details
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