- The Meta-Problem of Consciousness.David Chalmers - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (9-10):6-61.details
|
|
The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality.Angela A. Mendelovici - 2018 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Representationalism and Sensory Modalities: An Argument for Intermodal Representationalism.David Bourget - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (3):251-268.details
|
|
Can you believe it? Illusionism and the illusion meta-problem.François Kammerer - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):44-67.details
|
|
The Structure of Appearance.N. Goodman & Geoffrey Hellman - 1966 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 42 (4):828-829.details
|
|
Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Philosophy 72 (282):602-604.details
|
|
Qualia and Consciousness.Sydney Shoemaker - 1991 - Mind 100 (4):507-524.details
|
|
The Language of Thought.J. A. Fodor - 1978 - Critica 10 (28):140-143.details
|
|
Subjective Intentionality.Brian Loar - 1987 - Philosophical Topics 15 (1):89-124.details
|
|
Reductive Representationalism and Emotional Phenomenology.Uriah Kriegel - 2017 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1):41-59.details
|
|
Pain Perception.George Pitcher - 1970 - Philosophical Review 79 (3):368.details
|
|
Realistic monism: why physicalism entails panpsychism.Galen Strawson - 2006 - In Anthony Freeman (ed.), Consciousness and Its Place in Nature: Does Physicalism Entail Panpsychism? Exeter: Imprint Academic. pp. 3-31.details
|
|
Experiences are Representations: An Empirical Argument (forthcoming Routledge).Adam Pautz - 2016 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception. New York: Routledge.details
|
|
Our Knowledge of the Internal World.Robert Stalnaker - 2008 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 1968 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Ted Honderich.details
|
|
Matters of Mind: Consciousness, Reason and Nature.Scott Sturgeon - 2000 - New York: Routledge.details
|
|
Mind and Cognition: An Anthology.William G. Lycan & Jesse J. Prinz (eds.) - 1999 - Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.details
|
|
Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness.Joseph Levine - 2001 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.details
|
|
Embodied Conceivability: How to Keep the Phenomenal Concept Strategy Grounded.Guy Dove & Andreas Elpidorou - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (5):580-611.details
|
|
Language, Mind, and Ontology.James Tomberlin - 2000 - Wiley-Blackwell.details
|
|
Phenomenal Concepts.Andreas Elpidorou - 2015 - Oxford Bibliographies Online.details
|
|
Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality Theories.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (5):325-337.details
|
|
Using phenomenal concepts to explain away the intuition of contingency.Nicholas Shea - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (4):553-570.details
|
|
Representationalism, perceptual distortion and the limits of phenomenal concepts.David Bourget - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (1):16-36.details
|
|
Blur.Keith Allen - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):257-273.details
|
|
The Phenomenology of Cognition, Or, What Is It Like to Think That P?David Pitt - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1-36.details
|
|
Phenomenal Concepts.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.details
|
|
Attention and mental paint1.Ned Block - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):23-63.details
|
|
Phenomenal Intentionality.Uriah Kriegel (ed.) - 2013 - , US: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Attention and perceptual content.Bence Nanay - 2010 - Analysis 70 (2):263-270.details
|
|
There are no phenomenal concepts.Derek Ball - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):935-962.details
|
|
Science and metaphysics: variations on Kantian themes.Wilfrid Sellars - 1968 - New York,: Humanities P..details
|
|
Consciousness and its place in nature.David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In David John Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. New York: Oxford University Press USA.details
|
|
Externalism and the Gappy Content of Hallucination.Susanna Schellenberg - 2013 - In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 291.details
|
|
What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1979 - In Mortal questions. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 435 - 450.details
|
|
On the persistence of phenomenology.Diana Raffman - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh. pp. 293--308.details
|
|
The intentionality of phenomenology and the phenomenology of intentionality.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 2002 - In David John Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 520--533.details
|
|
The representational character of experience.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The future for philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.details
|
|
Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion.William Fish - 2009 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Situation-Dependency of Perception.Susanna Schellenberg - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (2):55-84.details
|
|
Consciousness is Underived Intentionality.David Bourget - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):32 - 58.details
|
|
Sensational sentences switched.Georges Rey - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):289 - 319.details
|
|
Individuation by acquaintance and by stipulation.David Lewis - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (1):3-32.details
|
|
Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.details
|
|
Intentional inexistence and phenomenal intentionality.Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):307-340.details
|
|
Empiricism and the philosophy of mind.Wilfrid Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.details
|
|
Elements of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind.Tim Crane - 2001 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Mental causation: What? Me worry?Jaegwon Kim - 1995 - Philosophical Issues 6:123-151.details
|
|
Real Presence.Alva Noë - 2005 - Philosophical Topics 33 (1):235-264.details
|
|
Representationalism and the transparency of experience.Michael Tye - 2002 - Noûs 36 (1):137-51.details
|
|