- Sentimental perceptualism and the challenge from cognitive bases.Michael Milona & Hichem Naar - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):3071-3096.details
|
|
The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling: On Affect and Intentionality.Jean Moritz Müller - 2019 - Cham, Schweiz: Palgrave Macmillan.details
|
|
(1 other version)Affective Representation and Affective Attitudes.Jonathan Mitchell - 2019 - Synthese (4):1-28.details
|
|
How Emotions Know: Naturalizing Epistemology via Emotions.Cecilea Mun - 2019 - In Laura Candiotto (ed.), The Value of Emotions for Knowledge. Springer Verlag. pp. 27-50.details
|
|
Fittingness.Christopher Howard - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (11):e12542.details
|
|
How (Not) to Think of Emotions as Evaluative Attitudes.Jean Moritz Müller - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):281-308.details
|
|
Emotion as Position-Taking.Jean Moritz Mueller - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (3):525-540.details
|
|
(1 other version)The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Subject‐Relative Reasons for Love.Hichem Naar - 2017 - Ratio 30 (2):197-214.details
|
|
(2 other versions)Perceiving : A Philosophical Study.Rodrick Chisholm - 1957 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 63 (4):500-500.details
|
|
The Rationality of Emotion.Ronald de Sousa, Jing-Song Ma & Vincent Shen - 1987 - Philosophy and Culture 32 (10):35-66.details
|
|
(2 other versions)Perceiving: a philosophical study.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1957 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 13 (3):365-366.details
|
|
(1 other version)Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.M. E. Bratman - 1991 - Noûs 25 (2):230-233.details
|
|
Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear, and Rage.Walter B. Cannon - 1917 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 14 (3):79-80.details
|
|
(2 other versions)The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions.Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65-90.details
|
|
Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior.Albert R. MELE - 1992details
|
|
(1 other version)The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)In What Sense Are Emotions Evaluations?Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2014 - In Sabine Roeser & Cain Samuel Todd (eds.), Emotion and Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 15-31.details
|
|
Emotions, Value, and Agency.Christine Tappolet - 2016 - Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.details
|
|
(2 other versions)Virtue, emotion and attention.Michael S. Brady - 2010 - Metaphilosophy 41 (1-2):115-131.details
|
|
Taking the Perceptual Analogy Seriously.Michael Milona - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (4):897-915.details
|
|
Epistemic perceptualism and neo-sentimentalist objections.Robert Cowan - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):59-81.details
|
|
Emotions in the Moral Life.Robert Campbell Roberts - 2013 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
Emotions and Reasons.Patricia S. Greenspan - 1992 - Noûs 26 (2):250-252.details
|
|
The Feeling Body: Affective Science Meets the Enactive Mind.Giovanna Colombetti - 2013 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)In what sense are emotions evaluations?Fabrice Teroni & Julien A. Deonna - 2014 - In Sabine Roeser & Cain Samuel Todd (eds.), Emotion and Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 15-31.details
|
|
Emotional Insight: The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience.Michael Brady - 2013 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2013 - Dissertation, Princeton Universitydetails
|
|
How is Recalcitrant Emotion Possible?Hagit Benbaji - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):577-599.details
|
|
The emotions: a philosophical introduction.Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2008 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Fabrice Teroni.details
|
|
(2 other versions)The Moralistic Fallacy.Daniel Jacobson - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65-90.details
|
|
Insights and Blindspots of the Cognitivist Theory of Emotions.Andrea Scarantino - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (4):729-768.details
|
|
Emotion, the bodily, and the cognitive.Rick Anthony Furtak - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (1):51 – 64.details
|
|
(2 other versions)Virtue, emotion and attention.Michael S. Brady - 2010 - Metaphilosophy 41 (1-2):115-131.details
|
|
Emotions, perceptions, and emotional illusions.Christine Tappolet - 2012 - In Calabi Clotilde (ed.), The Crooked Oar, the Moon’s Size and the Kanizsa Triangle. Essays on Perceptual Illusions. pp. 207-24.details
|
|
How we act: causes, reasons, and intentions.Berent Enç - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)Springs of action: understanding intentional behavior.Alfred Mele - 1992 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?Tim Crane - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):452-469.details
|
|
Emotion, perception and perspective.Julien A. Deonna - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (1):29–46.details
|
|
Emotion and choice.Robert C. Solomon - 1973 - Review of Metaphysics 27 (1):20-41.details
|
|
Action, Emotion And Will.Anthony Kenny - 1963 - Ny: Humanities Press.details
|
|
The Emotions.Nico H. Frijda - 1986 - Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
Cognitivism in the theory of emotions.John Deigh - 1994 - Ethics 104 (4):824-54.details
|
|
Explaining action by emotion.Sabine Döring - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):214-230.details
|
|
The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration.Peter Goldie - 2000 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Perceiving: A Philosophical Study.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1957 - Ithaca,: Cornell University Press.details
|
|
(4 other versions)The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.details
|
|
Action, Emotion and Will.Anthony Kenny - 1963 - Philosophy 39 (149):277-278.details
|
|
(2 other versions)The Moralistic Fallacy: On the “Appropriateness” of Emotions.Justin D’Arms & Daniel Jacobson - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65-90.details
|
|