- (2 other versions)Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference.Saul A. Kripke - 1977 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1):255-276.details
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Holism, Hyper‐analyticity and Hyper‐compositionality.Ned Block - 2007 - Mind and Language 8 (1):1-27.details
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Referential Intentions and Communicative Luck.Andrew Peet - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (2):379-384.details
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(1 other version)How to Defeat Opposition to Moore.Ernest Sosa - 1999 - Noûs 33 (s13):141-153.details
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Normative Concepts: A Connectedness Model.Laura Schroeter - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14.details
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On sense and nominatum.Gottlob Frege - 1949 - In Herbert Feigl (ed.), Readings in philosophical analysis. New York,: Appleton-Century-Crofts. pp. 85-102.details
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The Myth of Concept Publicity.Laura Duhau Girola - 2012 - Ideas Y Valores 61 (148):101-113.details
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The Sense of Communication.Richard Heck - 1995 - Mind 104 (413):79 - 106.details
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(1 other version)How to defeat opposition to Moore.Ernest Sosa - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:137-49.details
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The semantics of singular terms.Brian Loar - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 30 (6):353 - 377.details
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The inescapability of Gettier problems.Linda Zagzebski - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):65-73.details
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Frege on demonstratives.John Perry - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (4):474-497.details
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Do demonstratives have senses?Richard Heck - 2002 - Philosophers' Imprint 2:1-33.details
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(1 other version)The thought: A logical inquiry.Gottlob Frege - 1956 - Mind 65 (259):289-311.details
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Belief De Re.Tyler Burge - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (6):338-362.details
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Atomism, pluralism, and conceptual content.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):131-163.details
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(1 other version)Holism, mental and semantic.Ned Block - 1996 - In Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Genealogy to Iqbal. New York: Routledge.details
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Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions: A Fregean Account.David J. Chalmers - 2011 - Noûs 45 (4):595-639.details
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(1 other version)The components of content.David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In David John Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. New York: Oxford University Press USA.details
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(1 other version)The meaning of 'meaning'.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.details
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(1 other version)The problem of the essential indexical.John Perry - 1979 - Noûs 13 (1):3-21.details
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Understanding belief reports.David Braun - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (4):555-595.details
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(2 other versions)Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Shared modes of presentation.Simon Prosser - 2018 - Mind and Language 34 (4):465-482.details
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Referential Intentions: A Response to Buchanan and Peet.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):610-615.details
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The Publicity of Thought.Andrea Onofri - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272).details
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Secondary belief content, what is it good for?Alexander Sandgren - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1467-1476.details
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Recanati on Communication of First‐person Thoughts.Sajed Tayebi - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):210-218.details
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(1 other version)What Does it Take to Refer?Kent Bach - 2005 - In Ernie Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 516--554.details
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Reference, Understanding, and Communication.Ray Buchanan - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (1):55-70.details
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From Coordination to Content.Samuel Cumming - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13.details
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Bootstrapping our way to samesaying.Laura Schroeter - 2012 - Synthese 189 (1):177-197.details
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Centered communication.Clas Weber - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):205-223.details
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(1 other version)Quasi-Singular Propositions: The Semantics of Belief Reports.François Récanati & Mark Crimmins - 1995 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 69 (1):175 - 209.details
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Afterthoughts.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 565-614.details
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(2 other versions)Individualism and the mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.details
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(2 other versions)Holism: A Consumer Update.Jerry Fodor - 1993 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 46:303-322.details
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Thoughts on demonstratives.David Kaplan - 1990 - In Palle Yourgrau (ed.), Demonstratives. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 34-49.details
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Sense, Communication, and Rational Engagement.Imogen Dickie & Gurpreet Rattan - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (2):131-151.details
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The communication of de re thoughts.Anne L. Bezuidenhout - 1997 - Noûs 31 (2):197-225.details
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An analysis of factual knowledge.Peter Unger - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (6):157-170.details
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(1 other version)Reference and description revisited.Frank Jackson - 1998 - Philosophical Perspectives 12:201-218.details
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Knowledge Can Be Lucky.Stephen Hetherington - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 164.details
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(2 other versions)Speaker's reference and semantic reference.Saul A. Kripke - 1977 - In Peter A. French, Theodore Edward Uehling & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Studies in the philosophy of language. Morris: University of Minnesota, Morris. pp. 255-296.details
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(2 other versions)Speaker’s reference and semantic reference.Saul Kripke - 2013 - In Maite Ezcurdia & Robert J. Stainton (eds.), The Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary in Philosophy. Peterborough, CA: Broadview Press. pp. 60.details
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Meaning Holism Defended.Gilbert Harman - 1993 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 46 (1):163-171.details
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The Gettier-illusion: Gettier-partialism and infallibilism.Stephen Hetherington - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):217-230.details
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