- Epistemic norms without voluntary control.Philippe Chuard & Nicholas Southwood - 2009 - Noûs 43 (4):599-632.details
|
|
Ought to Believe.Matthew Chrisman - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (7):346-370.details
|
|
Epistemic Normativity and Cognitive Agency.Matthew Chrisman - 2016 - Noûs 52 (3):508-529.details
|
|
Responsibility and reproach.Cheshire Calhoun - 1989 - Ethics 99 (2):389-406.details
|
|
Active belief.Matthew Boyle - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary 35 (S1):119-147.details
|
|
The wrongs of racist beliefs.Rima Basu - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2497-2515.details
|
|
Can Beliefs Wrong?Rima Basu - 2018 - Philosophical Topics 46 (1):1-17.details
|
|
The deontological conception of epistemic justification.William P. Alston - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:257-299.details
|
|
Does belief (only) aim at the truth?Daniel Whiting - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300.details
|
|
What Do We Aim At When We Believe?Conor Mchugh - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (3):369-392.details
|
|
Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: Toward a Wider Theory of Moral Responsibility.David Shoemaker - 2011 - Ethics 121 (3):602-632.details
|
|
Answerability Without Blame?Andrea C. Westlund - 2018 - In Marina Oshana, Katrina Hutchison & Catriona Mackenzie (eds.), Social Dimensions of Moral Responsibility. New York: Oup Usa.details
|
|
The Ethics of Belief.W. K. Clifford - 1999 - In William Kingdon Clifford (ed.), The ethics of belief and other essays. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books. pp. 70-97.details
|
|
To the Best of Our Knowledge: Social Expectations and Epistemic Normativity.Sanford Goldberg (ed.) - 2018 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.details
|
|
Deontology and Descartes’s Demon.Brian Weatherson - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):540-569.details
|
|
Two Faces of Responsibility.Gary Watson - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (2):227-248.details
|
|
Epistemic Reactive Attitudes.Deborah Perron Tollefsen - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (4):353-366.details
|
|
1. Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - In John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (eds.), Perspectives on Moral Responsibility. Cornell University Press. pp. 1-25.details
|
|
Responsibility for attitudes: Activity and passivity in mental life.Angela M. Smith - 2005 - Ethics 115 (2):236-271.details
|
|
Responsibility as Answerability.Angela M. Smith - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (2):99-126.details
|
|
Control, responsibility, and moral assessment.Angela M. Smith - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (3):367 - 392.details
|
|
Attitudes, Tracing, and Control.Angela M. Smith - 2015 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 32 (2):115-132.details
|
|
Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: In Defense of a Unified Account.Angela M. Smith - 2012 - Ethics 122 (3):575-589.details
|
|
Doxastic deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.details
|
|
Doxastic compatibilism and the ethics of belief.Sharon Ryan - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):47-79.details
|
|
In defense of doxastic blame.Lindsay Rettler - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2205-2226.details
|
|
Doxastic responsibility, guidance control, and ownership of belief.Robert Carry Osborne - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):82-98.details
|
|
How to be a Normativist about the Nature of Belief.Kate Nolfi - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):181-204.details
|
|
Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge.Richard Moran - 2001 - Princeton University Press.details
|
|
The Normativity of Belief.Conor McHugh & Daniel Whiting - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):698-713.details
|
|
Epistemic responsibility and doxastic agency.Conor McHugh - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):132-157.details
|
|
Exercising Doxastic Freedom.Conor Mchugh - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):1-37.details
|
|
Attitudinal control.Conor McHugh - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2745-2762.details
|
|
Taking control of belief.Miriam McCormick - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):169-183.details
|
|
How Can Beliefs Wrong?: A Strawsonian Epistemology.Berislav Marušić & Stephen White - 2018 - Philosophical Topics 46 (1):97-114.details
|
|
Doxastic Responsibility.Neil Levy - 2007 - Synthese 155 (1):127-155.details
|
|
Justified belief and epistemically responsible action.Hilary Kornblith - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (1):33-48.details
|
|
The Wrong Kind of Reason.Pamela Hieronymi - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.details
|
|
Responsibility for believing.Pamela Hieronymi - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):357-373.details
|
|
Controlling attitudes.Pamela Hieronymi - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):45-74.details
|
|
Hobartian voluntarism: Grounding a deontological conceptionof epistemic justification.Mark Heller - 2000 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2):130–141.details
|
|
Hobartian Voluntarism: Grounding a Deontological Conceptionof Epistemic Justification.Mark Heller - 2000 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2):130-141.details
|
|
Should have known.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2863-2894.details
|
|
The Ethics of Belief.Richard Feldman - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.details
|
|
The ethics of belief.Richard Feldman - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.details
|
|
Modest deontologism in epistemology.Richard Feldman - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):339 - 355.details
|
|
Doxastic Wronging.Rima Basu & Mark Schroeder - 2019 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 181-205.details
|
|
Believing Against the Evidence: Agency and the Ethics of Belief.Miriam Schleifer McCormick - 2014 - New York: Routledge.details
|
|
Problems of the Self.Bernard Williams - 1973 - Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|