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  1. Freedom and Resentment, and Other Essays.Peter Frederick Strawson - 1974 - London, England: Routledge.
    asks them would normally be taken to be committed to the belief that the phenomenon which is the subject of his inquiry is something publicly perceptible . ...
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  • Doxastic Freedom.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):375-392.
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  • Responsibility for Believing.Pamela Hieronymi - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):357-373.
    Many assume that we can be responsible only what is voluntary. This leads to puzzlement about our responsibility for our beliefs, since beliefs seem not to be voluntary. I argue against the initial assumption, presenting an account of responsibility and of voluntariness according to which, not only is voluntariness not required for responsibility, but the feature which renders an attitude a fundamental object of responsibility (that the attitude embodies one’s take on the world and one’s place in it) also guarantees (...)
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  • Modest Deontologism in Epistemology.Richard Feldman - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):339 - 355.
    Deontologism in epistemology holds that epistemic justification may be understood in terms of “deontological” sentences about what one ought to believe or is permitted to believe, or what one deserves praise for believing, or in some similar way. If deonotologism is true, and people have justified beliefs, then the deontological sentences can be true. However, some say, these deontological sentences can be true only if people have a kind of freedom or control over their beliefs that they do not in (...)
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  • Entitlement: Epistemic Rights Without Epistemic Duties?Fred Dretske - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):591-606.
    The debate between externalists and internalists in epistemology can be viewed as a disagreement about whether there are epistemic rights without corresponding duties or obligations. Taking an epistemic right to believe P as an authorization to not only accept P as true but to use P as a positive reason for accepting other propositions, the debate is about whether there are unjustified justifiers. It is about whether there are propositions that provide for others what nothing need provide for them—viz., reasons (...)
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  • The Ethics of Belief.Richard Feldman - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.
    In this paper I will address a few of the many questions that fall under the general heading of “the ethics of belief.” In section I I will discuss the adequacy of what has come to be known as the “deontological conception of epistemic justification” in the light of our apparent lack of voluntary control over what we believe. In section II I’ll defend an evidentialist view about what we ought to believe. And in section III I will briefly discuss (...)
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  • The Ethics of Belief.Richard Feldman - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.
    In this paper I will address a few of the many questions that fall under the general heading of “the ethics of belief.” In section I I will discuss the adequacy of what has come to be known as the “deontological conception of epistemic justification” in the light of our apparent lack of voluntary control over what we believe. In section II I’ll defend an evidentialist view about what we ought to believe. And in section III I will briefly discuss (...)
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  • Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law.H. L. A. Hart - 1968 - Oxford University Press.
    This classic collection of essays, first published in 1968, represents H.L.A. Hart's landmark contribution to the philosophy of criminal responsibility and punishment. Unavailable for ten years, this new edition reproduces the original text, adding a new critical introduction by John Gardner, a leading contemporary criminal law theorist.
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  • Clearing Space For Doxastic Voluntarism.Nishi Shah - 2002 - The Monist 85 (3):436-445.
    It is common for philosophers to claim that doxastic voluntarism, the view that an agent can form beliefs voluntarily, is false, and therefore that agents do not have the kind of control over their beliefs required for a straightforward application of deontological concepts such as obligation or duty in the domain of epistemology. The role that the denial of doxastic voluntarism plays in an argument to the effect that agents do not have obligations with respect to belief is simply this.
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  • Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge.William P. Alston - 1989 - Cornell University Press.
    Introduction As the title indicates, the chief focus of this book is epistemic justification. But just what is epistemic justification and what is its place ...
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  • Practices of Belief: Volume 2, Selected Essays.Nicholas Wolterstorff (ed.) - 2010 - Cambridge University Press.
    This volume brings together Nicholas Wolterstorff's essays on epistemology written between 1983 and 2008.
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  • Epistemic Norms Without Voluntary Control.Philippe Chuard & Nicholas Southwood - 2009 - Noûs 43 (4):599-632.
    William Alston’s argument against the deontological conception of epistemic justification is a classic—and much debated—piece of contemporary epistemology. At the heart of Alston’s argument, however, lies a very simple mistake which, surprisingly, appears to have gone unnoticed in the vast literature now devoted to the argument. After having shown why some of the standard responses to Alston’s argument don’t work, we elucidate the mistake and offer a hypothesis as to why it has escaped attention.
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  • Doxastic Voluntarism and Forced Belief.Murray Clarke - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (1):39 - 51.
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  • Beyond "Justification": Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation.William P. Alston - 2005 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
    " In a book that seeks to shift the ground of debate within theory of knowledge, William P. Alston finds that the century-lo.
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  • Problems of Ethics.Moritz Schlick - 1939 - New York: Dover Publications.
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  • Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue.Matthias Steup (ed.) - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
    This volume gathers eleven new and three previously unpublished essays that take on questions of epistemic justification, responsibility, and virtue. It contains the best recent work in this area by major figures such as Ernest Sosa, Robert Audi, Alvin Goldman, and Susan Haak.
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  • Reason Without Freedom: The Problem of Epistemic Normativity.David Owens - 2000 - Routledge.
    We call beliefs reasonable or unreasonable, justified or unjustified. What does this imply about belief? Does this imply that we are responsible for our beliefs and that we should be blamed for our unreasonable convictions? Or does it imply that we are in control of our beliefs and that what we believe is up to us? Reason Without Freedom argues that the major problems of epistemology have their roots in concerns about our control over and responsibility for belief. David Owens (...)
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  • Knowledge and its Place in Nature.Hilary Kornblith - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
    Hilary Kornblith argues for a naturalistic approach to investigating knowledge. Knowledge, he explains, is a feature of the natural world, and so should be investigated using scientific methods. He offers an account of knowledge derived from the science of animal behavior, and defends this against its philosophical rivals. This controversial and refreshingly original book offers philosophers a new way to do epistemology.
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  • Responsibility.Jonathan Glover - 1970 - New York: Humanities P..
    I THEORIES OF RESPONSIBILITY This book is concerned with attitudes to people and to what they do. In particular it concerns questions about when it is right ...
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  • Doing & Deserving; Essays in the Theory of Responsibility.Joel Feinberg - 1970 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.
    Supererogation and rules -- Problematic responsibility in law and morals -- On being "morally speaking a murderer" -- Justice and personal desert -- The expressive function of punishment -- Action and responsibility -- Causing voluntary actions -- Sua culpa -- Collective responsibility -- Crime, clutchability, and individuated treatment -- What is so special about mental illness?
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  • Controlling Attitudes.Pamela Hieronymi - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):45-74.
    I hope to show that, although belief is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, "believing at will" is impossible; one cannot believe in the way one ordinarily acts. Further, the same is true of intention: although intention is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, the features of belief that render believing less than voluntary are present for intention, as well. It turns out, perhaps surprisingly, that you can no more intend at will than believe at will.
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  • Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life.Angela M. Smith - 2005 - Ethics 115 (2):236-271.
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  • Justified Belief and Epistemically Responsible Action.Hilary Kornblith - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (1):33-48.
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  • Deontology and Descartes’s Demon.Brian Weatherson - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):540-569.
    In his Principles of Philosophy, Descartes says, Finally, it is so manifest that we possess a free will, capable of giving or withholding its assent, that this truth must be reckoned among the first and most common notions which are born with us.
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  • Ought to Believe.Matthew Chrisman - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (7):346-370.
    My primary purpose in this paper is to sketch a theory of doxastic oughts that achieves a satisfying middle ground between the extremes of rejecting epistemic deontology because one thinks beliefs are not within our direct voluntary control and rejecting doxastic involuntarism because one thinks that some doxastic oughts must be true. The key will be appreciating the obvious fact that not all true oughts require direct voluntary control. I will construct my account as an attempt to surpass other accounts (...)
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  • Does Doxastic Responsibility Entail the Ability to Believe Otherwise?Rik Peels - 2013 - Synthese 190 (17):3651-3669.
    Whether responsibility for actions and omissions requires the ability to do otherwise is an important issue in contemporary philosophy. However, a closely related but distinct issue, namely whether doxastic responsibility requires the ability to believe otherwise, has been largely neglected. This paper fills this remarkable lacuna by providing a defence of the thesis that doxastic responsibility entails the ability to believe otherwise. On the one hand, it is argued that the fact that unavoidability is normally an excuse counts in favour (...)
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  • Doxastic Compatibilism and the Ethics of Belief.Sharon Ryan - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):47-79.
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  • Belief Control and Intentionality.Matthias Steup - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):145-163.
    In this paper, I argue that the rejection of doxastic voluntarism is not as straightforward as its opponents take it to be. I begin with a critical examination of William Alston's defense of involuntarism and then focus on the question of whether belief is intentional.
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  • Identification and Responsibility.Angela M. Smith - 2000 - In A. van den Beld (ed.), Moral Responsibility and Ontology. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 233--246.
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  • Responsible Believers.Mark Leon - 2002 - The Monist 85 (3):421-435.
    For an action to be free, for an agent to be responsible for his action, it is sometimes thought that he must act from a will that is free or for which he is responsible. There is a connection between freedom of action and freedom or autonomy of will, but the connection cannot be the one envisaged here, modelling free will on a free action, for not only does that set off an obvious regress, but as importantly the elements of (...)
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  • The Psychological Turn.Hilary Kornblith - 1982 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 60 (3):238 – 253.
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  • Belief and Will.H. H. Price - 1954 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 28 (1):1-26.
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  • Responsible Belief and Our Social Institutions.René van Woudenberg - 2009 - Philosophy 84 (1):47 - 73.
    The idea that we can properly be held responsible for what we believe underlies large stretches of our social and institutional life; without that idea in place, social and institutional life would be unthinkable, and more importantly, it would stumble and fall. At the same time, philosophers have argued that this idea is strange, puzzling, beyond belief, false, meaningless or at any rate defective. The first section develops the alleged problem. The burden of this paper, however, is not to discuss (...)
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  • Compatibilism and Free Belief.Anthony Robert Booth - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (1):1-12.
    Matthias Steup (Steup 2008) has recently argued that our doxastic attitudes are free by (i) drawing an analogy with compatibilism about freedom of action and (ii) denying that it is a necessary condition for believing at will that S's having an intention to believe that p can cause S to believe that p . In this paper, however, I argue that the strategies espoused in (i) and (ii) are incompatible.
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  • Believing Reasonably.John Heil - 1992 - Noûs 26 (1):47-61.
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  • Hobartian Voluntarism: Grounding a Deontological Conceptionof Epistemic Justification.Mark Heller - 2000 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2):130–141.
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  • Doxastic Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontology.Matthias Steup - 2000 - Acta Analytica 15 (1):25-56.
    Epistemic deontology is the view that the concept of epistemic justification is deontological: a justified belief is, by definition, an epistemically permissible belief. I defend this view against the argument from doxastic involuntarism, according to which our doxastic attitudes are not under our voluntary control, and thus are not proper objects for deontological evaluation. I argue that, in order to assess this argument, we must distinguish between a compatibilist and a libertarian construal of the concept of voluntary control. If we (...)
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  • Epistemic Obligation and the Possibility of Internalism.Hilary Kornblith - 2001 - In Abrol Fairweather & Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 231--248.
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  • Responsibility Especially for Beliefs.Michael Stocker - 1982 - Mind 91 (363):398-417.
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  • Knowledge and Its Place in Nature.Hilary Kornblith & Jonathan E. Adler - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (216):479-482.
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  • Epistemic Deontology, Doxastic Voluntarism, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities.Christoph Jäger - 2004 - In Winfried Löffler and Paul Weingartner (ed.), Knowledge and Belief. ÖBV. pp. 217-227.
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  • Ascriptions of Responsibility.Marina A. L. Oshana - 1997 - American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1):71 - 83.
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