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(3 other versions)Moral Luck.B. A. O. Williams & T. Nagel - 1976 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 50 (1):115-152.details
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What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.details
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The Myth of Morality.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2004 - Mind 113 (452):760-763.details
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Metaphysics Without Conceptual Analysis.Robert Stalnaker - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):631-636.details
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Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.Bernard Williams - 1985 - Ethics 97 (4):821-833.details
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Moral Realism: Facts and Norms. [REVIEW]David O. BRINK - 1991 - Ethics 101 (3):610-624.details
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Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.Fred Feldman & J. L. Mackie - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (1):134.details
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Irrelevant Influences.Katia Vavova - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:134-152.details
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How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?David Enoch - 2009 - The Journal of Ethics 13 (1):15-50.details
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(3 other versions)Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.Bernard Williams - 1985 - London: Fontana.details
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Acknowledgments.Robert Audi - 2013 - In Moral Perception. Princeton University Press.details
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Index.Robert Audi - 2013 - In Moral Perception. Princeton University Press. pp. 175-180.details
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Moral Perception.Robert Audi - 2013 - Princeton University Press.details
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(1 other version)The Right and the Good. By R. Robinson. [REVIEW]W. D. Ross - 1930 - International Journal of Ethics 41:343.details
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Rights, Restitution, and Risk.Judith Jarvis Thomson & William Parent - 1988 - Ethics 98 (4):806-826.details
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Belief in the Face of Controversy.Hilary Kornblith - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy. [REVIEW]David Christensen - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):754-767.details
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3 Rawls on Justification.T. M. Scanlon - 2002 - In Samuel Freeman (ed.), The Cambridge companion to Rawls. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 139.details
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(1 other version)Superintelligence: paths, dangers, strategies.Nick Bostrom (ed.) - 2014 - Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Why There Really Are No Irreducibly Normative Properties.Bart Streumer - 2013 - In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking about reasons: themes from the philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 310-336.details
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The Independence of Moral Theory.John Rawls - 1974 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 48:5 - 22.details
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In defense of moral error theory.Jonas Olson - 2010 - In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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(1 other version)Folk Moral Relativism.Hagop Sarkissian, John Park, David Tien, Jennifer Cole Wright & Joshua Knobe - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (4):482-505.details
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In defense of objectivism about moral obligation.Peter A. Graham - 2010 - Ethics 121 (1):88-115.details
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Disagreements, Philosophical and Otherwise.Brian Weatherson - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 54.details
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Naturalism and Prescriptivity.Peter Railton - 1989 - Social Philosophy and Policy 7 (1):151.details
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Ethical Intuitionism.Michael Huemer - 2005 - New York: Palgrave Macmillan.details
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(1 other version)Disagreement as evidence: The epistemology of controversy.David Christensen - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):756-767.details
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Are normative properties descriptive properties?Bart Streumer - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (3):325 - 348.details
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Epistemological puzzles about disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2006 - In Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology futures. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 216-236.details
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Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.John Leslie Mackie - 1977 - New York: Penguin Books.details
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Slaves of the passions.Mark Andrew Schroeder - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Ethics without principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Moral realism: a defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.details
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The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.details
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Moral vision: an introduction to ethics.David McNaughton - 1988 - New York, NY: Blackwell.details
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(2 other versions)Moral disagreement and moral expertise.Sarah McGrath - 2009 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 87-108.details
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(1 other version)Peer disagreement and higher order evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.details
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Reasons and value – in defence of the buck-passing account.Jussi Suikkanen - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (5):513 - 535.details
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Moral relativism defended.Gilbert Harman - 1975 - Philosophical Review 84 (1):3-22.details
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(1 other version)Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.details
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(1 other version)Solving the skeptical problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.details
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Is objective moral justification possible on a quasi-realist foundation?Simon Blackburn - 1999 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 42 (2):213 – 227.details
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From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Acting for the Right Reasons, Abilities, and Obligation.Errol Lord - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 10.details
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Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normative Language By Stephen Finlay.Stephen Finlay - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):99-101.details
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Do ‘Objectivist’ Features of Moral Discourse and Thinking Support Moral Objectivism?Gunnar Björnsson - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (4):367-393.details
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