- Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.details
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(1 other version)Alief and Belief.Tamar Gendler - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.details
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Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.details
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On the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):312-326.details
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The Stability Theory of Belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (2):131-171.details
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Knowing That P without Believing That P.Blake Myers-Schulz & Eric Schwitzgebel - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):371-384.details
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On being in the same place at the same time.David Wiggins - 1968 - Philosophical Review 77 (1):90-95.details
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Can we do without pragmatic encroachment.Brian Weatherson - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):417–443.details
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How I learned to stop worrying and love probability 1.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):179-201.details
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Knowledge entails dispositional belief.David Rose & Jonathan Schaffer - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):19-50.details
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Reason and the grain of belief.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):139–165.details
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The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge.Ernest Sosa - 1980 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):3-26.details
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Belief Is Credence One (in Context).Roger Clarke - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13:1-18.details
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Alief in Action (and Reaction).Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (5):552--585.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge Is Belief For Sufficient (Objective and Subjective) Reason.Mark Schroeder - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.details
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Beliefs do not come in degrees.Andrew Moon - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):760-778.details
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Knowledge: By Examples.Colin Radford - 1966 - Analysis 27 (1):1.details
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How superduper does a physicalist supervenience need to be?Jessica Wilson - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (194):33-52.details
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Outright Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.details
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Beliefs, buses and lotteries: Why rational belief can’t be stably high credence.Julia Staffel - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1721-1734.details
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Valuation and acceptance of scientific hypotheses.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1956 - Philosophy of Science 23 (3):237-246.details
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The Epistemology of Belief and the Epistemology of Degrees of Belief.Richard Foley - 1992 - American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (2):111 - 124.details
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Copper Statues and Pieces of Copper: A Challenge to the Standard Account.Michael B. Burke - 1992 - Analysis 52 (1):12 - 17.details
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Alief in Action (and Reaction).Tamarszabó Gendler - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (5):552-585.details
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(1 other version)Evidentialism and pragmatic constraints on outright belief.Dorit Ganson - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (3):441 - 458.details
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(1 other version)Confidence and Coarse-Grained Attitudes.Scott Sturgeon - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3.details
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On Doxastic Justification and Properly Basing One’s Beliefs.Paul Silva - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (5):945-955.details
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Mental causation, determinables, and property instances.Douglas Ehring - 1996 - Noûs 30 (4):461-80.details
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(1 other version)Working without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology.Richard Fumerton & Richard Foley - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):141.details
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Credence and Correctness: In Defense of Credal Reductivism.Matthew Brandon Lee - 2017 - Philosophical Papers 46 (2):273-296.details
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The Architecture of Reason.Robert Audi - 1988 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 62:227.details
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On Doubt.Matthew Brandon Lee - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (1):141-158.details
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On the relation between categorical and probabilistic belief.Daniel Hunter - 1996 - Noûs 30 (1):75-98.details
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Wrongs within rights.Robert Audi - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):121–139.details
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