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  1. (1 other version)Nominalism, Naturalism, Epistemic Relativism.William G. Lycan, Penelope Maddy, Gideon Rosen & Nathan Salmon - 2001 - Philosophical Perspectives 15:69–91.
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  • (2 other versions)Phenomenal States (Revised Version).Brian Loar - 2004 - In Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. MIT Press. pp. 219.
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  • (1 other version)An Abstract Consideration: De-Ontologizing the Noema.John J. Drummond - 1992 - In John Drummond & Lester Embree (eds.), The Phenomenology of the Noema. Springer.
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  • Representationalism, perceptual distortion and the limits of phenomenal concepts.David Bourget - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (1):16-36.
    This paper replies to objections from perceptual distortion against the representationalist thesis that the phenomenal characters of experiences supervene on their intentional contents. It has been argued that some pairs of distorted and undistorted experiences share contents without sharing phenomenal characters, which is incompatible with the supervenience thesis. In reply, I suggest that such cases are not counterexamples to the representationalist thesis because the contents of distorted experiences are always impoverished in some way compared to those of normal experiences. This (...)
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  • Nonconceptual Content: From Perceptual Experience to Subpersonal Computational States.José Luis Bermúdez - 1995 - Mind and Language 10 (4):333-369.
    Philosophers have often argued that ascriptions of content are appropriate only to the personal level states of folk psychology. Against this, this paper defends the view that the familiar propositional attitudes and states defined over them are part of a larger set of cognitive proceses that do not make constitutive reference to concept possession. It does this by showing that states with nonconceptual content exist both in perceptual experience and in subpersonal information-processing systems. What makes these states content-involving is their (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Mind and World.Huw Price & John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Books 38 (3):169-181.
    How do rational minds make contact with the world? The empiricist tradition sees a gap between mind and world, and takes sensory experience, fallible as it is, to provide our only bridge across that gap. In its crudest form, for example, the traditional idea is that our minds consult an inner realm of sensory experience, which provides us with evidence about the nature of external reality. Notoriously, however, it turns out to be far from clear that there is any viable (...)
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  • Perceptual Content Defended.Susanna Schellenberg - 2011 - Noûs 45 (4):714 - 750.
    Recently, the thesis that experience is fundamentally a matter of representing the world as being a certain way has been questioned by austere relationalists. I defend this thesis by developing a view of perceptual content that avoids their objections. I will argue that on a relational understanding of perceptual content, the fundamental insights of austere relationalism do not compete with perceptual experience being representational. As it will show that most objections to the thesis that experience has content apply only to (...)
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  • Experience and judgment: investigations in a genealogy of logic.Edmund Husserl - 1973 - London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Edited by Ludwig Landgrebe.
    This volume provides an articulate restatement of many of the themes of Husserlian phenomenology.
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  • Phenomenological psychology: lectures, summer semester, 1925.Edmund Husserl - 1977 - The Hague: M. Nijhoff.
    THE TEXT In the summer semester of 1925 in Freiburg, Edmund Husserl delivered a lecture course on phenomenological psychology, in 1926127 a course on the possibility of an intentional psychology, and in 1928 a course entitled "Intentional Psychology. " In preparing the critical edition of Phiinomeno logische Psychologie (Husserliana IX), I Walter Biemel presented the entire 1925 course as the main text and included as supplements significant excerpts from the two subsequent courses along with pertinent selections from various research manuscripts (...)
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  • Having the world in view: essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars.John McDowell - 2009 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    In this new book, John McDowell builds on his much discussed Mind and World—one of the most highly regarded books in contemporary philosophy.
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  • Husserl's noema and the internalism‐externalism debate.Dan Zahavi - 2004 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):42-66.
    In a number of papers, Hubert Dreyfus and Ronald McIntyre have claimed that Husserl is an internalist. In this paper, it is argued that their interpretation is based on two questionable assumptions: (1) that Husserl's noema should be interpreted along Fregean lines, and (2) that Husserl's transcendental methodology commits him to some form of methodological solipsism. Both of these assumptions are criticized on the basis of the most recent Husserl-research. It is shown that Husserl's concept of noema can be interpreted (...)
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  • Blurred vision and the transparency of experience.Michael Pace - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (3):328–354.
    This paper considers an objection to intentionalism (the view that the phenomenal character of experience supervenes on intentional content) based on the phenomenology of blurred vision. Several intentionalists, including Michael Tye, Fred Dretske, and Timothy Crane, have proposed intentionalist explanations of blurred vision phenomenology. I argue that their proposals fail and propose a solution of my own that, I contend, is the only promising explanation consistent with intentionalism. The solution, however, comes at a cost for intentionalists; it involves rejecting the (...)
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  • Heidegger's critique of Husserl's and Brentano's accounts of intentionality.Dermot Moran - 2000 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):39-65.
    Inspired by Aristotle, Franz Brentano revived the concept of intentionality to characterize the domain of mental phenomena studied by descriptive psychology. Edmund Husserl, while discarding much of Brentano?s conceptual framework and presuppositions, located intentionality at the core of his science of pure consciousness (phenomenology). Martin Heidegger, Husserl?s assistant from 1919 to 1923, dropped all reference to intentionality and consciousness in Being and Time (1927), and so appeared to break sharply with his avowed mentors, Brentano and Husserl. Some recent commentators have (...)
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  • Husserl's notion of noema.Dagfinn Føllesdal - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (20):680-687.
    Darstellung des Noema in 12 Thesen.\nverwendete Textstellen: Ideen 1: S. 203, 22-23; S. 204, 20-21; S. 357, 19-20: Handlungen sind zielgerichtet. Dabei bedarf eines keines physischen Objekts. Husserl setzt and diese Stelle das Noema. Somit wird auch zielgerichtetes Handeln aufgrund einer Halluzination m{ö}glich, Zielgerichtet zu sein bedeutet ein Noema zu haben.\n1. Follesdal´sche These: Noema ist eine intensionale Entit{ä}t, eine Generalisierung des Begriffs Sinn/Bedeutung.\n2. These: Das Noema hat zwei Bestandteile, a) der noematische Sinn, der allen thetischen Handlungen (erinnern, sich vorstellen usw.) (...)
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  • Intentional inexistence and phenomenal intentionality.Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):307-340.
    How come we can represent Bigfoot even though Bigfoot does not exist, given that representing something involves bearing a relation to it and we cannot bear relations to what does not exist? This is the problem of intentional inexistence. This paper develops a two-step solution to this problem, involving an adverbial account of conscious representation, or phenomenal intentionality, and the thesis that all representation derives from conscious representation. The solution is correspondingly two-part: we can consciously represent Bigfoot because consciously representing (...)
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  • (1 other version)Theory of intentionality.Ronald McIntyre & David Woodruff Smith - 1989 - In Jitendranath Mohanty & William R. McKenna (eds.), Husserl's phenomenology: a textbook. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America.
    §1. Intentionality; §2. Husserl's Phenomenological Conception of Intentionality; §3. The Distinction between Content and Object; §4. Husserl's Theory of Content: Noesis and Noema; §5. Noema and Object; §6. The Sensory Content of Perception; §7. The Internal Structure of Noematic Sinne; §8. Noema and Horizon; §9. Horizon and Background Beliefs.
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  • (1 other version)Cartesian error and the objectivity of perception.Tyler Burge - 1986 - In Philip Pettit (ed.), Subject, Thought, And Context. NY: Clarendon Press.
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  • The transparency of experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.
    A common objection to sense-datum theories of perception is that they cannot give an adequate account of the fact that introspection indicates that our sensory experiences are directed on, or are about, the mind-independent entities in the world around us, that our sense experience is transparent to the world. In this paper I point out that the main force of this claim is to point out an explanatory challenge to sense-datum theories.
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  • Representationalism and the transparency of experience.Michael Tye - 2002 - Noûs 36 (1):137-51.
    Representationalism is a thesis about the phenomenal character of experiences, about their immediate subjective ‘feel’.1 At a minimum, the thesis is one of supervenience: necessarily, experiences that are alike in their representational contents are alike in their phenomenal character. So understood, the thesis is silent on the nature of phenomenal character. Strong or pure representationalism goes further. It aims to tell us what phenomenal character is. According to the theory developed in Tye 1995, phenomenal character is one and the same (...)
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  • (1 other version)The content of perceptual experience.John McDowell - 1994 - Philosopical Quarterly 44 (175):190-205.
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  • Is there a problem about nonconceptual content?Jeff Speaks - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (3):359-98.
    In the past twenty years, issues about the relationship between perception and thought have largely been framed in terms of the question of whether the contents of perception are nonconceptual. I argue that this debate has rested on an ambiguity in `nonconceptual content' and some false presuppositions about what is required for concept possession. Once these are cleared away, I argue that none of the arguments which have been advanced about nonconceptual content do much to threaten the natural view that (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Nonconceptual Content of Experience.Tim Crane - 1992 - In Paul F. Snowdon (ed.), The Contents of Experience. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 136-57.
    Some have claimed that people with very different beliefs literally see the world differently. Thus Thomas Kuhn: ‘what a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what his previous visual—conceptual experience has taught him to see’ (Kuhn 1970, p. ll3). This view — call it ‘Perceptual Relativism’ — entails that a scientist and a child may look at a cathode ray tube and, in a sense, the first will see it while the second won’t. The (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Waterfall Illusion.Tim Crane - 1988 - Analysis 48 (June):142-47.
    If you stare for a period of time at a scene which contains movement in one direction, and then turn your attention to an object in a scene which contains no movement, this object will appear to move in the opposite direction to that of the original movement. The effect can be easily achieved by attaching a piece of paper with a spiral drawn on it to the spinning turntable of a record player, and then turning the turntable off while (...)
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  • Against intentionalism.Bernard Nickel - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):279-304.
    Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenological properties of a perceptual experience supervene on its intentional properties. The paper presents a counter-example to this claim, one that concerns visual grouping phenomenology. I argue that this example is superior to superficially similar examples involving grouping phenomenology offered by Peacocke (Sense and Content, Oxford: Oxford University Press), because the standard intentionalist responses to Peacocke’s examples cannot be extended to mine. If Intentionalism fails, it is impossible to reduce the phenomenology of an experience (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Brentano's Concept of Intentional Inexistence.Tim Crane - 2006 - In Markus Textor (ed.), The Austrian contribution to analytic philosophy. New York: Routledge. pp. 1--20.
    Franz Brentano’s attempt to distinguish mental from physical phenomena by employing the scholastic concept of intentional inexistence is often cited as reintroducing the concept of intentionality into mainstream philosophical discussion. But Brentano’s own claims about intentional inexistence are much misunderstood. In the second half of the 20th century, analytical philosophers in particular have misread Brentano’s views in misleading ways.1 It is important to correct these misunderstandings if we are to come to a proper assessment of Brentano’s worth as a philosopher (...)
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  • (1 other version)Social content and psychological content.Brian Loar - 1988 - In Robert H. Grimm & Daniel Davy Merrill (eds.), Contents of Thought. Tucson.
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  • (2 other versions)Individualism and the mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
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  • (1 other version)The meaning of 'meaning'.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.
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  • (1 other version)Representationalism about consciousness.William E. Seager & David Bourget - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. New York: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 261-276.
    A representationalist-friendly introduction to representationalism which covers a number of central problems and objections.
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  • (4 other versions)The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
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  • Representational theories of consciousness.William G. Lycan - 2000 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The idea of representation has been central in discussions of intentionality for many years. But only more recently has it begun playing a wider role in the philosophy of mind, particularly in theories of consciousness. Indeed, there are now multiple representational theories of consciousness, corresponding to different uses of the term "conscious," each attempting to explain the corresponding phenomenon in terms of representation. More cautiously, each theory attempts to explain its target phenomenon in terms of _intentionality_, and assumes that intentionality (...)
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  • Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - MIT Press.
    In this provocative book, Fred Dretske argues that to achieve an understanding of the mind it is not enough to understand the biological machinery by means of...
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  • (1 other version)Intentionalism defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.
    Traditionally, perceptual experiences—for example, the experience of seeing a cat—were thought to have two quite distinct components. When one sees a cat, one’s experience is “about” the cat: this is the representational or intentional component of the experience. One’s experience also has phenomenal character: this is the sensational component of the experience. Although the intentional and sensational components at least typically go together, in principle they might come apart: the intentional component could be present without the sensational component or vice (...)
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  • The Intentional Structure of Consciousness.Tim Crane - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 33-56.
    Newcomers to the philosophy of mind are sometimes resistant to the idea that pain is a mental state. If asked to defend their view, they might say something like this: pain is a physical state, it is a state of the body. A pain in one’s leg feels to be in the leg, not ‘in the mind’. After all, sometimes people distinguish pain which is ‘all in the mind’ from a genuine pain, sometimes because the second is ‘physical’ while the (...)
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  • (1 other version)Intentionality as the mark of the mental.Tim Crane - 1998 - In Tim Crane (ed.), Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press. pp. 229-251.
    ‘It is of the very nature of consciousness to be intentional’ said Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘and a consciousness that ceases to be a consciousness of something would ipso facto cease to exist’.1 Sartre here endorses the central doctrine of Husserl’s phenomenology, itself inspired by a famous idea of Brentano’s: that intentionality, the mind’s ‘direction upon its objects’, is what is distinctive of mental phenomena. Brentano’s originality does not lie in pointing out the existence of intentionality, or in inventing the terminology, which (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Phenomenal states.Brian Loar - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:81-108.
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  • (4 other versions)The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 2014 - In Josh Weisberg (ed.), Consciousness (Key Concepts in Philosophy). Cambridge, UK: Polity.
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  • (4 other versions)The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • (2 other versions)Mind and World.John McDowell - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):99-109.
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  • Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy -- Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution.Edmund Husserl - 1990 - Springer.
    As is made plain in the critical apparatus and editorial matter appended to the original German publication of Hussed's Ideas II, I this is a text with a history. It underwent revision after revision, spanning almost 20 years in one of the most fertile periods of the philosopher's life. The book owes its form to the work of many hands, and its unity is one that has been imposed on it. Yet there is nothing here that cannot be traced back (...)
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  • In Defence of Psychologism.Tim Crane - 2014 - In Aspects of Psychologism. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
    The term ‘psychologism’ is normally used for the doctrine that logical and mathematical truths must be explained in terms of psychological truths (see Kusch 1995 and 2011). As such, the term is typically pejorative: the widespread consensus is that psychologism in this sense is a paradigm of philosophical error, a gross mistake that was identified and conclusively refuted by Frege and Husserl.
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  • (2 other versions)Intentionalism.Tim Crane - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 474-93.
    The central and defining characteristic of thoughts is that they have objects. The object of a thought is what the thought concerns, or what it is about. Since there cannot be thoughts which are not about anything, or which do not concern anything, there cannot be thoughts without objects. Mental states or events or processes which have objects in this sense are traditionally called ‘intentional,’ and ‘intentionality’ is for this reason the general term for this defining characteristic of thought. Under (...)
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  • Kant and Husserl on the Contents of Perception.Corijn van Mazijk - 2016 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (2):267-287.
    https://rug.academia.edu/corijnvanmazijk.
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  • Do We Have To Choose between Conceptualism and Non-Conceptualism?Corijn Van Mazijk - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (5):645-665.
    It is today acknowledged by many that the debate about non-conceptual content is a mess. Over the past decades a vast collection of arguments for non-conceptual content piled up in which a variety of conceptions of what determines a state’s content is being used. This resulted in a number of influential attempts to clarify what would make a content non-conceptual, most notably Bermúdez’s classic definition, Heck’s divide into ‘state’ and ‘content’ conceptualism and Speaks’s ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ non-conceptualism. However, these interpretations, (...)
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  • Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger.Steven Galt Crowell - 2013 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Steven Crowell has been for many years a leading voice in debates on twentieth-century European philosophy. This volume presents thirteen recent essays that together provide a systematic account of the relation between meaningful experience and responsiveness to norms. They argue for a new understanding of the philosophical importance of phenomenology, taking the work of Husserl and Heidegger as exemplary, and introducing a conception of phenomenology broad enough to encompass the practices of both philosophers. Crowell discusses Husserl's analyses of first-person authority, (...)
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  • (1 other version)The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology.Edmund Husserl - 1970 - Evanston,: Northwestern University Press.
    The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Husserl's last great work, is important both for its content and for the influence it has had on other philosophers. In this book, which remained unfinished at his death, Husserl attempts to forge a union between phenomenology and existentialism. Husserl provides not only a history of philosophy but a philosophy of history. As he says in Part I, "The genuine spiritual struggles of European humanity as such take the form of struggles between (...)
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  • Aspects of Psychologism.Tim Crane - 2014 - Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
    Aspects of Psychologism is a penetrating look into fundamental philosophical questions of consciousness, perception, and the experience we have of our mental lives. Psychologism, in Tim Crane’s formulation, presents the mind as a single subject-matter to be investigated not only empirically and conceptually but also phenomenologically: through the systematic examination of consciousness and thought from the subject’s point of view.
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  • (1 other version)An abstract consideration: De-ontologizing the noema.John J. Drummond - 1992 - In John Drummond & Lester Embree (eds.), The Phenomenology of the Noema. Springer. pp. 89-109.
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  • Husserl's Type and Kant's Schemata: Systematic Reasons for Their Correlation or Identity.Dieter Lohmar - 2003 - In Donn Welton (ed.), The New Husserl: A Critical Reader. Indiana University Press.
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  • (1 other version)Finding the Noema.Dallas Willard - 1992 - In John Drummond & Lester Embree (eds.), The Phenomenology of the Noema. Springer.
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