- Updating on the Credences of Others: Disagreement, Agreement, and Synergy.Kenny Easwaran, Luke Fenton-Glynn, Christopher Hitchcock & Joel D. Velasco - 2016 - Philosophers' Imprint 16 (11):1-39.details
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The Principal Principle Implies the Principle of Indifference.James Hawthorne, Jürgen Landes, Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (1):axv030.details
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Probabilistic Opinion Pooling.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2016 - In Alan Hájek & Christopher Hitchcock (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.details
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Two mistakes about credence and chance.Ned Hall - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):93 – 111.details
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A subjectivist’s guide to objective chance.David K. Lewis - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 263-293.details
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Correcting the guide to objective chance.Ned Hall - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):505-518.details
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The Principal Principle Implies the Principle of Indifference.Jon Williamson, Christian Wallmann, Jürgen Landes & James Hawthorne - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (1):123-131.details
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Calibration for epistemic causality.Jon Williamson - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (4):941-960.details
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Bayesian conditionalisation and the principle of minimum information.P. M. Williams - 1980 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 31 (2):131-144.details
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(1 other version)The Principal Principle and subjective Bayesianism.Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-14.details
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Admissibility Troubles for Bayesian Direct Inference Principles.Christian Wallmann & James Hawthorne - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):957-993.details
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The Principal Principle Does Not Imply the Principle of Indifference, Because Conditioning on Biconditionals Is Counterintuitive.Michael G. Titelbaum & Casey Hart - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (2):621-632.details
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Testimony as Evidence: More Problems for Linear Pooling. [REVIEW]Katie Steele - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):983-999.details
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No one can serve two epistemic masters.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2389-2398.details
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On the Inadmissibility of Some Historical Information.Ittay Nissan-Rozen - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):479-493.details
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A puzzle about experts, evidential screening-off and conditionalization.Ittay Nissan-Rozen - 2020 - Episteme 17 (1):64-72.details
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A defense of imprecise credences in inference and decision making1.James M. Joyce - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):281-323.details
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Intuitive Dilation?Casey Hart & Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (4):252-262.details
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Randomness and the Right Reference Class.Henry E. Kyburg - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (9):501-521.details
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Learning from others: conditioning versus averaging.Richard Bradley - 2017 - Theory and Decision 85 (1):5-20.details
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In Defence of Objective Bayesianism.Jon Williamson - 2010 - Oxford University Press.details
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Lectures on Inductive Logic.Jon Williamson - 2017 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.details
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Probability Theory. The Logic of Science.Edwin T. Jaynes - 2002 - Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. Edited by G. Larry Bretthorst.details
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