- How Valuable Are Chances?H. Orii Stefansson & Richard Bradley - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (4):602-625.details
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Rationalizing the Principal Principle for Non-Humean Chance.J. Khawaja - manuscriptdetails
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Two-Dimensional De Se Chance Deference.J. Dmitri Gallow - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Deference Done Better.Kevin Dorst, Benjamin A. Levinstein, Bernhard Salow, Brooke E. Husic & Branden Fitelson - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):99-150.details
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Changes in attitude.Daniel Drucker - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):151-169.details
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Epistemic Risk and the Demands of Rationality.Richard Pettigrew - 2022 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Being Rational and Being Wrong.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23 (1).details
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Unprincipled.Gordon Belot - forthcoming - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-57.details
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Why Defend Humean Supervenience?Siegfried Jaag & Christian Loew - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy 117 (7):387-406.details
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What Chance Doesn’t Know.Harjit Bhogal & Michael Townsen Hicks - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.details
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Centering the Principal Principle.Isaac Wilhelm - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1897-1915.details
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Eternal Worlds and the Best System Account of Laws.Ryan A. Olsen & Christopher Meacham - 2020 - In Valia Allori (ed.), Statistical Mechanics and Scientific Explanation: Determinism, Indeterminism and Laws of Nature. World Scientific.details
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"Click!" Bait for Causalists.Huw Price & Yang Liu - 2018 - In Arif Ahmed (ed.), Newcomb's Problem. Cambridge University Press. pp. 160-179.details
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Impermissive Bayesianism.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2013 - Erkenntnis 79 (Suppl 6):1185-1217.details
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Time-Slice Rationality.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Mind 124 (494):449-491.details
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Fundamental Properties and the Laws of Nature.Heather Demarest - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (5):334-344.details
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Backwards Causation and the Chancy Past.John Cusbert - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):1-33.details
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What chance-credence norms should be.Mariangela Zoe Cocchiaro, Zalán Gyenis & Leszek Wroński - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-22.details
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Epistemic Akrasia: No Apology Required.David Christensen - 2022 - Noûs 1 (online first):1-22.details
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Epistemic akrasia: No apology required.David Christensen - 2024 - Noûs 58 (1):54-76.details
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Credence in the Image of Chance.Michael Caie - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (4):626-648.details
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The Metaphysics of Chance.Rachael Briggs - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (11):938-952.details
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The anatomy of the big bad bug.Rachael Briggs - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):428-449.details
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Foundations of Probability.Rachael Briggs - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):625-640.details
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The Mysteries of Self-Locating Belief and Anthropic Reasoning.Nick Bostrom - 2003 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 11 (1):59-73.details
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The Doomsday Argument Adam & Eve, UN++, and Quantum Joe.Nick Bostrom - 2001 - Synthese 127 (3):359-387.details
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When propriety is improper.Kevin Blackwell & Daniel Drucker - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):367-386.details
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On what we know about chance.Frank Arntzenius & Ned Hall - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2):171-179.details
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Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):251-278.details
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Higher-Order Evidence.Kevin Dorst - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 176-194.details
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The Meta-Reversibility Objection.Meacham Christopher - 2023 - In Barry Loewer, Brad Weslake & Eric B. Winsberg (eds.), The Probability Map of the Universe: Essays on David Albert’s _time and Chance_. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.details
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Confidence and coarse-grained attitudes.Scott Sturgeon - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 3--126.details
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Naturalism, Functionalism and Chance: Not a Best Fit for the Humean.Alison Fernandes - 2023 - In Christian Loew, Siegfried Jaag & Michael Townsen Hicks (eds.), Humean Laws for Human Agents. Oxford: Oxford UP.details
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Higher-order uncertainty.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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An Empiricist's Guide to Objective Modality.Jenann Ismael - 2017 - In Matthew H. Slater & Zanja Yudell (eds.), Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science: New Essays. New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 109-125.details
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The Principal Principle, admissibility, and normal informal standards of what is reasonable.Jürgen Landes, Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (2):1-15.details
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The Principal Principle Does Not Imply the Principle of Indifference.Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (2):605-619.details
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Measure theoretic analysis of consistency of the Principal Principle.Miklós Rédei & Zalán Gyenis - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (5):972-987.details
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On Uncertainty.Brian Weatherson - 1998 - Dissertation, Monash Universitydetails
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The Modal Future: A Theory of Future-Directed Thought and Talk.Fabrizio Cariani - 2021 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.details
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The Typical Principle.Isaac Wilhelm - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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Direct inference and probabilistic accounts of induction.Jon Williamson - 2023 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 54 (3):451-472.details
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Justified Inference.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):273-295.details
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Humeanism without Humean Supervenience: A Projectivist Account of Laws and Possibilities.Barry Ward - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (3):191-218.details
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The Principal Principle and subjective Bayesianism.Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-14.details
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The Principal Principle and subjective Bayesianism.Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-14.details
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Admissibility Troubles for Bayesian Direct Inference Principles.Christian Wallmann & James Hawthorne - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):957-993.details
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Who's afraid of undermining?Peter B. M. Vranas - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (2):151-174.details
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Have your cake and eat it too: The old principal principle reconciled with the new.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):368–382.details
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Have Your Cake and Eat It Too: The Old Principal Principle Reconciled with the New.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):368-382.details
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