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Killing Kripkenstein's Monster

Noûs 54 (2):257-289 (2020)

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  1. (4 other versions)Philosophical investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein & G. E. M. Anscombe - 1953 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 161:124-124.
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  • Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories.Ruth Millikan - 1984 - Behaviorism 14 (1):51-56.
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  • (1 other version)The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
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  • (2 other versions)Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 36 (3):602-605.
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  • (2 other versions)Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Foundations of Language 13 (1):145-151.
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  • Making it Explicit.Isaac Levi & Robert B. Brandom - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):145.
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  • (2 other versions)Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 42 (3):341-344.
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  • Wittgenstein on rules and private language.Saul Kripke - 1982 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 173 (4):496-499.
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  • (1 other version)What the tortoise said to Achilles.Lewis Carroll - 1895 - Mind 4 (14):278-280.
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  • Does a rock implement every finite-state automaton?David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Synthese 108 (3):309-33.
    Hilary Putnam has argued that computational functionalism cannot serve as a foundation for the study of the mind, as every ordinary open physical system implements every finite-state automaton. I argue that Putnam's argument fails, but that it points out the need for a better understanding of the bridge between the theory of computation and the theory of physical systems: the relation of implementation. It also raises questions about the class of automata that can serve as a basis for understanding the (...)
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  • How to speak of the colors.Mark Johnston - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.
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  • Grounding, transitivity, and contrastivity.Jonathan Schaffer - 2012 - In Fabrice Correia & Benjamin Schnieder (eds.), Metaphysical grounding: understanding the structure of reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 122-138.
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  • Putnam’s paradox.David Lewis - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):221 – 236.
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  • Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):589-601.
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  • Dispositions and conditionals.C. B. Martin - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):1-8.
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  • (1 other version)The rule-following considerations.Paul Boghossian - 1989 - Mind 98 (392):507-49.
    I. Recent years have witnessed a great resurgence of interest in the writings of the later Wittgenstein, especially with those passages roughly, Philosophical Investigations p)I 38 — 242 and Remarks on the Foundations of mathematics, section VI that are concerned with the topic of rules. Much of the credit for all this excitement, unparalleled since the heyday of Wittgenstein scholarship in the early IIJ6os, must go to Saul Kripke's I4rittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. It is easy to explain why. (...)
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  • (1 other version)Situations and Attitudes.Jon Barwise - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (11):668.
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  • (1 other version)Models and reality.Hilary Putnam - 1980 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3):464-482.
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  • (2 other versions)On the Very idea of a Conceptual Scheme.Donald Davidson - 1984 - In Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 183-198.
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  • Against Content Normativity.Kathrin Glüer & Åsa Wikforss - 2009 - Mind 118 (469):31-70.
    As meaning's claim to normativity has grown increasingly suspect the normativity thesis has shifted to mental content. In this paper, we distinguish two versions of content normativism: 'CE normativism', according to which it is essential to content that certain 'oughts' can be derived from it, and 'CD normativism', according to which content is determined by norms in the first place. We argue that neither type of normativism withstands scrutiny. CE normativism appeals to the fact that there is an essential connection (...)
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  • Representation and Reality.Robert Stalnaker - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):359.
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  • Primitive Normativity and Skepticism about Rules.Hannah Ginsborg - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (5):227-254.
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  • Meaning and normativity.Allan Gibbard - 1994 - Philosophical Issues 5:95-115.
    The concepts of meaning and mental content resist naturalistic analysis. This is because they are normative: they depend on ideas of how things ought to be.
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  • "Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics". By Ludwig Wittgenstein.G. D. Duthie - 1957 - Philosophical Quarterly 7 (29):368-373.
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  • Aspects of Scientific Explanation.Michael D. Resnik - 1966 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 27 (1):139-140.
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  • Is meaning normative?Anandi Hattiangadi - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (2):220-240.
    Many people claim that semantic content is normative, and that therefore naturalistic theories of content face a potentially insuperable difficulty. The normativity of content allegedly undermines naturalism by introducing a gap between semantic 'ought's and the explanatory resources of naturalism. I argue here that this problem is not ultimately pressing for naturalists. The normativity thesis, I maintain, is ambiguous; it could mean either that the content of a term prescribes a pattern of use, or that it merely determines which pattern (...)
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  • (1 other version)Semantic normativity.Åsa Maria Wikforss - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 102 (2):203-26.
    My paper examines the popular idea, defended by Kripke, that meaning is an essentially normative notion. I consider four common versions of this idea and suggest that none of them can be supported, either because the alleged normativity has nothing to do with normativity or because it cannot plausibly be said that meaning is normative in the sense suggested. I argue that contrary to received opinion, we don’t need normativity to secure the possibility of meaning. I conclude by considering the (...)
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  • Vagueness.Loretta Torrago - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (4):637.
    Consider an object or property a and the predicate F. Then a is vague if there are questions of the form: Is a F? that have no yes-or-no answers. In brief, vague properties and kinds have borderline instances and composite objects have borderline constituents. I'll use the expression "borderline cases" as a covering term for both. ;Having borderline cases is compatible with precision so long as every case is either borderline F, determinately F or determinately not F. Thus, in addition (...)
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  • (1 other version)The individual strikes back.Simon Blackburn - 1984 - Synthese 58 (March):281-302.
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  • (2 other versions)Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics.Michael Dummett - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (3):324-348.
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  • (1 other version)Models and reality.Hilary Putnam - 1983 - In Realism and reason. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-25.
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  • Is Meaning Fraught with Ought?Daniel Whiting - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (4):535-555.
    According to Normativism, what an expression means has immediate implications for how a subject should or may (not) employ that expression. Many view this thesis as imposing substantive constraints upon theories of linguistic meaning. In this paper, I shall not consider that view; instead, I shall address the prior issue of whether or not one should accept Normativism. Against certain recent prominent lines of attack common to a number of different anti‐Normativist discussions, I shall defend both the Normativist thesis and (...)
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  • Quotation.Donald Davidson - 1984 - In Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 79–92.
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  • The social aspect of language.Donald Davidson - 1994 - In Brian F. McGuinness & Gianluigi Oliveri (eds.), The Philosophy of Michael Dummett. Dordrecht, Netherland: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 1--16.
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  • (1 other version)Kripke’s Account of the Argument Against Private Language.Crispin Wright - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (12):759.
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  • Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.Christopher Peacocke - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (2):263.
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  • (2 other versions)Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics.Michael Dummett - 1997 - Journal of Philosophy 94 (7):166--85.
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  • Methodological reflections on current linguistic theory.W. V. Quine - 1970 - Synthese 21 (3-4):386-398.
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  • Dispositional properties.A. D. Smith - 1977 - Mind 86 (343):439-445.
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  • (1 other version)The Sharpness of Vague Terms.Paul Horwich - 2005 - In Reflections on meaning. New York : Oxford University Press,: Clarendon Press ;.
    According to the ancient sorites paradox, zero grains of sand is not enough to make a heap, and adding one single grain can never transform a non-heap into a heap, so there can be no heaps of sand! Similar reasoning applies to all vague terms. In view of this problem, some philosophers have suggested that we must modify classical logic. This chapter argues that there is no need for this, for we should allow that one grain of sand can make (...)
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  • Dispositions, rules, and finks.Toby Handfield & Alexander Bird - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 140 (2):285 - 298.
    This paper discusses the prospects of a dispositional solution to the Kripke–Wittgenstein rule-following puzzle. Recent attempts to employ dispositional approaches to this puzzle have appealed to the ideas of finks and antidotes—interfering dispositions and conditions—to explain why the rule-following disposition is not always manifested. We argue that this approach fails: agents cannot be supposed to have straightforward dispositions to follow a rule which are in some fashion masked by other, contrary dispositions of the agent, because in all cases, at least (...)
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  • Normativity in Reasoning.John Broome - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4):622-633.
    Reasoning is a process through which premise-attitudes give rise to a conclusion-attitude. When you reason actively you operate on the propositions that are the contents of your premise-attitudes, following a rule, to derive a new proposition that is the content of your conclusion-attitude. It may seem that, when you follow a rule, you must, at least implicitly, have the normative belief that you ought to comply with the rule, which guides you to comply. But I argue that to follow a (...)
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  • The Normative Force of Promising.Jack Woods - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 6:77-101.
    Why do promises give rise to reasons? I consider a quadruple of possibilities which I think will not work, then sketch the explanation of the normativity of promising I find more plausible—that it is constitutive of the practice of promising that promise-breaking implies liability for blame and that we take liability for blame to be a bad thing. This effects a reduction of the normativity of promising to conventionalism about liability together with instrumental normativity and desire-based reasons. This is important (...)
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  • If You Can’t Make One, You Don’t Know How It Works.Fred Dretske - 1994 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):468-482.
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  • Rule-following, ideal conditions, and finkish dispositions.Andrea Guardo - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (2):195-209.
    This paper employs some outcomes (for the most part due to David Lewis) of the contemporary debate on the metaphysics of dispositions to evaluate those dispositional analyses of meaning that make use of the concept of a disposition in ideal conditions. The first section of the paper explains why one may find appealing the notion of an ideal-condition dispositional analysis of meaning and argues that Saul Kripke’s well-known argument against such analyses is wanting. The second section focuses on Lewis’ work (...)
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  • Introduction: Prospects and problems for teleosemantics.Graham Macdonald & David Papineau - 2006 - In Graham Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics: New Philo-sophical Essays. New York: Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 1--22.
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  • A Sceptical Guide to Meaning and Rules: Defending Kripke's Wittgenstein.Jussi Haukioja - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):688-690.
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  • (2 other versions)Kripke on Wittgenstein on rules.Warren D. Goldfarb - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (September):471-488.
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  • Sense and prescriptivity.Kathrin Gluer - 1999 - Acta Analytica 14 (23):111-128.
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  • Naturalizing content.Paul Boghossian - 1990 - In Barry M. Loewer (ed.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
    The conviction that intentional realism requires intentional reductionism has the philosophy of mind in its grip. Thus, Jerry Fodor: .... It is worth noting — if only because it so seldom is nowadays — that this rationale for the naturalistic conviction begs a question that doesn't obviously deserve to be begged. Why, indeed, must we think that no property can be real unless it is identical with, or supervenient upon, the properties that appear in the catalogues provided by physics? There (...)
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