- Ethics without principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Being Realistic About Reasons.Thomas Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Value in ethics and economics.Elizabeth Anderson - 1993 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.details
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Moral Luck.B. A. O. Williams & T. Nagel - 1976 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 50 (1):115-152.details
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(1 other version)The Wrong Kind of Reason.Pamela Hieronymi - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.details
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From Normativity to Responsibility.Joseph Raz - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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The Norm of Belief.John Gibbons - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)The normativity of rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2013 - Dissertation, Humboldt University of Berlindetails
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The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.details
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Being for Beauty: Aesthetic Agency and Value.Dominic Lopes - 2018 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Ethics 122 (3):457-488.details
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Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Philosophy 78 (305):414-425.details
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Being More Realistic About Reasons: On Rationality and Reasons Perspectivism.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):605-627.details
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Acting for the right reasons.Julia Markovits - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (2):201-242.details
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Disagreements about taste.Timothy Sundell - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (2):267-288.details
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A new argument for evidentialism.Nishi Shah - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498.details
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There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes.Barry Maguire - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):779-805.details
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What is a Reason to Act?Kieran Setiya - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):221-235.details
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(2 other versions)The Nature of Morality.D. Z. Phillips & Gilbert Harman - 1977 - Philosophical Quarterly 28 (110):89.details
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On Liking Aesthetic Value.Keren Gorodeisky - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2):261-280.details
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Should I Believe the Truth?Daniel Whiting - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (2):213-224.details
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The Value-Based Theory of Reasons.Barry Maguire - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.details
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Rationality and Reasons.Derek Parfit - unknowndetails
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Transmission and the Wrong Kind of Reason.Jonathan Way - 2012 - Ethics 122 (3):489-515.details
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Against Second‐Order Reasons.Daniel Whiting - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):398-420.details
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Reasons and Guidance.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (3):214-235.details
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The rationality of belief and other propositional attitudes.Thomas Kelly - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (2):163-96.details
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We Have No Positive Epistemic Duties.Mark T. Nelson - 2010 - Mind 119 (473):83-102.details
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Reasons Wrong and Right.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (3):371-399.details
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Art, emotion and ethics.Berys Nigel Gaut - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Acting for the Right Reasons, Abilities, and Obligation.Errol Lord - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 10.details
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Reasons: Wrong, Right, Normative, Fundamental.Kurt Sylvan & Errol Lord - 2019 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 15 (1).details
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In defense of objectivism about moral obligation.Peter A. Graham - 2010 - Ethics 121 (1):88-115.details
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Art, Emotion and Ethics.Berys Gaut - 2008 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 66 (2):199-201.details
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Grounding Aesthetic Obligations.Robbie Kubala - 2018 - British Journal of Aesthetics 58 (3):271-285.details
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We Have No Reason to Think There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes.David Faraci - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):225-234.details
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Does belief (only) aim at the truth?Daniel Whiting - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300.details
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(1 other version)Acting for the Right Reasons, Abilities, and Obligation.Errol Lord - 2015 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 10. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Goodness and Advice.Judith JarvisHG Thomson - 2009 - Princeton University Press.details
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Reasons and Impossibility.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):351-384.details
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Robust Immoralism.A. W. Eaton - 2012 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 70 (3):281-292.details
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Faultless Disagreement and Aesthetic Realism.Karl Schafer - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):265-286.details
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Buck-passing and the wrong kind of reasons.Jonas Olson - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):295–300.details
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Art Criticism as Practical Reasoning.Anthony Cross - 2017 - British Journal of Aesthetics 57 (3):299-317.details
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Moral Realism, Aesthetic Realism, and the Asymmetry Claim.Louise Hanson - 2018 - Ethics 129 (1):39-69.details
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An Absolutist Theory of Faultless Disagreement in Aesthetics.Carl Baker & Jon Robson - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (3):429-448.details
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The Amoralist and the Anaesthetic.Alex King - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (4):632-663.details
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Approach to aesthetics: collected papers on philosophical aesthetics.Frank Sibley (ed.) - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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