- Reasons, Values and Agent‐Relativity.R. Jay Wallace - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (4):503-528.details
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Is Love Based On Reasons?Dalia Drai - 2016 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 12 (1):5-26.details
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The right and the wrong kind of reasons.Jan Gertken & Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (5):e12412.details
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(1 other version)The Consequential Conception of Doxastic Responsibility.Anne Https://Orcidorg Meylan - 2016 - Theoria 82 (4):4-28.details
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In Defense of Practical Reasons for Belief.Stephanie Leary - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):529-542.details
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Reasons Wrong and Right.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (3):371-399.details
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(1 other version)Responsibility, Reaction, and Value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2010 - The Journal of Ethics 14 (2):103-115.details
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Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value.Ben Bradley - 2006 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (2):111-130.details
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Your death might be the worst thing ever to happen to you (but maybe you shouldn't care).Travis Timmerman - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):18-37.details
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A moral reason to be a mere theist: improving the practical argument.Xiaofei Liu - 2016 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 79 (2):113-132.details
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Constructivism in Ethics.Carla Bagnoli (ed.) - 2013 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Reasons as explanations.John Brunero - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):805-824.details
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Exercising Doxastic Freedom.Conor Mchugh - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):1-37.details
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Believing at Will.Pamela Hieronymi - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 35 (sup1):149-187.details
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Moral Blameworthiness and the Reactive Attitudes.Leonard Kahn - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (2):131-142.details
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The buck-passing account of value: lessons from Crisp.S. Matthew Liao - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):421 - 432.details
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Buck-passing accounts of value.Jussi Suikkanen - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):768-779.details
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Abandoning the buck passing analysis of final value.Andrew E. Reisner - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):379 - 395.details
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The right kind of solution to the wrong kind of reason problem.Gerald Lang - 2008 - Utilitas 20 (4):472-489.details
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The possibility of pragmatic reasons for belief and the wrong kind of reasons problem.Andrew Reisner - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):257 - 272.details
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(1 other version)Value and the right kind of reason.Mark Schroeder - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 5:25-55.details
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(1 other version)The Wrong Kind of Reason.Pamela Hieronymi - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.details
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Intrinsic vs. extrinsic value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Buck-passing and the right kind of reasons.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):114–120.details
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(1 other version)Fitting attitudes and welfare.Chris Heathwood - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3:47-73.details
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Reasons and value – in defence of the buck-passing account.Jussi Suikkanen - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (5):513 - 535.details
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G. E. Moore on goodness and reasons.Jonas Olson - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):525 – 534.details
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A field guide to social construction.Ron Mallon - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 2 (1):93–108.details
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Brentano and the Buck-Passers.Sven Danielsson & Jonas Olson - 2007 - Mind 116 (463):511 - 522.details
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(1 other version)Arguments from reference and the worry about dependence.Ron Mallon - 2007 - In Peter A. French & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Philosophy and the Empirical. Blackwell. pp. 160-183.details
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The Right Kind of Reason for the Wrong Kind of Thing.Laura Tomlinson Makin - 2023 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 21 (1-2):106-126.details
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Positive illusion and the normativity of substantive and structural rationality.Tsung-Hsing Ho - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 26 (3).details
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How Final and Non-Final Valuing Differ.Levi Tenen - 2022 - The Journal of Ethics 26 (4):683-704.details
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The explanatory objection to the fitting attitude analysis of value.Francesco Orsi & Andrés G. Garcia - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (4):1207-1221.details
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Ambidextrous Reasons (or Why Reasons First's Reasons Aren't Facts).Nathan Robert Howard - 2021 - Philosophers' Imprint 21 (30):1-16.details
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A Humean explanation of acting on normative reasons.Elizabeth Radcliffe - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1269-1292.details
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Aesthetic Reasons and the Demands They (Do Not) Make.Daniel Whiting - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (2):407-427.details
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Subjectivism and the Framework of Constitutive Grounds.Andrés G. Garcia & Jakob Green Werkmäster - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (1):155-167.details
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The Wrong Kind of Reasons.Nye Howard - 2018 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 340-354.details
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Ethics, Fitting Attitudes, and Practical Reason: A Theory of Normative Facts.Howard Nye - 2009 - Dissertation, University of Michigandetails
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Stephen Darwall, Welfare and Rational Care, Princeton Monographs in Philosophy, Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 2002. 135 pp. [REVIEW]Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2004 - SATS 5 (1):171-180.details
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Fitting Attitudes And Essentially Contestable Concepts.Cain Todd - 2012 - Filosofia Unisinos 13 (2 - suppl.).details
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The Use of Reasons in Thought (and the Use of Earmarks in Arguments).Pamela Hieronymi - 2013 - Ethics 124 (1):114-127.details
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(1 other version)The FA Analysis of Emotional Values and Practical Reasons.Stephane Lemaire - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (1):31-53.details
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Transmission and the Wrong Kind of Reason.Jonathan Way - 2012 - Ethics 122 (3):489-515.details
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(2 other versions)Resisting the Buck-Passing Account of Value.Pekka Väyrynen - 2006 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 295-324.details
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(1 other version)The Consequential Conception of Doxastic Responsibility.Anne Https://Orcidorg Meylan - 2016 - Theoria 83 (1):4-28.details
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Reasons and Normativity.Jakob Green Werkmäster - 2019 - Dissertation, Lund Universitydetails
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Two Reasons Why Epistemic Reasons Are Not Object‐Given Reasons.Anthony Robert Booth - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):1-14.details
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Psychopaths and Filthy Desks: Are Emotions Necessary and Sufficient for Moral Judgment?Hanno Sauer - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1):95-115.details
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