Results for 'AGM'

21 found
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  1.  27
    The AGM Theory and Inconsistent Belief Change.Koji Tanaka - 2005 - Logique Et Analyse 48 (189-192):113-150.
    The problem of how to accommodate inconsistencies has attracted quite a number of researchers, in particular, in the area of database theory. The problem is also of (...)
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  2.  25
    AGM-Like Paraconsistent Belief Change.Rafael R. Testa, Marcelo E. Coniglio & Marcio M. Ribeiro - 2017 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 25 (4):632-672.
    Two systems of belief change based on paraconsistent logics are introduced in this article by means of AGM-like postulates. The first one, AGMp, is defined over (...)any paraconsistent logic which extends classical logic such that the law of excluded middle holds w.r.t. the paraconsistent negation. The second one, AGMo , is specifically designed for paraconsistent logics known as Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs), which have a formal consistency operator that allows to recover all the classical inferences. Besides the three usual operations over belief sets, namely expansion, contraction and revision (which is obtained from contraction by the Levi identity), the underlying paraconsistent logic allows us to define additional operations involving (non-explosive) contradictions. Thus, it is defined external revision (which is obtained from contraction by the reverse Levi identity), consolidation and semi-revision, all of them over belief sets. It is worth noting that the latter operations, introduced by S. Hansson, involve the temporary acceptance of contradictory beliefs, and so they were originally defined only for belief bases. Unlike to previous proposals in the literature, only defined for specific paraconsistent logics, the present approach can be applied to a general class of paraconsistent logics which are supraclassical, thus preserving the spirit of AGM. Moreover, representation theorems w.r.t. constructions based on selection functions are obtained for all the operations. (shrink)
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  3. Transmission Failure, AGM-Style.Jake Chandler - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (2):383-398.
    This article provides a discussion of the principle of transmission of evidential support across entailment from the perspective of belief revision theory in the AGM tradition. After (...)
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  4. Belief Revision I: The AGM Theory.Franz Huber - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):604-612.
    Belief revision theory studies how an ideal doxastic agent should revise her beliefs when she receives new information. In part I I will first present the AGM (...)
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  5.  18
    On Strengthening the Logic of Iterated Belief Revision: Proper Ordinal Interval Operators.Jake Chandler & Richard Booth - 2018 - In Michael Thielscher, Francesca Toni & Frank Wolter (eds.), Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR2018). Palo Alto, CA, USA: pp. 210-219.
    Darwiche and Pearls seminal 1997 article outlined a number of baseline principles for a logic of iterated belief revision. These principles, the DP postulates, have been (...)supplemented in a number of alternative ways. Most suggestions have resulted in a form ofreductionismthat identifies belief states with orderings of worlds. However, this position has recently been criticised as being unacceptably strong. Other proposals, such as the popular principle (P), akaIndependence’, characteristic ofadmissibleoperators, remain commendably more modest. In this paper, we supplement the DP postulates and (P) with a number of novel conditions. While the DP postulates constrain the relation between a prior and a posterior conditional belief set, our new principles notably govern the relation between two posterior conditional belief sets obtained from a common prior by different revisions. We show that operators from the resulting family, which subsumes both lexicographic and restrained revision, can be represented as relating belief states associated with aproper ordinal interval’ (POI) assignment, a structure more fine-grained than a simple ordering of worlds. We close the paper by noting that these operators satisfy iterated versions of many AGM era postulates, including Superexpansion, that are not sound for admissible operators in general. (shrink)
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  6.  57
    Extending Dynamic Doxastic Logic: Accommodating Iterated Beliefs And Ramsey Conditionals Within DDL.Sten Lindström & Wiodek Rabinowicz - 1997 - In Lars Lindahl, Paul Needham & Ryszard Sliwinski (eds.), For Good Measure. Uppsala, Sverige:
    In this paper we distinguish between various kinds of doxastic theories. One distinction is between informal and formal doxastic theories. AGM-type theories of belief change are (...)of the former kind, while Hintikkas logic of knowledge and belief is of the latter. Then we distinguish between static theories that study the unchanging beliefs of a certain agent and dynamic theories that investigate not only the constraints that can reasonably be imposed on the doxastic states of a rational agent but also rationality constraints on the changes of doxastic state that may occur in such agents. An additional distinction is that between non-introspective theories and introspective ones. Non-introspective theories investigate agents that have opinions about the external world but no higher-order opinions about their own doxasticnstates. Standard AGM-type theories as well as the currently existing versions of Segerbergs dynamic doxastic logic (DDL) are non-introspective. Hintikka-style doxastic logic is of course introspective but it is a static theory. Thus, the challenge remains to devise doxastic theories that are both dynamic and introspective. We outline the semantics for truly introspective dynamic doxastic logic, i.e., a dynamic doxastic logic that allows us to describe agents who have both the ability to form higher-order beliefs and to reflect upon and change their minds about their own (higher-order) beliefs. This extension of DDL demands that we give up the Preservation condition on revision. We make some suggestions as to how such a non-preservative revision operation can be constructed. We also consider extending DDL with conditionals satisfying the Ramsey test and show that Gärdenforswell-known impossibility result applies to such a framework. Also in this case, Preservation has to be given up. (shrink)
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  7.  46
    Epistemic Entrenchment with Incomparabilities and Relational Belief Revision.Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1991 - In André Fuhrmann & Michael Morreau (eds.), The Logic of Theory Change. Springer. pp. 93--126.
    In earlier papers (Lindström & Rabinowicz, 1989. 1990), we proposed a generalization of the AGM approach to belief revision. Our proposal was to view belief revision as a (...) relation rather thanas a function on theories (or belief sets). The idea was to allow for there being several equally reasonable revisions of a theory with a given proposition. In the present paper, we show that the relational approach is the natural result of generalizing in a certain way an approach to belief revision due to Adam Grove. In his (1988) paper, Grove presents two closely related modelings of functional belief revision, one in terms of a family of "spheres" around the agent's theory G and the other in terms of an epistemic entrenchment ordering of propositions. The "sphere"-terminology is natural when one looks upon theories and propositions as being represented by sets of possible worlds. Grove's spheres may be thought of as possible "fallback" theories relative to the agent's original theory: theories that he may reach by deleting propositions that are not "sufficiently" entrenched (according to standards of sufficient entrenchment of varying stringency). To put it differently, fallbacks are theories that are closed upwards under entrenchment The entrenchment ordering can be recovered from the family of fallbacks by the definition: A is at least as entrenched as B iff A belongs to every fallback to which B belongs. To revise a theory T with a proposition A, we go to the smallest sphere that contain A-worlds and intersect it with A. The relational notion of belief revision that we are interested in, results from weakening epistemic entrenchment by not assuming it to be connected. I.e., we want to allow that some propositions may be incomparable with respect to epistemic entrenchment. As a result, the family of fallbacks around a given theory will no longer have to be nested. This change opens up the possibility for several different ways of revising a theory with a given proposition. (shrink)
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  8. Paraconsistent Belief Revision Based on a Formal Consistency Operator.Rafael R. Testa, Marcelo E. Coniglio & Márcio M. Ribeiro - 2015 - CLE E-Prints 15 (8):01-11.
    In this paper two systems of AGM-like Paraconsistent Belief Revision are overviewed, both defined over Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs) due to the possibility of defining (...)a formal consistency operator within these logics. The AGM° system is strongly based on this operator and internalize the notion of formal consistency in the explicit constructions and postulates. Alternatively, the AGMp system uses the AGM-compliance of LFIs and thus assumes a wider notion of paraconsistency - not necessarily related to the notion of formal consistency. (shrink)
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  9.  6
    On An Error In Grove's Proof.Koji Tanaka & Graham Priest - 1997 - Logique Et Analyse 158:215-217.
    Nearly a decade has past since Grove gave a semantics for the AGM postulates. The semantics, called sphere semantics, provided a new perspective of the area of (...)
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  10. The Irreducibility of Iterated to Single Revision.Jake Chandler & Richard Booth - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (4):405-418.
    After a number of decades of research into the dynamics of rational belief, the belief revision theory community remains split on the appropriate handling of sequences of (...)
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  11.  66
    Some Connections Between Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Nonadditive Probability.Philippe Mongin - 1992 - In Paul Humphreys (ed.), Patrick Suppes: Scientific Philosopher. Dordrecht: Kluwer. pp. 135-171.
    This paper is concerned with representations of belief by means of nonadditive probabilities of the Dempster-Shafer (DS) type. After surveying some foundational issues and results in (...)the D.S. theory, including Suppes's related contributions, the paper proceeds to analyze the connection of the D.S. theory with some of the work currently pursued in epistemic logic. A preliminary investigation of the modal logic of belief functions à la Shafer is made. There it is shown that the Alchourrron-Gärdenfors-Makinson (A.G.M.) logic of belief change is closely related to the D.S. theory. The final section compares the critique of Bayesianism which underlies the present paper with some important objections raised by Suppes against this doctrine. -/- . (shrink)
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  12.  47
    The Ramsey Test Revisited.Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1995 - In G. Crocco, L. Fariñas del Cerro & A. Herzig (eds.), Conditionals: From Philosophy to Computer Science. Oxford University Press. pp. 131-182.
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  13.  70
    Simple Hyperintensional Belief Revision.F. Berto - 2018 - Erkenntnis:1-17.
    I present a possible worlds semantics for a hyperintensional belief revision operator, which reduces the logical idealization of cognitive agents affecting similar operators in doxastic and epistemic (...)
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  14. Approaching the Truth Via Belief Change in Propositional Languages.Gustavo Cevolani & Francesco Calandra - 2010 - In M. Suàrez, M. Dorato & M. Rèdei (eds.), EPSA Epistemology and Methodology of Science: Launch of the European Philosophy of Science Association. Springer. pp. 47--62.
    Starting from the sixties of the past century theory change has become a main concern of philosophy of science. Two of the best known formal accounts of (...)
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  15.  80
    DDL Unlimited: Dynamic Doxastic Logic for Introspective Agents.Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1999 - Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):353-385.
    The theories of belief change developed within the AGM-tradition are not logics in the proper sense, but rather informal axiomatic theories of belief change. Instead of (...)characterizing the models of belief and belief change in a formalized object language, the AGM-approach uses a natural languageordinary mathematical Englishto characterize the mathematical structures that are under study. Recently, however, various authors such as Johan van Benthem and Maarten de Rijke have suggested representing doxastic change within a formal logical language: a dynamic modal logic. Inspired by these suggestions Krister Segerberg has developed a very general logical framework for reasoning about doxastic change: dynamic doxastic logic (DDL). This framework may be seen as an extension of standard Hintikka-style doxastic logic with dynamic operators representing various kinds of transformations of the agent's doxastic state. Basic DDL describes an agent that has opinions about the external world and an ability to change these opinions in the light of new information. Such an agent is non-introspective in the sense that he lacks opinions about his own belief states. Here we are going to discuss various possibilities for developing a dynamic doxastic logic for introspective agents: full DDL or DDL unlimited. The project of constructing such a logic is faced with difficulties due to the fact that the agents own doxastic state now becomes a part of the reality that he is trying to explore: when an introspective agent learns more about the world, then the reality he holds beliefs about undergoes a change. But then his introspective (higher-order) beliefs have to be adjusted accordingly. In the paper we shall consider various ways of solving this problem. (shrink)
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  16. Belief Revision II: Ranking Theory.Franz Huber - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):613-621.
    Belief revision theory studies how an ideal doxastic agent should revise her beliefs when she receives new information. In part I, I have first presented the AGM (...)
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  17. Presuppositions, Logic, and Dynamics of Belief.Slavko Brkic - 2004 - Prolegomena 3 (2):151-177.
    In researching presuppositions dealing with logic and dynamic of belief we distinguish two related parts. The first part refers to presuppositions and logic, which is not necessarily (...)
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  18.  11
    Extending the Harper Identity to Iterated Belief Change.Jake Chandler & Richard Booth - 2016 - In Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI).
    The field of iterated belief change has focused mainly on revision, with the other main operator of AGM belief change theory, i.e. contraction, receiving relatively little (...)attention. In this paper we extend the Harper Identity from single-step change to define iterated contraction in terms of iterated revision. Specifically, just as the Harper Identity provides a recipe for defining the belief set resulting from contracting A in terms of (i) the initial belief set and (ii) the belief set resulting from revision by ¬A, we look at ways to define the plausibility ordering over worlds resulting from contracting A in terms of (iii) the initial plausibility ordering, and (iv) the plausibility ordering resulting from revision by ¬A. After noting that the most straightforward such extension leads to a trivialisation of the space of permissible orderings, we provide a family of operators for combining plausibility orderings that avoid such a result. These operators are characterised in our domain of interest by a pair of intuitively compelling properties, which turn out to enable the derivation of a number of iterated contraction postulates from postulates for iterated revision. We finish by observing that a salient member of this family allows for the derivation of counterparts for contraction of some well known iterated revision operators, as well as for defining new iterated contraction operators. (shrink)
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  19.  20
    Belief Revision in Science: Informational Economy and Paraconsistency.Daniel Coimbra - 2017 - Contemplação 1 (15):19-38.
    In the present paper, our objective is to examine the application of belief revision models to scientific rationality. We begin by considering the standard model AGM, and (...)
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  20.  88
    On Action Theory Change.Ivan José Varzinczak - 2010 - Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 37 (1):189-246.
    As historically acknowledged in the Reasoning about Actions and Change community, intuitiveness of a logical domain description cannot be fully automated. Moreover, like any other logical theory, (...)
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  21.  69
    Modelling Belief Revision Via Belief Bases Using Situation Semantics.Ayse Sena Bozdag - 2017 - Dissertation, Bogazici University
    The belief base approach to belief representation and belief dynamics is developed as an alternative to the belief set approaches, which are pioneered by the AGM model. (...)
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