In my paper, I shall provide a reading of Diogenes of Apollonia such that his understanding of the metaphysics of differentiation and of individual ensoulment may constitute an ingenious answer to the problems of his time. To this extent, I will argue that Diogenes' worldview solves the difficulties of Anaxagoras' metaphysics and successfully integrates mentality in a causally closed conception of nature. Finally, I will suggest that a Diogenes-inspired approach might be relevant to treat some pressing concerns in the (...) contemporary philosophy of mind – thus demonstrating how his production might offer some interesting solutions for the problems of our time too. (shrink)

In fragment B 12 Anaxagoras asserted: ‘And [Mind] has every gnômê concerning everything and is strong to the greatest degree.’ The definitions of gnômê given in the standard Greek lexicon cover a wide range: ‘mark’, ‘token’, ‘intelligence’, ‘thought’, ‘judgment’, ‘understanding’, ‘attention’, ‘conscience’, ‘reason’, ‘will’, ‘disposition’, ‘inclination’, ‘purpose’, ‘initiative’, ‘opinion’, ‘verdict’, ‘decision’, ‘proposition’, ‘resolution’, ‘advice’, and ‘maxim’. Taking a clue from the assonance of ischei (has) with ischuei (is strong), it would be natural to take both parts of the assertion (...) to be concerned with the extent of Mind’s strength, and this would suggest the translation: ‘for it holds every decision concerning everything and (thereby) has the greatest strength’. So understood, both parts of the assertion would be reinforcing Anaxagoras’ basic claim that Mind ‘rules over’ (kratein) everything. Thus, what Anaxagoras’ cosmic nous does is provide just the kind of intelligent oversight nous typically provides in early Greek poetry and philosophy. (shrink)

I argue that a common interpretation of DA 3.4, which sees Aristotle as there rejecting Anaxagoras’s account of mind, is mistaken. Instead, I claim that, in providing his solution to the main puzzles of this chapter, Aristotle takes special care to preserve the essential features that he thinks Anaxagoras ascribes to mind, namely, its ability to know all things, its being unmixed, and its inability to be affected by mixed objects.

Aristotle introduced in the history of the reception of Anaxagoras the term “homoiomerous.” This word refers to substances whose parts are similar to each other and to the whole. Although Aristotle’s explanations can be puzzling, the term “homoiomerous” may explain an authentic aspect of Anaxagoras’ doctrine reflected in the fragments of his work. Perhaps one should find a specific meaning for the term “homoiomerous” in Anaxagoras, somewhat different from the one present in Aristotle. This requires a review (...) of the sense of the two terms involved in it: “homoios” and “moira.” In other words, the following questions should be answered: what realities are named parts and to what whole do they belong? On the other hand, which similarity do they have to each another and to the whole? The author concludes that the parts are “all things,” which resemble each other and the universe as a whole because, according to Anaxagoras, they are all composed of all things. (shrink)

In order to show the relevance of the Presocratic thinkers, certain achievements are sometimes presented as anticipations of some discoveries made by contemporary science. Anaxagoras’ explanation for the origin of the world in particular has been compared to the Big Bang theory by some scholars. The purpose of this article is to show why this theory is very different from Anaxagoras’ view of the origin of the world. For Anaxagoras, the world does not start from a tiny (...) expanding particle. Rather, already before the beginning of the cosmos, there is a totality filled by a primordial mixture. The world emerges in it as a kind of dilating bubble. The cosmos grows by means of a whirl which absorbs the exterior mixture, deconstructing it to give origin to the different things that we know. This vortex is a unique explanation for multiple phenomena, not only helping to understand the origin of the world but also the present cosmos, which is in continuous expansion, since cosmogenesis has not been interrupted. (shrink)

Anaxagoras’ theory of the nous constitutes one aspect of his philosophy particularly interesting for Aristotle. However, he maintains a somewhat bivalent position about it: on the one hand, he praises the Presocratic philosopher for putting the nous as the first principle, while on the other, he shows his disappointment. According to him, Anaxagoras’ nous works insufficiently in the universe, but it is also the cause of goodness, indeed it is the Good capitalized. Our goal is to explain how (...) Aristotle was able to develop both types of seemingly inconsistent discourse concerning Anaxagorean nous. Two solutions to this dilemma are offered: even although some teleology exists in Anaxagoras’ philosophy, it is insufficient for Plato and Aristotle; the reception of the thought of Anaxagoras in later authors still before Aristotle furtively associates goodness with nous. (shrink)

Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494) focuses on Anaxagoras (ca. 500-428 BC) because he considers him as a precursor of the the later Neoplatonic concept all things exist in all things in their own mode, which became the core of Pico’s metaphysics. Anaxagoras’s philosophy permits Pico to establish his doctrine that all things share a portion of God within them, in their own way. Pico rejects the fixed position of man in the ontological hierarchy. Man has the chance to (...) become everything. Pico asserts that man contains all things in himself as their center, just like God contains all things as their origin. As a consequence, Anaxagoras’s principle is supportive to Pico’s metaphysics. Furthermore, Anaxagoras’s metaphysical principle is supportive of Pico’s method of allegorical interpretation, which is indispensable for his syncretism and his attempt to reveal hidden truths in every text or level of reality. (shrink)

For Anaxagoras, both before the beginning of the world and in the present, “all is together” and “everything is in everything.” Various modern interpretations abound regarding the identity of this “mixture.” It has been explained as an aggregation of particles or as a continuous “fusion” of different sorts of ingredients. However—even though they are not usually recognized as a distinct group—there are a number of other scholars who, without seemingly knowing each other, have offered a different interpreta- tion: (...) class='Hi'>Anaxagoras’ mixture as an “interpenetration” of different ingredients, which are as far-extended as the whole mixture is. As a result, there are different entities occupying the same place at the same time. This explanation assigns to Anaxagoras the same model of mixture which was later used by the Stoics. A new book by Marmodoro helps us to clarify this position. (shrink)

Aristotle introduced in the history of the reception of Anaxagoras the term ‘homoiomerous’. This word refers to substances whose parts are similar to each other and to the whole. Although Aristotle’s explanations can be puzzling, the term ‘homoiomerous’ may explain an authentic aspect of Anaxagoras’ doctrine reflected in the fragments of his work. Perhaps one should find a specific meaning for the term ‘homoiomerous’ in Anaxagoras, somewhat different from the one present in Aristotle. This requires a review (...) of the sense of the two terms involved in it: ‘homoios’ and ‘moira’. In other words, the following questions should be answered: what realities are named parts and to what whole they belong? On the other hand, which similarity do they have to each another and to the whole? The author concludes that the parts are “all things,” which resemble each other and the universe as a whole because, according to Anaxagoras, they are all composed of all things. (shrink)

The closing chapters of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics x are regularly described as “puzzling,” “extremely abrupt,” “awkward,” or “surprising” to readers. Whereas the previous nine books described—sometimes in lavish detail—the multifold ethical virtues of an embodied person situated within communities of family, friends, and fellow-citizens, NE x 6-8 extol the rarified, god-like and solitary existence of a sophos or sage (1179a32). The ethical virtues that take up approximately the first half of the Ethics describe moral exempla who experience fear fighting for (...) their communities, are sensitive to the esteem and recognition of others, and feel love for a desire to live together with a wide variety of kinds of friends. Such good people take pleasure in prudently expending sums to improve their communities—communities in which they exchange goods and participate in ruling and being ruled in a cooperative fashion. The exemplum of x 7-8, by contrast, is a person whose activity consists almost entirely in exercising his or her mind (nous)—a part of one’s soul that Aristotle explicitly notes is disconnected from human emotions and that can be exercised, insofar as one as wise, in a wholly solitary fashion (1178a15-16, a19-20; 1177a33-34). Although Aristotle’s claim that a “life in accord with the mind” is best and most pleasant (1178a6-7) may jar the intuitions of many people—he himself endorses Anaxagoras’ claim that the happy person will appear as “someone who is absurd” (atopos, 1179a15) to most people—it is false to claim that his conclusions in NE x 6-8 are unexpected or unanticipated, or that the text is in any way discontinuous with what precedes it. The Nicomachean Ethics exhibits aspects of ring-composition both within the work as a whole and within book 10. In NE i 5 Aristotle introduces his rendition of a trope that he inherits (most immediately) from Plato, viz. that the problem of the good can be considered like a contest between three different kinds of life—the life of enjoyment (apolaustikos), the life of politics (politikos), and the life of contemplation (theôrêtikos). NE x 6-8 returns to that contest, rendering a verdict about which life takes first, second, and third place. As the opening lines of NE x 6 note, that verdict presupposes central claims articulated between the first and last books of the Ethics, specifically about the nature of the virtues, the nature of friendship, and the nature of pleasure. NE i 5 and x 6-8 thus serve as “bookends” which encase arguments and proposition located between them. Book 10 exhibits a similar ring-composition. NE x opens with methodological reflection on the gap between the theoretical positions that thinkers articulate and the way they live their lives (especially in the case of scolds who simultaneously criticize pleasure on a scientific level but seek it on a practical level [1172a33-b8]). Chapter 8 concludes with an explicit reiteration of the methodological point, a reiteration that underscores how Aristotle’s treatment of the contest of lives incorporates central aspects of the discussion of pleasure in NE x 1-5. Aristotle’s reiteration of the problem of a gap between theory and practice also draws attention to the centrality of his treatment of pleasure in his adjudication of the three lives. Although the life of pleasure takes a distant third in the contest of lives, the contemplative life wins the contest in part because it itself is the most pleasant form of life. The central philosophical problem looming behind Aristotle’s treatment of the contest of lives concerns the relationship between the notion of activity (energeia) and the notion of a way of life (bios). In the last four decades, much of the scholarship on NE x 6-8 has sought to address the question of what activities a certain way of life includes or excludes. “Monistic” or “dominant” end interpretations of the best life have viewed it as including only contemplative activities whereas “inclusivist” end interpretations of the best life have viewed it as including non-contemplative activities. Although this chapter largely side-steps this debate—partially because there are ample recent first-rate introductory treatments of the debate, partially because I have addressed the question elsewhere in my own writing —I argue that focusing solely on the contest between the two best ways of life overshadows the way that Aristotle incorporates insights from the third way of life into the best way of life. Although the notion of a contest among different kinds of lives presupposes that the lives are mutually exclusive, Aristotle has no problem saying that the contemplative life trumps the life of pleasure because the contemplative life is more pleasant. I proceed in two parts. In the first part I examine what I will call the “outer” ring of the Ethics, namely the relationship between the contest of lives proposed in NE i 5 and its overall resolution in x 6-8. I show how i 5 and x 6 establish the framework for the contest, how x 7 adjudicates that contest in large part by relying upon premises articulated in the interim between books 1 and 10, and how x 6 and x 8 determine the second and third place positions in the contest. In the second part I focus on what I will call the “inner” ring of NE x. More than half of NE x struggles with the nature of pleasure, its role in a happy life, and the methodological problems of examining pleasure within a practical science. I show how x 1 and x 8 are “bookends” that underscore the methodological problem of examining pleasure and how the contest of lives draws upon the proximate conclusions concerning the nature of pleasure in NE x 1-5. (shrink)

The book "Theory of Forms: The Construction of Plato and Aristotle’s Criticism" focuses on two main aspects, construction and criticism. The constriction of Forms theory is the basis on which Plato built all of his philosophy and which influenced all forms of ideas philosophy that emerged after Plato. The research topic was completed by adding Aristotle's critique of the theory of Forms in order to put a clear picture in front of the reader, which was presented by Plato himself and (...) Aristotle's criticism of this theory. -/- Therefore, the book consists four chapters, the first chapter covers the following topics; The philosophical roots of Plato's theory of Forms, The numbers in the Pythagorean school, The Heraclitus' idea of change, Anaxagoras’ idea of Mind, Sophists. Chapter two, Plato's theory of Forms. Definitions of the Forms. The importance of the Forms, The existential and logical significance, Evidence of Forms, Evidence that knowledge is remembering. Chapter Three, Forms and Levels of Knowledge, Dialectic ,Inferential knowledge, Mental knowledge The fourth chapter, The nature of the Forms existence and its being Causes. Forms as numbers and their relationship to movement. The problem of Participation. The final Evaluation of Forms. (shrink)

The term “Presocratics” refers to a group of Greek thinkers who lived not later than Socrates and who were not decisively influenced by him. They are often referred to as the first philosophers as they represent the dawn of human speculation in the West. The essay examines the fragments of major Presocratics - Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Parmenides, Empidocles and Anaxagoras, which contain their views and arguments as reported by subsequent authors. Although these fragments are incomplete and are (...) based on secondary quotations, it is possible to sift through them and develop coherent and logical interpretations that approximate the original idea and intentions of these philosophers. The aim of this essay is to shed light on the philosophical meaning and significance of the concept of Arche (ἀρχή) – an untranslatable Greek word that connotes origin, principle, first in the series, or source, which constitutes the central thread of speculation among the Presocratics and their most influential contribution to the history of Western thought. (shrink)

This textbook has been written to discuss the fundamental problems of Greek Philosophy. There has been many philosophical Problems which Greek philosophers has discussed and examined with rational approach. The philosophical problems which we have mentioned in this book are: Greek Rationalism, Greek Naturalism, Greek Idealism, Greeks on human mind, Number theory and Greek Metaphysics. We have defined some significant issues like Greek atomism, Nihilism, Solipsism, Dogmatism, Sophism and Pluralism. Philosophy is the subject which studies the fundamental Problems of the (...) world. The problems which Philosophy studies are reality, existence, mind, thought, language, essence, experience, perception, knowledge, God, and so on. This book ‘Problems of Greek Philosophy’ is divided into six chapters while first Chapter ‘Introduction to western Philosophy’ deals with overall discussion and argumentation of western philosophy and also some valuable introductory information on Greek Philosophy. Second Chapter ‘Greeks on Nature’ attempts to discuss the lonian classification and examination of natural elements like water, air, Aperion, fire and reality. This chapter deals with the ultimate constituents of the natural stuff. Third chapter ‘Greek Rationalism’ deals with the role of reason in explanation of the world. Greek rationalists have used reason as the fundamental constituent of the universe. Fourth chapter ‘Number theory and Greek Metaphysics’ deals with the contribution of great mathematicians like Pythagoras and Zeno to the world. This chapter has highlighted the philosophy of number and metaphysics. Fifth Chapter ‘Greek Idealism’ highlights the philosophy of Greek idealists; Protagoras, Socrates and Plato. Sixth Chapter ‘Mind in Greek Philosophy’ deals with the concept of mind and thought in Greek philosophy. This section examines the contribution of Anaxagoras and Empedocles. (shrink)

I argue that Plato believes that the soul must be both the principle of motion and the subject of cognition because it moves things specifically by means of its thoughts. I begin by arguing that the soul moves things by means of such acts as examination and deliberation, and that this view is developed in response to Anaxagoras. I then argue that every kind of soul enjoys a kind of cognition, with even plant souls having a form of Aristotelian (...) discrimination (krisis), and that there is therefore no completely unintelligent, evil soul in the cosmos that can explain disorderly motions; as a result, the soul is not the principle of all motion but only motion in the cosmos after it has been ordered by the Demiurge. (shrink)

After the discoveries of such scholars as J. H. Poincaré, E. N. Lorenz, I. Prigogine, etc. the term ‘chaos’ is used actively by representatives of various scientific fields; however, one important aspect remains uninvestigated: which attitude one should have toward chaotic phenomena. This is a philosophical question and my dissertation aims to find the answer in the history of philosophy, where chaos theme has had its investigators from ancient philosophy to the philosophical theories of the 21st century. My dissertation is (...) based on the idea that sciences and philosophy can achieve significant success in exploring chaos theme when their efforts are combined. This dissertation research is designed to help in the planning of conscious, rational actions towards chaotic phenomena, since it is aimed at exploration and systematic presentation, as well as comprehension of possible systems of such actions – philosophical strategies for interacting with chaos. -/- Results of the dissertation are the following. I reveal, reconstruct, and explain the content of six possible strategies for interacting with chaos that were worked out in history of philosophical thought: ordering, avoiding, transfiguring, preventing, controlling, and integrating. I argue that the first philosophical strategies for interacting with chaos were worked out in the 19th century by German philosophers K. W. F. Schlegel and F. W. Nietzsche on the basis of their rethinking the ideas which were expressed by different thinkers during classical antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the modern period. I show that ideas of strategic views towards chaos were also elaborated by such 20th-century thinkers as H. Rickert, N. Berdyaev, I. Prigogine, H. Haken, G. Deleuze, Q. Meillassoux, and others. I outline the main stages of the evolution of philosophical strategies for interacting with chaos as well as its regularities. The dissertation shows perspectives of further development of each one of the six strategies for interacting with chaos. -/- In contemporary scientific and philosophical research on chaos, my exploration contributes to the new approach to improving the understanding of aims of acts towards chaotic phenomena. I think that knowing a range of different strategic views of chaos help researchers of chaotic phenomena to choose the most appropriate and rational reactions. In the area of history of philosophy, my research contributes detailed data about development and conceptual transformations of the notion of ‘chaos’ through all periods of Western philosophy. -/- The dissertation consists of five chapters: 1) Literature Review, Methodology and Key Research Terms, 2) Ancient and Medieval Philosophical Ideas about Chaos, 3) Genesis of the First Strategies for Interacting with Chaos, 4) Strategies for Interacting with Chaos in the 20th and 21st Centuries, 5) Regularities and Prospects of the Development of Philosophical Strategies for Interacting with Chaos. In the first chapter I analyze more than five hundred books, articles, and other philosophical and scientific sources in which the chaos theme is raised. I also argue the necessity of applying methods such as analysis, the structural method, the hermeneutic method of interpretation, and the comparative method in my dissertation research. Moreover, in this chapter, I define key terms for my dissertation – ‘chaos’ and ‘philosophical strategies for interacting with chaos.’ -/- Then, in the next chapter, I analyze the appearance and development of Ancient and Medieval philosophical ideas about chaotic phenomena and order. Particularly, I explore thoughts of philosophers such as Anaxagoras, Anaximander, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Plato, Aristotle, Augustine of Hippo, Bernard Silvestris, Ramon Llull, etc. In this chapter I also compare the first Western ideas about chaos with similar thoughts from Eastern philosophy, analyzing Indian and Chinese philosophical ideas about disorder. -/- In the third chapter I explore transformations in understanding the meaning of the term ‘chaos’ in philosophy from the 15th to the end of the 19th century. I analyze ideas about chaos and order from thinkers such as M. Ficino, Paracelsus, F. Bacon, P. Bayle, Voltaire, J. G. Herder, I. Kant, F. W. J. Schelling and other philosophers from the Renaissance, the Age of Enlightenment, and the German idealist period, showing that these thinkers’ new approaches to interpreting the notion of ‘chaos’ were the background for K. W. F. Schlegel’s and F. W. Nietzsche’s creations of the first strategies for interacting with chaos in the 19th century. I finish the chapter with detailed analysis of K. W. F. Schlegel’s strategy for transfiguring chaos and F. W. Nietzsche’s strategy for ordering chaos. -/- The development of philosophical strategies for interacting with chaos in the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century is the topic of the fourth chapter. I research new ideas about ordering chaos (H. Rickert) and transfiguring chaos (N. Berdyaev). Also, I reveal thoughts about avoiding chaos (A. Camus), preventing chaos (J. Ortega y Gasset), integrating chaos (G. Deleuze, Q. Meillassoux). Moreover, I analyze a philosophical component of the strategy for chaos control (I. Prigogine, H. Haken). In the final fifth chapter of the dissertation I trace the major features of philosophical strategies for interacting with chaos and find out the main conditions and periods of their development. Then I outline the prospects for the development of the philosophical strategies for interacting with chaos and show the most productive ways of their progress. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to outline an interpretation of the philosophical understanding of the concept of the good in pre-Platonic thought. The interpretation is based on those fragments only in which the concept actually appears. As a result of the adopted assumption, the ideas of the first philosophers, i.e. Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes, were outside the scope of the investigation, as well as those of Xenophanes, Eleatics, Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Leucippus. In the case of the first philosophical (...) systems of the pre-Platonic philosophy one notices a connection between the good and the One. It can also be found that understanding of the ‘the Best’ is depended on, and results from, ‘the good’. This is true also in Heraclitus, though, at the same time, he introduces an significant reversal in this respect, for he abolishes the absolute difference between the good and evil, and turns it to a subjective relation. The good has no ontological basis in the Democritus’ system as well, though the good’s connection with truth, accessible for every human being, allows to interpret him as arguing for an objectivistic conception of the good. The objectivity of good has subsequently been denied by the Sophists. (shrink)

The Fifth Element (1997) is a French science-fiction film in English, directed and co-written by Luc Besson. The title and the plot of the film refer to a central notion of Greek philosophy, that is, pemptousia, or quintessence. Pre-Socratic philosophers such as Thales, Anaxagoras, Anaximenes and others, were convinced that all natural beings – in fact, nature itself – consist in four primary imperishable elements or essences (ousiai), i.e., fire, earth, water, and air. To these four, Aristotle added aether, (...) a fifth essence (pemptousia). The introduction of aether gave birth to a great tradition in late Antique and Medieval philosophy, and eventually it came to signify not an additional primary element, but the core-essence of all beings, their fundamental ontological structure. Besson’s film draws its inspiration on this philosophical tradition but its cinematographic rendering of the concept of Quintessence is typical of the contemporaneous views on the core characteristics of matters. The modernity that stimulates the film is equally anti-transcendentalist and anti-essentialist. Thus, the fifth element of the film is existentially personified and genderized making the traditional philosophical significance of the term to be adjusted by modernity in an immanent and temporal context where in addition aesthetics plays a crucial role. (shrink)

Thought (νοῦς) for Aristotle is ‘that whereby the soul thinks and judges.’ This identity, however, ‘is not actually any real thing before thinking’ (ἐνεργείᾳ τῶν ὄντων πρὶν νοεῖν) and, thus, cannot reasonably be regarded as blended with the body and cannot acquire any quality or have any organ. (So., Γ, 4, 429a22-27) In fact, Aristotle defines thought more with a capability: ‘That which is capable of receiving the object of thought, i.e. the substance, is thought.’ (Met., Λ, 1072b22-23) Thought is (...) not blended with and, thus, is separable from body. (So., Γ, 4, 429b4-5) This separability, however, belongs only to the active thought. (So., Γ, 5, 430a17-19) A. Nature of thought ‘Since everything is a possible object of thought,’ Aristotle believes, as Anaxagoras believed before him, in order to know things, mind ‘must be pure from all admixtures.’ The reason for this being that ‘the co-presence of what is alien to its nature is a hindrance and a block.’ Therefore, thought ‘can have no nature of its own other than that of having a certain capacity.’ (So., Γ, 4, 429a18-22) B. Thought elements A thought element, i.e. an element/object in thought or a concept (νόημα) has the following features: 1. Every thought element or concept (νόημα) is single (ἓν). This singularity is not restricted to substances because the concept of any other thing is single as well. (Met., A, 990b22-27) 2. Concepts (νόηματα) of thought are either simple or complex. Simple concepts do not involve truth or falsity but complex ones do. Aristotle speaks of ‘thoughts without co-positing and positing away’ (ἄνευ συνθέσεως καὶ διαίρέσεως νοήματι) to which nouns and verbs are similar. (OI., I, 1, 16a13-14) In OI., I, 1, 16a9-11 Aristotle does not use the words simple or complex but his assertion implies them: ‘As there are in the mind thoughts (νόημα) which do not involve truth or falsity, and also those which must be either true or false, so it is in speech.’ 3. The copula-is has no corresponding concept in thought: ‘For neither are ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’ the participle ‘being’ significant of any fact, unless something is added; for they do not themselves indicate anything, but imply a copulation, of which we cannot form a conception apart from the things coupled.’ (OI., I, 3, 16b22-25) C. Thought and its objects To understand Aristotle’s theory of thought, we have two differentiations, one between objects of thought and one in thought itself. Everything that might be posited in front of our thought and be thought as a possible object of thought we call object I (to distinguish it from what we call object II). Therefore, everything in the world is an object I of thought. These objects are in the sensible forms, viz. both the abstract objects and all the states and affections of sensible things. (So., Γ, 8, 432a3-6) These objects might be either composite, containing matter and form, or simple and matterless. When they are thought, we will have them in thought but not necessarily as they are in the world, i.e. as object I, but as something else, which we call object II. This is supposed to make the difference between object I and object II clear: object I is in the world and object II is its corresponding object in our thought. These two kinds of objects are neither necessarily the same nor necessarily different. Objects I are of two kinds: matterful and matterless. Whereas a matterful object I is necessarily different from its corresponding object II (So., Γ, 4, 430a6-9), a matterless object I is not different from its corresponding object II. (So., Γ, 4, 430a2-5; Met., Λ, 1075a3-4) Object II must thus be understood as the form of object I: ‘The thinking part of the soul must therefore be, while impassible, capable of receiving the form of an object; that is, must be potentially identical in character with its object without being the object.’ (So., Γ, 4, 429a13-16) Thought has no nature by its own and is all potentiality before thinking. (cf. So., Γ, 4, 429b6-10) Let’s call this the first potentiality of thought. This potentiality is the potentiality of a tabula rasa: ‘Thought is in a sense potentially whatever is thinkable, though actually it is nothing until it has thought? What it thinks must be in it just as characters may be said to be on a writing-table on which as yet nothing actually stands written: this is exactly what happens with thought.’ (So., Γ, 4, 429b29-430a2) Thought is then all dependent on its objects. By thinking on objects I, objects II are formed in thought. Now thought is nothing but its objects II which are necessarily matterless objects (Met., Λ, 1075a5-7): ‘In every case the thought which is actively thinking is the objects which it thinks.’ (So., Γ, 7, 431b16-17) Thought is the same as its objects II and in the case of matterless objects I, it is the same as its objects I. (Met., Λ, 1075a3-5) This thought is actual compared to its first potentiality: while it was all potentiality in its first potentiality, it now contains some objects II and is then actual. It seems we must interpret Aristotle based on this sense of actuality when he calls a thought possessing object as active: ‘For that which is capable of receiving the objects of thought, i.e. the substance, is thought. And it is active when it possesses this object.’ (Met., Λ, 1072b22-23) This thought, however, is called passive thought due to a second potentiality: ‘When thought has become each thing in the way in which a man who actually knows is said to do so (this happens when he is now able to exercise the power on his own initiatives). Its condition is still one of potentiality, but in a different sense from the potentiality which preceded the acquisition of knowledge by learning or discovery; and thought is then able to think of itself.’ (So., Γ, 4, 429b6-10) It is this thought in its second potentiality that Aristotle calls passive thought distinguishing it from active thought: ‘And in fact thought … is what it is by virtue of becoming all things, while there is another which what it is by virtue of making all things: this is a sort of positive state like light; for in a sense light makes potential colors into actual colors.’ (So., Γ, 5, 530a14-17) These two thoughts have a relationship like the relationship between matter and productive cause: ‘Since in every class of things, as in nature as a whole, we find two factors involved, a matter which is potentially all the particulars included in the class, a cause which is productive in the sense that it makes them all (the latter standing to the former, as e.g. an art to its material), these elements must likewise be found within the soul.’ (So., Γ, 5, 430a10-14) To understand Aristotle’s sense of active thought we must consider his theory of thinking. 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Hynek Bartos does the field of ancient philosophy a great service by detailing the influence of early Greek thinkers (such as Heraclitus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, and Diogenes of Apollonia) on the Hippocratic work On Regimen, and by demonstrating that work’s innovative engagement with contemporary scientific and philosophical concepts as well as its direct influence on Plato and Aristotle. His study usefully counteracts the lamentable tendency among ancient philosophers to ignore or downplay the influence of medical literature on philosophy in (...) general, and to heap scorn on this text in particular, which Kirk, Raven, and Schofield considered ‘an eclectic and very superficial quasi- philosophical treatise’ and Barnes famously called ‘a silly farrago of ill-digested Presocratic opinions’. (shrink)

This study of Greek time before Aristotle’s philosophy starts with a commentary on his first text, the Protrepticus. We shall see two distinct forms of time emerge: one initiatory, circular and Platonic in inspiration, the other its diametrical opposite, advanced by Aristotle. We shall explore this dichotomy through a return to poetic conceptions. The Tragedians will give us an initial outline of the notion of time in the Greek world (Fate); we shall then turn to Homer in order to better (...) grasp the complex relations between time and the religious sphere (the Hero); the work of the great theologian Hesiod will confirm this initiatory vision, later set out in remarkable fashion by Nietzsche (Myths); we shall then dive deep into Pythagoreanism to complete our account (Mysteries). Having understood this current of thought, powerfully influenced by the Iranian theogony, we shall be able to discern its clear differences from the so-called “Ionian” current, and thus to move away from Plato (Ideology). Lastly, we shall return to the early Ionian thinkers Thales and Anaximander to analyse whether this really was the vision of the world that Aristotle adopted in developing the first model of time (Science). In the second volume we shall see the return of the thought of the theologoi within the Aristotelian corpus itself, and will question our distinction between the being and existence of time. Régis Laurent is a philosopher and member of the association Kairos Kai logos (Centre for the study of ancient philosophy). This book is the first part of his doctoral thesis in philosophy, undertaken under the aegis of three French universities (Grenoble, Clermont-Ferrand and Rennes). In addition to his philosophical training, the author is also qualified to Masters level in linguistics and in general psychology, and studied theology at the Thomist University in Paris (ULSH) and at the CEJ of the EHESS. (shrink)

The article deals with the problem of the divine light in the mystical works of St Symeon the New Theologian in the context of the Eastern Christian ascetical tradition. The author focuses on the passages referring to the divine light in the works of Evagrios Pontikos, St Isaac the Syrian, St Maximus the Confessor, and in the Makarian corpus. As is shown in the present contribution, none of these authors created a fully-developed theory of the vision of the divine light. (...) Being close to these writers in many ideas, St Symeon was generally independent of any of them in his treatment of the theme of vision of light, always basing himself primarily upon his own experience. (shrink)

An Italian abstract of my thesis, which contains an interpretation of the most important issues of Anaxagoras' philosophy and the early history of his reception (among his disciples, the Academy and, prominently, Aristotle).

Anaxagoras’ “nous” has a cosmological value. Additionally, it has inspired interesting reflections in order to understand metaphysically the intellect. The question we want to answer is twofold. On one hand, we will inquire whether or not Anaxagoras has understood correctly the nature of the intellect. On the other hand, we will discern if our author has understood the peculiarity of consciousness. The answer to these questions will probably be negative. Notwithstanding that, it will be possible to ask whether (...) or not Anaxagoras was able to detect at least the basic elements for a metaphysics of the intellect and, consequently, for an ontology of consciousness. (shrink)

Vietnamese scientists on the list of "100.000 influential scientists" this year increased sharply in number and rank. -/- The ranking was selected by a group of scientists led by Professor John PA Ioannidis and colleagues from Stanford University (USA) on the Scopus database and published by Elsevier Publishing House.

This paper challenges the first Gettier counterexample to the tripartite account of knowledge. Noting that 'the man who will get the job' is a description and invoking Donnellan's distinction between their 'referential' and 'attributive' uses, I argue that Smith does not actually believe that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. Smith's ignorance about who will get the job shows that the belief cannot be understood referentially, his ignorance of the coins in his pocket (...) shows that it cannot be understood attributively. An explanation for why Smith appeared to have justified true belief is given by distinguishing between 'belief' and 'belief in truth'. Smith believes the sentence 'the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket' to be true (he mistakenly believes that Jones will get the job, of whom he knows that he has ten coins in his pocket) (hence his 'belief'), the sentence is true (hence 'truth'), and he has sufficient reason to assent to it (hence his 'justification'). But he does not believe the proposition expressed. Hence he does not know it either. (shrink)

The fifth century BC is one of the most brilliant of Greek history. Pericles, as the leader of a splendid Athens, promoted the entry into his polis of the new scientific movement that until then had developed primarily in Ionia and in the Italian peninsula. However, their research raised suspicions among the Athenians, who regarded it as a risk for traditional religion. In spite of the somewhat flexible and plural character of the Greek religion, in this period three famous trials (...) took place in which different philosophers were tried for impiety: Anaxagoras, Protagoras and Socrates. The controversy between religion and philosophy can lead us to an oversimplification of the facts. Thus, several modern scholars have understood philosophy as an exorcism of myth and therefore as something necessarily guiding to a progressive elimination of the divine from the worldview. We intend to interpret this conflict only as a change in understanding of the divinity, rather than a suppression of it. This has, of course, effects on religion, but it does not drag inevitably to irreligion. (shrink)

This article aims at clarifying some issues raised by a recent book of Daniel W. Graham about the Presocratic cosmology. It particularly intends to shed some light on the understanding of Anaxagoras’ universe by suggesting some reasons why, despite Graham’s opinion, it is still possible to think that the stars were flat according to him. Another goal is highlighting the importance of the comprehensive physical theory of Anaxagoras, based on a circular motion called perichoresis, which would explain diverse (...) phenomena in a consistent way by introducing simplicity in his cosmology. (shrink)

Development of the world economy bears numerous negative phenomena, and require constant need to rebalance socioeconomic interests of nations, transnational subjects, and individuals. Socialisation is an important and effective tool for balancing social and individual; however, despite socialisation is evolving rapidly, its scientific and practical potential is not duly uncovered. In the article theoretical and methodological foundations of socialisation of economy is surveyed in the context of globalisation, and etymology, explanations, scope, historical phases of development, theoretical aspects and practical forms (...) of use, consequences and prospects are analysed. The term «socialisation» was determined as a multidisciplinary, used in many scientific fields, increasingly involving various areas of research and is understood as inclusion, adaptation and development of human being in society. It was determined that the economy socialisation is implemented in different fields and semantic structures, contains a large number of methodological tools, is involved at all management levels, and is primarily identified with the increasing role of social component in the life of human resources. The assumptions were made about the future transformation of this category in line with the identified predictive trends. (shrink)

Greco-Roman meteorology will be described in four overlapping developments. In the archaic period, astro-meteorological calendars were written down, and one appears in Hesiod’s Works and Days; such calendars or almanacs originated thousands of years earlier in Mesopotamia. In the second development, also in the archaic period, the pioneers of prose writing began writing speculative naturalistic explanations of meteorological phenomena: Anaximander, followed by Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, and others. When Aristotle in the fourth century BCE mentions the ‘inquiry that all our predecessors (...) have been calling meteorology’ (338a26), he is referring to these writers. In the third development, the first two enterprises were combined: empirical data collection about meteorological phenomena began to be married to naturalistic theoretical explanation. This innovation was prompted by Democritus and synthesised in its most influential form by Aristotle. At this point more sophisticated techniques of both short-term weather forecasting and long-term speculation about global climate change were also developed. In the fourth development, the wider implications of the naturalistic explanation of meteorological phenomena were contested. The views of ‘meteorologists’ had been controversial since the archaic period because they were perceived, and sometimes intended, to displace the divine prerogatives and undermine traditional religion. These controversies intensified throughout the classical and Hellenistic periods. (shrink)

Simplicius’ project of harmonizing previous philosophers deserves to be taken seriously as both a philosophical and an interpretive project. Simplicius follows Aristotle himself in developing charitable interpretations of his predecessors: his distinctive project, in the Neoplatonic context, is the rehabilitation of the Presocratics (especially Parmenides, Anaxagoras and Empedocles) from a Platonic-Aristotelian perspective. Simplicius’ harmonizations involve hermeneutic techniques which are recognisably those of the serious historian of philosophy; and harmonization itself has a distinguished history as a constructive philosophical method.

Regarding the relation of Plato’s early and middle period dialogues, scholars have been divided to two opposing groups: unitarists and developmentalists. While developmentalists try to prove that there are some noticeable and even fundamental differences between Plato’s early and middle period dialogues, the unitarists assert that there is no essential difference in there. The main goal of this article is to suggest that some of Plato’s ontological as well as epistemological principles change, both radically and fundamentally, between the early and (...) middle period dialogues. Though this is a kind of strengthening the developmentalistic approach corresponding the relation of the early and middle period dialogues, based on the fact that what is to be proved here is a essential development in Plato’ ontology and his epistemology, by expanding the grounds of development to the ontological and epistemological principles, it hints to a more profound development. The fact that the bipolar and split knowledge and being of the early period dialogues give way to the tripartite and bound knowledge and benig of the middle period dialogues indicates the development of the notions of being and knowledge in Plato’s philosophy before the dialogues of the middle period. -/- Keywords Plato; early dialogues; middle dialogues; being; knowledge; development -/- Introduction The differences between two groups of the early and middle period dialogues have always been a matter of dispute. Whereas the developmentalists like Vlastos, Silverman (2002), Teloh (1981), Dancy (2004) and Rickless (2007) think that from the early to the middle dialogues Plato’s philosophy changes, at least in some essential points, the unitarists like Kahn, Cherniss and Shorey believe that there happens no development and the differences must be taken as natural, ignorable and even pedagogic. In his well-known article, Socrates contra Socrates in PLATO, Vlastos lists ten theses of difference between two groups of dialogues. The first group which includes Plato’s early dialogues he divides to 'elenctic' (Apology, Charmides, Crito, Euthyphro, Gorgias, Hippias Minor, Ion, Laches, Protagoras and Republic I) and 'transitional' (Euthydemus, Hippias Major, Lysis, Menexenus and Meno) dialogues. These transitional come after all the elenctic dialogues and before all the dialogues of the second group which compose Plato’s middle period dialogues, including (with Vlastos' chronological order) Cratylus, Phaedo, Symposium, Republic II-X, Phaedrus, Parmenides and Theaetetus (1991, 46-49). Vlastos asserts strictly that his list of differences are 'so diverse in content and method that they contrast as sharply with one another as with any third philosophy you care to mention, beginning with Aristotole’s' (ibid, 46). Vlastos’ list of differences between two Socrateses is considered a view breaking sharply between the early and the middle dialogues. Besides all ten differences between the two Socrateses in Vlastos’ list that can be supportive for our doctrine here, we intend to focus on some ontological as well as epistemological distinctions that have not completely been discussed hitherto. Contrary to the developmentalist theory of Vlastos, unitarian theory of Charles Kahn wishes to eliminate any substantial difference between the early and the middle dialogues. He distinguishes seven 'pre-middle' or 'threshold' dialogues including Laches, Charmides, Euthyphro, Protagoras, Meno, Lysis and Euthydemus from the other Socratic dialogues which he calls 'earliest group' (1996, 41). The threshold dialogues, Kahn thinks, 'embarke upon a sustained project' that is to reach to its climax in the middle period dialogues, namely Phaedo, Symposium and Republic. Believing in that there is no 'fundamental shift'between the early and middle dialogues (ibid, 40), Kahn thinks the Socratic dialogues are just the 'first stage' with a 'deliberate silence' towards the theories of later periods (ibid, 339). One of the reasons of the surprising fact that Plato gives no hint of the metaphysics and epistemology of the Forms in the early dialogues, he thinks, is the pedagogical advantages of aporia. He thinks that Plato 'obscurely', and mostly because of education, hinted to some doctrines and conceptions in his early dialogues and with the aim of clarifying them only in the later ones (ibid, 66). The seven threshold dialogues, Kahn asserts, 'had been designed from the first' to prepare the pupils and readers for the views expounded in the middle period dialogues (ibid, 59-60). To show that the differences of the two Socrateses of the early and middle period dialogue are in their onto-epistemological grounds and thence cannot be explained by a unitaristic view, we try to draw the ontological and epistemological principles of the early dialogues in the first part below in order to show, in the second part, that those principles have been developed in the middle period dialogues. -/- A. The Onto-Epistemologic Principles of the Early Dialogues Socratic dialogues are paradoxical about knowledge because while being knowledge-oriented always searching for knowledge, they deny it and even never discuss it directly. Three elements of Socrates’ way of searching Knowledge throughout the early dialogues, i.e. Socratic 'what is X?' question, his disavowal of knowledge and his elenctic method combined together produce something like a circle which works, more or less, in the same way in these dialogues. Though this circle is an embaressing inquiry always resulting in ignorance instead of knowledge, its motivation is surprisingly Socrates’ passionate enthusiasm for knowledge, an intensive love of wisdom. The starting point of this circle is Socrates’ confession of having no knowledge which might be explicitly asserted or presupposed, maybe because it was one of the famous characteristics of Socrates; a confession always paradoxically accompanied with his intense longing for knowledge (e.g., Gorgias 505e4-5). Every time Socrates encounters with someone who thinks he knows something (οἴεταί τι εἰδέναι) (Apology 21d5) and tries to examine him. This examination seems to be the simplest one asking just what it is that he knows. Socrates’ elenchus, therefore, is always connected with 'what is X?' (τίς ποτέ ἐστιν) question, a question that most of the early dialogues of Plato are concerned with; 'what is courage?' in the Laches, 'what is piety?' in Euthydemus, 'what is temperance?' in Charmides and 'what is beauty?' in Hippias Major. This question we call here 'Socratic question' and probably is the very question the historical Socrates used to employ, is tightly interrelated with both his disavowal and his elenchus. He disclaims knowledge because he cannot find the answer to the question himself and he rejects others’ since they cannot offer the correct answer too. Every interlocutor can claim he knows X, if and only if he can answer the Socratic question. Otherwise, he is more of an ignorant than of a knower of τί ποτέ ἐστι X. Knowing the answer to this question is, thus, knowledge’s criterion for Socrates. Having found out that he cannot answer what it is which he would claim to know, the interlocutor comes to the point Socrates was there at the beginning. The least advantage of this circle is that he becomes as wise as Socrates does about the subject, becoming aware that he does not know it. At the end of the circle they are both still at the beginning, not knowing what X is. So let us first take a glance at these three elements. Socratic disavowal of knowledge is strictly asserted in some passages. At Apology 21b4-5, Socrates says: -/- I do not know of myself being wise at all (οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν σύνοιδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὤν) -/- Moreover, at 21d4-6: -/- None of us knows anything worthwhile (καλὸν κἀγαθὸν εἰδέναι) …. I do not know (οἶδα) neither do I think I know. -/- In Charmides Socrates speaks about a fear about his probable mistake of thinking that he knows (εἰδέναι) something when he does not (166d1-2). The somehow generalization of this disavowal can be seen in Gorgias. After calling his disavowal 'an account that is always the same' (509a4-5), Socrates continues (a5-7): -/- I say that I do not know (οἶδα) how these things are, but no one I have ever met, like now, who can say anything else without being absurd. -/- At the end of Hippias Major (304d7-8), Socrates affirms his disavowal of knowledge of 'what is X?' this time about the fine: -/- I do not know (οἶδα) what that is itself (αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὅτι ποτέ ἐστιν). Some other passages, however, made a number of scholars dubious about Socrates’ disavowal. Vlastos mentions Apology 29b6-7 as an evidence : 'that to do wrong and to disobey one’s master, both god and men, I know (οἶδα) to be evil and shameful'. He thinks that if we give this single text 'its full weight' it can suffice to show that Socrates does claim knowledge of a moral truth (1985, 7). Vlastos’ claim is not admittable since it would be too strange, I think, for a man like Socrates to violate his disavowal claim just after emphasizing it. We can see his claim just before the already mentioned passage: -/- And surely it is the most blameworthy ignorance to believe that one knows what one does not know. It is perhaps on this point and in this respect, gentlemen, that I differ from the majority of men and if I were to claim that I am wiser than anyone in anything it world be in this, that, as I have no adequate knowledge (οὐκ εἰδὼς ἱκανῶς) of things in the underworld, so I do not think I have (οὐκ εἰδέναι) (Apology 29b1-6) Vlastos tries to solve what he calls the 'paradox' of Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge distinguishing the 'certain' knowledge from 'elenctic' knowledge (1985, 11) and thinking that when Socrates avows knowledge, we must perceive it as an elenctic knowledge, a knowledge its content 'must be propositions he thinks elenctically justifiable' (ibid, 18). Irwin’s solution is the distinction of knowledge and belief. He approves that Socrates does not 'explicitly' make such a distinction, but still thinks that Socrates’ 'test for knowledge would make it reasonable for him to recognize true belief without knowledge, and his own claims are easily understood if they are claims to true belief alone' (1977, 40). While I agree with Vlastos up to a point, I strongly disagree with Irwin about the early dialogues. As I will try to show below, we are not permitted to consider any kind of distinction within knowledge in Socratic dialogues because only one category of knowledge is alluded to there and the distinction of knowledge and belief thoroughly belongs to the second Sorcates. Although no kind of distinction can be admittable here, I think Vlastos’ distinction can be accepted only if we regard it as a distinction between knowledge, which is unique and without any, even incomparable, rival, and a semi-idiomatic and ordinary one that is a necessary requirement for any argument, and thus, unavoidable even for someone who does not claim any kind of knowledge. An apparent evidence of this is Gorgias 505e6-506a4: -/- I go through the discussion as I think it is (ὡς ἄν μοι δοκῇ ἔχειν), if any of you do not agree with admissions I am making to myself, you must object and refute me. For I do not say what I say as I know (οὐδὲ γάρ τοι ἔγωγε εἰδὼς λέγω ἃ λέγω) but as searching jointly with you (ζητῶ κοινῇ μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν). -/- The minimal degree of knowledge everyone must have to take part in an argument, conduct it and use the phrase "I know" when it is necessary is what Socrates cannot deny. We can call it elenctic knowledge only if we agree that it is not the kind of knowledge that Socrates has always been searching, the one that can be accepted as the answer of Socratic 'what is X?' question. His disavowal of knowledge is applied only to the knowledge which can truly be the answer of Socratic question and pass the elenctic exam; a knowledge that, I believe, is never claimed by first Socrates. Socrates conducts his method of examining his interlocutors’ knowledge, our second element here, by almost the same method repeated in Socratic dialogues. That whether we are allowed to regard all the examinations of Socrates in the early dialogues as based on the same or not has been a matter of dispute. Vlastos himself (1994, 31) distinguished Euthydemas, Lysis, Menexenns and Hippias Major from the other Socratic dialogues because he thinks Socrates has lost his faith to elenchus in there. Irwin (1977, 38) distinguishes Apology and Crito where Socrates’ own convictions is present. Contrary to some scholars like Benson (2002, 107) who take elenchus in all the Socratic dialogues as a unique method, Michelle Carpenter and Ronald M. Polansky (2002, 89-100) argue pro the variety of methods of elenchus. Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith (2002, 145-160) even reject such a thing as Socratic elenchus which can gather all of the Socrates’ various arguments under such a heading. There can be no solution for the problem of elenchus, they think, is due to 'the simple reason that there is no such thing as 'the Socratic elenchos"'(p.147). Though we consider elenchus a somehow determined process and a part of Socratic circle in the early dialogues, all we assume is that whatever differences it might have in different dialogues, it has the same onto-epistemological principles and, thus, we are not going to take it necessarily as a unique method. This method sets out to prove that the interlocutors are as ignorant as Socrates himself is. That whether elenchus is constructive, capable of establishing doctrines as Vlastos (1994) or Brickhouse and Smith (1994, 20-21) believe or not is another issue to which this paper is not to claim anything. What is crucial for our discussion here is that elenchus does not reach to the very knowledge Socrates is looking for. This is strictly against Irwin who thinks that not only elenchus leads to positive results, 'it should even yield knowledge to match Socrates’ conditions'(1977, 68, cf. 48). He does not explain where and how they really yield to that kind of knowledge. He explains his elenctic method in his apology in the court (Apology 21-22), that how he used to examine wise men, politicians, poets and all those who had the highest reputation for their knowledge and every time found that they have no knowledge. If we accept, as I strongly do, that Socrates’ disavowal of his knowledge is not irony, it might seem more reasonable to agree that the process that has that disavowal as its first step cannot be irony as well. The key of the circle which can explain why Socrates disclaims knowledge and how he can reject others’ claim of having any kind of knowledge lies in the third element, Socratic question. In Hippias Major (287c1-2), Socrates asks: 'Is it not by Justice that just people are Just? (ἆρ᾽ οὐ δικαιοσύνῃ δίκαιοί εἰσιν οἱ δίκαιοι). He insists at 294b1 that they were searching for that by which (ᾧ) all beautiful things are beautiful (cf. b4-5, 8). At Euthyphro 6d10-11 it is said that the Socratic question is waiting for 'the form itself (αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος) by which (ᾧ) all the pious actions are pious; and at 6d11-e1: -/- Through one form (που μιᾷ ἰδέᾳ) impious actions are impious and pious actions pious. -/- Since the X itself is that by which X is X, knowing 'X itself' is the only way of knowing X. It is probably because of this that Socrates makes the distinction between the ousia as a right answer to the question and effect as a wrong one: -/- I am afraid, Euthyphro, that when you were asked what piety is (τὸ ὅσιον ὅτι ποτ᾽ ἐστίν) you did not wish to make clear its nature itself (οὐσίαν … αὐτοῦ) to me, but you said some effect (πάθος) about it. (Euthp. 11a6-9) -/- 1. Knowledge of what X is Now it is time to look for the onto-epistemological principles of Socratic circle and its three elements. It cannot reasonably be expected from the first Socrates to present us explicitly and clearly formulated principles of his onto-epistemology when such explications cannot be found even in the second Socrates who has some obviously positive theoris. Since there must be some principles underlying this first systematic inqury of knowledge, we must seek to them and be satisfied with elicitation of the first Socratas’ principle. What will be drawn out as his principles cannot and must not, thus, be taken as very fix and dogmatic principles. Some very slightest principles and grounds suffice for our purposes here. The first principle that is the prima facie significance of the Socratic question and his implementation of all those elenctic arguments I call the principle of 'Knowledge of What X is' (KWX): -/- KWX To know X, it is required to know what X is. -/- Aristotle (Metaphysics 1078b23-25, 27-29, 987b4-8) takes Plato’s τί ἐστι question as seeking the definition of a thing that is the same as historical Socrates’ search but applying to a different field. That Plato’s 'what is X?' question was a search for definition became the prevailed understanding of this question up to now. I am going neither to discuss the answer of Socratic question nor to challenge taking it as definition. What I am to insist is that knowledge is attached firmly to the answer of the question: Knowledge of X is not anything but the knowledge of what X is. It entails, certainly, the priority of this knowledge to any other kind of knowledge about X but it also has something more fundamental about the relation of knowledge and Socratic question. Socrates’ exclusive focus on the answer of his question can authorize the consideration of such an essential role for KWX in his epistemolgoy. The total rejection of his interlocutors’ knowledge when they are unable to answer the question can be regarded as a strong evidence for it. Socrates’ elenctic method and his rejection of others’ knowledge in the early dialogues, which all end aporetically with no one accepted as knower and nothing as knowledge, prevent us from finding any positive evidence for this. We have to be content, therefore, of negative evidences which, I think, can be found wherever Socrates rejects his interlocutors’ knowledge when they are not able to give an acceptable answer to his 'what is X?' question. 2. Bipolar Epistemology Socrates’ rejection of his interlocutors’ knowledge has another epistemological principle as its basis. Let me call this principle Bipolar Epistemology' (BE): BE There is no third way besides knowledge and Ignorance. -/- BE says that about every object of knowledge there are only two subjective statuses: knowledge and Ignorance. Socrates’ disavowal, however, says nothing but that he is ignorant of knowledge of X because he does not know what X is. This means that BE is presupposed here. Socrates’ elenchus and his rejection of interlocutors’ having any kind of knowledge are the necessary results of the fact that he does not let any third way besides knowledge and ignorance. The first Socrates never let anyone partly know X or have a true opinion about it, as he would not let anyone know anything about X when he did not know what X is. -/- 3. Bipolar Ontology The principle of BE in first Socrates’ epistemology is parallel to another principle in his ontology. Plato’s bipolar distinction between being and not being is as strict and perfect as his distinction between knowledge and ignorance. This principle I shall call the principle of 'Bipolar Ontology' (BO): BO Being is and not being is not. BO is apparently the same with the well-known Parmenidean Principle of being and not being (cf. Diels-Kranz (DK) Fr. 2.2-5). Euthydemus’ statement against the possibility of false knowledge can be good evidence for this principle: -/- The things which are not surely do not exist (τὰ δὲ μὴ ὄντα … ἄλλο τι ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν). (Euthydemus 284b3-4) -/- He continues (b4-5): -/- There is nowhere for not being to be there (οὖν οὐδαμοῦ τά γε μὴ ὄντα ὄντα ἐστίν). -/- That BE does not let true opinion as a third option besides knowledge and ignorance seems to be related to BO’s rejecting a third option besides being and not being, which is itself the basis of the impossibility of false belief. Socrates’ elaborate discussion of the problem of false belief in Theatetus that leads to a more decisive discussion and finally to some solutions in Sophist can make our consideration of BO for the first group of dialogues authentive. -/- 4. &5. Split Knowledge and Split Being The fourth principle I shall call the principle of 'Split Knowledge' (SK): -/- SK Knowledge of X is separated from any other knowledge (of anything else) as if the whole knowledge is split to various parts. -/- This Principle is hinted and criticized as Socrates’ way of treating with knowledge in Hippias Major: -/- But Socrates, you do not contemplate the entireties of things, nor do people you have used to talk with (τὰ μὲν ὅλα τῶν πραγμάτων οὐ σκοπεῖς, οὐδ᾽ ἐκεῖνοι οἷς σὺ εἴωθας διαλέγεσθαι). (301b2-4) -/- Contrary to Rankin who regards the passage as 'antilogical, almost eristic in tone rather than presenting a serious philosophy of being' (1983, 54), I think it can be taken as serious. Hippias criticizes Sorcates that he does not contemplate (σκοπεῖς) the entireties of things (ὅλα τῶν πραγμάτων), a critique which Socrates is not its only subject but all those whom Socrates accustomed to talk with (ἐκεῖνοι οἷς σὺ εἴωθας διαλέγεσθαι). This last phrase, I think, extends this critic beyond this dialogue to other Socratic dialogues. Hippias’ use of the perfect tense of the verb ἔθω (to be accustomed) is a good evidence of this extension. We can get, thus, these ἐκεῖνοι as Socrates’ interlocutors in his other dialogues that hints that this criticism has the epistemological groundings of the previous dialogues as its subject. What ἐκεῖνοι οἷς σὺ εἴωθας διαλέγεσθαι points to is that Hippias does not have in mind Socrates’ way of treating things only in this dialogue, but he is also criticizing Socrates’ way throughout his dialogues. At 301b4-5, Socrates and his interlocutors’ way of beholding things is described as such: -/- You people knock (κρούετε) at the fine and each of the beings (ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων) by taking each being cut up in pieces (κατατέμνοντες) in words (ἐν τοῖς λόγοις). This leads us to our next principle that is parallel to, and the ontological side of, SK, the principle of 'Split Being'(SB): -/- SB Everything (being) is separated from any other thing as if the whole being is split to many beings. -/- Socrates and his interlocutors and thus, as we saw, the Socratic dialogues are accused to regard everything as it is separated from all other things. This separation is en tois logois that, I think, can reasonably be taken as saying that Socratic dialogues (it refers of course to the dialogues before Hippias Major) cut up all things which have the same name/definition from all other things and try to understand them separately, without considering other things that are not in their logos. They, for example in Hippias Major, are cutting up to kalon and try to understand what it and all others inside this logos are by separating it from all other things. This is directed straightly against Socratic question and the way Socratic dialogues follow to find its answer, every time separating one logos. As Meyer (1995, 85) points out, every question 'presupposes that the X in question in a logos is something' and 'every answer to every question aims at unity' (84). The critique of Hippias Major is, therefore, at the same time a critique of SK and SB. It is also a critique of KWX because it is only based on KWX that Socratic dialogues could search for the answer of 'what is X' question supposing that knowing what X is is enough for the knowledge of X. SK and KWX are absolutely interdependent. What Socrates and all his previous interlocutors have neglected in Socratic dialogues, Hippias says, was 'continuous bodies of being' (διανεκῆ σώματα τῆς οὐσίας) (301b6). Either this theory actually belongs to the historical Hippias as it is being said or not, it is strictly criticizing SB. We have the same phrase with changing sūma to logos some lines later at 301e3-4: διανεκεῖ λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας. Although this theory that can be observed as both an ontological and an epistemological theory is rejected by Socrates (301cff.), it is still against first Socrates’ onto-epistemological principles and might let us look at what is rejected as Socratic prineple. -/- 6. Knowledge is of Being The sixth principle that I think is presupposed by the first Socrates, is the 'Knowledge of Being' Principle (KB): -/- KB Knowledge is of Being. -/- This principle is obviously the source of the problem of false knowledge, a very important problem throughout Plato’s philosophy. We face this problem maybe for the first time in Euthydemus. In less than 20 Stephanus’ pages, 276-295, we are encountered with different interwoven problems about knowledge , all grounded in the problem of false opinion. Having challenged the obvious possibility of telling lies at 283e, at 284 Euthydemus discusses it saying that the man who speaks is speaking about 'one of those things that are (ἓν μὴν κἀκεῖνό γ᾽ ἐστὶν τῶν ὄντων)' (284a3) and thus speaks what is (λέγων τὸ ὄν) (a5). He must necessarily be saying truth when he is speaking what is because he who speaks what is (τὸ ὄν) and the things that are (τὰ ὄντα) speaks truth (τἀληθῆ λέγει) (a5-6). This is based on Parmenidean principle of the impossibility of being of not being which Euthydemus restates (284b3-4) and we mentioned discussing BO principle above. The things that are not are nowhere (οὐδαμοῦ) and there is no possibility for anyone to do (πράξειεν) anything with them because they must be made as being before anything else can be done, which is impossible (b5-7). The words, then, are of things that exist (εἰσὶν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων λόγοι) (285e9) and as they are (ὡς ἔστιν) (e10). The result is that no one can speak of things as they are not. It is this impossibility of false speach that is extended to thinking (δοξάζειν) at 286d1 and leads to the impossibility of false opinion (ψευδής … δόξα) (286d4). The general conclusion is asserted at 287a extending this impossibility to actions and making any kind of mistake. Not only knowledge is of being but speech, thought and action are of being simply because of the fact that nothing can be of not being. -/- B. First Socrates’ Principles in the Middle Period Dialogues Out of what were presupposed or criticized mostly in five dialogues, Euthyphro, Euthydemus, Hippias Major, Laches and Charmides, we tried to draw the first Socrates’ principles. Our inquiry here is directed to find out the fate of these principles in the three dialogues of the middle period, Meno, Phaedo and Republic. To do this, first we ought to check the situation of Socratic circle in these dialogues. The Socratic circle that was predominant in the early dialogues, does not look like a circle here anymore though they certainly have some features in common. Meno, Phaedo and Republic II-X are not committed to the principles of the circle and the whole circle in disrupted in them. The difference of the two Socrateses towards acquiring knowledge is obvious. The Socrates of Meno, Phaedo and Republic is evidently more self-confident that he can get to some truths during his arguments as he does. They are in their first appearance, as almost all other dialogues, committed to Socrates’ disavowal. All of them try to keep the shape of the Socratikoi Logoi genre, which is committed to the historical Socrates’ way of discussion; a dramatic personage who is to challenge his interlocutors, ask them and refuse the answers. Nevertheless, the fact is that what we have in common between two groups of dialogues is mostly a dramatic structure. Whereas the first group’s arguments are based on Socrates’ disavowal and lead to no positive results, the second group is decisively going to achieve some positive results. The aim of the first Socrates was to show others that they are ignorant of what they thought they knew. The new Socrates of Meno, on the opposite, makes so much efforts to show that the slave boy has within himself true opinions (ἀληθεῖς δόξαι) about the things that he does not know (οἶδε) (85c6-7). Despite his lack of knowledge, he has true opinions nevertheless. The way from these true opinions to knowledge, as Socrates states, is not so long. These true opinions are now like a dream but 'can become knowledge of the same things not less accurate than anyone’s' (οὐδενὸς ἧττον ἀκριβῶς ἐπιστήσεται περὶ τούτων) (c11-d1), if they be repeated by asking the same questions. The most outstanding text regarding Socrates’ disavowal is Meno 98b where he explicitly claims knowledge: -/- And indeed I also speak as (ὡς) one who does not know (εἰδὼς) but is guessing (εἰκάζων). However, [about the fact] that true opinion and knowledge are different, I do not altogether expect (δοκῶ) myself to be guessing (εἰκάζειν), but if I say about anything that I know (εἰδέναι) -which about few things I say- this is one of the things that I know (οἶδα). (98b1-5) This passage is very significant about Plato’s disavowal of knowledge. There can hardly be found, I think, anywhere else in Plato’s corpus where Socrates speaks about his knowledge of something as such. He says first that he speaks as someone who does not know. This ὡς οὐκ εἰδὼς λέγω comparing with what he used to say in the first group, οὐκ οἶδα, has this added ὡς. Socrates does not claim strongly anymore that he does not know anything but speaks only as someone who does not know. He needs this ὡς not only because he is going to accept that he does know some, though few, things immediately after this sentence, but also because he needs his previous disavowal to be loosened from Meno on. He does not merely say here that he knows something. It is then different from the examples mentioned before which could be taken as idiomatic or at least not emphatic. Socrates’ remarkable emphasis on distinguishing εἰδέναι from εἰκάζειν departs it from all other passages where he says only he knows something. Moreover, he claims definitely that he has knowledge about few (ὀλίγα) things. From the early to the middle dialogues, Socrates’ attitude to knowledge has totally renewed its face. He brings forth a new concept, true opinion, and he does not speak of knowledge as he used to before; the rough, perfect and unachievable knowledge of the first group has turned to something more smooth, realistic and achievable. Comparing with the early dialogues that did not set out from the first to reach positive results, the middle ones are extraordinarily and surprisingly positive and hence destroy the basis of the Socratic circle. The questions and answers are purposely directed to some specific new theories; most of them are not directly related to the topics or the main questions of the dialogues. They are suggested when Socrates draws the attention of the interlocutor away from the main question because of the necessity of another discussion. Even if the main question remains unanswered, we have still many positive theories, prominently of metaphysical type. These theories are so abundant and dominant in these dialogues, especially Phaedo and Republic, that one might think that they may appear to be arbitrarily sandwiched in there. This helps dialogues to keep their original Socratic structure while they are suggesting new theories. Hence, the Socratic question of 'what is X?', though is still used to launch the discussion, is loosened and is forgotten for most part of the dialogues. Meno that has first a differently formulated question, 'can virtue be taught?', leads finally to the Socratic question of 'What is virtue?'. Phaedo is dedicated to the demonstration of the immortality of soul and the life after death without having a central Socratic question. The case of Republic is more complicated. The first book, on the one hand, has all the criteria of a Socratic circle: its 'what is justice?' question, Socrates’ strong disavowal (e.g. 337d-e), his rejection of all answers and coming back to the first point without finding out any answer. This Book, considered alone, is a perfect Socratic dialogue, as many scholars regard it as early and separated from other books. The books II-X are, on the other hand, far from implementing a Socratic circle. They have still the 'what is justice?' question as their incentive leading question, but they are, in most of the positive doctrines and methods that encompass the main parts, ignoring the question. Even these books that, I believe, are the farthest discussions from the Socratic circle are so cautious not to break the Socratic structure of the dialogue as long as it is possible. What is changed is not the structure of the dialogue but the ontological and epistemological grounds based on which new theories are suggested. -/- 1. Knowledge of the Good We can clearly see in the second group of dialogues that the KWX principle loses the place it had before in our first group. It is not, of course, rejected, but still we cannot say that it has the same situation. KWX that was based on Socratic question, as we discussed before, was the leading principle of the first Socrates’ epistemology and of the highest position. Other epistemological principles, SK directly and BE indirectly, were relying on Socratic question and therefore on KWX. Such a position does not belong to KWX from Meno on. What makes it different in the second Socrates is another principle that is needed it not only as its complementary principle but also as what is more fundamental. Plato, then, does not reject KWX in this period, but, it seems, he transcends to another more basic principle; a principle we shall call the principle of 'Knowledge of the Good' (KG): -/- KG Knowledge of X requires knowledge of the Good. -/- Whereas all the dialogues of our first group are free from any discuscon about KG, it bears a very important role in the second group so as becomes the superior principle of knowledge in Republic. Trying to solve the problem of teachability of virtue, Socrates says that it can be teachable only if it is a kind of knowledge because nothing can be taught to human beings but knowledge (ἐπιστήμην) (Meno 87c2). The dilemma will be, then, whether virtue is knowledge or not (c11-12) and since virtue is good, we can change the question to: whether is there anything good separate from knowledge (εἰ μέν τί ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἄλλο χωριζόμενον ἐπιστήμης) (d4-5). Therefore, the conclusion will be that if there is nothing good which knowledge does not encompass, virtue can be nothing but knowledge (d6-8). What let us discuss KG as an epistemological principle for the second Secrates is the relation he tries to establish between knowledge and the Good which, though is alongside with the mentioned thesis and the idea of virtue as knowledge, goes much deeper inside epistemology asking to regard the Good as the basis of knowledge. The effort of Phaedo cannot succeed in establishing the Good as the criterion of explanation and knowledge since, I think, it needs a far more complicated ontology of Republic where Socrates can finally announce KG. What is said in Republic is totally compatible with Phaedo 99d–e and the metaphor of watching an eclipse of the sun. In spite of the fact that we do not have adequate knowledge of the Idea of the Good, it is necessary for every kind of knowledge: 'If we do not know it, even if we know all other things, it is of no benefit to us without it' (505a6-7). The problem of our not having sufficient knowledge of the Idea of Good is tried to be solved by the same method of Phaedo 99d-e, that is to say, by looking at what is like instead of looking at thing itself (506d8-e4). It is this solution that leads to the comparison of the Good with sun in the allegory of Sun (508b12-13). What the Good is in the intelligible realm corresponds to what the sun is in the visible realm; as sun is not sight, but is its cause and is seen by it (b9-10), the Good is so regarding knowledge. It has, then, the same role for knowledge that the sun has for sight. Socrates draws our attention to the function of sun in our seeing. The eyes can see everything only in the light of the day being unable to see the same things in the gloom of night (508c4-6). Without the sun, our eyes are dimmed and blind as if they do not have clear vision any longer (c6-7). That the Good must have the same role about knowledge based on the analogy means that it must be considered as a required condition of any kind of knowledge: -/- The soul, then, thinks (νόει) in the same way: whenever it focuses on what is shined upon by truth and being, understands (ἐνόησέν), knows (ἔγνω) and apparently possesses understanding (νοῦν ἔχειν). (508d4-6) -/- Socrates does not use agathon in this paragraph and substitutes it with both aletheia and to on. He links them with the Idea of the Good when he is to assert the conclusion of the analogy: -/- That which gives truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower, you must say, is the Idea of the Good: being the cause of knowledge and truth (αἰτίαν δ᾽ ἐπιστήμης οὖσαν καὶ ἀληθείας) so far as it is known (ὡς γιγνωσκομένης μὲν διανοοῦ). (508e1-4) Knowledge and truth are called goodlike (ἀγαθοειδῆ) since they are not the same as the Good but more honoured (508e6-509a5). KG, which had been implicitly contemplated and searched in Phaedo, is now explicitly being asserted in Republic. As what was quoted clearly proves, this principle is the very one which we can observe as the most fundamental principle of the second Socrates in Republic, corresponding to the role KWX had in the first Socrates. The Form of the Good in Republic, of which Santas speaks as 'the centerpiece of the canonical Platonism of the middle dialogues, the centerpiece of Plato’s metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and …' (1983, 256) much more can be said. Plato’s Cave allegory in Book VIII dedicates a similar role to the Idea of the Good. The Idea of the Good is there as the last thing to be seen in the knowable realm, something so important that its seeing equals to understanding the fact that it is the cause of all that is correct and beautiful (517b). Producing both light and its source in visible realm, it controls and provides truth and understanding in the intelligible realm (517c). -/- 2. Tripartite Epistemology BE is thoroughy rejected in the second Socrates and substituted by its opposite, the principle of 'Tripartite Epistemolgy' (TE): -/- TE Opinion is an epistemological status between knowledge and ignorance. BE of the first Socrates was denying any third way besides knowledge and ignorance which was the foundation of Socratic circle without which Socrates could not reject his interlocutors’ possessing any kind of knowledge. We cannot say, however, that the first Socrates had a third epistemological status in mind but rejected it. Such a status was unacceptable for him so that one can say that he would reject any kind of such status if suggested. There were only two possibilities about knowledge: either one knows something or he does not know it. TE, thus, was not the first Socrates’ discovery and, I think it is not the second Socrates’discovery. All we can see in our second group of dialouges is that he uses this principle as an already demonstrated one. Having examined the slave boy in Meno for the prupose of showing the working of recollection, it truns out that he has some opinions in him while he still does not know. Without trying to prove it, Socrates takes this as the distinction between knowledge and opinion: -/- So, he who does not know (οὐκ εἰδότι) about what he does not know (περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ) has within himself true opinions (ἀληθεῖς δόξαι) about the same things he did not know (περὶ τούτων ὧν οὐκ οἶδε) (85c6-7). -/- The same distinction is set between ὀρθὴν δόξαν and ἐπιστήμην at 97b5-6 ff. (also cf. 97b1-2: ὀρθῶς μὲν δοξάζων … ἐπιστάμενος). He connects then their difference to the myth of Daedalus, the statue that would run away and escape. So are true opinions, not willing to remain long in mind and thus not worthy until one ties them down by αἰτίας λογισμῷ (98a3-4). Socrates says that this tying down is anamnesis. We face, in Phaedo, the same relation is settled between knowledge as the process of being tied down and getting the capability to give an account, on the one hand, and anamnesis, on the other hand. When a man knows, he must be able to give an account of what he knows (Phaedo 76b5-6) and since not all people are able to give such an account, those who recollect, recollect what once they learned (76c4). Although the distinction between knowledge and opinion is not explicitly used in Phaedo, referring to the parallel link between knowledge plus account and anamnesis in Phaedo and Meno, one can say that those who cannot recollect are not able to give account and, thus, are in a state of opinion. What is said at Phaedo 84a, though not yet a definite distinction between knowledge and opinion, makes a distinction between their objects so as we can agree that it is presupposed. The soul of the philosopher, Socrates says, follows reason, stays with it forever and contemplates the divine, which is not the object of opinoin (ἀδόξαστον) (84a8, cf. Meno 98b2-5). The distinction of knowledge and belief in Republic has a significant difference with what we discussed in Meno and Phaedo since the distinction of Meno was based on anamnesis and thus more an epistemological distinction. Even in Phaedo that we do not have any elaborate discussion about the distinction, the only hint to the matter at 76 is bound to the theory of anamnesis. In addition to the relation of the distinction with this theory, there is another evidence that does not permit us to consider the distinction as an ontological distinction. Let’s see Meno 85c6-7: -/- So, he who does not know about what he does not know has within himself true opinions about the same things he did not know (τῷ οὐκ εἰδότι ἄρα περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ ἔνεισιν ἀληθεῖς δόξαι περὶ τούτων ὧν οὐκ οἶδε). (85c6-7) -/- This last sentence persists that the objects of knowledge and true opinion are the same. What Socrates is to say here is that whereas he does not know X he has true opinion about the same X. I think Socrates’ sentence that the slave boy οὐκ εἰδότι ἄρα περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ and his restatement of it by saying περὶ τούτων ὧν οὐκ οἶδε is because he wants to emphasize that the slave boy who does not know, has true opinion about the same thing. Socrates could say this just with using τούτων and there would be no necessity to bring περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ for οὐκ εἰδότι if he did not want to emphasize. -/- 3. Tripartite Ontology The distinction between knowledge and true opinion in Republic, on other side, has nothing to do with recollection, but is based on an ontological principle, 'Tripartite Ontology' (TO): -/- TO There are things that both are and are not. -/- This principle I confine, among our three dialogues of the second group, to Republic not extended to Meno and Phaedo, is obviously the opposite of BO. Speaking about the lovers of sights and sounds in the fifth book, Socrates distinguishes them from philosophers because their thought is unable to understand the nature of beautiful itself besides beautiful things (476a6-8) and hence they can only have opinions. The philosopher who, on the contrary, believes in beautiful itself and can distinguish it from beautiful things (476c9-d3), has knowledge because he knows, contrasting others who have opinion because they only opine (d5-6). Since those whose knowledge were degraded as opinion will complain about Socrates’ such calling their thought, he provides them the following argument (476e7-477b1): -/- - Does the person who knows, knows (γιγνώσκει) something (τὶ) or nothing (οὐδέν)? - He knows something (τί). - Something that is (ὂν) or is not (οὐκ ὄν)? - Something that is (ὂν) for how could something that is not be known (πῶς γὰρ ἂν μὴ ὄν γέ τι γνωσθείη)? - Then we have an adequate grasp of this: No matter how many ways we examine it, what completely is (παντελῶς ὂν) is completely knowable (παντελῶς γνωστόν) and what is in no way (μὴ ὂν δὲ μηδαμῇ) is in every way unknowable (πάντῃ ἄγνωστον). - A most adequate one. - Good. Now, if anything is such as to be and also not to be (ὡς εἶναί τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι), won’t it be intermediate (μεταξὺ) between what purely is (εἰλικρινῶς ὄντος) and what in no way is (μηδαμῇ ὄντος)? - Yes, it’s intermediate. - Then as knowledge (γνῶσις) is set over what is (τῷ ὄντι), while ignorance (ἀγνωσία) is of necessity set over what is not (μὴ ὄντι) mustn’t we find an intermediate between ignorance (ἀγνοίας) and knowledge (ἐπιστήμης) to be set over the intermediate, if there is such a thing? -/- From the third status of being we must reach to the third status of knowledge. The simple reading of this text can be an existential reading, taking the "is" of the mentioned sentences as existence. The problem is that when it is said that there is something that both is and is not reading "is" existentially, it sounds too bizarre to be acceptable. It cannot easily be understandable to have something as both existent and non-existent at the same time. This problem arose so many debates and led many scholars to reject the existential reading of "is" and suggest some other readings like predicative or veridical readings. I think though Plato’s complicated ontology of Republic cannot be correctly understood by a simple existential reading, this "is" cannot be free from existential sense of being and, thus, cannot be reduced to just a predicative or veridical sense of being. -/- 4. Bound Knowledges In addition to KG, the Good is also the basis of another principle in the second Socrates, namely the principle of 'Bound Knowledge' (BK): -/- BK Knowledge of everything is bound to the knowledge of the Good. -/- We distinguished BK from KG because we want to insist, in BK, on what had not been insisted upon in KG, that is, the binding role that the Good plays in the second Socrates, contrasting the absence of such a role in the first Socrates. Socrates remembers, in Phaedo, his wonderful keen on natural philosophers' wisdom when he was young. The origin of this enthusiasm was Socrates’ hope to know the cause of everything as they used to claim. When he was searching the matters of his interest on their basis, Socrates says, he became convinced he can get no acceptable answer from them and found himself blind even to the things he thought he knew before. One day he hears Anaxagoras’ theory that 'it is Mind that arranges and is the cause of everything (ὡς ἄρα νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος)' (Phd. 97c1-2 cf. DK, Fr.15.8-9, 11-12, 12-14) and thinks that he can finally find what he has always expected, i.e. something which can explain all things. What I intend to show here is that what makes Socrates hopeful is that Anaxagoras’ theory tries 1) to explain all things by one thing and 2) this explanation is understood by Socrates as if it is based on the concept of the Good. That Socrates was searching for one explanation for all things can be proved even from what he has been expecting from natural philosophers. The case is, nonetheless, more clearly asserted when he speaks about Anaxagoras’ theory. In addition to διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος of 97c2 mentioned above, we have τὸ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι πάντων αἴτιον (c3-4) and τόν γε νοῦν κοσμοῦντα πάντα κοσμεῖν (c4-5) all emphasizing on the cause of all things (πάντα) which can clearly prove that one of the reasons which caused Socrates to embrace it delightfully was its claim to provide the cause of all things by one thing. Another reason was that Anaxagoras’ Mind, at least in Socrates’ view, was attempting to explain everything by the concept of the Good. This connection between Mind and Good belongs more to the essential relation they have in Socrates’ thinking than Anaxagoras’ theory because there are almost nothing about such a relation in Anaxagoras. The reason for Socrates’ reading can be that Mind is substantially compatible with Socrates’ idea of the relation between good and knowledge. Both the thesis 'no one does wrong willingly' and the theory of virtue as knowledge we pointed to above are evidences of this essential relation. Nobody who knows that something is bad can choose or do it as bad. The reason, when it is reason, that means when it is as it should be, when it is wise or when it knows, works only based on good-choosing. In this context, when Socrates hears that Mind is considered as the cause of everything, it sounds to him like this: good should be regarded as the basis of the explanation of all things. We see him, thus, passing from the former to the latter without any proof. This is done in the second sentence after introducing Mind: -/- I thought that if this were so, the arranging Mind would arrange all things and put each thing in the way that was Best (ὅπῃ ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχῃ). If one then wished to find the cause of each thing by which it either perishes or exists, one needs to find what is the best way (βέλτιστον αὐτῷ ἐστιν) for it to be, or to be acted upon, or to act. On these premises then it befitted a man to investigate only, about this and other things, what is the most excellent (ἄριστον) and best (βέλτιστον). The same man must inevitably also know what is worse (χεῖρον), for that is part of the same knowledge. (97c4-d5) This passage is a good evidence of Socrates’ leap from Anaxagoras’ Mind to his own concept of the Good that can explain why Socrates found Anaxagoras theory after his own heart (97d7). Mind is welcomed because of its capability for explanation on the basis of good to 'explain why it is so of necessity, saying which is better (ἄμεινον), and that it was better (ἄμεινον) to be so' (97e1-3). What Socrates thought he had found in Anaxagoras can indicate what he had been expecting from natural scientists before. Socrates could not be satisfied with their explanations because they were unable to explain how it is the best for everything to be as it is. It can probably be said, then, that it was the lack of the unifying Good in their explanation that had disappointed him. We must insist that we are discussing what Socrates thought that Anaxagoras’ theory of Mind should have been, not about Anaxagoras’ actual way of using Mind. Phaedo 97c-98b, is not about what Socrates found in Anaxagoras but what he thought he could find in it. On the contrary, it should also be noted that it was not this that was dashed at 98b, but Anaxagoras’ actual way of using Mind. It was Anaxagoras’ fault not to find out how to use such an excellent thesis (98b8-c2, cf. 98e-99b). Socrates gives an example to show how not believing in 'good' as the basis of explanation makes people be wanderers between different unreal explanations of a thing. His words δέον συνδεῖν (binding that binds together) as a description for the Good we chose as the name of BK principle: They do not believe that the truly good and binding binds and holds them together (ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον συνδεῖν καὶ συνέχειν οὐδὲν οἴονται). (99c5-6) -/- Having in mind Plato’s well-known analogy of the sun and the Good at Republic 508-509, we can dare to say that his warning of the danger of seeing the truth directly like one watching an eclipse of the sun in Phaedo (99d-e) is more about the difficulty of so-called good-based explanation than its insufficiency, a difficulty which is precisely confirmed in Republic (504e-505a, 506d-e). Moreover, BK is asserted in a more explicit way in the Republic, where the Good is considered not only as a condition for the knowledge of X, as was noted above discussing KG, but also as what binds all the objects of knowledge and also the soul in its knowing them. At Republic VI, 508e1-3, when Socrates says that the Form of the Good 'gives truth to the things known and the power to know to the knower (τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρέχον τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γιγνώσκοντι τὴν δύναμιν ἀποδιδὸν)', he wants to set the Good at the highest point of his epistemological structure by which all the elements of this structure are bound. This binding aspect of the Good is by no means a simple binding of all knowledges or all the objects of knowledge, but the most complicated kind of binding as it is expected from the author of the Republic. The kind of unity the Good gives to the different knowledges of different things is comparable with the unity which each Form gives to its participants in Republic: as all the participants of a Form are united by referring to the ideas, all different kinds of knowledge are united by referring to the Good. If we observe Aristotle's assertion that for Plato and the believers of Forms, the causative relation of the One with the Forms is the same as that of the Forms with particulars (e.g. Metaphysics 988a10-11, 988b4), that is to say the One is the essence (e.g., ibid, 988a10-11: τοῦ τί ἐστὶν, 988b4-6: τὸ τί ἢν εἶναί) of the Forms besides his statement that for them One is the Good (e.g., ibid, 988b11-13) the relation between the Good and unity may become more understandable. Since the quiddity of the Good (τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ τἀγαθὸν) is more than discussion (506d8-e2), we cannot await Socrates to tell us how this binding role is played. All we can expect is to hear from him an analogy by which this unifying role is envisaged, the sun. The kind of unity that the Good gives to the knowledge and its objects in the intelligible realm is comparable to the unity that the sun gives to the sight and its objects in the visible realm (508b-c). The allegory of Line (Republic VI, 509d-511), like that of the Sun, tries to bind all various kinds of knowledges. The hierarchical model of the Line which encompasses all kinds of knowledge from imagination to understanding can clearly be considered as Plato’s effort to bind all kinds of knowledges by a certain unhypothetical principle. The method of hypothesis starts, in the first subsection of the intelligible realm, with a hypothesis that is not directed firstly to a principle but a conclusion (510b4-6). It proceeds, in the other subsection, to a 'principle which is not a hypothesis' (b7) and is called the 'unhypothetical principle of all things' (ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν) (511b6-7). This παντὸς must refer not only to the objects of the intelligible realm but to the sensible objects as well. Plato does posit, therefore, an epistemological principle for all things, a principle that all things are, epistemologically, bound and, thus, unified by. -/- 5. Bound Beings The ontological aspect of BK we shall call the principle of 'Bound Beings' (BB): -/- BB Being of all things are bound by the Good. -/- We saw in our principle of Split Being (SB) how the first Socrates was criticized because of his approach to split being and separate each thing from other things. The principle of Bound Beings intends to make the things more related, a duty which is done again by the Good. In the allegory of Sun, there are two paragraphs that evidently and deliberately extend the binding role of the Good to the ontological scene: -/- You will say that the sun not only makes the visible things have the ability of being seen but also coming to be, growth and nourishment. (509b2-4) -/- This clearly intends to remind the ontological role the sun plays in bringing to being all the sensible things in order to display how its counterpart has the same role in the intelligible realm (b6-10): -/- Not only the objects of knowledge (γιγνωσκομένοις) owe their being known (γιγνώσκεσθαι) to the Good, but also their existence (τὸ εἶναί) and their being (οὐσίαν) are due to it, though the Good is not being but superior to it in rank and power. That the Good is here represented as responsible for being of things in addition to their being known means, in my opinion, that Plato wants to posit BB in addition to BK. The allegory of Cave at the very beginning of the seventh Book (514aff.) can be taken as another evidence. The role of the Good, one might say, is confined to the intelligible realm because it is asserted that the role the Good plays in this realm is corresponding to that of the sun in the visible realm. The fact that Plato wants to observe the Good also as the ontological cause of the sensible things is obvious from his saying, in the allegory of Cave, that the Form of the Good 'produces light and its source (τὸν τούτου κύριον) [i.e. the sun] in the visible realm' (517c3). We can conclude, then, that the ontological function of the Good is not confined to the intelligible realm in which it is the lord and provides truth and understanding (c3-4) because it is also responsible to produce τὸν κύριον of light. 6. Proportionality of Being and Knowledge Insofaras BE and BO principles of the first Socrates gave way to TE and TO principles of the second Socrates, we cannot expect him to preserve KB in the same way as it was in the first Socrates. The new tripartite ontology and epistemology necessitates some modifications in KB which results in the principle of 'Proportionality of Being and Knowledge' (PBK): -/- PBK To every class of being there is a proportionate category of knowledge. -/- This principle, of course, does not entail the refutation of KB and thus is not kind of rejecting PBK but only a more complicated version of it. Based on PBK, we can still agree that knowledge is of being (KB) but the issue is that since none of the concepts of knowledge and being in the second Socrates are as simple as they were for the first Socrates, we need a more complicated principle for their relation here. Although from Meno 97a where the distinction of knowledge and true opinion is drawn out in the second group of the dialogues, we can expect a new relation, it is articulated in its most complete way in Republic and specifically in the allegory of Line. All the beings are divided there hierarchically to four classes, to each of them belongs a class of knowledge: imagination to images, belief to the sensible things (more correctly: the things of which they[in previous class] were images (ᾧ τοῦτο ἔοικεν)), thought to mathematical objects (?) and understanding to the Forms and the first principle. The degree of clarity that each of the classes of knowledge shares in (σαφηνείας ἡγησάμενος μετέχειν) is proportionate to the degree that its object shares in truth (ἀληθείας μετέχει). (511e2-4) -/- Conclusion From the six onto-epistemilogical principles of the first Socrates, four principles turn to their opposite in the middle period dialogues. While bipolar epistemology and ontology of the early dialogues give place to tripartite epistemology in the middle period dialogues and tripartite ontology in Republic, the split knowledge and being of the first Socrates are inclined to be substituted by bound knowledges and bound beings in the second Socrates and specifically in Republic. Not all our system of principles in this article is necessarily determinative. Either they are rightly formulated or not, our result would not be vulnerable if we accept that 1) making the distinction of knowledge and belief, 2) accepting the being of not being and 3) trying to bind both being and knowledge by the concept of the Good happens only in middle period dialogues, having been absent in the early ones. These are the favourite results all those somehow arbitrary and even oversimplified principles were to illustrate; that there is kind of a development in the epistemological as well as the ontological grounds of Plato’s philosophy. -/- Notes . (shrink)

The philosophy of Diogenes pays special attention to knowledge. Diogenes bases his thought on the well-known thesis of Parmenides which identifies einai and noein, combining it with the nous of Anaxagoras. According to Diogenes, the intellect (noesis) is embodied in the formal features of things and therefore is powerful, like the nous of Anaxagoras. The aim of the following pages is to show, in confrontation with Laks, that noesis does not homogenize the cosmos, but rather it diversifies it.

In this book the author presented the history of the Greek philosophy that extends from the six century BC till the six century AC. He divided the book into three main stages: Philosophy before Socrates: It extended from 6th century BC to mid 5th century BC. This stage began with Thales and his school of Physics; Heraclitus; Pythagoras school; Eleaties School; then Empedocles and Anaxagoras; Democritus and Sophists school. The themes of philosophical contemplation were nature, universe and man. Socratic (...) Method was represented by Socrates, Plato and Aristotle as all of them paid much concern to establishing philosophical systems especially Plato and Aristotle. They both presented solutions to the problems raised by philosophers before the time of Socrates. As for Socrates, he was the real founder of Ethics science and approach. The third stage is Hellenistic philosophy which is in its turn divided into two stages. The first is represented by Stoicism school, The Epicureanism School, and Skepticism. The second was represented in the modern Pythagorean and Platonic schools. The researcher focused on two aspects which the Greek philosophy. The first one is the large number of philosophers and philosophical schools in comparison with Islamic, Christian, modern and contemporary philosophies. The second is the diversity and change amongst the philosophers of Greece whether they belong to the same philosophical school or to independent schools in addition to the miracle of the Greek philosophy as mentioned by Aristotle who said that it was created from nothing as well as the opinions by the researcher in this concern. (shrink)

This paper aims to synthesize two equally impressive systems of thought: Indian philosophy in the East and Presocratic philosophy in the West, which are separated not only by space and time but by our prejudices. It attempts to show the universality of philosophy by exploring the parallelisms and similarities, clarifying contrasts, and highlighting the common themes that are emphasized and de-emphasized in them. The study does not intend to give a complete account of the early Greek and Hindu thoughts. The (...) discussion of Hindu philosophy focuses on the Upanishads, the main source of Hinduism. We will use for our primary source the following texts which majority of Indologists consider as the most authoritative: Aiteriya, Kaushitaki, Taittiriya, Chandogya, Brihadharanyaka, Katha, Mandukya, Maitriyani, Svetasvatara, Isa, and Kena. On the side of Presocratic philosophy are included such major thinkers as Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, and Empidocles. (shrink)

TUCÍDIDES: GUERRA DO PELOPONESO E A BUSCA DA OBJETIVIDADE1 TUCÍDIDES: PELOPONNESE WAR AND THE SEARCH OF OBJECTIVITY Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva2 IFPE - Belo Jardim 1 CONTEXTO HISTÓRICO: GUERRA DE PELOPONESO Os gregos liderados por Atenas e Esparta venceram os persas na batalha naval, em Salamina (480 a.C.), e terrestre, em Plateia (479 a.C.), expulsando-os definitivamente da sua terra. Nos anos seguintes, Atenas consolidou seu poder sobre outras cidades, especialmente nas ilhas do Mar Jônico, formando a Confederação de Delos. (...) Ressentindo-se com a ascensão da rival, Esparta começou a bloquear o desenvolvimento do império ateniense. Temístocles,3 que assumiu papel preponderante nas guerras persas, começou a alertar a seus compatriotas das intenções da grande cidade do Peloponeso. Não obstante, foi derrubada por uma oligarquia, sendo exilado em seguida. Surgiu, então, uma nova liderança do partido democrático, Péricles, que, em 441 a.C., assumiu o governo de Atenas. 4 TUCÍDIDES nasceu, por volta de 465 a 460 a.C., em data incerta, em Halinute, 5 próximo de Atenas, descendente de rica família ateniense, sendo filho de Oberós. Sofreu muito com a grave epidemia de 430 a 427 a.C., na qual faleceu Péricles, mas a ela sobreviveu. Em 424 a.C., era comandante naval das tropas ateniense na Trácia, estacionada na ilha de Samos, mas não conseguiu impedir que o comandante espartano Brasidas ocupasse Anfípolis, cidade de grande importância para o fornecimento de trigo para Atenas, razão pela 6 qual foi exilado no mesmo ano.7 Depois de vinte anos, com o fim da guerra de Peloponeso, pôde retornar do ostracismo, falecendo em 400 a.C., sem ter terminado a sua obra História da Guerra do Peloponeso. Foi educado e influenciado pelas personalidades mais ilustres de Atenas, como Péricles e pelos sofistas, tendo ainda convivido com Eurípedes. Existia narração de encontro seu, ainda adolescente, com HERÔDOTOS, historiador da guerra com os persas e já 8 conhecido em sua época. Este lia trechos de sua História, por ocasião de concurso literário, durante a realização de Jogos Olímpicos, tendo TUCÍDIDES chegado às lágrimas, ao ouvir as narrativas, demonstrando seu pendor para a história.9 O autor escolheu como tema de sua obra a Guerra do Peloponeso, por ele considerada a mais importante até então, como expunha no início de sua obra: “1. O ateniense Tucídides escreveu a história da guerra entre os peloponesos e os atenienses, começando desde os primeiros sinais, na expectativa de que ela seria grande e mais importante que todas as anteriores, pois viu que ambas as partes estavam preparadas em todos os sentidos; além disto, observava os demais helenos aderindo a um lado ou ao outro, uns imediatamente, os restantes pensando em fazê-lo. Com efeito, tratava-se do maior movimento jamais realizado pelos helenos, estendendo-se também a alguns povos bárbaros, bem dizer à maior parte da humanidade”. 10 As relações entre Atenas e Esparta continuaram tensas, principalmente depois que aquela, ignorando essa, levantou uma nova e extensa muralha em sua volta, com a desculpa de precisar de defesa contra os persas. A Confederação de Delos, ao longo dos anos, serviu apenas para fortalecer seu poder marítimo e embelezar a cidade, que tinha sido destruída pelos persas. As cidades-estados que integravam a Confederação como aliadas passaram logo à condição de súditas, perdendo a liberdade. O estopim para a guerra foi a ajuda que os atenienses deram a Córcira, contra sua metrópole, Corinto, aliada dos espartanos, em 431 a.C. No começo, com a força de Atenas, na frota marítima, e de sua rival, com suas falanges, houve apenas incursões periódicas. Contudo, a grande peste de 429 a.C., que levou Péricles, bem como as desastrosas campanhas contra Siracura, na Sicília, em 415 a.C., cidade dória, que fornecia trigo para Esparta, enfraqueceu os atenienses. Logo seus aliados começaram a se revoltar e os espartanos levaram a guerra para a Ática, fazendo com que Atenas capitulasse em 404 a.C., sendo destruída suas muralhas e sua frota naval. O esforço de guerra foi tão grande que todo o mundo grego se enfraqueceu, permitindo que a Macedônia dominasse toda a Grécia, em 338 a.C. A única obra de TUCÍDIDES foi marcada pela objetividade e busca da verdade, evitando as fábulas e as lendas. A História da Guerra do Peloponeso compunha-se de cinco partes: a primeira, o Livro I, tratava da importância dessa guerra e do método histórico do autor; a segunda, os Livros II, III, IV e parte do V, versava sobre a chamada Guerra dos Dez Anos; a terceira, fim do Livro V, descrevia a paz precária; a quarta, Livros VI e VII, cobria a guerra na Sicília; e a quinta, Livro VIII, tratava da chamada Guerra de Decêleia e da operação na Ásia Menor. Faleceu antes de terminar sua obra, deixando-a inacabada, em 400 a.C. Não podia deixar de haver comparações entre as obras de TUCÍDIDES e HERÔDOTOS, pois enquanto este escreveu sobre amplo tema envolvendo várias regiões, povos e época, aquele restringiu seu assunto à Guerra de Peloponeso. O método de 11 TUCÍDIDES foi mais neutro e racional, sendo considerado mais objetivo do que o do outro, pois escrevia apenas com base no conhecimento pessoal ou em informações cuidadosamente verificadas. A exatidão e a objetividade levaram-no a ser considerado um dos maiores historiadores da Antiguidade e, até hoje, admirado pela precisão e pesquisa empreendida. 2 TUCÍDIDES E O MÉTODO: A BUSCA DA OBJETIVIDADE A obra de TUCÍDIDES tem fundamentação teórica no racionalismo de Anaxágora e 12 na visão crítica dos sofistas. Estava voltado para o rigor de exatidão, tanto nos fatos históricos, como na apreciação dos homens e nas descrições do espaço geográfico. Existia em sua obra um método, voltado para a aferição da verdade e a imparcialidade de julgamento, excluindo os mitos e as lendas. O autor procurou, inicialmente, separar seu método do utilizado por HERÔDOTOS ao denunciar que “20 [...] Os homens, na verdade, aceitam uns dos outros relatos de segunda mão dos eventos passados, negligenciando pô-los à prova ainda que tais eventos se relacionem com sua própria terra. [...] A tal ponto chegou a aversão de certos homens pela pesquisa meticulosa da verdade e tão grande é a predisposição para valer-se apenas do que está ao alcance da mão”.14 TUCÍDIDES procurou elaborar sua análise das ações históricas, como a movimentação de tropas e os combates, as matérias relativas à opinião pública, as discussões dos dirigentes sobre a estratégia adequada ou o confronto entre as delegações diplomáticas. Procurou, então, explicar a complexidade da situação política e a dificuldade de se escolher a opção adequada. Para ele, o conflito era permanente entre as soluções adequadas aos problemas apresentados, com base na influência sofista. O método utilizado significava exprimir a complexidade da situação e a dificuldade de escolha, dentro de um mesmo contexto. A discussão contraditória entre os oponentes representava as opções extremadas das soluções de problemas.15 Para Jackeline de Romilly, o método utilizado foi o da antiloquia, que consistia em opor discursos. Essa autora indicava que a metodologia de TUCÍDIDES estava perfeitamente exemplificada, nos dois discursos pronunciados em Camerina, por Heróncrates e pelo ateniense Eufemos, no Livro VI (§§ 75 a 87). Usava a prática jurídica, pois entre os gregos havia o hábito de sempre se ouvir duas teorias adversas, apresentadas como o maior vigor possível, de modo que da relação entre os dois discursos pudesse sair a verdade.16 Coube a TUCÍDIDES, ainda, a paternidade da investigação do passado, em um trabalho quase de arqueologia, ainda que ele não se tivesse preocupado em fazer escavações. Não obstante, trouxe para a história novas provas e informações. O autor afirmava, então, que: “22. [...] O empenho em apurar os fatos se constitui numa tarefa laboriosa, pois as testemunhas oculares de vários eventos nem sempre faziam os mesmos relatos a respeito das mesmas coisas, mas variavam de acordo com suas simpatias por um lado ou pelo outro, ou de acordo com sua memória. Pode acontecer que a ausência do fabuloso em minha narrativa pareça menos agradável ao ouvido, mas quem quer que deseje ter uma ideia clara tanto dos eventos ocorridos quanto daqueles que algum dia voltarão a ocorrer em circunstâncias idênticas ou semelhante em consequência de seu conteúdo humano, julgará minha história útil e isto me bastará. Na verdade, ela foi feita para ser patrimônio sempre útil, e não uma composição a ser ouvida no momento da competição por algum prêmio”. 17 A obra de TUCÍDIDES tinha seus problemas, pois às vezes era lenta e cansativa, sem a graça e a criatividade de HERÔDOTOS, mas a objetividade obtida representava um marco na análise histórica e política da humanidade. Precedera em dois mil anos a própria criação da ciência, podendo dizer que sua pesquisa tinha rigor científico e busca da verdade. Por outro lado, várias de suas antilogias foram criadas pelo autor, a partir de informações orais, com o uso da contradição, mas sem chegar exatamente a uma síntese, apenas informando as posições contrárias, sem qualquer opção pessoal. Notas: 1 In. COSTA, N. N. Ciência Política. 3. ed. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2012. p. 68-74. 2 Tecnólogo em agropecuária pelo Instituto Federal de Pernambuco campus Belo Jardim. Normalista pela Escola Frei Cassiano Comacchio. Pesquisador assíduo de assuntos com cunho filosófico, com ênfase em política. 3 “Temístocles, general e político ateniense (Atenas, c. 525 – Magnésia do Menandro, c. 460 a.C.). Chefe do partido democrático, havia aconselhado osateniensesa voltarem todasas suasatividades paraaexpansão marítima, encontrado neste ponto a oposição de Aristides, chefe do partido aristocrático. Tendo obtido a condenação deste ao ostracismo, Temístocles fez construir o porto de Pireu e equipou excelente frota. Ao ser invadidaa Grécia por Xerxes, obrigou os persas a aceitar um combate naval, antes que o exército grego se retirasse para o Peloponeso, daí resultando a vitória de Salamina (480). Apesar da oposição de Esparta, rival de Atenas, Temístocles fez reconstruir as muralhas de Atenas, fortificou a parte de Pireu e de Muníquia. Contado, em decorrência das intrigas de Esparta, foiacusado de peculato e condenado ao ostracismo (471)” (KOOGAN/HOUAISS. Enciclopédia e Dicionário Ilustrado, op. cit., p. 1558). 4 Vide nota 7 do capítulo II, Herôdotos. 5 “Tucídides em gr. Thoukidídes, historiador grego (Atenas c. 465 – 395 a.C.). Eleito estratego em 424 a.C., foi encarregado da defesa do litoral da Trácia durante a Guerra do Peloponeso. Derrotado, viu-se forçado a partir para o exílio e só regressou à sua pátria por volta de 404 a.C. No exílio começou aescrever (431 a.C.) suas Histórias da Guerra do Peloponeso, que não chegou a terminar e que é uma profundareflexão políticasobrea natureza do poder indo em busca das causas profundas dosacontecimentos. O desenvolvimento do conflito éaí narrado em estilo simples e direto, por vezes entremeados de trechos de grande força emotiva, como o discurso de Péricles sobre atenienses mortos na guerra. Além de ter sido o compilador de um relato concreto dos acontecimentos. Túcides é considerado o primeiro historiador a adotar uma postura críticaem relação aeles” (Grande Enciclopédia Larousse Cultural, op. cit., vol. 23, p. 5734). 6 “104. [...] E mandaram um mensageiro ao outro comandante para o território fronteiro à Trácia; ele era Tucídides filho de Oloros, o autor desta História, na época estacionado em Tasos, ilha situada a aproximadamente meio-dia de viagem por mar de Anfípolis e colônia de Paros, e lhe pediam para socorrê-los. Recebendo a mensagem, ele partiu imediatamente com sete naus que se encontravam lá, pois queriam chegar o mais depressa possível, principalmente para socorrer Anfípolis antes dela render-se, ou, se isto não fosse possível para ocupar Êion. 105. Nesse ínterim Brasidas, temendo a vinda dos de Tasos, e tendo ouvido dizer que Tucídides, um detentor dos direitos de exploração das minas de ouro naquela parte da Trácia, exercendo por isso grande influência sobre os homens mais importantes do continente, apressou-se em capturar a cidade” (TUCÍDIDES. A Guerra do Peloponeso. 3ª ed. Brasília: Universidade de Brasília, 1987, pp. 228-9). 7 “26. [...] Vivi a guerra inteira, tendo umaidade que me permitiaformar meu próprio juízo, e segui-aatentamente, de modo a obter informações precisas. Atingiu-me também uma condenação ao exílio que me manteve longe de minha terra por vinte anos após meu período de comando em Anfípolis e, diante de minhafamiliaridade com asatividades de ambos os lados, especialmente aquelas do Peloponeso em consequência de meu banimento, graças ao meu ócio pude acompanhar melhor o curso dos acontecimentos” (TUCÍDIDES. História da Guerra do Peloponeso, op. cit., p. 255). 8 Vide nota 12 do capítulo II, Herôdotos. 9 KURY, Mário Gama (Introdução. In: TUCÍDIDES. História da Guerra do Peloponeso, op. cit., p. 13) cita com referência dos fatos a obra de Marcelino, que escreveu a Vida de Tucídides, na época do imperador bizantino Justiniano. 10 TUCÍDIDES. A Guerra do Peloponeso, op. cit., p. 19. 11 “Tucídides começou do ponto em que Herôdotos deixou a narração – o termo de Guerra Persa. [...] Herôdotos escrevia com o fito de entreter o leitor culto; Tucídides escreve visando fornecer informaçõesaos futuros historiadores e orientar com a experiência do passado aos futuros estadistas. Herôdotos narra em estilo solto e fluente, inspirado talvez pelo modo dos poemas de Homero; Tucídides, como alguém que tinha ouvido filósofos, oradores e dramaturgos, escreve em estilo frequentemente complicado e obscuro. [...] Herôdotos abrangia os mais remotos lugares, e as mais variadas épocas; Tucídides força a sua história numa severa moldura cronológica de estações e anos sacrificando a continuidade da narrativa. Herôdotos escrevia mais à luz das personalidades do que dos processos, sentindo que estes se operam através daqueles; Tucídides, [...] inclina-se mais para o relato impessoal e para a consideração das causas, desenvolvimentos e resultado. Herôdotos descrevia acontecimentos remotos, a ele narrados, na maioria das vezes, de segunda e terceira mão; Tucídides com frequênciase exprime baseado na própriatestemunha, no de quem informa ou em documentos originais, em vários trechos reproduz os documentos citados” (DURANT, Will. A História da Civilização. nossa herança clássica, op. cit., vol. II, p. 341). 12 Vide nota 8 do capítulo II, Herôdotos. 13 “Os primeiros desses novos humanistas, os Sofistas, salientaram-se no tempo da grande eclosão do individualismo que se referem às Guerras Persas e da difusão da democracia por todo o mundo grego e os sofistas consideravam perda de tempo a busca de uma vaga e fugitiva verdade a respeito do universo. Achavam muito melhor estudar o problema, bem mais prático, do homem e da sociedade. Como mestres, sua finalidade ideal era preparar jovens para assumirem sua responsabilidade de cidadão” (SAVELLE, Max (coord.), História da Civilização Mundial: as primeiras culturas humanas, op. cit., vol. I, p. 203). 14 TUCÍDIDES. História de Guerra do Peloponeso, op. cit., p. 27. 15 CHÂTELLET, François. Tucídides: a guerra do peloponeso. In: CHÂTELLET, François, DUHAMEL, Olivier, e PISIER, Evelyne. Dicionário de Obras Políticas. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1993, p. 1.221. 16 “Os Gregos sempre viram no princípio daantilogiaa própria condição dasabedoriae da compreensão. A antilogiaé a deliberação” (ROMILLY, Jackeline de. História e Razão em Tucídides. Brasília: Universidade de Brasília, 1998, p. 143). 17 TUCÍDIDES. História da Guerra de Peloponeso, Livro Primeiro, op. cit., p. 28. (shrink)

This essay intends to discuss what Plato was seeking as an explanation in Phaedo. In this dialogue, we observe Socrates criticizing both the natural scientists’ explanations and Anaxagoras’ theory of Mind because they could not explain all things, firstly, in a unitary and, secondary, in a real way. Thence, we are to call what Plato is seeking as his ideal explanation in Phaedo “One Real Explanation”. He talks at least about three kinds of explanation, two of which, the confused (...) and foolish way of explanation by Forms and the explanation by Forms appealing to essence, are just "second best" and lower degrees of explanation. His ideal explanation is an explanation that can explain all things by one thing and in a real way. Though he cannot show, at least in Phaedo, how this One Real Explanation can work, we can see Plato completing the theory by the Form of the Good in Republic. (shrink)

This paper looks at the causal activity of the unmoved mover of Aristotle. The author affirms both the efficient causality of God and his teleological role. According to Aristotle, the main explanation, by describing God, is ‘thinking on thinking’. That means his most important factor to act cannot only ‘be aimed’ but must also ‘be thought’. The final causality is based on the higher energeia what owns the efficient cause, since the energeia itself is regarded by Aristotle as good. God (...) as unmoved mover not moves as a form such the idea of the Good, but as individual and active substance. The goal of the divine activity is God himself, while the other immaterial substances move the spheres as instruments for the change in the world. Insofar those substances are intelligent agents, they are ends for themselves and for their effects. Many new texts to defend such as an efficient causal interpretation are quoted. (shrink)

¿Cuál es el origen de todas las cosas? A pesar de su gran diversidad, ¿tienen una raíz común? ¿Tuvo el mundo un comienzo? ¿Cómo surgió la vida en la tierra? Tales preguntas, que aún provocan a los científicos, fueron formuladas por vez primera por los primeros pensadores griegos. Anaxágoras responde a ellas poniendo al inicio del tiempo una confusa mezcla de todas las cosas sobre la cual obró un ser llamado Intelecto, quien dio lugar al orden del mundo que hoy (...) contemplamos. Con ello, este autor presocrático comienza a plantear algunas cuestiones filosóficas que perdurarán hasta nuestros días: la constitución de la materia, la naturaleza del conocimiento sensorial e intelectual, la intervención de Dios en el mundo… Este libro pretende analizar cuidadosamente la filosofía de Anaxágoras prestando atención a los dos aspectos principales de su doctrina: la mezcla e Intelecto. Su comprensión de la realidad física como una mezcla tiene consecuencias filosóficas de gran interés y constituye quizá la más sugestiva entre las primeras concepciones de la materia. Por otro lado, Intelecto es, según Anaxágoras, quien provoca la variedad de los seres a través del movimiento. Así, nuestro filósofo distingue del sustrato material la causa de sus cambios, la cual se hallaría, además, dotada de inteligencia. Tales rasgos de la filosofía de Anaxágoras atrajeron la atención de los grandes filósofos clásicos, particularmente de Aristóteles. El segundo gran objetivo de este libro es, pues, recorrer el camino por el cual discurrieron las enseñanzas de Anaxágoras, desde que fueron expuestas por él en Atenas, justo durante el siglo que definió la preponderancia intelectual de dicha polis durante siglos, hasta que llegaron a oídos de Aristóteles, el testigo más determinante para comprender a Anaxágoras. (shrink)

Encyclopedia entry about Anaxagoras, the presocratic philosopher: Life, works, mixture, nous, biological and cosmological problems, and a bibliography.

The guise of the good is the claim that whatever I desire or intentionally do is seen by me as good in some respect. Historical scholarship has so far predominantly focused on ancient and medieval...

What is a game? What are we doing when we play a game? What is the value of playing games? Several different philosophical subdisciplines have attempted to answer these questions using very distinctive frameworks. Some have approached games as something like a text, deploying theoretical frameworks from the study of narrative, fiction, and rhetoric to interrogate games for their representational content. Others have approached games as artworks and asked questions about the authorship of games, about the ontology of the work (...) and its performance. Yet others, from the philosophy of sport, have focused on normative issues of fairness, rule application, and competition. The primary purpose of this article is to provide an overview of several different philosophical approaches to games and, hopefully, demonstrate the relevance and value of the different approaches to each other. Early academic attempts to cope with games tried to treat games as a subtype of narrative and to interpret games exactly as one might interpret a static, linear narrative. A faction of game studies, self-described as “ludologists,” argued that games were a substantially novel form and could not be treated with traditional tools for narrative analysis. In traditional narrative, an audience is told and interprets the story, where in a game, the player enacts and creates the story. Since that early debate, theorists have attempted to offer more nuanced accounts of how games might achieve similar ends to more traditional texts. For example, games might be seen as a novel type of fiction, which uses interactive techniques to achieve immersion in a fictional world. Alternately, games might be seen as a new way to represent causal systems, and so a new way to criticize social and political entities. Work from contemporary analytic philosophy of art has, on the other hand, asked questions whether games could be artworks and, if so, what kind. Much of this debate has concerned the precise nature of the artwork, and the relationship between the artist and the audience. Some have claimed that the audience is a cocreator of the artwork, and so games are a uniquely unfinished and cooperative art form. Others have claimed that, instead, the audience does not help create the artwork; rather, interacting with the artwork is how an audience member appreciates the artist's finished production. Other streams of work have focused less on the game as a text or work, and more on game play as a kind of activity. One common view is that game play occurs in a “magic circle.” Inside the magic circle, players take on new roles, follow different rules, and actions have different meanings. Actions inside the magic circle do not have their usual consequences for the rest of life. Enemies of the magic circle view have claimed that the view ignores the deep integration of game life from ordinary life and point to gambling, gold farming, and the status effects of sports. Philosophers of sport, on the other hand, have approached games with an entirely different framework. This has lead into investigations about the normative nature of games—what guides the applications of rules and how those rules might be applied, interpreted, or even changed. Furthermore, they have investigated games as social practices and as forms of life. (shrink)

This is my (Subhasis Chattopadhyay's) draft of PhD pre-submission. Dr. Scriver has (had) put it up online in her blog and I found it today, that is 1:06 pm, 28th May, 2017. I am grateful to her since intellectual ideas can otherwise be hijacked. She has done a wonderful editorial job.

In Vom Selbstgefühl (1910) (identical to Über die Typen des Selbstgefühls), Else Voigtländer undertakes an accurate analysis of a category of feelings named “feeling of self-worth” and its types. This entry presents Voigtländer's definition, characterization and taxonomy of the feeling of self-worth.

This articles explores Philo's variant for Anaxagoras' 21a DK fragment as an alternative for Sextus Empiricus' reading (ὄψις τῶν ἀδήλων τὰ φαινόμενα). Philo's variant (πίστις τῶν ἀδήλων τὰ ἐμφανῆ: De vita Mosis, I, 280) is not present in the current literature on Presocratics but his reading could be a reliable form for this fragment.

The philosophy of hope centers on two interlocking sets of questions. The first concerns the nature of hope. Specific questions here include how to analyze hope, how hope motivates us, and whether there is only one type of hope. The second set concerns the value of hope. Key questions here include whether and when it is good to hope and whether there is a virtue of hope. Philosophers of hope tend to proceed from the first set of questions to the (...) second. This is a natural approach, for one might expect that you must develop a basic understanding of what hope is before you can determine its value. The structure of this chapter thus follows this approach. But readers should not be misled: there is in fact a good deal of feedback between the two sets of questions. A theory of hope is more plausible to the extent that it fits well with plausible ideas about the value of hope. So the movement from hope’s nature to its value is one of emphasis rather than a strict, step-wise process. (shrink)

There is a widespread view that in order to be rational we must mostly know what we believe. In the probabilistic tradition this is defended by arguments that a person who failed to have this knowledge would be vulnerable to sure loss, or probabilistically incoherent. I argue that even gross failure to know one's own beliefs need not expose one to sure loss, and does not if we follow a generalization of the standard bridge principle between first-order and second-order beliefs. (...) This makes it possible for a subject to use probabilistic decision theory to manage in a rational way cases of potential failure of this self-knowledge, as we find in implicit bias. Through such cases I argue that it is possible for uncertainty about what our beliefs are to be not only rationally permissible but advantageous. (shrink)