Intense or industrial animal husbandry is morally bad. This consensus in animal ethics led to the emergence of veganism which is recently in decline in favour of ‘conscientious carnivorism’ which advocates eating animal products from animal-friendly animal husbandry in response to the moral problems of industrial farming. Advocates of animal-friendly husbandry justify rearing and killing ‘happy animals’ by highlighting that the animals live pleasant lives and would not have existed if not (...) reared for human consumption. In this paper, I tackle this ‘logic of the larder’ by showing that it serves as a purification strategy to conceal the harm that animals experience in this alleged animal-friendly type of farming. Defenders of ‘happy meat’ claim that animal-friendly animal husbandry is in the animals’ best interests and that it is in effect a ‘win-win situation’ for humans and farm animals alike. Departing from two critics of animal-friendly animal husbandry, I will show that the problem of this logic is that it evades the fact that moral residuals, which is the experienced harm by the animals, remain by engaging in this practice. Even if there may be strong reasons for the consumption of meat and derivatives of ‘happy animals’, the experienced harm for the animals will not be extinguished. I will denote the detachment that derives from the strategy of rendering the animals’ experienced harm in animal-friendly animal husbandry invisible as guilt. I will conclude that instead of purifying eating animals the ‘good way’, we should face the responsibility we have when killing ‘happy animals’ for ‘happy meat’. (shrink)

Most people agree that inflicting unnecessary suffering upon animals is wrong. Many fewer people, including among ethicists, agree that painlessly killing animals is necessarily wrong. The most commonly cited reason is that death (without pain, fear, distress) is not bad for them in a way that matters morally, or not as significantly as it does for persons, who are self-conscious, make long-term plans and have preferences about their own future. Animals, at least those that are not persons, lack a morally (...) significant interest in continuing to live. At the same time, some argue that existence itself can be good, insofar as one’s life is worth living. For animals, a good life can offset a quick, if early, death. So, it seems to follow that breeding happy animals that will be (prematurely) killed can be a good thing overall. Insofar as slaughter and sale makes it economically sustainable to raise new ones, who would otherwise not exist, raising and killing animals for food who will have lives worth living is good overall. It benefits them as well as consumers, and makes the world better by adding to the sum of happiness. The process of raising and killing animals with positive welfare produces a sequence of replacement that maintains or increases overall welfare, all else being equal (assuming in particular no overall negative impact on the welfare of other parties). Call this the Replaceability Argument (RA) and the ensuing controversy the Replaceability Problem (RP). This is a problem at the crossroads of the ethics of killing, agricultural ethics, procreation ethics, and population ethics. (shrink)

In Fall 2012, Green Mountain College’s oxen team “Bill and Lou” became the focus of an international animal rights protest. The Guernsey team had plowed the fields of the small Vermont college farm together for a decade. Lou injured a rear leg twice over the summer and eventually became unable to support his own great weight. With administrative support, the college’s farm crew decided to slaughter the team. This was in keeping with an aim of the college’s Farm and (...) Food Project to “close the loop” with its dining services. At that time the mission of the environmentally-themed liberal arts college was to represent a community-wide ethos of responsibility for the systemic impact of human behaviors. Accordingly, the college farm sought to build a sustainable farming and food system that lifts the veil that separates consumers from the source of meat and livestock products. The basic idea was that if students wish to be change agents in the world, they need to understand the ins-and-outs of the systems in which that change can take place. So the college strove to bring the food system into the classroom. Chefs and farmers weren’t hidden away in kitchens and fields; they were brought into the educational process. Guided by faculty, staff, and administrative oversight, along with a thick sheaf of policies, this periodically meant that students made life-and-death decisions. (shrink)

Proponents of humane or traditional husbandry, in contrast to factory farming, often argue that maintaining meaningful relationships with animals entails working with them. Accordingly, they argue that animal liberation is misguided, since it appears to entail erasing our relationships to animals and depriving both us and them of valuable opportunities to live together. This chapter offers a critical examination of defense of animal husbandry based on the value of labour, in particular the view that farm animals (...) could be seen as workers, and what it entails. It then considers ways in which our relationships to domesticated species could be made meaningful, including through work, without entailing the premature killing of animals raised for food. Meaningful animal lives depend on a proper analysis of the meaning, and value, of labour, which this chapter argues is missing from labour-based defenses of humane husbandry. (shrink)

Within this paper, I critique the history of the modification of the broiler chicken through selective breeding and possible future genetic modification. I utilize Margaret Atwood’s fictitious depiction of genetically engineered chickens, from her novel Oryx and Crake , in order to forward the argument that modifications that eliminate animal telos either move beyond the range of current ethical frameworks or can be ethically defended by them. I then utilize the work of feminist epistemologists to argue that understanding what (...) it means to be a chicken shapes our conceptions of what modifications are or are not acceptable. Taking into account justifications stemming from practical knowledge when making ontological claims can help to shift our understanding of what animal modifications can or cannot be justified. The paper ends by addressing three possible problems brought about by accepting such justifications. (shrink)

This paper investigates how reticulate evolution contributes to a better understanding of human sociocultural evolution in general, and community formation in particular. Reticulate evolution is evolution as it occurs by means of symbiosis, symbiogenesis, lateral gene transfer, infective heredity, and hybridization. From these mechanisms and processes, we mainly zoom in on symbiosis and we investigate how it underlies the rise of (1) human, plant, animal, and machine interactions typical of agriculture, animal husbandry, farming, and industrialization; (2) diet-microbiome (...) relationships; and (3) host-virome and other pathogen interactions that underlie human health and disease. We demonstrate that reticulate evolution necessitates an understanding of behavioral and cultural evolution at a community level, where reticulate causal processes underlie the rise of synergistic organizational traits. (shrink)

This paper focuses on reciprocity among the nomadic hunter-gatherer Rāute and sedentary groups, ie farmers and artisans. The Rāute’s reciprocal relation depends on social contracts, trust, territorial relations and residential propinquity. These facets of reciprocity can be accepted, denied or even cancelled. I argue that the Rāute are economically prosperous because of their regular exchange of woodenwares for grains and other necessary items, though they refrain from storing resources, earning cash incomes, and eschew agricultural production and animal husbandry. (...) Sharing, exchange, gift and counter-gift engagements are obligatory or compulsory, free and voluntary, ensuring their reciprocity with neighbouring populations – which has been regulated by seasonality, foraging and population density around the vicinities of their camps. Qualitative research was employed, with informal interviews, observations, personal accounts, audio and video recording, as well as field diaries. (shrink)

PUERPÉRIO EM BOVINOS -/- INTRODUÇÃO -/- O puerpério é definido como o período entre o parto e a apresentação do primeiro estro fértil. Dois processos ocorrem durante o puerpério: a involução uterina e o início da atividade ovariana pós-parto. Em vacas leiteiras, os cuidados médicos pós-parto são essenciais nos programas de manejo, uma vez que as patologias uterinas são diagnosticadas e tratadas nesse período para que a vaca esteja em ótimas condições para ser inseminada, uma vez terminado o período de (...) espera voluntário. -/- 4.1 Involução uterina -/- O útero após o parto sofre modificações macroscópicas e microscópicas, até atingir as características de um útero não gestante, o que leva de 30 a 45 dias. O peso e o tamanho pós-parto diminuem rapidamente como consequência da atrofia das fibras musculares; por necrose das carúnculas e por eliminação de líquidos. Ao mesmo tempo em que o útero diminui de tamanho, o endométrio passa por um processo regenerativo para poder hospedar uma nova gestação. -/- A involução é promovida pelas contrações uterinas, que facilitam a eliminação de fluidos e dejetos e reduzem o tamanho do útero. As contrações são causadas pela secreção contínua de PGF2α, de origem uterina, e pela ocitocina secretada durante a amamentação. A PGF2α é secretada durante as primeiras 3 semanas pós-parto e seu envolvimento é considerado necessário para que a involução uterina ocorra normalmente. -/- Durante a involução uterina, as secreções conhecidas como lóquios, que são formadas por restos de membranas, carúnculas, fluidos fetais e sangue, são derramadas pela vagina. Essas secreções variam da cor vermelha ao marrom, têm consistência viscosa e são inodoras. A maioria dos lóquios é descartada durante os primeiros 15 dias após o parto e, em seguida, praticamente desaparece, exceto em casos de involução uterina anormal, quando o útero continua a derramar fluidos de consistência, cor e odor diferentes (figura 1). -/- Figura 1: O útero após o parto sofre alterações macroscópicas e microscópicas, até atingir as características de um útero não grávido, o que leva de 30 a 45 dias. -/- Antes do parto, o útero é estéril, pois é protegido da contaminação bacteriana pelo colo do útero ou cérvix. Durante e após o parto, essa barreira física desaparece e o útero é invadido por bactérias que se encontram no meio ambiente, pele e fezes, ou que são introduzidas durante a assistência ao parto. Além disso, a capacidade funcional dos fagócitos uterinos é baixa após o parto, o que contribui para o estabelecimento de infecções. Cerca de 95% das vacas desenvolvem infecções uterinas durante a involução, e uma alta porcentagem de vacas as eliminam por meio de mecanismos naturais. -/- Os mecanismos de defesa uterinos são constituídos pelas barreiras anatômicas (vagina, vulva e cérvix); fatores fisiológicos (produção de muco na vagina e cérvix); fagocitose promovida por neutrófilos, que migram da circulação geral para o útero; pela produção de substâncias inespecíficas, que inibem o crescimento bacteriano e favorecem a eliminação de microrganismos. A capacidade de eliminar bactérias do útero é determinada pelos hormônios ovarianos (progesterona e estrogênios); durante o diestro, a progesterona reduz a migração de neutrófilos, suprime o sistema imunocompetente, fecha o colo do útero e causa atonia uterina, resultando em aumento da suscetibilidade à infecção. Ao contrário, durante a fase folicular do ciclo estral (proestro e estro), o estradiol promove a migração de neutrófilos, abre a cérvix e aumenta o tônus uterino, o que facilita a eliminação de agentes infecciosos. Além disso, a atividade dos neutrófilos é afetada pelas deficiências antioxidantes e pela profundidade do balanço energético negativo. -/- 4.2 Anormalidades do puerpério -/- Após o parto, ocorrem algumas patologias que retardam a involução uterina e, consequentemente, afetam o intervalo entre o parto e o primeiro serviço. -/- 4.2.1 Retenção da placenta -/- A placenta é eliminada dentro de 12 horas após o parto; a retenção da placenta por mais de 24 horas é considerada uma patologia. A retenção placentária (RP) é uma alteração frequente do puerpério, que deve ser considerada como um sinal clínico de várias condições que podem ter origem infecciosa (aborto), metabólica (hipocalcemia, cetose, síndrome do vaca gorda), deficiências nutricionais (selênio e vitamina E) e erros de manejo (demasiada intervenção no parto). -/- A incidência de RP varia de 5 a 15% e depende, em grande parte, do estado de saúde e do manejo do rebanho. A RP é o principal fator de risco para infecções uterinas (metrite puerperal, metrite, endometrite e endometrite subclínica); também causa atraso no período entre o parto e a concepção e está associada à redução do percentual de concepção no primeiro serviço. -/- Em termos econômicos, determinou-se que a RP causa perdas significativas principalmente devido aos custos de serviços médicos, aumento da taxa de eliminação e diminuição da fecundidade. Além disso, vacas com retenção placentária produzem 355 kg a menos de leite durante os primeiros 60 dias do que vacas que não apresentam esta patologia (figuras 2 e 3). -/- 4.2.2 Patogenia -/- A placenta está ligada ao endométrio pelas vilosidades coriônicas, que estão ligadas às carúnculas (junção carúncula-cotilédone). A união entre essas estruturas é favorecida por um fluido adesivo formado por colágeno e outras proteínas. Antes e durante o trabalho de parto, observa-se um aumento da atividade das enzimas proteolíticas (colagenase, talvez a mais importante), que são responsáveis por separar o cotilédone da carúncula. Posteriormente, a placenta é removida mecanicamente por contrações uterinas após o parto do feto. -/- A etiologia e patogênese da retenção placentária não são conhecidas. Uma explicação proposta é que isso se deve a uma falha dos mecanismos proteolíticos responsáveis pela separação do cotilédone da carúncula. Foi observado que a atividade da colagenase no cotilédone é maior em vacas que não retêm placenta do que naquelas que a retêm. Propõe-se que alguns fatores de risco para retenção placentária possam estar atuando na redução da atividade da colagenase. Por outro lado, as condições inflamatórias na junção carúncula-cotilédone de origem infecciosa também impedem a separação da placenta. -/- Figura 3: Vaca com retenção placentária. -/- Figura 2: Vaca com retenção placentária. Em rebanhos comerciais, 5 a 15% das vacas retêm a placenta. -/- 4.2.3 Tratamento -/- Existem vários tratamentos, como a remoção manual da placenta em combinação com a aplicação local de antibióticos (infusões intrauterinas) e a administração de produtos hormonais (ocitócicos e PGF2α). A eficácia desses tratamentos é discutível. -/- A remoção manual da placenta é o tratamento mais popular; entretanto, não é a melhor, pois causa danos ao endométrio, que variam de leve sangramento a hematomas, mesmo quando não há evidências externas. Além disso, a remoção manual diminui a capacidade fagocítica dos leucócitos uterinos, resultando em metrite mais grave, maior atraso na involução uterina e baixo desempenho reprodutivo. -/- Outro tratamento consiste em cortar a placenta ao nível da vulva. Posteriormente, quando a placenta se separa das carúnculas, devido ao processo de decomposição do tecido, uma leve tração da vulva é suficiente para retirá-la, sem consequências. Essas vacas devem ser observadas quanto à febre e imediatamente integradas ao programa de check-up pós-parto, pois certamente desenvolverão metrite ou endometrite. A administração de antibióticos, tanto nos casos de retirada manual como naqueles em que a placenta é cortada, depende do estado geral da vaca. Deve-se sempre ter em mente que a RP é o principal fator de risco para metrite, portanto as vacas devem ser observadas para detectar prontamente aquelas que apresentam febre. Os antibióticos devem ser considerados para inibir a putrefação das membranas fetais, o que pode atrasar sua expulsão. No caso de opção pela administração de antibióticos, deve-se optar pela via parenteral em vez da intrauterina, pois esta causa irritação do endométrio, que está associada à baixa fertilidade (figura 4). -/- Outros tratamentos são baseados na administração de hormônios que estimulam a mobilidade uterina (ocitocina, estrogênios e PGF2α); entretanto, não há evidências clínicas que demonstrem sua eficácia; além disso, a causa menos frequente de RP é a incapacidade mecânica do útero de expelir a placenta. -/- 4.2.4 Prevenção -/- As estratégias de prevenção dessa patologia devem ter como objetivo reduzir a influência dos fatores de risco para RP. Assim, a incidência de abortos deve ser reduzida por meio de programas eficazes de vacinação e biossegurança; deve-se evitar períodos de seca muito longos para que as vacas não cheguem obesas ao parto; intervir o mínimo possível nos partos, e se atendido, deve ser feito com medidas de higiene rígidas; oferecer sais minerais de boa qualidade e administrar antioxidantes antes do parto (vitamina E, selênio e betacarotenos; tabela 1). -/- Figura 4: A placenta não deve ser removida inserindo a mão na vagina. É aconselhável aguardar a autólise (48 horas) e removê-la por leve tração. -/- Tabela 1: Incidência de retenção na membrana fetal (RMF), metrite hemorrágica (HM), metrite purulenta (PM) e puerpério anormal (PA) em vacas leiteiras tratadas com selênio e vitamina E nos dias 60, 21 antes do parto e 30, 90 pós-parto (grupo pré-pós-parto) e 21 dias pré-parto (grupo pré-parto) e testemunhas. -/- Laterais diferentes na mesma coluna indicam diferença estatística (P < 0,05). Adaptado de RUIZ et al., 2008. -/- 4.3 Infecções uterinas -/- Cerca de 95% das vacas desenvolvem infecção uterina durante os primeiros dias pós-parto; no entanto, a maioria elimina infecções por meio de seus mecanismos de defesa e apenas 30 a 50% delas desenvolvem metrite ou endometrite nas primeiras três semanas. As bactérias mais frequentes encontradas em processos inflamatórios no útero são: Arcanobacterium pyogenes (antes Actinomyces pyogenes), Fusobacterium necrophorum e Escherichia coli. Essas três bactérias agem sinergicamente. -/- 4.3.1 Metrite puerperal -/- A metrite puerperal é comum em vacas com retenção placentária. Essa patologia é observada nas três primeiras semanas pós-parto e é caracterizada pela presença de secreções abundantes na luz uterina que são vermelhas ou marrons, aquosas, fétidas e com involução retardada. As vacas afetadas mostram sinais de doença sistêmica (toxemia e febre > 39,5 °C) e diminuição da produção de leite (figura 5). -/- Figura 5: Vaca com metrite puerperal; vacas afetadas apresentam sinais de doença sistêmica. -/- 4.3.2 Metrite clínica -/- Metrite é o processo inflamatório que envolve as diferentes camadas do útero (mucosa, muscular e serosa). Esta condição se apresenta nos primeiros 21 dias pós-parto e é caracterizada por atraso na involução uterina e secreção purulenta, e não há sinais de doença sistêmica (figura 6). -/- 4.3.3 Endometrite clínica -/- Endometrite se refere à inflamação do revestimento uterino; clinicamente, caracteriza-se por retardo na involução uterina e eliminação de exsudato purulento ou mucopurulento. Pode surgir nos primeiros 21 dias pós-parto ou mais, sem apresentar qualquer afetação no estado geral. -/- Figura 6: Vaca com exsudato mucopurulento. Na prática, é difícil estabelecer um diagnóstico diferencial entre endometrite e metrite. Uma vaca com essa secreção pode ser tratada com cefalosporinas intrauterinas ou, se ela já estiver em ciclo, a administração de PGF2a é eficaz. -/- 4.3.4 Endometrite subclínica -/- Apresenta-se entre 21 e 40 dias pós-parto, não apresenta sinais externos e só é diagnosticada pela citologia uterina. Essa condição afeta entre 20 e 30% das vacas. Os fatores de risco identificados são retenção placentária e metrite. -/- 4.4 Diagnóstico -/- O diagnóstico é baseado na avaliação uterina por palpação retal, na qual são verificados o grau de involução e as características das secreções. Além disso, é necessária uma avaliação clínica geral, uma vez que vacas com metrite nos primeiros 10 dias pós-parto desenvolvem febre. Outra forma de estabelecer o diagnóstico é avaliando as secreções uterinas sem palpação retal. Pode ser feito introduzindo a mão por via vaginal, após a limpeza da região; embora este método possa parecer arriscado, a experiência em campo indica que é um método seguro e rápido. Outra possibilidade é por meio da vaginoscopia, esse método permite a avaliação da cérvix e das secreções uterinas. Existe um instrumento (Metricheck) que é inserido pela vagina e possui uma campânula atraumática na extremidade que permite a coleta das secreções uterinas (figuras 7 e 8). -/- 4.5 Impacto das infecções uterinas na reprodução e produção -/- As infecções uterinas (metrite e endometrite) prolongam o período do parto até a concepção; diminuem a porcentagem de concepção no primeiro serviço; a porcentagem de resíduos aumenta; a taxa de vacas inseminadas diminui e a produção diminui (300 kg a menos que vacas não afetadas). Além disso, eles afetam o período do parto à primeira ovulação; em vacas com puerpério anormal, os folículos dominantes são menores em diâmetro e produzem menos estradiol do que vacas saudáveis. Também uma proporção menor dos folículos da primeira onda ovula em comparação com as vacas com puerpério anormal. -/- A endometrite subclínica diminui a taxa de concepção no primeiro serviço e aumenta os dias abertos. Além disso, a metrite ou endometrite pode afetar os ovidutos e causar inchaço, obstrução e aderências (esse processo é mais frequente em vacas que recebem injeções de estrogênio). -/- Figura 8: Outra forma de diagnosticar infecções uterinas é por meio da introdução de um instrumento que possui em sua extremidade uma campânula atraumática que permite a coleta de secreções uterinas (Metricheck). -/- Figura 7: O diagnóstico de infecções uterinas pode ser estabelecido com a introdução da mão por via vaginal, após limpeza da região. -/- 4.6 Tratamentos -/- Para evitar o efeito negativo das infecções uterinas na eficiência reprodutiva, é necessário um diagnóstico e tratamento oportunos. Existem diversos tratamentos para a metrite ou endometrite, como o uso de antibióticos sistêmicos ou intrauterinos, infusões intrauterinas de antissépticos e a administração de hormônios. -/- 4.6.1 Antibióticos -/- Os tratamentos com antibióticos intrauterinos são usados há muitos anos e são uma opção, desde que alguns aspectos sejam considerados: que o útero é um ambiente anaeróbio; que há a presença de exsudatos e tecidos em decomposição e a existência de uma grande diversidade de bactérias, algumas das quais até produzem enzimas que inativam alguns antibióticos. -/- Como o útero é um ambiente anaeróbio, os antibióticos do grupo dos aminoglicosídeos não são ativos, pois precisam de oxigênio. Por outro lado, o acúmulo de exsudato purulento e restos de tecido no útero inibe a atividade das sulfonamidas. Os nitrofuranos são eficazes contra A pyogenes, somente quando doses extremamente altas são usadas; as doses usuais nunca atingem a concentração inibitória mínima no endométrio; além disso, não são ativos na presença de sangue ou exsudato purulento, são irritantes e estão associados a problemas de fertilidade. -/- A penicilina intrauterina ou parenteral é eficaz na cura de infecções entre os dias 25 e 30 após o parto; ou seja, quando for observada uma diminuição na diversidade de espécies bacterianas (menor probabilidade de que algumas bactérias produzam penicilinase) e predomina A pyogenes, que é sensível a este antibiótico. As formulações intrauterinas de cefalosporinas (cefapirina benzatina) são eficazes em vacas com endometrite entre os dias 15-20 pós-parto e não é necessário retirar o leite do mercado. -/- A tetraciclina é o antibiótico mais utilizado devido ao seu amplo espectro e por manter sua atividade nas condições do útero pós-parto; porém, a probabilidade de resistência bacteriana é alta devido ao seu uso contínuo por muitos anos, também causa danos ao endométrio e reduz a fertilidade (figura 9). -/- Em testes de campo, a administração de uma única infusão intrauterina de cefapirina benzatina, em vacas com endometrite entre os dias 15 a 20 pós-parto, produz uma maior taxa de recuperação e não afeta a fertilidade, em comparação com aquelas que foram tratadas com infusões de oxitetraciclina. -/- O problema mais importante na terapia com antibióticos é estabelecer um critério de quais animais realmente precisam. Nos casos de metrite puerperal não há dúvida, essas vacas precisam de tratamento com antibióticos por via sistêmica e intrauterina. Porém, em casos de metrite e endometrite a decisão é difícil, pois muitas vacas se curam sem nenhum tratamento. Na prática, antes que os antibióticos sejam administrados às vacas, deve-se considerar alguns dos fatores: características das secreções uterinas, dias após o parto, início da atividade ovariana, presença de febre e condição corporal. -/- Figura 9: As infusões de oxitetraciclina causam irritação do endométrio e diminuem a fertilidade. -/- 4.6.2 Tratamento com infusões de substâncias antissépticas -/- Tratamentos baseados na administração intrauterina de substâncias antissépticas também são usados. O tratamento mais frequente consiste na infusão de soluções de iodo; no entanto, os resultados com esta terapia não são positivos e estão associados a uma diminuição subsequente da fertilidade. Deve-se ter cautela no uso de antissépticos intrauterinos, pois todos causam irritação, afetam os mecanismos de defesa do útero e, em alguns casos, chegam a causar necrose do endométrio. -/- 4.6.3 Tratamentos hormonais -/- Na prática, a administração de estrogênio é comum em casos de metrite, principalmente quando o útero retém muito líquido. Sabe-se que os estrógenos em condições fisiológicas favorecem a contratilidade uterina e auxiliam na eliminação de infecções, porém, em doses farmacológicas o efeito é negativo. A administração de estrogênios pode contribuir para infecções que ascendem aos ovidutos e causam salpingite, aderências ovarianas e infertilidade. -/- A PGF2α desempenha um papel importante no parto e durante a involução uterina. Em vacas com puerpério normal, a duração dos níveis elevados de PGF2α está negativamente correlacionada com o tempo de involução uterina; portanto, quanto mais tempo duram os níveis elevados de PGF2α, menor é o tempo de involução uterina. Além disso, a administração de PGF2α a cada 12 horas, dos dias 3 a 10 pós-parto, encurta o período de involução uterina. Ao contrário, em vacas com puerpério anormal, foi observada uma correlação positiva entre as concentrações de PGF2α e o tempo de involução uterina; portanto, vacas com retenção placentária ou endometrite apresentam níveis mais elevados de PGF2α. -/- Algumas evidências envolvem a PGF2α como parte do mecanismo de eliminação da placenta; ou seja, foi observado que as vacas que normalmente eliminam a placenta apresentaram maiores concentrações de PGF2α na placenta, em comparação com as vacas com retenção placentária. Foi proposto que a falha do processo que leva à separação do cotilédone da carúncula está associada a uma alteração no metabolismo da prostaglandina, resultando em uma diminuição na PGF2α e um aumento na PGE2. Por outro lado, a inibição da síntese de PGF2α após o parto, por meio da injeção de ácido acetilsalicílico (aspirina), causa retenção da placenta. Esse conhecimento motivou estudos nos quais o tratamento com PGF2α após o parto foi avaliado para prevenir a retenção placentária ou reduzir o tempo de involução em vacas com retenção placentária ou metrite. Em alguns estudos, uma única injeção de PGF2α foi administrada nas primeiras horas após o parto com resultados conflitantes. Em outros estudos, a injeção de PGF2α entre os dias 20 a 30 pós-parto foi avaliada e não foi observado um efeito favorável na involução uterina. Porém, a injeção sistemática de PGF2α, a cada 14 dias a partir do 25º dia pós-parto, aumenta a proporção de vacas inseminadas, o que aumenta a taxa de prenhez. A PGF2α causa contrações uterinas e favorece a eliminação de secreções; entretanto, um efeito favorável da PGF2α na involução uterina, sem envolver um corpo lúteo, é questionável. -/- Na prática, um programa é usado com base na administração sistemática de PGF2α a todas as vacas a cada 14 dias, do 25º ao 30º dia pós-parto. Esse tratamento é baseado no encurtamento das fases lúteas, o que favorece a eliminação das infecções. Deve-se observar que cerca de 30% das vacas desenvolvem corpos lúteos longevos (21 a 50 dias) nos primeiros ciclos pós-parto, nessas condições a injeção de PGF2α, a cada 14 dias, encurta o ciclo estral e diminui o risco de persistência de infecções uterinas. -/- 4.7 Piometra -/- Esta patologia se desenvolve em vacas que ovulam nos primeiros 20 dias pós-parto e, concomitantemente, sofrem de infecção uterina. Nessas condições, a progesterona promove a proliferação bacteriana e fecha o colo do útero, causando acúmulo de exsudato purulento no útero. As alterações causadas no endométrio alteram a secreção de PGF2α, resultando na persistência do corpo lúteo e anestro. Vacas com piometra respondem muito bem ao tratamento com PGF2α; uma segunda injeção desse hormônio, 14 dias depois, encurta o período de recuperação (figura 10). -/- Figura 10: A piometra é caracterizada pelo acúmulo de exsudato purulento no útero, colo uterino fechado e presença de corpo lúteo. O diagnóstico é feito por palpação retal e tratado com PGF2α. -/- 4.8 Vaginite em fêmeas gestantes -/- A vaginite em fêmeas grávidas ocorre com baixa frequência; porém, quando há um caso, causa alarme porque é confundido com um aborto. Nesses casos, o veterinário deve fazer um exame retal para determinar se o produto está vivo e se a cérvix está aberta. O diagnóstico é concluído com o exame vaginal com vaginoscópio ou diretamente à mão com luva limpa. -/- No caso de um aborto, o produto geralmente está morto e a cérvix está aberta; nestes casos, o produto deve ser extraído. Ao contrário, se a cérvix estiver fechada e o feto estiver vivo, o prognóstico é favorável e o problema diminui com o tratamento com antibióticos sistêmicos. -/- RESUMO -/- < >O útero após o parto pesa 13 kg e no dia 21 pós-parto, 1 kg. A regeneração do epitélio uterino leva 25 dias. A regeneração das camadas profundas do endométrio leva 42 a 56 dias. 95% das vacas desenvolvem alguma infecção uterina. 30 a 50% das vacas desenvolvem metrite nas primeiras duas semanas após o parto. 15 a 20% persistem como endometrite clínica > 3 semanas após o parto. 18 a 20% têm metrite com efeitos sistêmicos. 20 a 30% das vacas têm endometrite subclínica. 5 a 15% das vacas retêm a placenta. 355 kg de leite são perdidos em vacas com retenção placentária. Em vacas que sofrem de puerpério anormal, a proporção de vacas prenhes é reduzida em 10 por cento no 90º dia pós-parto. No Reino Unido, 192 euros são gastos por cada vaca que tem um puerpério anormal. REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS -/- ANDREWS, Anthony H. et al. (Ed.). Bovine medicine: diseases and husbandry of cattle. John Wiley & Sons, 2008. -/- AZAWI, O. I. Postpartum uterine infection in cattle. Animal reproduction science, v. 105, n. 3-4, p. 187-208, 2008. -/- BEARDEN, Henry Joe et al. Applied animal reproduction. Reston Publishing Company, Inc., 1984. -/- HOLY, Lubos; MARTÍNEZ JÚSTIZ, G. Colab. Biología de la reproducción bovina. Havana: Revolucionária, 1975. -/- HOPPER, Richard M. (Ed.). Bovine reproduction. John Wiley & Sons, 2014. -/- HORTA, António Eduardo Monteiro. Fisiologia do puerpério na vaca. Jornada Internales de Reproductión Animal, v. 8, p. 73-84, 1995. -/- KOZICKI, Luiz Ernandes. Aspectos fisiológicos e patológicos do puerpério em bovinos. Archives of Veterinary Science, v. 3, n. 1, 1998. -/- LEBLANC, S. J. et al. Defining and diagnosing postpartum clinical endometritis and its impact on reproductive performance in dairy cows. Journal of dairy science, v. 85, n. 9, p. 2223-2236, 2002. -/- LEBLANC, S. J. et al. The effect of treatment of clinical endometritis on reproductive performance in dairy cows. Journal of dairy science, v. 85, n. 9, p. 2237-2249, 2002. -/- MARTINS, T. M.; BORGES, A. M. Avaliação uterina em vacas durante o puerpério. Rev. Bras. Reprod. Anim, Belo Horizonte, v. 35, n. 4, p. 433-443, 2011. -/- RADOSTITS, Otto M. et al. Clínica Veterinária: um tratado de doenças dos bovinos, ovinos, suínos, caprinos e eqüinos. Rio de Janeiro: Guanabara Koogan, 2002. -/- RISCO, CARLOS A.; YOUNGQUIST, ROBERT S.; SHORE, M. DAWN. Postpartum uterine infections. In: Current therapy in large animal theriogenology. WB Saunders, 2007. p. 339-344. -/- SHELDON, I. M. et al. Influence of uterine bacterial contamination after parturition on ovarian dominant follicle selection and follicle growth and function in cattle. REPRODUCTION-CAMBRIDGE-, v. 123, n. 6, p. 837-845, 2002. -/- SHELDON, I. M. et al. Mechanisms of infertility associated with clinical and subclinical endometritis in high producing dairy cattle. Reproduction in domestic animals, v. 44, p. 1-9, 2009. -/- SHELDON, I. Martin et al. Uterine diseases in cattle after parturition. The Veterinary Journal, v. 176, n. 1, p. 115-121, 2008. -/- TIXI, C. et al. Factores que afectan el porcentaje de vacas gestantes en el día 90 posparto. In: Memorias del XXXIII Congreso Nacional de Buiatría. Tuxtla Gutiérrez Chiapas. México. pp. 2009. (shrink)

While seeking novel food sources to feed the increasing population of the globe, several alternatives have been discussed, including algae, fungi or in vitro meat. The increasingly propagated usage of farmed insects for human nutrition raises issues regarding food safety, consumer information and animal protection. In line with law, insects like any other animals must not be reared or manipulated in a way that inflicts unnecessary pain, distress or harm on them. Currently, there is a great need for research (...) in the area of insect welfare, especially regarding species-specific needs, health, farming systems and humane methods of killing. Recent results from neurophysiological, neuroanatomical and behavioral sciences prompt caution when denying consciousness and therefore the likelihood of presence of pain and suffering or something closely related to it to insects. From an animal protection point of view, these issues should be satisfyingly solved before propagating and establishing intensive husbandry systems for insects as a new type of mini-livestock factory farming. (shrink)

In debates about animal sentience, the precautionary principle is often invoked. The idea is that when the evidence of sentience is inconclusive, we should “give the animal the benefit of the doubt” or “err on the side of caution” in formulating animal protection legislation. Yet there remains confusion as to whether it is appropriate to apply the precautionary principle in this context, and, if so, what “applying the precautionary principle” means in practice regarding the burden of proof (...) for animal sentience. Here I construct a version of the precautionary principle tailored to the question of animal sentience together with a practical framework for implementing it. I explain and defend the key features of this framework, argue that it is well-aligned with current practice in animal welfare science, and consider and reject a number of influential counterarguments to the use of precautionary reasoning in this area. (shrink)

Observations of animals engaging in apparently moral behavior have led academics and the public alike to ask whether morality is shared between humans and other animals. Some philosophers explicitly argue that morality is unique to humans, because moral agency requires capacities that are only demonstrated in our species. Other philosophers argue that some animals can participate in morality because they possess these capacities in a rudimentary form. Scientists have also joined the discussion, and their views are just as varied as (...) the philosophers’. Some research programs examine whether animals countenance specific human norms, such as fairness. Other research programs investigate the cognitive and affective capacities thought to be necessary for morality. There are two sets of concerns that can be raised by these debates. They sometimes suffer from there being no agreed upon theory of morality and no clear account of whether there is a demarcation between moral and social behavior; that is, they lack a proper philosophical foundation. They also sometimes suffer from there being disagreement about the psychological capacities evident in animals. Of these two sets of concerns—the nature of the moral and the scope of psychological capacities—we aim to take on only the second. In this chapter we defend the claim that animals have three sets of capacities that, on some views, are taken as necessary and foundational for moral judgment and action. These are capacities of care, capacities of autonomy, and normative capacities. Care, we argue, is widely found among social animals. Autonomy and normativity are more recent topics of empirical investigation, so while there is less evidence of these capacities at this point in our developing scientific knowledge, the current data is strongly suggestive. (shrink)

The study of animal cognition raises profound questions about the minds of animals and philosophy of mind itself. Aristotle argued that humans are the only animal to laugh, but in recent experiments rats have also been shown to laugh. In other experiments, dogs have been shown to respond appropriately to over two hundred words in human language. In this introduction to the philosophy of animal minds Kristin Andrews introduces and assesses the essential topics, problems and debates as (...) they cut across animal cognition and philosophy of mind. She addresses the following key topics: what is cognition, and what is it to have a mind? What questions should we ask to determine whether behaviour has a cognitive basis? the science of animal minds explained: ethology, behaviourist psychology, and cognitive ethology rationality in animals animal consciousness: what does research into pain and the emotions reveal? What can empirical evidence about animal behaviour tell us about philosophical theories of consciousness? does animal cognition involve belief and concepts; do animals have a ‘Language of Thought’? animal communication other minds: do animals attribute ‘mindedness’ to other creatures? moral reasoning and ethical behaviour in animals animal cognition and memory. Extensive use of empirical examples and case studies is made throughout the book. These include Cheney and Seyfarth’s ververt monkey research, Thorndike’s cat puzzle boxes, Jensen’s research into humans and chimpanzees and the ultimatum game, Pankseep and Burgdorf’s research on rat laughter, and Clayton and Emery’s research on memory in scrub-jays. Additional features such as chapter summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary make this an indispensable introduction to those teaching philosophy of mind, animal cognition. It will also be an excellent resource for those in fields such as ethology, biology and psychology. (shrink)

It is commonly held that since non-human animals are not persons, they are not objects of due regard and care in the same way that humans are. But how might we begin to think about recognizing animals as persons? This chapter attempts to reconstruct an answer by drawing on the resources of the Pātañjalayogaśāstra (the Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali, 200-400 CE). Animals are persons from the perspective of this tradition, and so animals are proper objects of due regard and care. (...) According to classical Yoga philosophy, however, this form of recognition is not easy to attain. The discerning insight that allows one to “see” the personhood of other living beings requires a discipline of attention, one that constitutes the practice of yoga itself. (shrink)

Though many ethicists have the intuition that we should leave nature alone, Kyle Johannsen argues that we have a duty to research safe ways of providing large-scale assistance to wild animals. Using concepts from moral and political philosophy to analyze the issue of wild animal suffering (WAS), Johannsen explores how a collective, institutional obligation to assist wild animals should be understood. He claims that with enough research, genetic editing may one day give us the power to safely intervene without (...) perpetually interfering with wild animals’ liberties.---------------Questions addressed include: In what way is nature valuable and is interference compatible with that value? Is interference a requirement of justice? What are the implications of WAS for animal rights advocacy? What types of intervention are promising?---------------Expertly moving the debate about human relations with wild animals beyond its traditional confines, Wild Animal Ethics is essential reading for students and scholars of political philosophy and political theory studying animal ethics, environmental ethics, and environmental philosophy. (shrink)

Animal welfare scientists face an acute version of the problem of inductive risk, since they must choose whether to affirm attributions of mental states to animals in advisory contexts, knowing their decisions hold consequences for animal welfare. In such contexts, the burden of proof should be sensitive to the consequences of error, but a framework for setting appropriate burdens of proof is lacking. Through reflection on two cases—pain and cognitive enrichment—I arrive at a tentative framework based on the (...) principle of expected welfare maximization. I then discuss the limitations of this framework and the questions it leaves open. (shrink)

Wild animal reproduction poses an important moral problem for animal rights theorists. Many wild animals give birth to large numbers of uncared-for offspring, and thus child mortality rates are far higher in nature than they are among human beings. In light of this reproductive strategy – traditionally referred to as the ‘r-strategy’ – does concern for the interests of wild animals require us to intervene in nature? In this paper, I argue that animal rights theorists should embrace (...) fallibility-constrained interventionism: the view that intervention in nature is desirable but should be constrained by our ignorance of the inner workings of ecosystems. Though authors sometimes assume that large-scale intervention requires turning nature into an enormous zoo, I suggest an alternative. With sufficient research, a new form of gene editing called CRISPR promises to one day give us the capacity to intervene without perpetually interfering with wild animals’ liberties. (shrink)

Animals have moral status, and we have corresponding obligations to take their interests into account. I argue that Stakeholder Theory provides a moderate, yet principled way for businesses to do so. Animals ought to be treated as stakeholders given that they affect and are affected by the achievement of the objectives of the businesses in which they are involved. Stakeholder Theory therefore requires taking those interests into account. It does not, however, require that they be given the same weight as (...) human interests. By taking the stakeholder approach, businesses can avoid merely reacting to (rapidly increasing) public outcry over the treatment of animals. Even those who hold extreme positions—that businesses have no obligations to animals, or that animal products and services are inherently immoral—can take the treatment of animals as stakeholders to provide an ethical realpolitik of sorts that is both better for animals and better for business. (shrink)

Definitions of animal welfare often invoke consciousness or sentience. Marian Stamp Dawkins has argued that to define animal welfare this way is a mistake. In Dawkins’s alternative view, an animal with good welfare is one that is healthy and “has what it wants.” The dispute highlights a source of strain on the concept of animal welfare: consciousness-involving definitions are better able to capture the normative significance of welfare, whereas consciousness-free definitions facilitate the validation of welfare indicators. (...) I reflect on how the field should respond to this strain, ultimately recommending against splitting the concept and in favor of consciousness-involving definitions. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to show that agency-based accounts of moral status are more plausible than many have previously thought. I do this by developing a novel account of moral status that takes agency, understood as the capacity for intentional action, to be the necessary and sufficient condition for the possession of moral status. This account also suggests that the capacities required for sentience entail the possession of agency, and the capacities required for agency, entail the possession of sentience. (...) Thus on this account sentient beings possess agency and agents possess sentience. If this is correct, it will show that an Agency Account of moral status can offer a plausible defence of the moral status of all sentient beings, something that previous Agency Accounts have not succeeded in doing. What is more, this account could establish that all sentient animals are not just moral status holders per se, but that they are owed pro tanto obligations regarding continued existence and liberty, similar in kind, though not always in strength, to those owed to humans. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to show that animal rights are not necessarily at odds with the use of animals for research. If animals hold basic moral rights similar to those of humans, then we should consequently extend the ethical requirements guiding research with humans to research with animals. The article spells out how this can be done in practice by applying the seven requirements for ethical research with humans proposed by Ezekiel Emanuel, David Wendler and Christine Grady (...) to animal research. These requirements are i) social value, ii) scientific validity, iii) independent review, iv) fair subject selection, v) favorable risk-benefit ratio, vi) informed consent, and vii) respect for research subjects. In practice, this means that we must reform the practice of animal research to make it more similar to research with humans, rather than completely abolish the former. Indeed, if we banned animal research altogether, then we would also deprive animals of its potential benefits – which would be ethically problematic. (shrink)

Animals who live in cities must coexist with us. They are, as a result, entitled to the conditions of their flourishing. This article argues that, as the boundaries of cities and urban areas expand, the boundaries of our conception of captivity should expand too. Urbanization can undermine animals’ freedoms, hence their ability to live good lives. I draw the implications of an account of “pervasive captivity” against the background of the Capabilities Approach. I construe captivity, including that of urban animals, (...) as affecting a range of animal capabilities, understood as freedoms, and I address some tensions within Nussbaum’s treatment of human-animal conflicts. Using the Capabilities Approach as a guide, I will attempt to motivate a convergence between habitat preservation in urbanized environments, urban design guided by justice, and the individual freedoms of animals. (shrink)

It has been argued that some animals are moral subjects, that is, beings who are capable of behaving on the basis of moral motivations. In this paper, we do not challenge this claim. Instead, we presuppose its plausibility in order to explore what ethical consequences follow from it. Using the capabilities approach, we argue that beings who are moral subjects are entitled to enjoy positive opportunities for the flourishing of their moral capabilities, and that the thwarting of these capabilities entails (...) a harm that cannot be fully explained in terms of hedonistic welfare. We explore the implications of this idea for the assessment of current practices involving animals. (shrink)

Do non-human animals have an interest in sociopolitical freedom? Cochrane has recently taken up this important yet largely neglected quest ion. He argues that animal freedom is not a relevant moral concern in itself, because animals have a merely instrumental but not an intrinsic interest in freedom (Cochrane 2009a, 2012). This paper will argue that even if animals have a merely instrumental interest in freedom, animal freedom should nonetheless be an important goal for our relationships with animals. Drawing (...) on recent work on the value of freedom, it will be argued that freedom is non-specifically instrumentally valuable. Accordingly, freedom is a means to other goods, but often it is not possible to identify those goods in advance or aim for them directly. Some of the reasons that make freedom non-specifically valuable for human relationships, it will be argued, also apply to relationships between humans and animals. Amongst other implications, it will be shown how this argument provides a response to those who fear that stricter animal protection policies might undermine people’s freedom: A concern for freedom actually requires stricter protection policies rather than speak against them. (shrink)

Empirical studies of the social lives of non-human primates, cetaceans, and other social animals have prompted scientists and philosophers to debate the question of whether morality and moral cognition exists in non-human animals. Some researchers have argued that morality does exist in several animal species, others that these species may possess various evolutionary building blocks or precursors to morality, but not quite the genuine article, while some have argued that nothing remotely resembling morality can be found in any non-human (...) species. However, these different positions on animal morality generally appear to be motivated more by different conceptions of how the term “morality” is to be defined than by empirical disagreements about animal social behaviour and psychology. After delving deeper into the goals and methodologies of various of the protagonists, I argue that, despite appearances, there are actually two importantly distinct debates over animal morality going on, corresponding to two quite different ways of thinking about what it is to define “morality”, “moral cognition”, and associated notions. Several apparent skirmishes in the literature are thus cases of researchers simply talking past each other. I then focus on what I take to be the core debate over animal morality, which is concerned with understanding the nature and phylogenetic distribution of morality conceived as a psychological natural kind. I argue that this debate is in fact largely terminological and non-substantive. Finally, I reflect on how this core debate might best be re-framed. (shrink)

This article brings animal protection theory to bear on Temple Grandin’s work, in her capacity both as a designer of slaughter facilities and as an advocate for omnivorism. Animal protection is a better term for what is often termed animal rights, given that many of the theories grouped under the animal rights label do not extend the concept of rights to animals. I outline the nature of Grandin’s system of humane slaughter as it pertains to cattle. (...) I then outline four arguments Grandin has made defending meat-eating. On a protection-based approach, I argue, Grandin’s system of slaughter is superior to its traditional counterpart. Grandin’s success as a designer of humane slaughterhouses however is not matched by any corresponding success in offering a moral defence of meat-eating. Despite, or perhaps because of, the popularity of her work, Grandin’s arguments for continuing to eat animals are noteworthy only in how disappointing and rudimentary they are. If we can thank Grandin for making a difference in the lives of millions of farm animals, her work can also be criticized for not engaging the moral status of animals with the depth and rigor that it deserves. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty suggests in his Nature lectures that myth provides the best way into thinking the relation of strange kinship between humanity and animality. He goes on to refigure Husserl’s paradigm of the two hands touching to extend beyond merely human-to-human relations, invoking in the process the myth of Narcissus. By carefully examining Merleau-Ponty’s late refiguration of that paradigm, alongside the revised conception of narcissism that it helps him to develop, we find that while human-animal empathy is made possible by (...) a ground of intercorporeal kinship, human-animal estrangement makes possible the emergence of an ethical relation to other animals, contingent upon the sublimation of animal desire. Holding human-animal kinship and estrangement in tension reveals a nascent ideal present implicitly in the early stages of childhood development: a vision of the possibility of interspecies harmony, rooted in the bodily reciprocity that drives the process of self-maturation. (shrink)

Following recent arguments that cultural practices in wild animal populations have important conservation implications, we argue that recognizing captive animals as cultural has important welfare implications. Having a culture is of deep importance for cultural animals, wherever they live. Without understanding the cultural capacities of captive animals, we will be left with a deeply impoverished view of what they need to flourish. Best practices for welfare should therefore require concern for animals’ cultural needs, but the relationship between culture and (...) welfare is also extremely complex, requiring us to rethink standard assumptions about what constitutes and contributes to welfare. (shrink)

This chapter considers philosophical problems concerning non-human (and sometimes human) animals, including their metaphysical, physical, and moral status, their origin, what makes them alive, their functional organization, and the basis of their sensitive and cognitive capacities. I proceed by assuming what most of Descartes’s followers and interpreters have held: that Descartes proposed that animals lack sentience, feeling, and genuinely cognitive representations of things. (Some scholars interpret Descartes differently, denying that he excluded sentience, feeling, and representation from animals, and I consider (...) the evidence for these interpretations as well.) Given that Descartes denied any sort of soul to animals, his other philosophical commitments entailed that he must explain the vital and sensitive powers of non-human animals through purely material causes. Indeed, he welcomed this task, for he was engaged in the larger project of providing purely mechanistic explanations for all natural phenomena of the material world. Animal bodies form functional unities that are adapted to environmental circumstances. In his new physics, Descartes sought to discover or hypothesize material mechanisms that would explain the physiological and behavioral capacities of animals, including how they maintain themselves by seeking food and drink, reproduce themselves, and modify their behavior to fit current circumstances. Metaphysically, his new perspective raised the problem of accounting for the functional unity of the animal body considered as a purely material construction, devoid of an active, organizing power such as the sensitive soul. Descartes’s project becomes even more challenging if we ask whence come such mechanisms that are capable of performing the functions of living things. Officially, Descartes endorsed the accepted theological orthodoxy, that God designed and created the bodily mechanisms of humans and animals. However, in his natural philosophy he set himself the task of explaining the origin of animals as part of the natural development of the universe out of an original chaotic soup of material particles. Within this naturalistic perspective, he must explain how, through purely material processes, the functionally organized bodies of living things (plants and animals) could be produced from non-living matter. Without a designing creator, how do animal bodies arise that are capable of digesting food, growing, reproducing, and performing the behaviors needed to preserve life and health? (shrink)

Peter Carruthers has recently argued for a surprising conditional: if a global workspace theory of phenomenal consciousness is both correct and fully reductive, then there are no substantive facts to discover about phenomenal consciousness in nonhuman animals. I present two problems for this conditional. First, it rests on an odd double-standard about the ordinary concept of phenomenal consciousness: its intuitive non-gradability is taken to be unchallengeable by future scientific developments, whereas its intuitive determinacy is predicted to fall by the wayside. (...) Second, it relies on dismissing, prematurely, the live empirical possibility that phenomenal consciousness may be linked to a core global broadcast mechanism that is shared by a wide range of animals. Future developments in the science of consciousness may lead us to reconsider the non-gradability of phenomenal consciousness, but they are unlikely to lead us to accept that there are no facts to discover outside the paradigm case of a healthy adult human. (shrink)

Starting from the assumption that Kant allows for the possible existence of conscious sensory states in non-rational animals, I examine the textual and philosophical grounds for his acceptance of the possibility that such states are also 'objective'. I elucidate different senses of what might be meant in crediting a cognitive state as objective. I then put forward and defend an interpretation according to which the cognitive states of animals, though extremely limited on Kant's view, are nevertheless minimally objective.

Proponents of the utilitarian animal welfare argument (AWA) for veganism maintain that it is reasonable to expect that adopting a vegan diet will decrease animal suffering. In this paper I argue otherwise. I maintain that (i) there are plausible scenarios in which refraining from meat-consumption will not decrease animal suffering; (ii) the utilitarian AWA rests on a false dilemma; and (iii) there are no reasonable grounds for the expectation that adopting a vegan diet will decrease animal (...) suffering. The paper is divided into four sections. In the first, I set out the utilitarian AWA in its original form. I give some background and I distinguish it from other, related arguments. In the second, I discuss the causal impotence objection, a popular objection to the utilitarian AWA. I explain how the objection works by means of a conceptual distinction between consumers and producers. In the third, I explain how proponents of the utilitarian AWA respond to this objection. In particular, I set out in some detail what I call the expected utility response. In the fourth and final section, I use the three objections noted above to explain why I do not find this response convincing. (shrink)

The keeping of captive animals in zoos and aquariums has long been controversial. Many take freedom to be a crucial part of animal welfare and, on these grounds, criticise all forms of animal captivity as harmful to animal welfare, regardless of their provisions. Here, we analyse what it might mean for freedom to matter to welfare, distinguishing between the role of freedom as an intrinsic good, valued for its own sake and an instrumental good, its value arising (...) from the increased ability to provide other important resources. Too often, this debate is conducted through trading intuitions about what matters for animals. We argue for the need for the collection of comparative welfare data about wild and captive animals in order to settle the issue. Discovering more about the links between freedom and animal welfare will then allow for more empirically informed ethical decisions regarding captive animals. (shrink)

We should conceive of illegal covert animal rescue as acts of “subrevolution” rather than as civil disobedience. Subrevolutions are revolutions that aim to overthrow some part of the government rather than the entire government. This framework better captures the relevant values than the opposing suggestion that we treat illegal covert animal rescue as civil disobedience. If animals have rights like the right not to be unjustly imprisoned and mistreated, then it does not make sense that an instance of (...) animal rescue will be justifiable only if it meets criteria for justified civil disobedience, e.g., the requirement that the civil disobedient not rescue more animals than would be necessary to communicate their message. Thus, the framework of subrevolution is a more apt way to analyze animal rescue. (shrink)

In Animal Ethics in Context, Clare Palmer tries to harmonise two competing approaches to animal ethics. One focuses on the morally relevant capacities that animals possess. The other is the Laissez-Faire Intuition (LFI): the claim that we have duties to assist domesticated animals but should (at least generally) leave wild animals alone. In this paper, I critique the arguments that Palmer offers in favour of the No-Contact LFI - the view that we have (prima facie) duties not to (...) harm wild animals but no duties to assist them. I argue that Palmer's endorsement of the No-Contact LFI is unwarranted. Her arguments actually provide strong reasons to endorse what I call the Gradient View - a position that posits weak presumptive duties to assist wild animals that become stronger as our relations with the animals grow stronger. (shrink)

The paper begins with a description of a grey seal performing conspecific infanticide. The paper then gives an account of “nobleness” and “brutishness.” Roughly, a behavioural-disposition is noble/brutish if it is one that would be a moral virtue/vice if the possessor of the behavioural-disposition were a moral agent. The paper then advances two pairs of axiological claims. The first pair of claims is that nobleness is good and that brutishness is bad. The second pair of claims is about an axiological (...) interaction between nobleness/brutishness and well-being. That any non-human animal lacks well-being is bad. Yet, it is worse that a noble non-human animal lacks well-being, and not so bad that a brutish non-human animal lacks well-being. Lastly, the paper discusses some potential moral implications of these axiological claims, for instance that factory farming is especially wrong because it causes noble non-human animals to lack well-being. (shrink)

We argue that animals are not cognitively stuck in time. Evidence pertaining to multisensory temporal order perception strongly suggests that animals can represent at least some temporal relations of perceived events.

This article engages with two fundamental attitudes toward animals who are used for human consumption: attention and ironic detachment. Taken as polarities linked with animal consumption and the refusal thereof, I discuss how these two attitudes are shaped and manifested during moments of encounter with the animals in question. Starting from a striking photograph from the Lychee and Dog Meat Festival in China, I explore the embodiment of these attitudes in the “gaze” of human participants during the encounter with (...) animals who are going to be killed for food. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that scientists working on the animal morality debate have been operating with a narrow view of morality that prematurely limits the variety of moral practices that animals may be capable of. We show how this bias can be partially corrected by paying more attention to the touch behaviours of animals. We argue that a careful examination of the ways in which animals engage in and navigate touch interactions can shed new light on current debates (...) on animal morality, like the study of consolation behaviour, while also revealing further forms that animal morality may take and that have been neglected so far, like capacities of tolerance or trust. This defence is structured as an analysis of the three main functions of touch: the discriminative function, the affiliative function, and the vigilance function. (shrink)

‘Sentience’ sometimes refers to the capacity for any type of subjective experience, and sometimes to the capacity to have subjective experiences with a positive or negative valence, such as pain or pleasure. We review recent controversies regarding sentience in fish and invertebrates and consider the deep methodological challenge posed by these cases. We then present two ways of responding to the challenge. In a policy-making context, precautionary thinking can help us treat animals appropriately despite continuing uncertainty about their sentience. In (...) a scientific context, we can draw inspiration from the science of human consciousness to disentangle conscious and unconscious perception (especially vision) in animals. Developing better ways to disentangle conscious and unconscious affect is a key priority for future research. (shrink)

How does consciousness vary across the animal kingdom? Are some animals ‘more conscious’ than others? This article presents a multidimensional framework for understanding interspecies variation in states of consciousness. The framework distinguishes five key dimensions of variation: perceptual richness, evaluative richness, integration at a time, integration across time, and self-consciousness. For each dimension, existing experiments that bear on it are reviewed and future experiments are suggested. By assessing a given species against each dimension, we can construct a consciousness profile (...) for that species. On this framework, there is no single scale along which species can be ranked as more or less conscious. Rather, each species has its own distinctive consciousness profile. (shrink)

Reportedly ever since Pythagoras, but possibly much earlier, humans have been concerned about the way non human animals (henceforward “animals” for convenience) should be treated. By late antiquity all main traditions with regard to this issue had already been established and consolidated, and were only slightly modified during the centuries that followed. Until the nineteenth century philosophers tended to focus primarily on the ontological status of animals, to wit on whether – and to what degree – animals are actually rational (...) beings; accordingly they allowed – or denied – them some kind of moral standing. This modus operandi was for the first time seriously questioned by Jeremy Bentham, who put the issue on a different track. If the question, as Bentham suggested, is not if animals can think or speak, but if they can suffer1, then it seems plausible that moral agents ought to abstain from inflicting unnecessary suffering on animals; in other words, humans might have at least one – even limited – moral duty towards animals. And if this, in turn, is true, then animals should arguably be allowed the commensurate moral right, namely the right not to be inflicted unnecessary pain. Then, if animals possess this right, they could probably possess others, as well. This is how grosso modo the issue of animal rights became a pivotal part of the discussion concerning animal ethics. Bentham himself, of course, wouldn’t have gone that far; to him even the idea of human rights sounded like “simple… rhetorical nonsense upon stilts”.2 It was mostly due to his views, however, that the debate was moved from the way things actually are to the way things should ideally be – thus merging into what, in my view, should always have been: one primarily concerning ethics. (shrink)

O presente trabalho procura se debruçar sobre a dimensão ontológica do homem animal-político-social em Aristóteles. Logo, desde já nos cabe ressaltar que a verificação do homem enquanto animal político-social abarcará um caráter metafísico para a efetivação no e do físico-material-natural, ou seja, o ser biopsicossocial. Refletindo, construindo e interligando o ser físico e “espiritual”. Portanto, o objeto principal será o que diz respeito ao homem como um animal político-social, no sentido ontológico do ser sensível em Aristóteles. Para (...) tanto, a proposta abarcará a Teoria das Quatro Causas de Aristóteles. Isso para demonstrar certa ontologia de uma suposta essência da ou na substancia no e do ser humano. Ou seja, quem é o “homem-ser-ente” coberto por sua estrutura física e sensível no sentido ontológico no corporal? São os seres humanos animais essencialmente políticos? E se forem são seres políticos do e ou no “espiritual”, “almático” e metafísico ou no físico-corporal? (shrink)

One of the primary concerns in animal research is ensuring the welfare of laboratory animals. Modern views on animal welfare emphasize the role of animal sentience, i.e. the capacity to experience subjective states such as pleasure or suffering, as a central component of welfare. The increasing official recognition of animal sentience has had large effects on laboratory animal research. The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness (Low et al., University of Cambridge, 2012) marked an official scientific recognition (...) of the presence of sentience in mammals, birds, and cephalopods. Animal sentience has furthermore been recognized in legislation in the European Union, UK, New Zealand and parts of Australia, with discussions underway in other parts of the world to follow suit. In this paper, we analyze this shift towards recognition of sentience in the regulation and practice in the treatment of laboratory animals and its effects on animal welfare and use. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 48, Issue 1, pp 57 - 76 The aim of this article is to address the question of the anthropological difference by focusing on the intersubjective relation between the human and the animal in the context of a phenomenological analysis of violence. Following some Levinasian and Derridian insights, my goal is to analyze the structural differences between interspecific and intraspecific violence by asking how the generic phenomenon of violence is modalized across various levels: from human to (...) human, from human to animal, from animal to human, from animal to animal. I will address questions of incarnated vulnerability and altered states of affectivity, and I will relate the various forms of violence emerging in the context of the anthropological difference to the question of territoriality, arguing that violence is structurally modified in relation to particular articulations of our worldly spatiality. (shrink)

In a recent study published in Scientific Reports, the researchers documented the first wild animal seen using a plant with known medicinal properties to heal a wound.

This paper addresses the issue of the moral status of non-human animals, or the question whether sentient animals are morally considerable. The arguments for and against the moral status of animals are discussed, above all the argument from marginal cases. It is argued that sentient animals have moral status based on their having interests in their experiential well-being, but that there are degrees of moral status. Two interest-based approaches are presented and discussed: DeGrazia’s view that sentient animals have interests in (...) continuing to live, and that their interests should be granted moral weight; and McMahan’s TRIA which similarly postulates that animals have interests and that in a given situation we should compare the human and animal interests at stake. Finally, the paper concludes that the anthropocentric approach to animal ethics should be abandoned in favour of the biocentric ethics. (shrink)

Higher-order thought theories maintain that consciousness involves the having of higher-order thoughts about mental states. In response to these theories of consciousness, an attempt is often made to illustrate that nonhuman animals possess said consciousness, overlooking an alarming consequence: attributing higher-order thought to nonhuman animals might entail that they should be held morally accountable for their actions. I argue that moral responsibility requires more than higher-order thought: moral agency requires a specific higher-order thought which concerns a belief about the rightness (...) or wrongness of affecting another’s mental states. This “moral thought” about the rightness or wrongness is not yet demonstrated in even the most intelligent nonhuman animals, thus we should suspend our judgments about the “rightness” or “wrongness” of their actions while further questioning the recent insistence on developing an animal morality. (shrink)

Which animals have conscious experiences? Many different, diverse and unrelated behaviors and cognitive capacities have been proposed as tests of the presence of consciousness in an animal. It is unclear which of these tests, if any, are valid. To remedy this problem, I develop a list consisting of eight desiderata which can be used to assess putative tests of animal consciousness. These desiderata are based either on detailed analogies between consciousness-linked human behavior and non-human behavior, on theories of (...) consciousness or on methods from human consciousness science. If a test or set of tests satisfies more of these desiderata, passing it provides stronger evidence of consciousness. Moreover, one can design future tests of animal consciousness with the intention of satisfying these desiderata to ensure their evidential strength. (shrink)

David. E. Cooper’s claim in Animals and Misanthropy is that honest reflection on the ways human beings treat and compare with animals encourages a dark, misanthropic judgment on humankind. Treatment of animals manifests a range of vices and failings that are ubiquitous and entrenched in our practices, institutions, and forms of life, organized by Cooper into five clusters. Moreover, comparisons of humans and animals reveals both affinities and similarities, including a crucial difference that animals are capable of virtues while being (...) vice-free, whereas humans are both virtuous and vicious. Various familiar ways of thinking morally and scientifically about animal life are criticized for being overly abstract, occluding richer ways of engaging with animals that are better able to disclose the fundamental wrong of their treatment by humans. The book offers a concise, lucid challenge to mainstream ways of thinking morally about animals and to comfortably optimistic estimations of the moral performance of humankind. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that nonhuman animals can be subject to epistemic injustice. I consider Miranda Fricker’s (2007) account of the nature of the harm of epistemic injustice and highlight that it requires that a knower be invested in being recognized as a knower. I argue that a focus on know-how, rather than testimony or concepts for self-understanding and communication, can serve to highlight how nonhuman animals can suffer epistemic injustice without an investment in recognition, by focusing on distributive (...) justice concerning epistemic goods. Drawing from work in animal ethology and movement ecology, I argue that human interruption of animal lifeways has negative downstream effects on nonhuman animals’ ability to acquire ‘answers’ to ‘questions’ they have an interest in answering: namely, acquiring both true beliefs about conspecifics and their environment, as well as acquisition of behaviors and skills that enable everyday successful coping, and that these interruptions can constitute epistemic injustice. (shrink)