Theory of illness causation is an important issue in all biomedical sciences, and solid etiological explanations are needed in order to develop therapeutic approaches in medicine and preventive interventions in public health. Until now, the literature about the theoretical underpinnings of illness causation research has been scarce and fragmented, and lacking a convenient summary. This interdisciplinary book provides a convenient and accessible distillation of the current status of research into this developing field, and adds a personal flavor to the discussion (...) by proposing the etiological stance as a comprehensive approach to identify modifiable causes of illness. (shrink)

Goethe's objections to Newton's theory of light and colours are better than often acknowledged. You can accept the most important elements of these objections without disagreeing with Newton about light and colours. As I will argue, Goethe exposed a crucial weakness of Newton's methodological self-assessment. Newton believed that with the help of his prism experiments, he could prove that sunlight was composed of variously coloured rays of light. Goethe showed that this step from observation to theory is more problematic than (...) Newton wanted to admit. By insisting that the step to theory is not forced upon us by the phenomena, Goethe revealed our own free, creative contribution to theory construction. And Goethe's insight is surprisingly significant, because he correctly claimed that all of the results of Newton's prism experiments fit a theoretical alternative equally well. If this is correct, then by suggesting an alternative to a well-established physical theory, Goethe developed the problem of underdete... (shrink)

Bradford Hill (1965) highlighted nine aspects of the complex evidential situation a medical researcher faces when determining whether a causal relation exists between a disease and various conditions associated with it. These aspects are widely cited in the literature on epidemiological inference as justifying an inference to a causal claim, but the epistemological basis of the Hill aspects is not understood. We offer an explanatory coherentist interpretation, explicated by Thagard's ECHO model of explanatory coherence. The ECHO model captures the complexity (...) of epidemiological inference and provides a tractable model for inferring disease causation. We apply this model to three cases: the inference of a causal connection between the Zika virus and birth defects, the classic inference that smoking causes cancer, and John Snow’s inference about the cause of cholera. (shrink)

Agent-based models (ABMs) are one type of simulation model used in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. In contrast to equation-based models, ABMs are algorithms that use individual agents and attribute changing characteristics to each one, multiple times during multiple iterations over time. This paper focuses on three philosophical aspects of ABMs as models of causal mechanisms, as generators of emergent phenomena, and as providers of explanation. Based on my discussion, I conclude that while ABMs cannot help much with causal (...) inference, they can be viewed as etio-prognostic explanations of illness occurrence and outcome. (shrink)

The search for causes of perinatal brain damage needs a solid theoretical foundation. Current theory apparently does not offer a unanimously accepted view of what constitutes a cause, and how it can be identified. We discuss nine potential theoretical misconceptions: (1) too narrow a view of what is a cause (causal production vs. facilitation), (2) extrapolating from possibility to fact (potential vs. factual causation), (3) if X, then invariably Y (determinism vs. probabilism), (4) co-occurrence in individuals vs. association in populations, (...) (5) one cause is all that is needed (single cause attribution vs. multicausal constellations), (6) drawing causal inferences from very small numbers of observations (the tendency to generalize), (7) unstated causal inferences, (8) ignoring heterogeneity, and (9) failing to consider alternative explanations for what is observed. We hope that our critical discussion will contribute to fruitful research and help reduce the burden of perinatal brain damage. (shrink)

In this chapter, I first outline the public health workflow from assessment via goal definition and intervention to evaluation. Further, I discuss the types and subtypes of explanation used in public health research and practice: scientific, justificatory, methodological, and prospective. In doing this, I take the discussion far beyond the usual focus in philosophy of science as answers to “why?”-questions. The chapter ends with a few comments on my proposal.

In order to support health interventions, biomedical and population health researchers need to collect solid evidence. This article asks what type of evidence this should be and expands on previous work that focused on etiological explanations, or causal-mechanical explanations of why and how illness occurs. The article proposes adding predictive evidence to the explanatory evidence, in order to form a joint evidence set, or JES = [A,B,C,D], which consists of four different types of evidence: association [A], biology [B], confirmation [C], (...) and difference-making [D]. The article discusses explanatory coherence as a backbone for this proposal, suggests criteria for each type of evidence, and offers a rubric for multi-evidence mapping. (shrink)

Diese klugen Reaktionen auf mein Buch unterscheiden sich erheblich. Während Susanne Burri mit meiner Grundthese sympathisiert und mir in deren Rahmen zwei knifflige Probleme vorlegt, die sich konstruktiv bearbeiten lassen, geht Christoph Lumers Kritik ans Eingemachte: Im Rahmen des von ihm bevorzugten philosophischen Ansatzes stellt sich meine Herangehensweise als haltlos dar, weil ihr jede Rationalität abgeht.

Dieser Aufsatz beschreibt und erörtert fünf Aspekte der gegenwärtigen Wissenschaft: Verfahren, Zwiespalt, Schweigen, Hoffnung, und Probieren.

As health systems around the world turn towards highly distributed, specialized and cooperative structures to increase quality and safety of care as well as efficiency and efficacy of delivery processes, there is a growing need for supporting communication and collaboration of all parties involved with advanced ICT solutions. The Electronic Health Record (EHR) provides the information platform which is maturing towards the eHealth core application. To meet the requirements for sustainable, semantically interoperable, and trustworthy EHR solutions, different standards and different (...) national strategies have been established. The workshop summarizes the requirements for such advanced EHR systems and their underlying architecture, presents different strategies and solutions advocated by corresponding protagonists, discusses pros and cons as well as harmonization and migration strategies for those approaches. It particularly highlights a turn towards ontology-driven architectures. (shrink)

In contrast to Axelrod’s advice “don’t be envious” it is argued that the emotion of envy may enhance cooperation. TIT FOR TAT does exhibit a certain degree of envy. But, it does so in inconsistent ways. Two variants of TIT FOR TAT are introduced and their strategic properties are analyzed. Both generate the very same actual play as TIT FOR TAT in a computer tournament without noise. However, if noise is introduced they display some greater degree of stability. This is (...) due to the fact that they form, in a prisoner’s dilemma supergame with suitable parameters, an equilibrium with themselves that is subgame perfect or (in case of the first strategy) close to subgame perfect. It is additionally argued that these strategies are exceptionally clear and comprehensible to others in that they conform to well known real live behavior patterns. (shrink)

Let us imagine an ideal ethical agent, i.e., an agent who (i) holds a certain ethical theory, (ii) has all factual knowledge needed for determining which action among those open to her is right and which is wrong, according to her theory, and who (iii) is ideally motivated to really do whatever her ethical theory demands her to do. If we grant that the notions of omniscience and ideal motivation both make sense, we may ask: Could there possibly be an (...) ideal utilitarian, that is, an ideal ethical agent whose ethical theory says that our only moral obligation consists in maximizing utility? I claim that an ideal agent cannot be utilitarian. My reasoning against ideal utilitarianism will parallel Putnam's famous argument against the brains in a vat. Putnam argues that an envatted brain cannot describe its own situation because its words do not refer to brains and vats; I argue that an ideal utilitarian cannot entertain or communicate the beliefs necessary to being a utilitarian. (shrink)

Wie viele empirische Daten auch immer wir zusammentragen mögen: es sind nie ausschließlich diese Daten, die bei unserer theoretischen Arbeit den Ausschlag geben. Ob wir eine Naturwissenschaftliche Theorie akzepieren, hängt nicht alleine davon ab, wie exakt sie zur Empirie passt ( also zu den Daten aus Beobachtungen und Versuchsergebnissen), sondern auch von weiteren - außerempirischen - Kriterien. Eines dieser Kriterien stützt sich auf unseren Schönheitssinn. Wie ein Blick in die Geschichte der Physik ohne jeden Zweifel lehrt, spielt der Sinn für (...) Ästhetik eine herausragende Rolle für den wissenschaftlichen Fortschritt. Gerade die Genies der neuzeitlichen und modernen Physik setzen bei ihrer bahnbrechenden Forschung immer wieder auf das Schöne. Das ist eine rätselhafte Tatsache, die wir deshalb ernstnehmen sollten, weil sich die zunächst ästhetisch optimierten Theorien im weiteren Geschichtsverlauf immer wieder empirisch als verblüffend erfolgreich herausgestellt haben. (shrink)

Quine claims that holism (i.e., the Quine-Duhem thesis) prevents us from defining synonymy and analyticity (section 2). In Word and Object, he dismisses a notion of synonymy which works well even if holism is true. The notion goes back to a proposal from Grice and Strawson and runs thus: R and S are synonymous iff for all sentences T we have that the logical conjunction of R and T is stimulus-synonymous to that of S and T. Whereas Grice and Strawson (...) did not attempt to defend this definition, I try to show that it indeed gives us a satisfactory account of synonymy. Contrary to Quine, the notion is tighter than stimulus-synonymy – particularly when applied to sentences with less than critical semantic mass (section 3). Now according to Quine, analyticity could be defined in terms of synonymy, if synonymy were to make sense: A sentence is analytic iff synonymous to self-conditionals. This leads us to the following notion of analyticity: S is analytic iff, for all sentences T, the logical conjunction of S and T is stimulus-synonymous to T; an analytic sentence does not change the semantic mass of any theory to which it may be conjoined (section 4). This notion is tighter than Quine's stimulus-analyticity; unlike stimulus-analyticity, it does not apply to those sentences from the very center of our theories which can be assented to come what may, even though they are not synthetic in the intuitive sense (section 5). Conclusion: We can have well-defined notions of synonymy and analyticity even if we embrace Quine's holism, naturalism, behaviorism, and radical translation. Quine's meaning skepticism is to be repudiated on Quinean grounds. (shrink)

Pacifists and their opponents disagree not only about moral questions, but most often about factual questions as well. For example, they came to divergent descriptions of the crisis in Kosovo. According to my reconstruction of pacifism, this is not a surprise because the pacifist, legitimately, looks at the facts in the light of her system of value. Her opponent, in turn, looks at the facts in the light of alternative systems of value, and the quarrel between the two parties about (...) supposedly descriptive matters does not come to an end as there is no objective reality about the war in question that could settle the issue. If I am right, the pacifist's value-laden way of looking at reality can be reconstructed as an obedience to three epistemic imperatives. First, the Epistemic Imperative concerning Human Nature ("Resist against demonizing the other side; always try to understand the case from their point of view"). Second, the Epistemic Imperative concerning Non-Violent Alternatives ("Always search for non-violent alternatives to projected military action"). Third, the Epistemic Imperative concerning Uncontrolled Escalation ("Sharpen your attention for uncontrolled, irreversible side effects of military action, particularly for the danger of escalation to another world war"). Objective reality does not decide how far one should go in following these imperatives. Rather, the decision about this is our's—similarly as in case of the scientist who decides to search for common deep structure behind the chaos of the manifold. So the pacifist's epistemic imperatives can be compared to Kant's regulative principles that are necessary for guiding the scientific scrutiny of reality. (shrink)

Using as case studies two early diagrams that represent mechanisms of the cell division cycle, we aim to extend prior philosophical analyses of the roles of diagrams in scientific reasoning, and specifically their role in biological reasoning. The diagrams we discuss are, in practice, integral and indispensible elements of reasoning from experimental data about the cell division cycle to mathematical models of the cycle’s molecular mechanisms. In accordance with prior analyses, the diagrams provide functional explanations of the cell cycle and (...) facilitate the construction of mathematical models of the cell cycle. But, extending beyond those analyses, we show how diagrams facilitate the construction of mathematical models, and we argue that the diagrams permit nomological explanations of the cell cycle. We further argue that what makes diagrams integral and indispensible for explanation and model construction is their nature as locality aids: they group together information that is to be used together in a way that sentential representations do not. (shrink)

Quine claims that holism (i.e., the Quine-Duhem thesis) prevents us from defining synonymy and analyticity (section 2). In "Word and Object," he dismisses a notion of synonymy which works well even if holism is true. The notion goes back to a proposal from Grice and Strawson and runs thus: R and S are synonymous iff for all sentences T we have that the logical conjunction of R and T is stimulus-synonymous to that of S and T. Whereas Grice and Strawson (...) did not attempt to defend this definition, I try to show that it indeed gives us a satisfactory account of synonymy. Contrary to Quine, the notion is tighter than stimulus-synonymy -- particularly when applied to sentences with less than critical semantic mass (section 3). Now according to Quine, analyticity could be defined in terms of synonymy, if synonymy were to make sense: A sentence is analytic iff synonymous to self-conditionals. This leads us to the following notion of analyticity: S is analytic iff, for all sentences T, the logical conjunction of S and T is stimulus-synonymous to T; an analytic sentence does not change the semantic mass of any theory to which it may be conjoined (section 4). This notion is tighter than Quine's stimulus-analyticity; unlike stimulus-analyticity, it does not apply to those sentences from the very center of our theories which can be assented to come what may, even though they are not synthetic in the intuitive sense (section 5). (shrink)

The majority rule has caught much attention in recent debate about the aggregation of judgments. But its role in finding the truth is limited. A majority of expert judgments is not necessarily authoritative, even if all experts are equally competent, if they make their judgments independently of each other, and if all the judgments are based on the same source of (good) evidence. In this paper I demonstrate this limitation by presenting a simple counterexample and a related general result. I (...) pave the way for this argument by introducing a Bayesian model of evidence and expert judgment in order to give a precise account of the basic problem. (shrink)

Ethical issues of information and communication technologies (ICTs) are important because they can have significant effects on human liberty, happiness, their ability to lead a good life. They are also of functional interest because they can determine whether technologies are used and whether their positive potential can unfold. For these reasons policy makers are interested in finding out what these issues are and how they can be addressed. The best way of creating ICT policy that is sensitive to ethical issues (...) would be to be proactive and address such issues at early stages of the technology life cycle. The present paper uses this position as a starting point and discusses how knowledge of ethical aspects of emerging ICTs can be gained. It develops a methodology that goes beyond established futures methodologies to cater for the difficult nature of ethical issues. The paper goes on to outline some of the preliminary findings of a European research project that has applied this method. (shrink)

Trust is generally held to have three different dimensions or aspects: a behavioral aspect, a cognitive aspect, and an affective aspect. While t here is hardly any disagreement about trusting behavior, there is some disagreement as to which of the two other aspects is more fundamental. After presenting some of the main ideas concerning the concept of trust as used in the analysis of social cooperation. I will argue that affective aspects of trust must be included in any adequate account (...) of the role of trust in social dilemma situations involving multiple equilibria. Cooperation in such situations requires coordination even though information on what another player might do is not available. A trusting person can handle such problems of cooperation by framing the situation in a way that goes beyond cognitive trust and solves what I shall call the problem of normative consent. I will conclude with some remarks ab out the design of institutions that foster trustful cooperation, especially in the context of the Internet. (shrink)

With increasing complexity of the networks of social interaction new and more abstract forms of trust are in need. A conceptual analysis of different forms of trust, namely interpersonal trust, trust in groups and institutional trust is given. It is argued that institutional trust cannot totally replace interpersonal trust. Institutional trust rather builds on more personal forms of trust in that it is primarily formed in personal encounters with salient representatives of the institution and presupposes trust in others trusting in (...) the institution. Any form of trust is grounded in some normative foundation. A trusting person can make herself vulnerable to the action of other individuals because she perceives those others as acting from shared aims or values. Thus, some sort of virtue is a prerequisite of any form of genuine trust. While institutional trust may in some respect be more easily acquired than interpersonal trust in general it may bear a fundamental problem: institutional trust may be extraordinary robust with regard to a wide range of behavioral experiences; thus, it may be enduringly maintained although in fact unjustified. In a concluding section the general analysis is illustrated by some reflections on the problem of trust in government. (shrink)

Communication is an inherently strategic matter. This paper introduces simple game theoretic models of information transmission to identify different forms of uncertainty which may pose a problem of trust in testimony. Strategic analysis suggests discriminating between trust in integrity, trust in competence, trust in (the will to invest) effort and trust in honesty. Whereas uncertainty about the sender's honesty or integrity may directly influence a rational receiver's readiness to rely on sender's statements, neither uncertainty about the competence of a sender (...) nor uncertainty about his willingness to invest effort has any direct impact on rational reliance on its own. In this regard, trust in honesty and trust in integrity appear to be more basic than trust in competence or effort. (shrink)

Naturalism, as Binmore understands the term, is characterized by a scientific stance on moral behavior. Binmore claims that a naturalistic account of morality necessarily goes with the conviction “that only hypothetical imperatives make any sense”. In this paper it is argued that this claim is mistaken. First, as Hume’s theory of promising shows, naturalism in the sense of Binmore is very well compatible with acknowledging the importance of categorical imperatives in moral practice. Moreover, second, if Binmore’s own theory of moral (...) practice and its evolution is correct, then the actual moral practice does-and in fact must-incorporate norms, which have the form of a categorical imperative. Categorical imperatives are part of social reality and, therefore, any (normative) moral theory that adequately reflects moral practice must also include categorical imperatives. (shrink)

Goethe carried out an enormous number of experiments before criticizing Newton's theory of light and colours in the Farbenlehre (1810). He managed to show that Newton's reasoning is based on a rather narrow choice of experiments, in which parameters such as the distance between the prism and the screen are fixed arbitrarily: Newton's famous spectrum (with its green centre) occurs only at a specific distance. Once you reduce the distance, the green centre disappears, and you see the two border spectra (...) instead. Newton can of course explain these border spectra; but things can be explained just as well the other way around: Then you start with a theory based on the two border spectra in order to derive the Newtonian spectrum. Both accounts fit many data (available in Newton and Goethe's days) equally well. Thus by insisting that the step to theory is not forced upon us by "reason and experiments" alone (as Newton would have it), Goethe revealed our own free, creative contribution to theory construction. And surprisingly, his theory of the prismatic colours seems no worse off than Newton's, even taking into account additional criteria of theory choice, such as simplicity or elegance. (shrink)

A particular problem of traditional Rational Choice Theory is that it cannot explain equilibrium selection in simple coordination games. In this paper we analyze and discuss the solution concept for common coordination problems as incorporated in the theory of Team Reasoning (TR). Special consideration is given to TR’s concept of opportunistic choice and to the resulting restrictions in using private information. We report results from a laboratory experiment in which teams were given a chance to coordinate on a particular pattern (...) of behavior in a sequence of HiLo games. A modification of the stage game offered opportunities to improve on the team goal through changing this accustomed pattern of behavior. Our observations throw considerable doubt on the idea of opportunistic team reasoning as a guide to coordination. Contrary to what TR would predict, individuals tend to stick to accustomed behavioral patterns. Moreover, we find that individual decisions are at least partly determined by private information not accessible to all members of a team. Alternative theories of choice, in particular cognitive hierarchy theory may be more suitable to explain the observed pattern of behavior. (shrink)

A basic conviction in moral non-cognitivism is: only hypothetical norms may be justified. Hartmut Kliemt argues for a moderate variant: there are only hypothetical justifications of norms whether the norms are hypothetical or categorical in kind. In this paper the con- cept of ‘hypothetical justification’ is analyzed. It is argued that hypothetical justifications are not of the kind that we should look for in normative ethics.

Faith in the sense of trust in God is discussed as a somewhat extreme case of trust. Trust in general is understood as an emotional attitude and determined by the way a trusting person perceives the world and the person trusted. Interpersonal trust as the most common form of trust is characterized by connectedness - the trusted person is perceived as acting according to norms, values or goals shared by the trusting person - and by a participant attitude in the (...) sense of Strawson. Trust in God differs essentially from ordinary interpersonal trust, as the asymmetrical relationship between God and a faithful person does not allow for sharing a normative basis of conduct in the strict sense of „sharing“. Therefore, trust in God is ‚categorical‘ in character: the faithful person acknowledges God’s will as the ultimate and binding standard of normative value. Whatever happens, the faithful person perceives it as an expression of God’s will, and, thus, as ‚good‘. (shrink)

Faced by the challenge of religious plurality, most philosophers of religion view pluralism and exclusivism as the most accepted and fully developed positions. The third alternative, the model of inclusivism, held especially within the Catholic tradition, has not received adequate attention in the debates in philosophy of religion, perhaps as it is based solely on theological grounds. In this essay I offer a philosophical defense of the position of religious inclusivism and give reasons why this position represents the most appropriate (...) position in the face of conflicting religious truth claims. (shrink)

Are we perhaps in the "matrix", or anyway, victims of perfect and permanent computer simulation? No. The most convincing—and shortest—version of Putnam's argument against the possibility of our eternal envattment is due to Crispin Wright (1994). It avoids most of the misunderstandings that have been elicited by Putnam's original presentation of the argument in "Reason, Truth and History" (1981). But it is still open to the charge of question-begging. True enough, the premisses of the argument (disquotation and externalism) can be (...) formulated and defended without presupposing external objects whose existence appears doubtful in the light of the very skeptical scenario which Putnam wants to repudiate. However, the argument is only valid if we add an extra premiss as to the existence of some external objects. In order to avoid circularity, we should run the argument with external objects which must exist even if we are brains in a vat, e.g. with computers rather than with trees. As long as the skeptic is engaged in a discussion of the brain-in-a-vat scenario, she should neither deny the existence of computers nor the existence of causal relations; for if she does, she is in fact denying that we are brains in a vat. (shrink)

In der Literatur zur Wirkungsgeschichte der Farbenlehre Goethes aus dem Jahr 1810 grassieren zwei Vorurteile: (1) Nur ein einziger Physiker von Rang (Seebeck) habe sich auf Goethes Projekt wissenschaftlich eingelassen. (2) Schon zu Goethes Lebzeiten habe sich die Fachwissenschaft mit überwältigender Mehrheit gegen den Dichter ausgesprochen. Beide Behauptungen sind falsch. ad (1): Der bedeutende Physiker und Chemiker Johann Ritter hat zwischen 1800 und 1801 eng mit Goethe kooperiert, dieselbe Forschungsmethode eingesetzt wie Goethe und aufgrund dieser Kooperation das UV-Licht entdeckt. Bis (...) zu seinem Lebensende war er der Ansicht, dass die newtonische Theorie durch Fortführung der Experimente Goethes unterminiert werden könne. ad (2): Wie sich bei einer Kampfabstimmung unter den MINT-Forschern der Goethe-Zeit ergibt (bei der sämtliche veröffentlichte Voten von 1810 bis 1832 gezählt werden), stimmten gegen Goethe die Hälfte der Naturwissenschaftler, für ihn ein Drittel, bei 15 Prozent Stimmenthaltungen. Goethe hat die Abstimmung in der Tat verloren, doch eine verheerende Niederlage sähe anders aus. (shrink)

Rarely does research in the history and philosophy of science lead to new empirical results, but that is exactly what has happened in one of the essays of this special issue: Rang and Grebe-Ellis have developed new experimental techniques to perform measurements Goethe proposed 217 years ago. These measurements fit neatly with Goethe’s idea of polarity—his complementary spectrum is not only an optical, but also a thermodynamical counterpart of Newton’s spectrum. I use the new measurements, firstly, to argue against the (...) asymmetries between light and darkness posited by Lyre and Schreiber; and, secondly, to explicate the alternative theory that Goethe had introduced to urge scientific pluralism. In my replies to exegetical criticism by Böhler, Hampe and Zemplén, I show that the main goal of Goethe’s Farbenlehre was indeed to expose symmetries between light and darkness. Furthermore, I argue that it is worthwhile to focus on the experiments, arguments and hypotheses of the Farbenlehre, and not merely on rhetorical, narrative or stylistical aspects, as Böhler and Hampe would have it. Goethe’s criticism of Newton is often dismissed, but it is in fact surprisingly relevant today. (shrink)

Wie müsste eine faire Lösung des Klimaproblems aussehen? Wie sollten wir Pflichten und finanzielle Lasten der nötigen CO2-Reduktionen verteilen, wenn es dabei gerecht zugehen soll und keiner übervorteilt werden darf? In meiner Antwort auf diese ethischen Fragen stütze ich mich auf einen Grundsatz, den Angela Merkel formuliert hat: Jeder Mensch hat das Recht, genauso viel CO2-Emissionen zu verursachen wie jeder andere. Anders als die Bundeskanzlerin, die den Grundsatz nur langfristig in die Tat umsetzen will, plädiere ich dafür, dass die Gleichberechtigung (...) aller in Sachen CO2-Ausstoß schon unter dem Nachfolge-Regime des Kyoto-Vertrags gelten soll. In einem ersten Schritt soll die Steigerung der weltweiten CO2-Emissionen angehalten werden. Um das auf gerechte Weise zu bewerkstelligen, werden in feiner Stückelung Rechte zum CO2-Ausstoß (die sog. Mikro-Zertifikate) ausgegeben, und zwar zunächst für genau so viel CO2, wie die Menschheit zur Zeit insgesamt pro Jahr in die Luft bläst. Wer CO2 emittieren will, gleichgültig wo, wie und wozu, darf das nur gegen Entwertung einer entsprechenden Anzahl an Mikro-Zertifikaten, sonst macht er sich strafbar. Die Mikro-Zertifikate werden auf einer weltweiten Börse gehandelt; ihr Preis ergibt sich aus Angebot und Nachfrage. Mein Vorschlag unterscheidet sich in zweierlei Hinsicht von den Versteigerungen der CO2-Zertifikate, wie sie bislang konzipiert und organisiert worden sind. Einerseits sollen am Ende alle Emissionen klimaschädlicher Gase in den Handel mit Mikro-Zertifikaten einbezogen werden. Andererseits wird das Geld, das durch die Versteigerung der Mikro-Zertifikate zusammenkommt, in regelmäßigen Abständen und ohne Abzüge an jeden einzelnen Menschen ausgezahlt. Das ist einfach, fair und transparent. In einem zweiten Schritt sind die weltweiten CO2-Emissionen drastisch zu verringern: Nach einer siebenjährigen Verschnaufpause (in der sich Produzenten und Verbraucher auf die erforderlichen Anpassungen vorbereiten können) beginnen die sieben dürren Jahre der CO2-Politik: Jahr für Jahr werden 10% weniger Mikro-Zertifikate ausgegeben. Am Ende dieser Durststrecke haben sich die weltweiten CO2-Emissionen halbiert, und die Klima-Investitionen sind dahin geflossen, wo sie dem Klima am stärksten nutzen und wo das am wenigsten Kapital verschlingt. (shrink)

Goethes Protest gegen Newtons Theorie des Lichts und der Farben ist besser, als man gemeinhin denkt. Man kann diesem Protest in den wichtigsten Elementen folgen, ohne Newton in der physikalischen Sache unrecht zu geben. Laut meiner Interpretation hat Goethe in Newtons wissenschaftsphilosophischer Selbsteinschätzung eine entscheidende Schwäche aufgedeckt: Newton glaubte, mithilfe prismatischer Experimente beweisen zu können, dass das Licht der Sonne aus Lichtstrahlen verschiedener Farben zusammengesetzt sei. Goethe zeigt, dass dieser Übergang vom Beobachtbaren zur Theorie problematischer ist, als Newton wahrhaben wollte. (...) Wenn Goethe darauf beharrt, dass uns der Übergang zur Theorie nicht von den Phänomenen aufgezwungen wird, dann kommt dadurch unser eigener, freier und kreativer Beitrag zur Theorie-Bildung ans Tageslicht. Und diese Einsicht Goethes gewinnt eine überraschende Schärfe, weil Goethe plausibel machen kann, dass sich alle entscheidenden prismatischen Experimente Newtons aus der geometrischen Optik ebenso gut mit einer alternativen Theorie vereinbaren lassen. Wenn ich recht sehe, war Goethe der erste Wissenschaftsphilosoph, der mindestens eine empirisch äquivalente Alternative zu einer wohletablierten physikalischen Theorie gesehen und daraus weitreichende wissenschaftstheoretische Schlüsse gezogen hat: Damit war Goethe seiner Zeit um ein gutes Jahrhundert voraus. (shrink)

Die Debatten über den „doux commerce“, die im Jahrhundert der Aufklärung geführt wurden, kreisen um zentrale Fragen der modernen Staats- und Wirtschaftsordnung: Führen Handel und Marktwirtschaft zur Steigerung von Wohlstand und Freiheit und zur Zivilisierung von Gesellschaften und internationalen Beziehungen? Oder sind sie Ursache neuer Ungleichheiten, Machtverhältnisse und Konflikte? In den Auseinandersetzungen zu diesen Fragen haben sich heterogene Theorien über die Organisation von Staat, Ökonomie und internationalem System herausgebildet, die politische und ökonomische Diskurse und Praxen bis in die Gegenwart prägen. (...) Der Band versammelt Beiträge internationaler Experten, die wichtige Theorien und Ansätze der Aufklärungsbewegung behandeln. Autoren wie Saint-Pierre oder Montesquieu, Rousseau, Smith oder Fichte, aber auch breitere Strömungen wie die Physiokraten oder Diskurse im revolutionären Frankreich werden in ihren Eigenarten, ihrer Heterogenität und ihren Beziehungen zueinander thematisiert. (shrink)