The purpose of this article is to present the influence of Plotinus' thought on the political philosophy of the Roman Emperor Julian, between the years 361 to 363. The methodology consists of selecting excerpts from the works of Juliano Misopogon and Cartas y Fragmentos that may indicate the influence of the ideas of Plotinus' Ennead in the speech given by the Emperor to legitimize his political power. Juliano argues that the laws of the empire were created by the gods (...) for the organization of human life, so that obedience to the gods necessarily requires an obedience to those laws. According to Juliano, knowledge or episteme about the laws of empire is conditioned to the escape from sensible reality in the name of spiritual reality, in which the wise ruler also needs to transcend the body to know and obey divine laws. Thus, after analyzing Juliano's arguments, we seek to reflect on the viability of the political system adopted by him, especially if the reception of his ideas by rulers from the 20th century onwards is considered. (shrink)

Invention of artificial general intelligence is predicted to cause a shift in the trajectory of human civilization. In order to reap the benefits and avoid pitfalls of such powerful technology it is important to be able to control it. However, possibility of controlling artificial general intelligence and its more advanced version, superintelligence, has not been formally established. In this paper, we present arguments as well as supporting evidence from multiple domains indicating that advanced AI can’t be fully controlled. Consequences of (...) uncontrollability of AI are discussed with respect to future of humanity and research on AI, and AI safety and security. This paper can serve as a comprehensive reference for the topic of uncontrollability. (shrink)

Why do we have social norms—of fairness, cooperation, trust, property, or gender? Modern-day Humeans, as I call them, believe these norms are best accounted for in cultural evolutionary terms, as adaptive solutions to recurrent problems of social interaction. In this paper, I discuss a challenge to this “Humean Program.” Social norms involve widespread behaviors, but also distinctive psychological attitudes and dispositions. According to the challenge, Humean accounts of norms leave their psychological side unexplained. They explain, say, why we share equally, (...) but not why we disapprove of those who don’t. I defend the Humean Program against this challenge. In particular, I suggest an idea for how to extend the Program to account for the psychological side of norms. Socially adaptive behaviors aren’t just likely to emerge in a group; They are also likely to be widely taught within it. The transmission of these behaviors through instruction explains why they are associated with distinctive normative attitudes and dispositions. These attitudes play a pedagogical role in helping transmit these behaviors to children and newcomers. (shrink)

Tradicionalmente, se ha argumentado que el concepto de eudaimonía en Aristóteles se encuentra anclado en el contexto de una comprensión teleológica del universo, por cuanto dicha noción parece radicar en una definición funcionalista de la naturaleza humana. Teniendo esto en mente, Bernard Williams ha desarrollado una crítica en contra de la propuesta ética de Aristóteles, acusándola de una cierta ambición científica en el campo del razonamiento práctico que resulta insostenible actualmente. Este ensayo busca discutir si, en efecto, estos señalamientos tienen (...) un sustento plausible o si, por el contrario, se basan en una interpretación debatible de los fundamentos de la ética aristotélica. Con este propósito, se analiza la justificación del razonamiento ético de Aristóteles a la luz de los argumentos de Williams y de algunos de sus contradictores. (shrink)

La presente contribución tiene por objeto examinar y describir la génesis y la elaboración de los Nuevos Ensayos sobre el entendimiento humano de Leibniz ). El interés de este estudio recae no sólo en transparentar la articulación histórica y teórica en que tienen lugar las etapas que preceden la redacción misma de los Nuevos Ensayos de Leibniz -equivalente a un período de casi diez años y que coincide con el punto de arranque de la maduración definitiva de su filosofía-, sino (...) también en atenuar la connotación estrictamente epistemológica que suele atribuírsele a dicha obra, subrayando las motivaciones metafísicas y teológicas que lo impulsaron a redactarla en respuesta al Ensayo sobre el entendimiento humano de Locke. Palabras clave: Dios, Leibniz, Locke, Nuevos Ensayos, Materialismo, Metafísica, Substancia, Teología. (shrink)

Frente a quienes sostienen una incompatibilidad entre historia de la filosofía y filosofía, en cuanto plantean una disyuntiva entre una práctica descriptiva y una argumentativa, en este trabajo nos proponemos mostrar, examinando la labor histórico-filosófica de Aris- tóteles, que esa disyuntiva no es excluyente. Para ello, en primer lugar, examinaremos algunos pasajes de su obra en los que ofrece indicaciones metodológicas que permiten comprender la doble función que cumplen las exposiciones críticas de los filósofos precedentes en la constitución misma de (...) su filosofía. En segundo lugar, ilustraremos el tipo de argumentación aristotélica a través del análisis de las críticas que dirige a las Ideas platónicas como causas. Contra Platón, Aristóteles establece que, para dar cuenta de la ingenerabilidad e incorruptibilidad de las formas, no es necesario caracterizarlas como entidades separadas de la materia y del movimiento. Basta asegurar la eternidad de la forma a través de su reproducción en otros individuos de la misma especie. Tal análisis nos permite concluir, finalmente, que filosofía o historia de la filosofía constitu- yen una falsa disyuntiva en Aristóteles, por lo que el examen dialéctico de las doctrinas precedentes es un método adecuado de indagación filosófica. (shrink)

Terms Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) and Human-Level Artificial Intelligence (HLAI) have been used interchangeably to refer to the Holy Grail of Artificial Intelligence (AI) research, creation of a machine capable of achieving goals in a wide range of environments. However, widespread implicit assumption of equivalence between capabilities of AGI and HLAI appears to be unjustified, as humans are not general intelligences. In this paper, we will prove this distinction.

According to many philosophers, rationality is, at least in part, a matter of one’s attitudes cohering with one another. Theorists who endorse this idea have devoted much attention to formulating various coherence requirements. Surprisingly, they have said very little about what it takes for a set of attitudes to be coherent in general. We articulate and defend a general account on which a set of attitudes is coherent just in case and because it is logically possible for the attitudes to (...) be jointly satisfied in the sense of jointly fitting the world. In addition, we show how the account can help adjudicate debates about how to formulate various rational requirements. (shrink)

O objetivo principal deste trabalho é apresentar a distinção entre ciência e cientificismo e, com base no trabalho de van Fraassen, intitulado A imagem científica (2006), discutir sobre as circunstâncias em que o cientificismo poderia ser repudiado. O cientificismo é uma corrente de pensamento que somente considera válido um conhecimento se ele for científico. Segundo essa corrente, os procedimentos da ciência natural seriam mais especiais, uma vez que, dentre outros motivos, eles são capazes de descrever regularidades e possibilitar predições. Dessa (...) forma, o cientificismo defende que os procedimentos não científicos não possuem valor algum, pois não seriam capazes de descrever regularidades e realizar predições como fazem os procedimentos da ciência natural. Trataremos de maneira crítica essa concepção, apresentando o argumento de van Fraassen de que a descrição de uma regularidade também pode ser construída por explicações não científicas. Em sua opinião, o poder explicativo de uma teoria vai além de sua importância empírica, ele é radicalmente dependente do contexto. Isso significa que as regularidades descritas por uma crença científica são também dependentes de explicações não científicas, como as explicações da psicologia, da história, da filosofia, da sociologia, etc. Assim, a forte predição que encontramos na ciência natural não é realizada somente com base na adequação empírica e científica, mas com base em um sistema de explicações não científicas. Isso torna incorreta a classificação do conhecimento científico como o mais verdadeiro ou especial por ser capaz de descrever regularidades e realizar a predições. Pretende-se, com isso, refletir se o conhecimento pode ser construído por outras áreas não científicas, sem que o conhecimento seja com isso prejudicado. Uma reflexão necessária que servirá para apresentar um dos problemas que tornam o cientificismo indesejável. (shrink)

It is still common to find the traditionalist and rationalist conception that scientific knowledge is the most accurate way of describing natural data, as if, therefore, the notion of knowledge were identical to the notion of natural science. In this article, this conception is problematized, based on some concrete cases of the history of science that seem to show that the beliefs of natural science can also be explained on the basis of non-scientific beliefs, such as the beliefs of sociology, (...) psychology, history and philosophy. That is, the main purpose of this paper is to argue that the assessment one can have of scientific clarity can not be constructed only through explanations provided by the procedures of natural science, but also through explanations provided by the procedures of other distinct areas. This argument runs counter to traditionalist rationalism and will be used in this article to criticize the conception that knowledge, in order to be valid, will necessarily have to be scientific and rational. (shrink)

It is widely held that there is a distinctive norm of assertion. A plausible idea is that there is an analogous, perhaps weaker, norm for indirect communication via implicatures. I argue against this type of proposal. My claim is that the norm of assertion is a social norm governing public updates to the conversational record. Off the record implicatures are not subject to social norms of this type. I grant that, as happens in general with intentional actions, off the record (...) communicative acts may be subject to normative assessments on different levels (for instance, regarding their moral or prudential appropriateness). However, such assessments do not generate distinctive norms that apply to all cases of implicature. (shrink)

Smartphone technology is ubiquitous and subject to frequent complaints, both by reformers and the recalcitrant. The ubiquity of smartphone technology has led to many negative consequences, some of which may not be fully addressed by empirically oriented literature. One such consequence is a threat to a certain kind of autonomy. I argue that this threat justifies a form of Cynicism about smartphone technology, styled after ancient Cynicism. Cynicism is importantly different from its colloquialized, contemporary namesake (“cynicism”). While ancient Cynicism shares (...) the theme of opting out, in some sense, with contemporary cynicism, it is not a philosophy of withdrawn futility; in fact, the Cynic emphasis on embodiment may have an import on our lives in a time of smartphone ubiquity. Accordingly, I offer one Cynic value, autarkeia (self-sufficiency), which can be recruited to address the way that smartphone technology threatens our autonomy. (shrink)

Higher‐order evidence can make an agent doubt the reliability of her reasoning. When this happens, it seems rational for the agent to adopt a cautious attitude towards her original conclusion, even in cases where the higher‐order evidence is misleading and the agent's original reasons were actually perfectly good. One may think that recoiling to a cautious attitude in the face of misleading self‐doubt involves a failure to properly respond to one's reasons. My aim is to show that this is not (...) so. My proposal is that (misleading) higher‐order evidence can undermine the agent's possession of her first‐order reasons, constituting what I call a dispossessing defeater. After acquiring the higher‐order evidence, the agent is no longer in a position to rely competently on the relevant first‐order considerations as reasons for her original conclusion, so that such reasons stop being available to her (even if they remain as strong as in the absence of the higher‐order evidence). In this way, an agent with misleading higher‐order evidence can adopt a cautious stance towards her original conclusion, while properly responding to the set of reasons that she possesses–a set that is reduced due to the acquisition of higher‐order dispossessing defeaters. (shrink)

O objetivo deste trabalho é apresentar as ponderações de Nietzsche sobre a filosofia nascente de Tales de Mileto com base em trechos selecionados dos ensaios nietzschianos do período da juventude intitulados A filosofia na época trágica dos gregos e Sobre verdade e mentira no sentido extramoral, da obra do período de transição A gaia ciência, assim como da obra do período mais tardio de sua vida intitulada Genealogia da moral, uma polêmica. Os trechos são suficientes para enfatizar o “erro” presente (...) na hipótese da água e as implicações da “intuição filosófica” de Tales para a representação da phýsis. Nietzsche pondera que a contemplação de Tales foi movida por uma crença ilógica, fantasiosa e indemonstrável, que encontramos em todos os filósofos, de que é possível acessar a realidade objetiva pelo “conhecimento”. Pondera ainda que o “filosofar indemonstrável” de Tales tem ainda o seu valor em pretender ser em todo caso não místico e não alegórico. Essas ponderações de Nietzsche sobre o filosofar de Tales servem neste trabalho para consolidar a perspectiva nietzschiana de que o conhecimento em suas formas de representar a “vida”, desde Tales, é movido pela crença ilógica na “verdade”, não na “aparência”. (shrink)

The objective of this article is to approach the way in which Kant considers the “analogies of experience” necessary connections for the scientific representation of the physical world to occur. The method consists of carrying out a conceptual analysis of selected excerpts from theCritique of pure reasonthat may serve to support the interpretation that the analogies of experience are, for Kant, rules that determine the necessary links between perceptions and the ability to understand phenomena. from them. In this way, we (...) seek to explain the divergence between pure knowledge and empirical knowledge, as well as the way in which physics manages to maintain its a priori concepts. -/- O objetivo deste artigo é abordar a maneira como Kant considera as “analogias da experiência” ligações necessárias para ocorrer a representação científica do mundo físico. O método consiste em analisar trechos selecionados da Crítica da razão pura, sobretudo do texto “Analítica dos princípios”, que apresentem as analogias da experiência como regras que determinam as ligações necessárias entre as percepções e a capacidade de compreensão dos fenômenos. Kant argumenta que embora os objetos sejam em si mesmos inacessíveis a nós isto não implica a impossibilidade de pensarmos neles. O resultado é uma perspectiva sobre o conhecimento científico capaz de considerar as analogias da experiência para manter alguns conceitos a priori sobre o mundo físico. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é apontar cinco aspectos do pensamento nietzschiano que podem ser relevantes para os debates da filosofia da ciência em torno da natureza e representação do conhecimento científico. Para tanto, é realizada uma revisão de literatura com o objetivo de selecionar trechos de obras nietzschianas como O nascimento da tragédia, Genealogia da moral, A gaia ciência e outras que permitam interpretar Nietzsche como um filósofo da ciência preocupado com a construção do conhecimento cientifico sobre a realidade física. (...) Como resultado é possível identificar uma proposta epistemológica na perspectiva nietzschiana, cuja representação objetiva do mundo deve apontar para uma estética da vida. -/- The purpose of this article is to point out five aspects of Nietzschean thought that may be relevant to debates in the philosophy of science around the nature and representation of scientific knowledge. To this end, a literature review is carried out with the aim of selecting excerpts from Nietzschean works such as The Birth of Tragedy, Genealogy of Morals, The Gay Science and others that allow us to interpret Nietzsche as a philosopher of science concerned with the construction of scientific knowledge about the physical reality. As a result, it is possible to identify an epistemological proposal in the Nietzschean perspective, whose objective representation of the world should point to an aesthetics of life. (shrink)

Williams’s famous argument against immortality rests on the idea that immortality cannot be desirable, at least for human beings, and his contention has spawned a cottage industry of responses. As I will intend to show, the arguments over his view rest on both a difference of temperament and a difference in the sense of desire being used. The former concerns a difference in whether one takes a forward-looking or a backward-looking perspective on personal identity; the latter a distinction between our (...) normal desire to continue living and the kind of desire implied in desiring immortality. Showing that there is some sense of identity and desire that support Williams’s conclusion goes some way toward providing support for his argument, if not a full-fledged defense of it. (shrink)

Ikigai is a Japanese concept, which, in brief, refers to the “reason or purpose to live”. I-risks have been identified as a category of risks complementing x- risks, i.e., existential risks, and s-risks, i.e., suffering risks, which describes undesirable future scenarios in which humans are deprived of the pursuit of their individual ikigai. While some developments in AI increase i-risks, there are also AI-driven virtual opportunities, which reduce i-risks by increasing the space of potential ikigais, largely due to developments in (...) generative AI, virtual worlds as well as AI-driven hyper-personalization. The purpose of this paper is to present a first attempt to map the potential AI-driven virtual hyper-personalised ikigai universe. Moreover, challenges and further ideas are presented. (shrink)

Обґрунтовано стратегію високочастотної біржової торгівлі (high-frequency trading) акціями. Для цього досліджено особливості та обмеження біржової високочастотної торгівлі, визначено верхню межу прибутку агресивного «шкідливого» високочастотного трейдера, обґрунтовано оптимальну частоту стратегії біржової високочастотної торгівлі акціями, розглянуто емпіричне підтвердження прогнозованості біржових курсів акцій на надкоротких горизонтах інвестування.

The aim of this article is to present the assumptions of Nietzsche's critique of the notion of “truth” that allow to consider his “perspectivism” an excellent critical and epistemological alternative to philosophy of science. It takes place, therefore, an interpretation of the Nietzschean expressions “tragedy”, “tragic knowledge”, “life”, “perspectivism” and “truth”. Nietzsche seems to be convinced that the belief in the notion of “truth” cannot be consistent with “life”, since “life” is also “tragedy” and therefore cannot be reduced to a (...) concept. On the other hand, the notion of “truth” found in natural science seeks to consolidate a concept about reality, which nullifies the plurality of perspectives on life. Thus, an analogy between this aspect behind Nietzsche's perspectivism and the construction of scientific knowledge allows us to consider that the construction of scientific knowledge needs to disregard the notion of truth and to consider all the individual perspectives of scientists – science must not seek truths but metaphors or perspectives on “life” – which allows to show an excellent contribution of Nietzsche to the debates about the notion of truth in the philosophy of science. (shrink)

RESUMEN El siguiente ensayo tiene como objetivo delimitar los argumentos bases que dan origen a la teoría política conocida como atomismo. Para ello será necesario hacer un análisis de sus orígenes en las proposiciones del contrato social, así como de las razones por las cuales se considera al individuo como autosuficiente, para luego ver cómo esto mismo les da un fundamento a los derechos de esta índole. Ello nos demostrará la importancia de replantear estos argumentos, si es que hacen posible (...) la convivencia entre otros, y cómo es que un sistema que requiera de mayor cooperación es contrario al atomismo político. Finalmente, se verán las implicaciones contradictorias y los elementos que juegan en contra de formar parte de este pensamiento, sobre todo en su forma radical. -/- ABSTRACT The following essay aims to delimit the basic arguments that give rise to the political theory known as atomism. To do so, it will be necessary to analyze its origins in the propositions of the social contract, the reasons why the individual is considered as self-su-fficient, and then see how this gives a foundation to the rights of this kind. This will demonstrate the importance of rethinking these arguments if they make coexistence among others possible and how a system that requires greater cooperation is contrary to political atomism. Finally, we will see the contradictory implications and the elements that play against being part of this thought, especially in its radical form. (shrink)

This paper discusses practical akrasia from the perspective of the sophisticated form of moral subjectivism that can be derived from Nuno Venturinha’s (2018) remarks on moral matters.

The purpose of this work is to present the analogy between the thoughts of Epicurus de Samos and Friedrich Nietzsche regarding the notion of “freedom”. In Epicurus, the idea of “freedom” (eleuthería) is linked to the idea of “self-assertion” (autárkeia), since “freedom” for Epicurus means the “exercise of wisdom” through the autonomy of the “sage” (sophós, prhóneo) when it is free to act according to thought. In a similar way, in Nietzsche the idea of freedom (Freiheit) is linked to the (...) idea of “affirming life” (Lebensbejahung) – and “of oneself” – in acting, when the “superman” (Übermensch) is above of good and evil and being able to create and determine their own values. The discussion about freedom, according to the thought of Epicurus and Nietzsche, makes it possible to identify the analogy between them regarding the understanding of the importance of freedom in philosophical action, in addition to promoting a reflection on thinking and acting in the world. (shrink)

The received wisdom in statistical mechanics is that isolated systems, when left to themselves, approach equilibrium. But under what circumstances does an equilibrium state exist and an approach to equilibrium take place? In this paper we address these questions from the vantage point of the long-run fraction of time definition of Boltzmannian equilibrium that we developed in two recent papers. After a short summary of Boltzmannian statistical mechanics and our definition of equilibrium, we state an existence theorem which provides general (...) criteria for the existence of an equilibrium state. We first illustrate how the theorem works with a toy example, which allows us to illustrate the various elements of the theorem in a simple setting. After a look at the ergodic programme, we discuss equilibria in a number of different gas systems: the ideal gas, the dilute gas, the Kac gas, the stadium gas, the mushroom gas and the multi-mushroom gas. In the conclusion we briefly summarise the main points and highlight open questions. (shrink)

CAMILO, Bruno. O anarquismo e o estímulo à inovação científica. In: SOUZA, Poliana Mendes de. (org.). Inovação na educação superior brasileira: metodologia e casos. Recife: Even3 Publicações, 2021. p. 57-73. -/- Este trabalho, inserido na subárea da filosofia da ciência, possui como tema principal o “anarquismo metodológico” tal como é apresentado pelo filósofo da ciência Paul Feyerabend. O objetivo geral é apresentar o modo como o “anarquismo metodológico”, tal como exposto em Feyerabend (2007), pode contribuir para resolver o problema (...) da “educação científica” e estimular a inovação ou mudança, para em seguida refletir sobre a possibilidade de aplicar o “anarquismo metodológico” nas escolas do Brasil. Tal reflexão será pertinente se consideradas as dificuldades que afligem a “educação científica” no Brasil, sobretudo aquelas que dizem respeito a falta de desenvolvimento da inovação científica e tecnológica do país. (shrink)

CAMILO, Bruno. Aspectos metafísicos na física de Newton: Deus. In: DUTRA, Luiz Henrique de Araújo; LUZ, Alexandre Meyer (org.). Temas de filosofia do conhecimento. Florianópolis: NEL/UFSC, 2011. p. 186-201. (Coleção rumos da epistemologia; 11). Através da análise do pensamento de Isaac Newton (1642-1727) encontramos os postulados metafísicos que fundamentam a sua mecânica natural. Ao deduzir causa de efeito, ele acreditava chegar a uma causa primeira de todas as coisas. A essa primeira causa de tudo, onde toda a ordem e (...) leis tiveram início, a qual para ele assume um caráter divino, Newton aponta para um Deus sábio e poderoso e responsável pela ordem inteligente e pela a harmonia das leis físicas e universais de tudo o que existe – Deus como criador e preservador da ordem do universo. Há ainda a analogia do conceito de Deus com o espaço e o tempo, na medida em que ambos comunicam infinitude e onipresença. Por fim, nas considerações finais apontarei a importância de Newton para a metafísica moderna e como os seus estudos contribuíram para uma visão posterior do universo e suas leis e do homem enquanto ser pensante. (shrink)

Gases reach equilibrium when left to themselves. Why do they behave in this way? The canonical answer to this question, originally proffered by Boltzmann, is that the systems have to be ergodic. This answer has been criticised on different grounds and is now widely regarded as flawed. In this paper we argue that some of the main arguments against Boltzmann's answer, in particular, arguments based on the KAM-theorem and the Markus-Meyer theorem, are beside the point. We then argue that something (...) close to Boltzmann's original proposal is true for gases: gases behave thermodynamic-like if they are epsilon-ergodic, i.e., ergodic on the entire accessible phase space except for a small region of measure epsilon. This answer is promising because there are good reasons to believe that relevant systems in statistical mechanics are epsilon-ergodic. (shrink)

Entropy is ubiquitous in physics, and it plays important roles in numerous other disciplines ranging from logic and statistics to biology and economics. However, a closer look reveals a complicated picture: entropy is defined differently in different contexts, and even within the same domain different notions of entropy are at work. Some of these are defined in terms of probabilities, others are not. The aim of this chapter is to arrive at an understanding of some of the most important notions (...) of entropy and to clarify the relations between them, After setting the stage by introducing the thermodynamic entropy, we discuss notions of entropy in information theory, statistical mechanics, dynamical systems theory and fractal geometry. (shrink)

My aim is to discuss the impact of higher-order evidence on aesthetic appreciation. I suggest that this impact is different with respect to aesthetic beliefs and to aesthetic affective attitudes (such as enjoyment). More specifically, I defend the view that higher-order evidence questioning the reliability of one’s aesthetic beliefs can make it reasonable for one to revise those beliefs. Conversely, in line with a plausible account of emotions, aesthetic affective attitudes are not directly sensitive to this type of higher-order evidence; (...) they are sensitive only to those features of objects that make such attitudes (un)fitting. Thus, I argue, there are cases of non-defective recalcitrant aesthetic attitudes where the subject has both a non-defective, fitting aesthetic affective attitude and a reasonable belief questioning the fittingness of this attitude. I further discuss whether, in this type of case, the subject has decisive reasons to try to change her recalcitrant attitudes—say by trying to modify her aesthetic affective dispositions. My answer is negative. Even granting that subjects always have aesthetic reasons to try to avoid aesthetically unfitting attitudes, these can be outweighed by further reasons not to do so—perhaps including aesthetic reasons related to the construction of valuable aesthetic identities or to the value of aesthetic engagement. (shrink)

CAMILO, Bruno. Princípios metafísicos do método newtoniano. In: CONTE, Jaimir; MORTARI, Cezar Augusto. (org.). Temas em filosofia contemporânea. Florianópolis: NEL/UFSC, 2014. p. 172-183. (Coleção rumos da epistemologia; 13). -/- É no modus operandi de Isaac Newton que visualizamos a relação entre o método dedutivo e o indutivo na análise científica dos fenômenos e a relação entre a metafísica e a prática científica. Pois, de um lado temos a “mecânica racional”, a qual compreende que a única forma de garantir a (...) certeza de algo é dispô-lo matematicamente, propondo a redução da natureza às categorias matemáticas, de outro, temos a “mecânica geométrica” que propõe grandes sistemas coerentes com a realidade empírica, cujo experimento criterioso é fundamental para o estabelecimento de verdades ou conceitos acerca dessa realidade. O modus operandi newtoniano não negava este ou aquele método epistêmico, simplesmente, por divergirem em seus procedimentos, mas, encarava-os como métodos que podiam andar juntos, na construção do conhecimento científico. Analisemos como ele descreve seu método, seu modus operandi, para que seja necessária uma apreciação da influência da metafísica no método científico. (shrink)

The objective of this work is to present Michel Foucault's perspective on the formation of moral subjectivity according to his text entitled “The use of pleasures and the techniques of self”. In the referred text, Foucault emphasizes that moral action should not be constituted in acts according to a rule of conduct supported by moral concepts, but in acts according to a pure relation of the subject with his internal wisdom (subjectivity), a relationship that should not be understood as simply (...) a “self-awareness” as a moral subject, but as a “constitution of the self” as a moral subject In this article, Foucault's position on the formation of moral subjectivity is considered to analyze the place of desire in the autonomy of oneself and of practical attitudes, especially if they are considered: the subject's experience as a process in which both subjectivity and desires are modified or annulled by specific norms or laws, established in certain societies and culture, almost always linked to norms of sexuality; the power of the strongest, insofar as it influences institutions to spread interests in society, corrupting the particular desires of individuals; the “techniques of self”, as rational and voluntary practices that curb desires, by which human beings determine for themselves rules of conduct that correspond to aesthetic values. (shrink)

The objective of this work is to present Ludwig Wittgenstein's perspective on the impossibility of the existence of philosophical problems, to then reflect on the implications of such a perspective based on Popper's thought. For that, Wittgenstein's perspective, as exposed in his work Tractatus logico-philosophicus, is contrasted with Karl Popper's perspective presented in “The nature of philosophical problems and their scientific roots” (in Conjectures and refutations). The example of the problem faced by Kant in his work Critique of pure reason (...) will also be considered for the analysis of Wittgenstein's argument. According to Wittgenstein, philosophical problems are pseudo-problems because they have no solution. However, despite admitting the existence of pseudo-problems, Popper argues that factual, logical, or hybrid problems, under certain circumstances, can be philosophical. Thus, the aim is to contrast these two perspectives in order to emphasize how not all philosophical problems are pseudo-problems. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to present the thesis of the Japanese-American philosopher and economist Francis Fukuyama, known as the “end of history”, to reflect on the central argument of this thesis that transhumanism represents a problem for democracy. Therefore, a conceptual analysis will be carried out, based on selected excerpts, of Fukuyama's works entitledThe end of history and the last man, Our posthuman futureand “Transhumanism”.

The objective of this work is to reflect on the usual and the unusual, based on Friedrich Nietzsche's perspective on the opposition between the pathos of distance or nobility and the ethos from the point of view of utility. In order to do so, an analysis of selected excerpts from Nietzsche's works is carried out, mainly On the genealogy of morality and Beyond Good and Evil. According to Nietzsche, there is no ethos, but only pathos, being the ethos, affirmed by (...) asceticism, only a strategy, a cunning and deceitful invention for the conservation of a precarious way of life. It is this ethos that forges and fixes ascetic values that represent the usual, by inverting values from the point of view of the resentful human's utility. Based on this Nietzschean perspective, we seek to reflect on the unusual as an active impulse that characterizes the noble-type pathos of distance, and the usual as a reactive impulse that characterizes the éthos from the point of view of utility. (shrink)

According to J=K, only beliefs that qualify as knowledge are epistemically justified. Traditionalists about justification have objected to this view that it predicts that radically deceived subjects do not have justified beliefs, which they take to be counter-intuitive. In response, proponents of J=K have argued that traditionalists mistake being justified with being excused in the relevant cases. To make this response work, Timothy Williamson has offered a dispositional account of excuse which has recently been challenged by Jessica Brown. She has (...) presented cases in which Williamson’s account excuses subjects believing things in an epistemically reckless fashion. To steer clear of Brown’s counterexamples, I argue for a modification of Williamson’s account that employs a more fine-grained notion of the dispositions involved. (shrink)

Deliberation issues in decision, and so might be taken as a paradigmatic volitional activity. Character, on the other hand, may appear pre-volitional: the dispositions that constitute it provide the background against which decisions are made. Bernard Williams offers an intriguing picture of how the two may be connected via the concept of practical necessities, which are at once constitutive of character and deliverances of deliberation. Necessities are thus the glue binding character and the will, allowing us to take responsibility for (...) our characters. Intriguing though the picture may be, it did not receive a thorough elaboration in Williams’s work. My aim here is to work out and defend what I take to be the most valuable aspect of Williams’s view of agency: its model of the way character and the will can jointly determine agency through mutual constitution. However, I argue that Williams’s attempt to use this model to ground his attack on Kantian morality does not succeed, because the primacy Williams accords to character over the will cannot yield the appropriate kind of normative authority, even from the perspective of the agent. I urge that we retain Williams’s model of the interaction between character and the will, modified to allow the will an authority that is not derived from the necessity of character. (shrink)

Daniel Whiting has argued, in this journal, that Mark Schroeder’s analysis of knowledge in terms of subjectively and objectively sufficient reasons for belief makes wrong predictions in fake barn cases. Schroeder has replied that this problem may be avoided if one adopts a suitable account of perceptual reasons. I argue that Schroeder’s reply fails to deal with the general worry underlying Whiting’s purported counterexample, because one can construct analogous potential counterexamples that do not involve perceptual reasons at all. Nevertheless, I (...) claim that it is possible to overcome Whiting’s objection, by showing that it rests on an inadequate characterization of how defeat works in the examples in question. (shrink)

Two interconnected surveys are presented, one of artifacts and one of designometry. Artifacts are objects, which have an originator and do not exist in nature. Designometry is a new field of study, which aims to identify the originators of artifacts. The space of artifacts is described and also domains, which pursue designometry, yet currently doing so without collaboration or common methodologies. On this basis, synergies as well as a generic axiom and heuristics for the quest of the creators of artifacts (...) are introduced. While designometry has various areas of applications, the research of methods to detect originators of artificial minds, which constitute a subgroup of artifacts, can be seen as particularly relevant and, in the case of malevolent artificial minds, as contribution to AI safety. (shrink)

Through the 'Spiritual Affections' of the Abbess of Tunja, Sister Francisca Josefa de la Concepción del Castillo, a reflection on colonial art is posed around the question of its apparent usefulness as a 'vehicle of evangelization', investigating its genuine purpose in the mysticism of the Mother of the Castle and the relationship of her work with Him. The aesthetic purpose of the work of colonial art is to bring the Divine closer to the human, trying to reflect and communicate the (...) testimony of a mystical spiritual search and experience lived by the author, inspired and revealed by God. -/- A través de los 'Afectos Espirituales' de la Abadesa de Tunja, Sor Francisca Josefa de la Concepción del Castillo, se plantea una reflexión acerca del arte colonial en torno a la cuestión de su aparente utilidad como 'vehículo de evangelización', indagando su genuino propósito en el misticismo de la Madre del Castillo y la relación de su obra con Él. Se planteará que el propósito estético de la obra de arte colonial es acercar lo Divino a lo humano, intentado reflejar y comunicar el testimonio de una búsqueda y experiencia espiritual mística vivenciada por la autora, inspirada y develada por Dios. (shrink)

Consider a gas confined to the left half of a container. Then remove the wall separating the two parts. The gas will start spreading and soon be evenly distributed over the entire available space. The gas has approached equilibrium. Why does the gas behave in this way? The canonical answer to this question, originally proffered by Boltzmann, is that the system has to be ergodic for the approach to equilibrium to take place. This answer has been criticised on different grounds (...) and is now widely regarded as flawed. In this paper we argue that these criticisms have dismissed Boltzmann’s answer too quickly and that something almost like Boltzmann’s answer is true: the approach to equilibrium takes place if the system is epsilon-ergodic, i.e. ergodic on the entire accessible phase space except for a small region of measure epsilon. We introduce epsilon-ergodicity and argue that relevant systems in statistical mechanics are indeed espsilon-ergodic. (shrink)

A central question of environmental ethics remains one of how best to account for the intuitions generated by the Last Man scenarios; that is, it is a question of how to explain our experience of value in nature and, more importantly, whether that experience is justified. Seeking an alternative to extrinsic views, according to which nonhuman entities possess normative features that obligate us, I turn to constitutive views, which make value or whatever other limits nonhuman nature places on action dependent (...) on features intrinsic to human beings and constitutive of them or their obligations. After examining two kinds of constitutive views—environmental virtue ethics and Korsgaard’s Kantianism—I suggest an alternative that takes up the strengths of both while avoiding their shortcomings. On this view, we have an indirect obligation to experience nature as obligating us, although we have direct obligations only to human beings. (shrink)

We discuss the role of practical costs in the epistemic justification of a novice choosing expert advice, taking as a case study the choice of an expert statistician by a lay politician. First, we refine Goldman’s criteria for the assessment of this choice, showing how the costs of not being impartial impinge on the epistemic justification of the different actors involved in the choice. Then, drawing on two case studies, we discuss in which institutional setting the costs of partiality can (...) play an epistemic role. This way we intend to show how the sociological explanation of the choice of experts can incorporate its epistemic justification. (shrink)

В статье рассмотрена деятельность ведущих кредитных рейтинговых агентств (Fitch Ratings, Moody's Investors Service и Standard & Poor's) в контексте снижения информационной ценности кредитных рейтингов, которые они присваивают, и сохранения доминирующих позиций на рынке финансового рейтингования. Целью исследования является рассмотрение деятельности кредитных рейтинговых агентств в измерении социального конструкционизма в процессе осуществления государственной финансовой политики, объясняя сопротивление регулятивной модели их деятельности многочисленным вызовам и переменам. Подход новой институциональной социологии в управлении мы сделали чувствительным к проблематике институциональных изменений во времени. Таким образом, мы (...) высказались за трактовку вопроса о неизменности организации деятельности КРА в соответствии с условиями нового социологического институционализма. То есть, дается приоритет когнитивной основе институтов, служащей поддержкой конкретного проявления социального порядка и дающей отличный способ для его понимания. (shrink)

Narrative views of agency and identity arise in opposition to reductionism in both domains. While reductionists understand both identity and agency in terms of their components, narrativists respond that life and action are both constituted by narratives, and since the components of a narrative gain their meaning from the whole, life and action not only incorporate their constituent parts but also shape them. I first lay out the difficulties with treating narrative as constitutive of metaphysical identity and turn to its (...) function in practical identity. I then explore the ways narrative shapes our agency—by tapping into our motivational structures, providing an understanding of the social background within which our agency operates, guiding our agency through an understanding of our histories and aspirations, providing the links that structure actions internally, and allowing us to change the meaning of our pasts. I suggest that putting these functions of narrative together may allow us to genuinely shape our past motivational structures through our actions. Finally, if life has the form of a narrative, it may seem as if mortality is necessary for our lives and their contents to be meaningful: a narrative, it might seem, relies on the ending for its meaning. If so, an immortal life would be meaningless. I examine the possibility that even an immortal life may draw meaning from local narratives that constitute projects within such a life, while arguing that, to the contrary, narrative may be a tool exclusively adapted to mortal lives. (shrink)

We find meaning and value in our lives by engaging in everyday projects. But, according to a recent argument by Samuel Scheffler, this value doesn’t depend merely on what the projects are about. In many cases, it depends also on the future generations that will replace us. By imagining the imminent extinction of humanity soon after our own deaths, we can recognize both that much of our current valuing depends on a background confidence in the ongoing survival of humanity and (...) that the survival and flourishing of those future generations matters to us. After presenting Scheffler’s argument, I will explore two twentieth century precursors—Hans Morgenthau and Simone de Beauvoir—before returning to Scheffler to see that his argument can not only show us why future generations matter, but it can also give us hope for immortality and a blueprint for embracing a changing future. (shrink)

The young field of AI Safety is still in the process of identifying its challenges and limitations. In this paper, we formally describe one such impossibility result, namely Unpredictability of AI. We prove that it is impossible to precisely and consistently predict what specific actions a smarter-than-human intelligent system will take to achieve its objectives, even if we know terminal goals of the system. In conclusion, impact of Unpredictability on AI Safety is discussed.

To hold developers responsible, it is important to establish the concept of AI ownership. In this paper we review different obstacles to ownership claims over advanced intelligent systems, including unexplainability, unpredictability, uncontrollability, self-modification, AI-rights, ease of theft when it comes to AI models and code obfuscation. We conclude that it is difficult if not impossible to establish ownership claims over AI models beyond a reasonable doubt.