Results for 'Certainty'

339 found
Order:
  1. Certainty in Action.Bob Beddor - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):711-737.
    When is it permissible to rely on a proposition in practical reasoning? Standard answers to this question face serious challenges. This paper uses these challenges to motivate a certainty norm of practical reasoning. This norm holds that one is permitted to rely on p in practical reasoning if and only if p is epistemically certain. After developing and defending this norm, I consider its broader implications. Taking a certainty norm seriously calls into question traditional assumptions about the importance (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  2.  93
    Knowledge, Certainty, and Assertion.John Turri - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (2):293-299.
    Researchers have debated whether knowledge or certainty is a better candidate for the norm of assertion. Should you make an assertion only if you know it's true? Or should you make an assertion only if you're certain it's true? If either knowledge or certainty is a better candidate, then this will likely have detectable behavioral consequences. I report an experiment that tests for relevant behavioral consequences. The results support the view that assertability is more closely linked to knowledge (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  3. Disagreement, Certainties, Relativism.Martin Kusch - 2018 - Topoi 40 (5):1097-1105.
    This paper seeks to widen the dialogue between the “epistemology of peer disagreement” and the epistemology informed by Wittgenstein’s last notebooks, later edited as On Certainty. The paper defends the following theses: not all certainties are groundless; many of them are beliefs; and they do not have a common essence. An epistemic peer need not share all of my certainties. Which response to a disagreement over a certainty is called for, depends on the type of certainty in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  4. Science, Certainty, and Descartes.Gary Hatfield - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:249 - 262.
    During the 1630s Descartes recognized that he could not expect all legitimate claims in natural science to meet the standard of absolute certainty. The realization resulted from a change in his physics, which itself arose not through methodological reflections, but through developments in his substantive metaphysical doctrines. Descartes discovered the metaphysical foundations of his physics in 1629-30; as a consequence, the style of explanation employed in his physical writings changed. His early methodological conceptions, as preserved in the Rules and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  5. New Work For Certainty.Bob Beddor - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (8).
    This paper argues that we should assign certainty a central place in epistemology. While epistemic certainty played an important role in the history of epistemology, recent epistemology has tended to dismiss certainty as an unattainable ideal, focusing its attention on knowledge instead. I argue that this is a mistake. Attending to certainty attributions in the wild suggests that much of our everyday knowledge qualifies, in appropriate contexts, as certain. After developing a semantics for certainty ascriptions, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  6. Certainty and Our Sense of Acquaintance with Experiences.François Kammerer - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.
    Why do we tend to think that phenomenal consciousness poses a hard problem? The answer seems to lie in part in the fact that we have the impression that phenomenal experiences are presented to us in a particularly immediate and revelatory way: we have a sense of acquaintance with our experiences. Recent views have offered resources to explain such persisting impression, by hypothesizing that the very design of our cognitive systems inevitably leads us to hold beliefs about our own experiences (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7.  34
    The Certainties of Delusion.Jakob Ohlhorst - 2021 - In Luca Moretti & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), Non-Evidentialist Epistemology. Leiden: Brill. pp. 211-229.
    Delusions are unhinged hinge certainties. Delusions are defined as strongly anchored beliefs that do not change in the face of adverse evidence. The same goes for Wittgensteinian certainties. My paper refines the so-called framework views of delusion, presenting an argument that epistemically speaking, considering them to be certainties best accounts for delusions’ doxastic profile. Until now there has been little argument in favour of this position and the original proposals made too extreme predictions about the belief systems of delusional patients. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Lying and Certainty.Neri Marsili - 2018 - In Jörg Meibauer (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Oxford University Press. pp. 170-182.
    In the philosophical literature on the definition of lying, the analysis is generally restricted to cases of flat-out belief. This chapter considers the complex phenomenon of lies involving partial beliefs – beliefs ranging from mere uncertainty to absolute certainty. The first section analyses lies uttered while holding a graded belief in the falsity of the assertion, and presents a revised insincerity condition, requiring that the liar believes the assertion to be more likely to be false than true. The second (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  9. What Certainty Teaches.Tomas Bogardus - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):227 - 243.
    Most philosophers, including all materialists I know of, believe that I am a complex thing?a thing with parts?and that my mental life is (or is a result of) the interaction of these parts. These philosophers often believe that I am a body or a brain, and my mental life is (or is a product of) brain activity. In this paper, I develop and defend a novel argument against this view. The argument turns on certainty, that highest epistemic status that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  10. Knowledge and Certainty.Jason Stanley - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):35-57.
    This paper is a companion piece to my earlier paper “Fallibilism and Concessive Knowledge Attributions”. There are two intuitive charges against fallibilism. One is that it countenances the truth (and presumably acceptability) of utterances of sentences such as “I know that Bush is a Republican, though it might be that he is not a Republican”. The second is that it countenances the truth (and presumably acceptability) of utterances of sentences such as “I know that Bush is a Republican, even though (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   76 citations  
  11. The Certainty, Modality, and Grounding of Newton’s Laws.Zvi Biener & Eric Schliesser - 2017 - The Monist 100 (3):311-325.
    Newton began his Principia with three Axiomata sive Leges Motus. We offer an interpretation of Newton’s dual label and investigate two tensions inherent in his account of laws. The first arises from the juxtaposition of Newton’s confidence in the certainty of his laws and his commitment to their variability and contingency. The second arises because Newton ascribes fundamental status both to the laws and to the bodies and forces they govern. We argue the first is resolvable, but the second (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  12. Certainty, Soil and Sediment.Kevin Mulligan - 2006 - In Markus Textor (ed.), The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 1--89.
    Many of the most important questions about primitive certainty have to do with the distinction between primitive certainty as a practical attitude or disposition and primitive certainty as a psychological attitude and with the distinction between these and primitive, objective certainty.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  13. Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief.Martin Smith - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
    This book explores a question central to philosophy--namely, what does it take for a belief to be justified or rational? According to a widespread view, whether one has justification for believing a proposition is determined by how probable that proposition is, given one's evidence. In this book this view is rejected and replaced with another: in order for one to have justification for believing a proposition, one's evidence must normically support it--roughly, one's evidence must make the falsity of that proposition (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   79 citations  
  14. Wittgenstein on Mathematics and Certainties.Martin Kusch - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (2-3):120-142.
    _ Source: _Volume 6, Issue 2-3, pp 120 - 142 This paper aims to contribute to the debate over epistemic versus non-epistemic readings of the ‘hinges’ in Wittgenstein’s _On Certainty_. I follow Marie McGinn’s and Daniele Moyal-Sharrock’s lead in developing an analogy between mathematical sentences and certainties, and using the former as a model for the latter. However, I disagree with McGinn’s and Moyal-Sharrock’s interpretations concerning Wittgenstein’s views of both relata. I argue that mathematical sentences as well as certainties are (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  15. Certainty, Necessity, and Knowledge in Hume's Treatise.Miren Boehm - 2013 - In Stanley Tweyman (ed.), David Hume, A Tercentenary Tribute [the version in PhilPapers is the accurate, final version of the paper].
    Hume appeals to different kinds of certainties and necessities in the Treatise. He contrasts the certainty that arises from intuition and demonstrative reasoning with the certainty that arises from causal reasoning. He denies that the causal maxim is absolutely or metaphysically necessary, but he nonetheless takes the causal maxim and ‘proofs’ to be necessary. The focus of this paper is the certainty and necessity involved in Hume’s concept of knowledge. I defend the view that intuitive certainty, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  16. Certainty and Explanation in Descartes’s Philosophy of Science.Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 7 (2):302-327.
    This paper presents a new approach to resolving an apparent tension in Descartes’ discussion of scientific theories and explanations in the Principles of Philosophy. On the one hand, Descartes repeatedly claims that any theories presented in science must be certain and indubitable. On the other hand, Descartes himself presents an astonishing number of speculative explanations of various scientific phenomena. In response to this tension, commentators have suggested that Descartes changed his mind about scientific theories having to be certain and indubitable, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Certainty and Assertion.Jacques-Henri Vollet - forthcoming - Dialectica.
    It is widely held that assertions are partially governed by an epistemic norm. But what is the epistemic condition set out in the norm? Is it knowledge, truth, belief, or something else? In this paper, I defend a view similar to that of Stanley (2008), according to which the relevant epistemic condition is epistemic certainty, where epistemic certainty (but not knowledge) is context-sensitive. I start by distinguishing epistemic certainty, subjective certainty, and knowledge. Then, I explain why (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. Practical Certainty and Cosmological Conjectures.Nicholas Maxwell - 2005 - In Michael Rahnfeld (ed.), Is there Certain Knowledge? Leipziger Universitätsverlag.
    We ordinarily assume that we have reliable knowledge of our immediate surroundings, so much so that almost all the time we entrust our lives to the truth of what we take ourselves to know, without a moment’s thought. But if, as Karl Popper and others have maintained, all our knowledge is conjectural, then this habitual assumption that our common sense knowledge of our environment is secure and trustworthy would seem to be an illusion. Popper’s philosophy of science, in particular, fails (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  19.  26
    Spatial Certainty : Feeling is the Truth.Ophelia Deroy & Merle Fairhurst - 2019 - In Spatial senses. London: Routleged.
    A common sense view is illustrated by Doubting Thomas, and surfaces in many philosophical and psychological writings : Touching is better than seeing. But can we make sense of this privilege? We rule out that it could mean that touch is more informative than vision, more ‘objective’ or more directly in contact with reality. Instead, we propose that touch offers not a perceptual, but a metacognitive advantage: touch is not more objective than vision but rather provides comparatively higher subjective (...). (shrink)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. Factivity and Epistemic Certainty: A Reply to Sankey.Moti Mizrahi - 2019 - Logos and Episteme 10 (4):443-444.
    This is a reply to Howard Sankey’s comment (“Factivity or Grounds? Comment on Mizrahi”) on my paper, “You Can’t Handle the Truth: Knowledge = Epistemic Certainty,” in which I present an argument from the factivity of knowledge for the conclusion that knowledge is epistemic certainty. While Sankey is right that factivity does not entail epistemic certainty, the factivity of knowledge does entail that knowledge is epistemic certainty.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  21. Cartesian Certainty, Realism and Scientific Inference.Manuel Barrantes - forthcoming - In Jorge Secada & C. Wee (eds.), The Cartesian Mind.
    In the Principles, Descartes explains several observable phenomena showing that they are caused by special arrangements of unobservable microparticles. Despite these microparticles being unobservable, many passages suggest that he was very confident that these explanations were correct. In other passages, however, Descartes points out that these explanations merely hold the status of ‘suppositions’ or ‘conjectures’ that could be wrong. The aim of this chapter is to clarify this apparent conflict. I argue that the possibility of natural explanations being wrong should (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. Reading 'On Certainty' Through the Lens of Cavell: Scepticism, Dogmatism and the 'Groundlessness of Our Believing'.Chantal Bax - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (4):515 - 533.
    While Cavell is well known for his reinterpretation of the later Wittgenstein, he has never really engaged himself with post-Investigations writings like On Certainty. This collection may, however, seem to undermine the profoundly anti-dogmatic reading of Wittgenstein that Cavell has developed. In addition to apparently arguing against what Cavell calls ‘the truth of skepticism’ – a phrase contested by other Wittgensteinians – On Certainty may seem to justify the rejection of whoever dares to question one’s basic presuppositions. According (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  23. Certainty, Laws and Facts in Francis Bacon’s Jurisprudence.Silvia Manzo - 2014 - Intellectual History Review 24 (4):457-478.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and Relativism.Martin Kusch - 2016 - In Harald A. Wiltsche & Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (eds.), Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives. Proceedings of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium. De Gruyter. pp. 29-46.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  25. Showing Certainty: An Essay on Wittgenstein's Response to Scepticism.Anne Newstead - manuscript
    Coping with everyday life limits the extent of one’s scepticism. It is practically impossible to doubt the existence of the things with which one is immediately engaged and interacting. To doubt that, say, a door exists, is to step back from merely using the door (opening it) and to reflect on it in a detached, theoretical way. It is impossible to simultaneously act and live immersed in situation S while doubting that one is in S. Sceptical doubts—such as ‘Is this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26.  13
    Chasing Certainty After Cardiac Arrest: Can a Technological Innovation Solve a Moral Dilemma?Mayli Mertens, Janine van Til, Eline Bouwers-Beens & Marianne Boenink - 2021 - Neuroethics 14 (3):541-559.
    When information on a coma patient’s expected outcome is uncertain, a moral dilemma arises in clinical practice: if life-sustaining treatment is continued, the patient may survive with unacceptably poor neurological prospects, but if withdrawn a patient who could have recovered may die. Continuous electroencephalogram-monitoring is expected to substantially improve neuroprognostication for patients in coma after cardiac arrest. This raises expectations that decisions whether or not to withdraw will become easier. This paper investigates that expectation, exploring cEEG’s impacts when it becomes (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. How to Be Sure: Sensory Exploration and Empirical Certainty.Mohan Matthen - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):38-69.
    I can be wrong about things I seem to perceive; the conditions might lead me to be mistaken about them. Since I can't rule out the possibility that the conditions are misleading, I can't be sure that I am perceiving this thing in my hand correctly. But suppose that I am able to examine it actively—handling it, looking closer, shining a light on it, and so on. Then, my level of uncertainty goes down; in the limit it is eliminated entirely. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  28. A Pragmatist Conception of Certainty: Wittgenstein and Santayana.Guy Andrew Bennett-Hunter - 2012 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 4 (2):146-157.
    The ways in which Wittgenstein was directly influenced by William James (by his early psychological work as well his later philosophy) have been thoroughly explored and charted by Russell B. Goodman. In particular, Goodman has drawn attention to the pragmatist resonances of the Wittgensteinian notion of hinge propositions as developedand articulated in the posthumously edited and published work, On Certainty. This paper attempts to extend Goodman’s observation, moving beyond his focus on James (specifically, James’s Pragmatism) as his pragmatist reference (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. Quintilian's Theory of Certainty and Its Afterlife in Early Modern Italy.Charles McNamara - 2016 - Dissertation, Columbia University
    This dissertation explores how antiquity and some of its early modern admirers understand the notion of certainty, especially as it is theorized in Quintilian's Institutio Oratoria, a first-century educational manual for the aspiring orator that defines certainty in terms of consensus. As part of a larger discussion of argumentative strategies, Quintilian turns to the “nature of all arguments,” which he defines as “reasoning which lends credence to what is doubtful by means of what is certain” (ratio per ea (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. Hermann von Helmholtz's Mechanism: The Loss of Certainty. A Study on the Transition From Classical to Modern Philosophy of Nature.Gregor Schiemann - 2009 - Springer.
    Two seemingly contradictory tendencies have accompanied the development of the natural sciences in the past 150 years. On the one hand, the natural sciences have been instrumental in effecting a thoroughgoing transformation of social structures and have made a permanent impact on the conceptual world of human beings. This historical period has, on the other hand, also brought to light the merely hypothetical validity of scientific knowledge. As late as the middle of the 19th century the truth-pathos in the natural (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  31.  36
    Knowledge, Certainty, and Factivity: A Possible Rapprochement.Jeffrey Hoops - 2020 - Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology 11 (2):237-243.
    In recent discussions in this journal, Moti Mizrahi defends the claim that knowledge equals epistemic certainty. Howard Sankey finds Mizrahi’s argument to be problematic, since, as he reads it, this would entail that justification must guarantee truth. In this article, I suggest that an account of the normativity of justification is able to bridge the gap between Mizrahi’s proposal and Sankey’s objections.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. Al-Ghazali and Descartes From Doubt to Certainty.Mohammad Alwahaib - 2017 - Discusiones Filosóficas 18 (31):15-40.
    This paper clarifies the philosophical connection between Al-Ghazali and Descartes, with the goal to articulate similarities and differences in their famous journeys from doubt to certainty. As such, its primary focus is on the chain of their reasoning, starting from their conceptions of truth and doubt arguments, until their arrival at truth. Both philosophers agreed on the ambiguous character of ordinary everyday knowledge and decided to set forth in undermining its foundations. As such, most scholars tend to agree that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  33. Does rationality demand higher-order certainty?Mattias Skipper - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11561-11585.
    Should you always be certain about what you should believe? In other words, does rationality demand higher-order certainty? First answer: Yes! Higher-order uncertainty can’t be rational, since it breeds at least a mild form of epistemic akrasia. Second answer: No! Higher-order certainty can’t be rational, since it licenses a dogmatic kind of insensitivity to higher-order evidence. Which answer wins out? The first, I argue. Once we get clearer about what higher-order certainty is, a view emerges on which (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  34. Dreaming and Certainty.Jim Stone - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 45 (May):353-368.
    I argue that being wide awake is an epistemic virtue which enables me to recognize immediately that I'm wide awake. Also I argue that dreams are imaginings and that the wide awake mind can immediately discern the difference between imaginings and vivid sense experience. Descartes need only pinch himself.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  35. Does Luck Exclude Knowledge or Certainty?Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2020 - Synthese 197 (6):2387-2397.
    A popular account of luck, with a firm basis in common sense, holds that a necessary condition for an event to be lucky, is that it was suitably improbable. It has recently been proposed that this improbability condition is best understood in epistemic terms. Two different versions of this proposal have been advanced. According to my own proposal :361–377, 2010), whether an event is lucky for some agent depends on whether the agent was in a position to know that the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  36. On Wittgenstein on Certainty.Christian Helmut Wenzel - 2011 - Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society 19:320-322.
    In the preface to On Certainty Anscombe and von Wright say that in 1949 Malcolm suggested to Wittgenstein to think again about Moore’s “Defense of Common Sense” (1925) and “Proof of an External World” (1939). Malcolm himself had written on the issue in “Defending Common Sense” (1949). In the preface to the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein quotes Nestroy saying that there is usually very little progress in philosophy. But I think some progress has been made from Moore and Malcolm to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37.  26
    Non/Living Queerings, Undoing Certainties, and Braiding Vulnerabilities: A Collective Reflection.Marietta Radomska, Mayra Citlalli Rojo Gomez, Margherita Pevere & Terike Haapoja - 2021 - Artnodes 27:1-10.
    The ongoing global pandemic of Covid-19 has exposed SARS-CoV-2 as a potent non-human actant that resists the joint scientific, public health and socio-political efforts to contain and understand both the virus and the illness. Yet, such a narrative appears to conceal more than it reveals. The seeming agentiality of the novel coronavirus is itself but one manifestation of the continuous destruction of biodiversity, climate change, socio-economic inequalities, neocolonialism, overconsumption and the anthropogenic degradation of nature. Furthermore, focusing on the virus – (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38.  52
    How to Assess the Epistemic Wrongness of Sponsorship Bias? The Case of Manufactured Certainty.Jon Leefmann - 2021 - Frontiers In 6 (Article 599909):1-13.
    Although the impact of so-called “sponsorship bias” has been the subject of increased attention in the philosophy of science, what exactly constitutes its epistemic wrongness is still debated. In this paper, I will argue that neither evidential accounts nor social–epistemological accounts can fully account for the epistemic wrongness of sponsorship bias, but there are good reasons to prefer social–epistemological to evidential accounts. I will defend this claim by examining how both accounts deal with a paradigm case from medical epistemology, recently (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39.  8
    Rethinking Cartesian Moral Certainty.Saja Mohammad Parvizian - manuscript
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. You Can’T Handle the Truth: Knowledge = Epistemic Certainty.Moti Mizrahi - 2019 - Logos and Episteme 10 (2):225-227.
    In this discussion note, I put forth an argument from the factivity of knowledge for the conclusion that knowledge is epistemic certainty. If this argument is sound, then epistemologists who think that knowledge is factive are thereby also committed to the view that knowledge is epistemic certainty.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. Getting Geist – Certainty, Rules and Us.Kevin Mulligan - 2001 - In Melika Ouelbani (ed.), Cinquantenaire Ludwig Wittgenstein, Actes du Colloque, Faculté des Sciences Humaines Et Sociales. Université de Tunis, Faculté des Sciences Humaines Et Sociales. pp. 35-62.
    Meaning, for example Sam's meaning that it rains by saying "es regnet", forms of life and the senses of propositions or thoughts are three categories that loom large in Wittgenstein's writings on language and mind. How do they stand to one another, how are they connected? The question was addressed before Wittgenstein by the realist phenomenologists, Scheler, Hartmann and Ortega as well as by the Viennese philosopher and psychologist, Karl Bühler. Like Wittgenstein, these philosophers were quite clear that the category (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. Review of Quitting Certainties by Michael G. Titelbaum. [REVIEW]Martin Smith - 2013 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. Strength of Justification – The Rational Degree of Certainty Approach.Christoph Lumer - 2018 - In Steve Oswald (ed.), Argumentation and Inference. Proceedings of the 2nd European Conference on Argumentation, Fribourg 2017. London, GB: College Publications. pp. 315-333.
    In this paper, I present the fundamental ideas of a new theory of justification strength. This theory is based on the epistemological approach to argumentation. Even the thesis of a valid justification can be false for various reasons. The theory outlined here identifies such possible errors. Justification strength is equated with the degree to which such possible errors are excluded. The natural expression of this kind of justification strength is the (rational) degree of certainty of the belief in the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44.  56
    Probability and Certainty.Jonny Blamey - 2008 - Praxis 1 (1).
    Probability can be used to measure degree of belief in two ways: objectively and subjectively. The objective measure is a measure of the rational degree of belief in a proposition given a set of evidential propositions. The subjective measure is the measure of a particular subject’s dispositions to decide between options. In both measures, certainty is a degree of belief 1. I will show, however, that there can be cases where one belief is stronger than another yet both beliefs (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  45. Certum Atque Confessum: Lorenzo Valla on the Forensics of Certainty.Charles McNamara - 2018 - Rhetorica 36 (3):244-268.
    Im Zentrum von Vallas Umgestaltung der Dialektik als rhetorischer Methode steht ein neues Verständnis von certum, das aus Quintilians Institutio oratoria stammt. Diesem Verständnis zufolge ist Gewissheit in dem begründet, was allgemein akzeptiert wird, nicht in dem, was wahr ist. Damit trennt Valla certum und verum. In den Dialecticae disputationes stellt er Dialektik nicht als eine logische oder philosophische Methode zum Beweis von Wahrheiten dar, sondern als Praxis Geständnisse herbeizuführen und als juristische Produktion konsensueller Gewissheiten. Auch in anderen Werken, etwa (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. Domestic Drone Surveillance: The Court’s Epistemic Challenge and Wittgenstein’s Actional Certainty.Robert Greenleaf Brice & Katrina Sifferd - 2017 - Louisiana Law Review 77:805-831.
    This article examines the domestic use of drones by law enforcement to gather information. Although the use of drones for surveillance will undoubtedly provide law enforcement agencies with new means of gathering intelligence, these unmanned aircrafts bring with them a host of legal and epistemic complications. Part I considers the Fourth Amendment and the different legal standards of proof that might apply to law enforcement drone use. Part II explores philosopher Wittgenstein’s notion of actional certainty as a means to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47.  7
    Rush Rhees, Wittgenstein's On Certainty: There Like Our Life Reviewed By. [REVIEW]Andrew Lugg - 2006 - Philosophy in Review 26 (2):123-125.
    Review of Rush Rhees's Wittgenstein's On Certainty: There Like Our Life.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Wittgenstein on knowledge, certainty and "hinge propositions".Pris Francois-Igor - 2017 - Germany: Lap Lambert.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. Experimental Mathematics in the 1990s: A Second Loss of Certainty?Henrik Kragh Sørensen - 2010 - Oberwolfach Reports (12):601--604.
    In this paper, I describe some aspects of the phenomenon of "experimental mathematics" in order to discuss whether it constitutes a subdiscipline or a particular style of mathematics. My conclusion is that neither of these notions accurately capture the complex culture of experimental mathematics.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50.  26
    God, Human Memory, and the Certainty of Geometry.Marc Champagne - 2016 - Philosophy and Theology 28 (2):299-310.
    Descartes holds that the tell-tale sign of a solid proof is that its entailments appear clearly and distinctly. Yet, since there is a limit to what a subject can consciously fathom at any given moment, a mnemonic shortcoming threatens to render complex geometrical reasoning impossible. Thus, what enables us to recall earlier proofs, according to Descartes, is God’s benevolence: He is too good to pull a deceptive switch on us. Accordingly, Descartes concludes that geometry and belief in God must go (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 339