Results for 'Conscious thought'

947 found
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  1. Aphantasia and Conscious Thought.Preston Lennon - 2023 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Vol. 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    The sensory constraint on conscious thought says that if a thought is phenomenally conscious, its phenomenal properties must be reducible to some sensory phenomenal character. I argue that the burgeoning psychological literature on aphantasia, an impoverishment in the ability to generate mental imagery, provides a counterexample to the sensory constraint. The best explanation of aphantasics’ introspective reports, neuroimaging, and task performance is that some aphantasics have conscious thoughts without sensory mental imagery. This argument against the (...)
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  2. Conscious Thought and the Limits of Restrictivism.Marta Jorba - 2015 - Critica 47 (141):3-32.
    How should we characterize the nature of conscious occurrent thought? In the last few years, a rather unexplored topic has appeared in philosophy of mind: cognitive phenomenology or the phenomenal character of cognitive mental episodes. In this paper I firstly present the motivation for cognitive phenomenology views through phenomenal contrast cases, taken as a challenge for their opponents. Secondly, I explore the stance against cognitive phenomenology views proposed by Restrictivism, classifying it in two strategies, sensory restrictivism and accompanying (...)
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  3. The Linguistic Determination of Conscious Thought Contents.Agustín Vicente & Marta Jorba - 2017 - Noûs (3):737-759.
    In this paper we address the question of what determines the content of our conscious episodes of thinking, considering recent claims that phenomenal character individuates thought contents. We present one prominent way for defenders of phenomenal intentionality to develop that view and then examine ‘sensory inner speech views’, which provide an alternative way of accounting for thought-content determinacy. We argue that such views fare well with inner speech thinking but have problems accounting for unsymbolized thinking. Within this (...)
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  4. Conscious thoughts from reflex-like processes: A new experimental paradigm for consciousness research.Allison K. Allen, Kevin Wilkins, Adam Gazzaley & Ezequiel Morsella - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (4):1318-1331.
    The contents of our conscious mind can seem unpredictable, whimsical, and free from external control. When instructed to attend to a stimulus in a work setting, for example, one might find oneself thinking about household chores. Conscious content thus appears different in nature from reflex action. Under the appropriate conditions, reflexes occur predictably, reliably, and via external control. Despite these intuitions, theorists have proposed that, under certain conditions, conscious content resembles reflexes and arises reliably via external control. (...)
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  5. (1 other version)Unconscious Belief and Conscious Thought.Tim Crane - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. , US: Oxford University Press. pp. 156-173.
    We call our thoughts conscious, and we also say the same of our bodily sensations, perceptions and other sensory experiences. But thoughts and sensory experiences are very different phenomena, both from the point of view of their subject and in their functional or cognitive role. Does this mean, then, that there are very different kinds or varieties of consciousness? Philosophers do often talk about different kinds of consciousness: Christopher Hill, for example, claims that ‘it is customary to distinguish five (...)
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  6. The Sound of Silence: Merleau‐Ponty on Conscious Thought.Philip J. Walsh - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):312-335.
    We take ourselves to have an inner life of thought, and we take ourselves to be capable of linguistically expressing our thoughts to others. But what is the nature of this “inner life” of thought? Is conscious thought necessarily carried out in language? This paper takes up these questions by examining Merleau-Ponty’s theory of expression. For Merleau-Ponty, language expresses thought. Thus it would seem that thought must be independent of, and in some sense prior (...)
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  7. (1 other version)Quantum mechanics and consciousness: Thoughts on a causal correspondence theory.Ian J. Thompson - 2017 - In S. Gosh, B. D. Mundhra, K. Vasudeva Rao & Varun Agarwal (eds.), Quantum Physics & Consciousness - Thoughts of Founding Fathers of Quantum Physics and other Renowned Scholars. Bhaktivedanta Institute. pp. 173-185.
    Which way does causation proceed? The pattern in the material world seems to be upward: particles to molecules to organisms to brains to mental processes. In contrast, the principles of quantum mechanics allow us to see a pattern of downward causation. These new ideas describe sets of multiple levels in which each level influences the levels below it through generation and selection. Top-down causation makes exciting sense of the world: we can find analogies in psychology, in the formation of our (...)
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  8. What the...! The role of inner speech in conscious thought.Fernando Martínez-Manrique & Agustin Vicente - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (9-10):141-67.
    Abstract: Introspection reveals that one is frequently conscious of some form of inner speech, which may appear either in a condensed or expanded form. It has been claimed that this speech reflects the way in which language is involved in conscious thought, fulfilling a number of cognitive functions. We criticize three theories that address this issue: Bermúdez’s view of language as a generator of second-order thoughts, Prinz’s development of Jackendoff’s intermediate-level theory of consciousness, and Carruthers’s theory of (...)
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  9. The centre and periphery of conscious thought.Mark Fortney - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (3-4):112-136.
    This paper is about whether shifts in attention can alter what it is like to think. I begin by taking up the hypothesis that attention structures consciousness into a centre and a periphery, following Watzl's (2014; 2017) understanding of the distinction between the centre and periphery of the field of consciousness. Then I show that introspection leads to divided results about whether attention structures conscious thought into a centre and a periphery -- remarks by Martin (1997) and Phillips (...)
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  10. Flow and the dynamics of conscious thought.Joshua Shepherd - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (4):969-988.
    The flow construct has been influential within positive psychology, sport psychology, the science of consciousness, the philosophy of agency, and popular culture. In spite of its longstanding influence, it remains unclear [a] how the constituents of the flow state ‘hang together’—how they relate to each other causally and functionally—[b] in what sense flow is an ‘optimal experience,’ and [c] how best to describe the unique phenomenology of the flow state. As a result, difficulties persist for a clear understanding of the (...)
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  11. Does consciousness entail subjectivity? The puzzle of thought insertion.Alexandre Billon - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):291 - 314.
    (2013). Does consciousness entail subjectivity? The puzzle of thought insertion. Philosophical Psychology: Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 291-314. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2011.625117.
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  12. Inserted Thoughts and the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2021 - In Pascual Angel Gargiulo & Humbert Mesones-Arroyo (eds.), Psychiatry and Neurosciences Update: Vol 4. Springer. pp. 61-71.
    Various psychopathologies of self-awareness, such as somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion in schizophrenia, might seem to threaten the viability of the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness since it requires a HOT about one’s own mental state to accompany every conscious state. The HOT theory of consciousness says that what makes a mental state a conscious mental state is that there is a HOT to the effect that “I am in mental state M” (Rosenthal 2005, Gennaro 2012). (...)
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  13. Higher-Order Thoughts, Neural Realization, and the Metaphysics of Consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2016 - In Consciousness. New York: Routledge. pp. 83-102.
    The higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness is a reductive representational theory of consciousness which says that what makes a mental state conscious is that there is a suitable HOT directed at that mental state. Although it seems that any neural realization of the theory must be somewhat widely distributed in the brain, it remains unclear just how widely distributed it needs to be. In section I, I provide some background and define some key terms. In section II, (...)
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  14. Consciousness as a topic of investigation in Western thought.Anderson Weekes - 2010 - In Michel Weber & Anderson Weekes (eds.), Process Approaches to Consciousness in Psychology, Neuroscience, and Philosophy of Mind. Albany: State University of New York Press. pp. 73-136.
    Terms for consciousness, used with a cognitive meaning, emerged as count nouns in the 17th century. This transformation repeats an evolution that had taken place in late antiquity, when related vocabulary, used in the sense of conscience, went from being mass nouns designating states to count nouns designating faculties possessed by every individual. The reified concept of consciousness resulted from the rejection of the Scholastic-Aristotelian theory of mind according to which the mind is not a countable thing, but a pure (...)
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  15.  98
    Thoughts on Consciousness.T. Ateş - manuscript
    (1 ∼ 4)The place of consciousness in nature; (5 ∼ 9) hard problem, Multiple Draft Model, Orch OR theory; (10 ∼ 11) space-time field; (12 ∼ 13)methodology; (14 ∼ 17)application of physio-phenomenology; (18) on electroencephalography signals; (19 ∼ 23) mental imagery; (24 ∼ 26) pandemonium process and hallucinations; (27 ∼ 30) awareness and attention; (31) measurement problem; (32 ∼ 33) futureworks; (34) Summary.
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  16. What Is the Role of Consciousness in Demonstrative Thought?Declan Smithies - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (1):5-34.
    Perception enables us to think demonstrative thoughts about the world around us, but what must perception be like in order to play this role? Does perception enable demonstrative thought only if it is conscious? This paper examines three accounts of the role of consciousness in demonstrative thought, which agree that consciousness is essential for demonstrative thought, but disagree about why it is. First, I consider and reject the accounts proposed by Gareth Evans in The Varieties of (...)
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  17. The Paradox of Thought: A Proof of God’s Existence from the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Christopher Morgan - 2017 - Philosophy and Theology 29 (1):169-190.
    This paper uses a paradox inherent in any solution to the Hard Problem of Consciousness to argue for God’s existence. The paper assumes we are “thought machines”, reading the state of a relevant physical medium and then outputting corresponding thoughts. However, the existence of such a thought machine is impossible, since it needs an infinite number of point-representing sensors to map the physical world to conscious thought. This paper shows that these sensors cannot exist, and thus (...)
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  18. Nature, Consciousness, and Metaphysics in Merleau-Ponty’s Early Thought.Dimitris Apostolopoulos - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9:1160-1198.
    La structure du comportement details consciousness-nature relations by navigating between realist and intellectualist alternatives. A phenomenological reading of form guides its attempt to formulate a view that does not reduce consciousness to matter or perceptual structure to a product of mind. I show that this strategy relies on hitherto overlooked idealist commitments. Forms are perceived objects whose intentional structure is intelligibly organized. Having denied that forms are constituted by mind or emergent from matter, Merleau-Ponty likens form-constitution to an ideal process (...)
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  19. On Whether the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness Entails Cognitive Phenomenology, or: What is it Like to Think that One Thinks that P?Richard Brown & Pete Mandik - 2012 - Philosophical Topics 40 (2):1-12.
    Among our conscious states are conscious thoughts. The question at the center of the recent growing literature on cognitive phenomenology is this: In consciously thinking P, is there thereby any phenomenology—is there something it’s like? One way of clarifying the question is to say that it concerns whether there is any proprietary phenomenology associated with conscious thought. Is there any phenomenology due to thinking, as opposed to phenomenology that is due to some co-occurring sensation or mental (...)
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  20. Process thought as a heuristic for investigating consciousness.Anderson Weekes & Michel Weber - 2010 - In Michel Weber & Anderson Weekes (eds.), Process Approaches to Consciousness in Psychology, Neuroscience, and Philosophy of Mind. Albany: State University of New York Press. pp. 37-56.
    The authors argue that the consciousness debate inhabits the same problem space today as it did in the 17th century. They attribute the lack of progress to a mindset still polarized by Descartes’ real distinction between mind and body, resulting in a standoff between humanistic and scientistic approaches. They suggest that consciousness can be adequately studied only by a multiplicity of disciplines so that the paramount problem is how to integrate diverse disciplinary perspectives into a coherent metatheory. Process philosophy is (...)
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  21. The unity of consciousness in Sartre’s early thought: reading The Transcendence of the Ego with The Imaginary.Henry Somers-Hall - 2023 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 31 (6):1212-1233.
    The aim of this paper is to provide an interpretation for Sartre’s account of the unity of consciousness in The Transcendence of the Ego. I will argue that it is only once The Transcendence of the Ego is read alongside other texts written around the same time, such as The Imaginary, that we can understand how Sartre believes it is possible for consciousness to be unified without an I. I begin by setting out the Kantian context that Sartre develops for (...)
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  22. HOTT and Heavy: Higher-Order Thought Theory and the Theory-Heavy Approach to Animal Consciousness.Jacob Berger & Myrto Mylopoulos - 2024 - Synthese 203 (98):1-21.
    According to what Birch (2022) calls the theory-heavy approach to investigating nonhuman-animal consciousness, we select one of the well-developed theories of consciousness currently debated within contemporary cognitive science and investigate whether animals exhibit the neural structures or cognitive abilities posited by that theory as sufficient for consciousness. Birch argues, however, that this approach is in general problematic because it faces what he dubs the dilemma of demandingness—roughly, that we cannot use theories that are based on the human case to assess (...)
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  23. (5 other versions)The Logical Structure of Consciousness (behavior, personality, rationality, higher order thought, intentionality).Michael R. Starks - 2017 - Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization -- Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 3rd Ed 686p(2017).
    After half a century in oblivion, the nature of consciousness is now the hottest topic in the behavioral sciences and philosophy. Beginning with the pioneering work of Ludwig Wittgenstein in the 1930’s (the Blue and Brown Books) and from the 50’s to the present by his logical successor John Searle, I have created the following table as an heuristic for furthering this study. The rows show various aspects or ways of studying and the columns show the involuntary processes and voluntary (...)
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  24. Perceptual consciousness plays no epistemic role.Jacob Berger - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):7-23.
    It is often assumed that perceptual experience provides evidence about the external world. But much perception can occur unconsciously, as in cases of masked priming or blindsight. Does unconscious perception provide evidence as well? Many theorists maintain that it cannot, holding that perceptual experience provides evidence in virtue of its conscious character. Against such views, I challenge here both the necessity and, perhaps more controversially, the sufficiency of consciousness for perception to provide evidence about the external world. In addition (...)
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  25. Consciousness and the Philosophy of Signs: How Peircean Semiotics Combines Phenomenal Qualia and Practical Effects.Marc Champagne - 2018 - Cham: Springer.
    It is often thought that consciousness has a qualitative dimension that cannot be tracked by science. Recently, however, some philosophers have argued that this worry stems not from an elusive feature of the mind, but from the special nature of the concepts used to describe conscious states. Marc Champagne draws on the neglected branch of philosophy of signs or semiotics to develop a new take on this strategy. The term “semiotics” was introduced by John Locke in the modern (...)
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  26. The apparent illusion of conscious deciding.Joshua Shepherd - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):18 - 30.
    Recent work in cognitive science suggests that conscious thought plays a much less central role in the production of human behavior than most think. Partially on the basis of this work, Peter Carruthers has advanced the claim that humans never consciously decide to act. This claim is of independent interest for action theory, and its potential truth poses a problem for theories of free will and autonomy, which often take our capacity to consciously decide to be of central (...)
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  27. Consciousness despite network underconnectivity in autism: Another case of consciousness without prefrontal activity?William Hirstein - 2015 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed consciousness: New essays on psychopathology and theories of consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 249-263.
    Recent evidence points to widespread underconnectivity in autistic brains owing to deviant white matter, the fibers that make long connections between areas of the cortex. Subjects with autism show measurably fewer long-range connections between the parietal and prefrontal cortices. These findings may help shed light on the current debate in the consciousness literature about whether conscious states require both prefrontal and parietal/temporal components. If it can be shown that people with autism have conscious states despite such underconnectivity, this (...)
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  28. Conceptualizing Consciousness.Jacob Berger & Richard Brown - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (5):637-659.
    One of the most promising theories of consciousness currently available is higher-order thought (“HOT”) theory, according to which consciousness consists in having suitable HOTs regarding one’s mental life. But critiques of HOT theory abound. We explore here three recent objections to the theory, which we argue at bottom founder for the same reason. While many theorists today assume that consciousness is a feature of the actually existing mental states in virtue of which one has experiences, this assumption is in (...)
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  29. Consciousness is not a property of states: A reply to Wilberg.Jacob Berger - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):829-842.
    According to Rosenthal's higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, one is in a conscious mental state if and only if one is aware of oneself as being in that state via a suitable HOT. Several critics have argued that the possibility of so-called targetless HOTs—that is, HOTs that represent one as being in a state that does not exist—undermines the theory. Recently, Wilberg (2010) has argued that HOT theory can offer a straightforward account of such cases: since consciousness (...)
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  30. Singular thought and the cartesian theory of mind.Kirk A. Ludwig - 1996 - Noûs 30 (4):434-460.
    (1) Content properties are nonrelational, that is, having a content property does not entail the existence of any contingent object not identical with the thinker or a part of the thinker.2 (2) We have noninferential knowledge of our conscious thoughts, that is, for any of our..
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  31. Animal Consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2018 - Springer: Encyclopedia of Animal Cognition and Behavior.
    This chapter addresses the extent to which nonhuman animals are conscious. Most important perhaps is what criteria should be used in making such a determination.
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  32. Whose Consciousness? Reflexivity and the Problem of Self-Knowledge.Christian Coseru - 2020 - In Mark Siderits, Ching Keng & John Spackman (eds.), Buddhist Philosophy of Consciousness: Tradition and Dialogue. Boston: Brill | Rodopi. pp. 121-153.
    If I am aware that p, say, that it is raining, is it the case that I must be aware that I am aware that p? Does introspective or object-awareness entail the apprehension of mental states as being of some kind or another: self-monitoring or intentional? That is, are cognitive events implicitly self-aware or is “self-awareness” just another term for metacognition? Not surprisingly, intuitions on the matter vary widely. This paper proposes a novel solution to this classical debate by reframing (...)
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  33. Somatoparaphrenia, Anosognosia, and Higher-Order Thoughts.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2015 - In Disturbed Consciousness: New Essays on Psychopathology and Theories of Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 55-74.
    Somatoparaphrenia is a pathology of self characterized by the sense of alienaton from parts of one’s body. It is usually construed as a kind of delusional disorder caused by extensive right hemisphere lesions. Lesions in the temporoparietal junction are common in somatoparaphrenia but deep cortical regions (for example, the posterior insula) and subcortical regions (for example, the basal ganglia) are also sometimes implicated (Valler and Ronschi 2009). Patients are often described as feeling that a limb belongs to another person and (...)
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  34. Fore- and Background in Conscious Non-Demonstrative Inference.Anders Nes - 2019 - In Anders Nes & Timothy Hoo Wai Chan (eds.), Inference and Consciousness. London: Routledge. pp. 199-228.
    It is often supposed one can draw a distinction, among the assumptions on which an inference rests, between certain background assumptions and certain more salient, or foregrounded, assumptions. Yet what may such a fore-v-background structure, or such structures, consist it? In particular, how do they relate to consciousness? According to a ‘Boring View’, such structures can be captured by specifying, for the various assumptions of the inference, whether they are phenomenally conscious, or access conscious, or else how easily (...)
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  35. Consciousness and Society: In Defence of a Phenomenological Approach to Social Reality.Koshy Tharakan - 2006 - In A. V. Afonso (ed.), Consciousness, society, and values. Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study. pp. 129-146.
    With the advent of Postmodernism, the recent discussions in Continental thought has called into question the philosophy of the Subject, particularly the Cartesian “cogito” and the related method of reflection. One of the important ramifications of these questioning of the reflective subject is to do with the phenomenological doctrine of intentionality of consciousness. Recently, David Carr, himself a phenomenologist, has advanced a serious objection to the phenomenological approach to social reality. In what follows, I will be attempting a defence (...)
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  36. Self, belonging, and conscious experience: A critique of subjectivity theories of consciousness.Timothy Lane - 2015 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed consciousness: New essays on psychopathology and theories of consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 103-140.
    Subjectivity theories of consciousness take self-reference, somehow construed, as essential to having conscious experience. These theories differ with respect to how many levels they posit and to whether self-reference is conscious or not. But all treat self-referencing as a process that transpires at the personal level, rather than at the subpersonal level, the level of mechanism. -/- Working with conceptual resources afforded by pre-existing theories of consciousness that take self-reference to be essential, several attempts have been made to (...)
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  37.  41
    Consciousness.Sam Lerman - manuscript
    There are many bodies, neurons, interacting in a brain. For bodies and interactions to produce consciousness might depend on specific matter and matter interactions, such as specifically those of the neural grey matter and voltages of the brain, or abstract representations and information patterns, such as just the neural firing patterns or those that can be simulated on GPUs. My flipbook thought experiment, elaborated on later in this work, reduces the latter possibility to absurdity. We're able to feel complex (...)
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  38. (1 other version)Consciousness Modeled: Reification and Promising Pluralism.Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther - 2011 - Pensamiento 67 (254):617-630.
    Paradoxically, explorers of the territory of consciousness seem to be studying consciousness out of existence, from inside the field of "consciousness studies". How? Through their love of the phenomenon/process, they have developed powerful single models or lenses through which to understand consciousness. But in doing so, they also seek to destroy the other /equally useful/ lenses. Our opportunity lies in halting the vendettas and cross-speakings/cross-fire. The imploration is to stop the dichotomous thinking and pernicious reification of single models, and instead (...)
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  39. Symbolic Conscious Experience.Venkata Rayudu Posina - 2017 - Tattva - Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):1-12.
    Inspired by the eminently successful physical theories and informed by commonplace experiences such as seeing a cat upon looking at a cat, conscious experience is thought of as a measurement or photocopy of given stimulus. Conscious experience, unlike a photocopy, is symbolic—like language—in that the relation between conscious experience and physical stimulus is analogous to that of the word "cat" and its meaning, i.e., arbitrary and yet systematic. We present arguments against the photocopy model and arguments (...)
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  40. Does Consciousness Necessitate Self-Awareness? Consciousness and Self-Awareness in Sartre's "The Transcendence of the Ego".Daniel R. Rodriguez-Navas - 2016 - In Miguens Sofia, Magueys Sofia & Preyer Gerhard (eds.), Pre-reflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. pp. 225-244.
    I offer a close reading of the first part of Sartre's The Transcendence of the Ego, arguing that contrary to widely held interpretation, one of Sartre's main goals in that text is to defend the view that consciousness does not necessitate self-awareness, that not all conscious states need be, ipso facto, states of self-awareness. In addition, I explain that this view about the conceptual relationship between consciousness and self-awareness has important methodological implications. One of the standard strategies for accounting (...)
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  41. Consciousness, adaptation, and epiphenomenalism.Owen J. Flanagan & Thomas W. Polger - 2002 - In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.
    Consciousness and evolution are complex phenomena. It is sometimes thought that if adaptation explanations for some varieties of consciousness, say, conscious visual perception, can be had, then we may be reassured that at least those kinds of consciousness are not epiphenomena. But what if other varieties of consciousness, for example, dreams, are not adaptations? We sort out the connections among evolution, adaptation, and epiphenomenalism in order to show that the consequences for the nature and causal efficacy of consciousness (...)
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  42. Self-consciousness in the Form of Sense Certainty.Bhakti Madhava Puri - 2011 - The Harmonizer.
    The object of study is consciousness. The activity of consciousness is called knowing. The study of a subject may only begin with immediacy, because a beginning implies that there is no prior mediation, i.e. no explicit differences or determinations. Such a beginning is mere being — what immediately is. Being as such is pure generality. Since consciousness is not a physical object that appears before the eyes like a tree, it has to be treated as an object of thought (...)
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  43. Subjective Facts about Consciousness.Martin A. Lipman - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10:530-553.
    The starting point of this paper is the thought that the phenomenal appearances that accompany mental states are somehow only there, or only real, from the standpoint of the subject of those mental states. The world differs across subjects in terms of which appearances obtain. Not only are subjects standpoints across which the world varies, subjects are standpoints that we can ‘adopt’ in our own theorizing about the world (or stand back from). The picture that is suggested by these (...)
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  44. Consciousness and Mental Qualities for Auditory Sensations.Adriana Renero - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (9-10):179-204.
    The contribution of recent theories of sound and audition has been extremely significant for the development of a philosophy of auditory perception; however, none tackle the question of how our consciousness of auditory states arises. My goal is to show how consciousness about our auditory experience gets triggered. I examine a range of auditory mental phenomena to show how we are able to capture qualitative distinctions of auditory sensations. I argue that our consciousness of auditory states consists in having thoughts (...)
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  45. Consciousness, Mind and Spirit.Arran Gare - 2019 - Cosmos and History 15 (2):236-264.
    The explosion of interest in consciousness among scientists in recent decades has led to a revival of interest in the work of Whitehead. This has been associated with the challenge of biophysics to molecular biology in efforts to understand the nature of life. Some claim that it is only through quantum field theory that consciousness will be made intelligible. Most, although not all work in this area, focusses on the brain and how it could give rise to consciousness. In this (...)
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  46. The Universe in Consciousness.Bernardo Kastrup - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (5-6):125-155.
    I propose an idealist ontology that makes sense of reality in a more parsimonious and empirically rigorous manner than mainstream physicalism, bottom-up panpsychism, and cosmopsychism. The proposed ontology also offers more explanatory power than these three alternatives, in that it does not fall prey to the hard problem of consciousness, the combination problem, or the decombination problem, respectively. It can be summarized as follows: there is only cosmic consciousness. We, as well as all other living organisms, are but dissociated alters (...)
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  47. Psychedelics, Meditation, and Self-Consciousness.Raphaël Millière, Robin L. Carhart-Harris, Leor Roseman, Fynn-Mathis Trautwein & Aviva Berkovich-Ohana - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9:375105.
    In recent years, the scientific study of meditation and psychedelic drugs has seen remarkable developments. The increased focus on meditation in cognitive neuroscience has led to a cross-cultural classification of standard meditation styles validated by functional and structural neuroanatomical data. Meanwhile, the renaissance of psychedelic research has shed light on the neurophysiology of altered states of consciousness induced by classical psychedelics, such as psilocybin and LSD, whose effects are mainly mediated by agonism of serotonin receptors. Few attempts have been made (...)
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  48. Conscious cognitive effort in cognitive control.Joshua Shepherd - forthcoming - WIREs Cognitive Science.
    Cognitive effort is thought to be familiar in everyday life, ubiquitous across multiple variations of task and circumstance, and integral to cost/benefit computations that are themselves central to the proper functioning of cognitive control. In particular, cognitive effort is thought to be closely related to the assessment of cognitive control’s costs. I argue here that the construct of cognitive effort, as it is deployed in cognitive psychology and neuroscience, is problematically unclear. The result is that talk of cognitive (...)
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  49. Quantum Theories of Consciousness.Paavo Pylkkänen - 2018 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Consciousness. New York: Routledge. pp. 216-231.
    This paper provides a brief introduction to quantum theory and the proceeds to discuss the different ways in which the relationship between quantum theory and mind/consciousness is seen in some of the main alternative interpretations of quantum theory namely by Bohr; von Neumann; Penrose: Everett; and Bohm and Hiley. It briefly considers how qualia might be explained in a quantum framework, and makes a connection to research on quantum biology, quantum cognition and quantum computation. The paper notes that it is (...)
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  50. Higher Order Thought and the Problem of Radical Confabulation.Timothy Lane & Caleb Liang - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):69-98.
    Currently, one of the most influential theories of consciousness is Rosenthal's version of higher-order-thought (HOT). We argue that the HOT theory allows for two distinct interpretations: a one-component and a two-component view. We further argue that the two-component view is more consistent with his effort to promote HOT as an explanatory theory suitable for application to the empirical sciences. Unfortunately, the two-component view seems incapable of handling a group of counterexamples that we refer to as cases of radical confabulation. (...)
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