In this paper, we assess the possibility of a critical knowledge of technology. In the case of facial recognition systems, 'FRS', we argue that behaviorism underlies this technology, and analyze the debate about behaviorism to show the lack of consensus about its theoretical foundations. In particular we analyze the structure of knowledge generated by FRS as affected by a technological behaviorism. Our last point is a suggestion to use the concept of dasiacritical knowledgepsila, which we borrow from (...) Ladriere, to question and challenge the technological finalities and the foundational scientific theory underlying FRS. (shrink)

This book aims at six important conceptual tools developed by philosophers. The author develops each particular view in a chapter, hoping to constitute at the end a concise, interesting and easily readable whole. These concepts are: 1. Ethics and realism: elucidation of the distinction between understanding and explanation – the lighthouse type of normativity. 2. Leadership, antirealism and moral psychology – the lightning rod type of normativity. 3. Bright light on self-identity and positive reciprocity – the reciprocity type of normativity. (...) 4. The virtue of generosity and its importance for inclusive education – the divine will type of normativity. 5. Ethical education as normative philosophical perspective. The normativity of self-transformation in education. 6. Aesthetics as expression of human freedom and concern for the whole world in which we live. (shrink)

While many scholars join in the call for an experiential shift in thinking and living, it is not always clear how it could be done. Recent environmental philosophy has illuminated the significance of re-animating human–environment relations on an experiential level for endeavouring a new (or renewed) ethical, experiential, and, indeed, existential stance of the human as part of the environed embodiment. In relation to this call, I explore embodied critical thinking (ECT) as a tool for recognising, revitalising, and reflecting (...) embodied, enactive, and embedded thinking that comes from a felt sense. Thus, this chapter employs some of the TAE (Thinking at the Edge) steps for ECT research as a practical approach to facilitating and embracing a new way of thinking that is crucial for reconnecting humans with their lived environments, but also for emancipating research practices to enable research that goes out from such a renewed connectivity. In particular, the chapter traces the application of Eugene Gendlin’s move of instancing to showcase the use of embodied knowing and felt sense in environmental contexts. Thus, it showcases how, in fundamental ways that speak directly to and from our embodied embeddedness, ECT has an emancipatory impact in ways that resonate with lived experiences. (shrink)

What are philosophers doing when they prescribe a particular epistemology for science? According to science and technology studies, the answer to this question implicates both knowledge and politics, even when the latter is hidden. Exploring this dynamic via a specific case, I argue that Longino’s “critical contextual empiricism” ultimately relies on a form of political liberalism. Her choice to nevertheless foreground epistemological concerns can be clarified by considering historical relationships between science and society, as well as the culture (...) of academic philosophy. This example, I conclude, challenges philosophers of science to consider the political ideals and accountability entailed by their prescribed knowledge practices. (shrink)

Through his phenomenological approach, Husserl criticized the situation of science and called it a crisis. He aimed to suggest a way out of this crisis by presenting a philosophical program. However, restoring philosophy to its ancient unifying situation, saving science from this crisis, and giving it a human face, requires, according to critical rationalism, to consider the objectivity and rationality of science. Ignoring these considerations puts science on an incorrect and inconvenient path. These considerations require a revision of Husserl’s (...) essentialism and justificationsim, and placing truth as the aim of science. (shrink)

In this dissertation I discuss the epistemology of ethical intuitionism, in particular the claim that mature moral agents possess self-evident moral knowledge. Traditional intuitionists such as W.D. Ross have claimed that by reflection, we can acquire knowledge of our basic moral duties such as the duty of veracity or benevolence. Recent defenders of intuitionism such as Robert Audi have further developed this theory and argued that adequate understanding can be sufficient for moral knowledge. I criticize this view (...) and argue that such accounts fail to make a convincing case for a foundationalist moral epistemology. Instead, I propose to separate the question of how we acquire moral knowledge from an account that justifies moral beliefs. In response to the first issue, I draw an analogy between our moral intuitions and chosmkian linguistics; in both areas, I argue, human beings possess a universal, unconscious and (partly) inaccessible system of rules that explains how we come to learn language and to make moral judgments. In regards to the justificatory issue, I address recent evolutionary debunking arguments designed to undermine the claim that our moral judgments track stance-independent truths. I try to show that this conclusion only follows under the assumption of an instrumentalist interpretation of moral reasoning which the intuitionist is not forced to accept. (shrink)

From the Scientific Revolution to the present era, the natural sciences have developed remarkably and recorded colossal success in different areas such as genetic engineering, cloning, hybrid technology, health and food technologies, space travel, audio-visual technology, among others. These evidences are indications of the growth of scientific knowledge. Accordingly, this paper raises the question of what is responsible for the growth of scientific knowledge. Inherent in this question is the pool of diverse conceptions of what the nature and (...) method of science is. Consequently, some significant contours in the construct of the problem of demarcation will be imported into this discourse as a means of assembling some pivotal conceptions of the growth of scientific knowledge. With this, the paper aims to consider Karl Popper’s fundamental conception of the growth of scientific knowledge and its associated criticisms, and from it, attempt to respond to the question of what is responsible for the growth of scientific knowledge. This will help to eliminate the confusion and complications surrounding the growth of scientific knowledge. (shrink)

Cattle farming is a traditional agricultural system that contributes to the rural economic, social, and cultural values of the communities. Cattle as common with other livestock, are affected by many diseases that cause mortality and economic losses. In many rural households, the use of plants and associated knowledge are popular for managing cattle diseases, especially in areas experiencing challenges with conventional veterinary medicine. Evidence on the documentation of indigenous knowledge and biological evaluation of plants used against cattle diseases (...) remain understudied and fragmented. The aim of the review is to collate and analyze the ethnoveterinary knowledge and biological evaluation of plants used against cattle diseases in South Africa. Different scientific databases were systematically explored to extract data from 37 eligible studies. A total of 310 medicinal plants from 81 families were used to treat 10 categories of cattle diseases across seven (7) provinces in South Africa. Leguminosae (Fabaceae), Compositae (Asteraceae), Asparagaceae, and Xanthorrhoeaceae were the most frequently used plant families. Common plant parts used were leaves and roots. Twenty-seven (27) combination remedies involving 2–6 plants were identified as treatment regimes against cattle diseases. Common preparation methods were infusion and decoction while the administration mode was predominantly unspecified (52%) while oral and topical contributed 26 and 22%, respectively. In terms of diseases, the most treated ones were general systems infection, reproduction disorders, and gastrointestinal problems. Currently, an estimated 21% of the 310 plants have been evaluated for diverse biological activities using relevant bioassays related to cattle diseases. Antibacterial activity remained the most studied biological activity. Evidence from the review revealed the significance of ethnoveterinary medicine against cattle diseases especially in rural areas of South Africa. Nevertheless, the use of plants for cattle diseases among other ethnic groups, particularly in the Northern Cape and Western Cape, remains understudied. (shrink)

Research on the capacity to understand others' minds has tended to focus on representations ofbeliefs,which are widely taken to be among the most central and basic theory of mind representations. Representations ofknowledge, by contrast, have received comparatively little attention and have often been understood as depending on prior representations of belief. After all, how could one represent someone as knowing something if one does not even represent them as believing it? Drawing on a wide range of methods across cognitive science, (...) we ask whether belief or knowledge is the more basic kind of representation. The evidence indicates that nonhuman primates attribute knowledge but not belief, that knowledge representations arise earlier in human development than belief representations, that the capacity to represent knowledge may remain intact in patient populations even when belief representation is disrupted, that knowledge (but not belief) attributions are likely automatic, and that explicit knowledge attributions are made more quickly than equivalent belief attributions. Critically, the theory of mind representations uncovered by these various methods exhibits a set of signature features clearly indicative of knowledge: they are not modality-specific, they are factive, they are not just true belief, and they allow for representations of egocentric ignorance. We argue that these signature features elucidate the primary function of knowledge representation: facilitating learning from others about the external world. This suggests a new way of understanding theory of mind – one that is focused on understanding others' minds in relation to the actual world, rather than independent from it. (shrink)

This paper contains a critical examination of the prospects for analyses of knowledge that weaken the factivity condition such that knowledge implies approximate truth.

The point of departure of this paper is the striking similarities between the dispositions critical media literacy education aims to cultivate and the characteristics conspiracy theorists claim to embody. The golden question of critical literacy, “who benefits?” is in fact the central question of conspiracy theorists: “cui bono?” While critical media literacy educators teach learners to disrupt the common sense, to interrogate multiple viewpoints, to focus on sociopolitical issues, and to take actions and promote social justice, conspiracy (...) theorists claim that they do exactly those things. What I wish to illuminate through this juxtaposition, however, is not a way to clearly demarcate “critical” from “conspiratorial” theorizing, but is a question of educational desirability of skepticism. Skepticism in this paper is not understood as a classical epistemological question of the possibility of knowledge attainment, but as a form of vigilance toward epistemic authorities like the government, media, and academic institutions. Drawing on philosophy of conspiracy theories and political epistemology, I illuminate the problem of radical skepticism that characterizes some conspiracy theories and discuss the pivotal epistemic role of trust. Through this, I claim that critical media literacy education for democratic citizenship must strike a balance between cultivation of skepticism and building of trust toward epistemic authorities. (shrink)

The following thesis discusses a range of central aspects in Timothy Williamson’s so-called «knowledge-first» epistemology. In particular, it adresses whether this kind of epistemological framework is apt to answer the challenges of scepticism.

The contribution of the data paper publishing paradigm to the knowledge generation and validation processes is becoming substantial and pivotal. In this paper, through the information-processing perspective of Mindsponge Theory, we discuss how the data article publishing system serves as a filtering mechanism for quality control of the increasingly chaotic datasphere. The overemphasis on machine-actionality and technical standards presents some shortcomings and limitations of the data article publishing system, such as the lack of consideration of humanistic values, radical race (...) for big data, and inadequate use of expertise in data evaluation. Without addressing the shortcomings and limitations, the reusability of data will be hindered, and scientific investment to facilitate data sharing will be wasted. Thus, we suggest that the current data paper publishing paradigm needs to be updated with a new philosophy of data. (shrink)

Recent work has shown that knowledge attributions affect how people think others should behave, more so than belief attributions do. This paper reports two experiments providing evidence that knowledge attributions also affect behavioral predictions more strongly than belief attributions do, and knowledge attributions facilitate faster behavioral predictions than belief attributions do. Thus, knowledge attributions play multiple critical roles in social cognition, guiding judgments about how people should and will behave.

The question of origins continues to captivate human thought and sentiment, despite the postmodern insistence that knowledge of origins is impossible since it must lie beyond the boundaries of the origin of knowledge. Knowledge cannot seek causes that precede its own existence, it is said. Still, theoretical narratives continue to arise accounting for such things as the origin of the universe, of our star and solar system, of Earth, of life on the planet, of the human species, (...) of self-aware human cultures, and so on down into the origins of the local and particular. This should not be surprising; we sense that knowing our origins will tell us who we are. With this in mind, this particular originary analysis of the origin of language will critically compare some of the foundational tenets of generative anthropology with the objective findings of palaeoanthropology and linguistics. Furthermore, an originary proposal of my own will be tendered. (shrink)

I begin by criticizing reductionist knowledge-first epistemology according to which knowledge can be used to reductively analyze other epistemic phenomena. My central concern is that proponents of such an approach commit a similar mistake to the one that they charge their opponents with. This is the mistake of seeking to reductively analyze basic epistemic phenomena in terms of other allegedly more fundamental phenomena. I then turn to non-reductionist brands of knowledge-first epistemology. Specifically, I consider the knowledge (...) norms of assertion and contrast them with an alternative that I have developed elsewhere (Gerken 2011, 2012a, 2013b, 2014, 2015a, 2015c, MS). On the basis of the critical discussion, I question whether a knowledge-first program that is both plausible and distinctive has been identified. On a more positive note, I sketch the contours of an alternative that I label ‘equilibristic epistemology.’ According to this approach, there isn’t a single epistemic phenomenon or concept that is “first.” Rather, there are a number of basic epistemic phenomena that are not reductively analyzable although they may be co-elucidated in a non-reductive manner. This approach preserves some grains of truth in knowledge-first epistemology. For example, it preserves the idea that knowledge can be taken to be explanatorily basic and unanalyzable. However, since no single epistemic phenomenon is first, knowledge is not first. (shrink)

A defense of the idea that knowledge is first in the sense that there is nothing prior to knowledge that puts reasons or evidence in your possession. Includes a critical discussion of the idea that perception or perceptual experience might provide reasons and a defense of a knowledge-first approach to justified belief.

The article deals with the philosophical problem of the objectivity of knowledge in relation to the ideas and postulates advanced by feminist critics from the 1960s on. To this end, I take the historical perspective into account and present successively selected threads of feminist criticism of the traditional theory of knowledge, followed by selected positive aspects of feminist epistemology. First of all, I discuss feminist criticism of the androcentric research model, which is based on the doctrine of the (...) disembodied, detached objectivity of the subject and object of research as well as of knowledge itself. Next, I present selected feminist approaches to knowledge which constitute cognitively valuable proposals for the transformation of the traditional theory of knowledge through the application in philosophical reflection and research of the feminist research perspective. (shrink)

In this article I critically discuss Professor Oladele Abiodun Balogun’s reflections on the proper final ends of doing philosophy and related sorts of abstract, speculative, or theoretical inquiry. Professor Balogun appears to argue that one should undertake philosophical studies only insofar as they are likely to make a practical difference to people’s lives, particularly by contributing to politico-economic development, or, in other words, that one should eschew seeking knowledge for its own sake. However, there is one line of thought (...) from Professor Balogun, about philosophy being able to make life meaningful, that I argue ultimately––perhaps contrary to his intentions––entails that it can be appropriate to some degree to pursue philosophy that is unlikely to ameliorate poverty and similar social ills. My central aims in this article are to identify Professor Balogun’s strongest argument against pursuing any knowledge for its own sake and to argue that an appeal to meaningfulness constitutes a strong, competing reason to seek out some of it. (shrink)

A growing number of authors defend putative examples of knowledge from falsehood (KFF), inferential knowledge based in a critical or essential way on false premises, and they argue that KFF has important implications for many areas of epistemology (whether evidence can be false, the Gettier debate, defeasibility theories of knowledge, etc.). I argue, however, that there is no KFF, because in any supposed example either the falsehood does not contribute to the knowledge or the subject (...) lacks knowledge. In particular, I show that if the subject actually has knowledge in putative KFF cases, then there is always a veridical evidential path meeting the basing conditions that accounts for her knowledge; if there is no such path, then the subject is in a type of Gettier case. All the recent arguments that rely on KFF are therefore based on a mistake. (shrink)

If knowledge requires safety, then one might think that when the epistemic source of knowledge is testimony, that testimony must itself be safe. Otherwise, will not the lack of safety transfer from testimony to hearer, such that hearer will lack knowledge? Resisting this natural line of reasoning, Goldberg (2005; 2007) argues that testimonial knowledge through unsafe testimony is possible on the basis of two cases. Lackey (2008) and Pelling (2013) criticize Goldberg’s examples. But Pelling goes on (...) to provide his own example that attempts to show that Goldberg’s thesis is true: one can gain safe testimonial belief from unsafe testimony. If any of these counterexamples were correct, they would undermine the main reason to think that knowledge based on unsafe testimony is impossible. My aim in this paper is to critically assess these arguments, and to consider the possibility of knowledge through unsafe testimony. Drawing a general moral from the analysis of these cases, I shall contend that it is impossible to acquire safe belief solely on the basis of unsafe testimony. If so, then testimonial knowledge based solely on unsafe testimony is impossible. (shrink)

How should we understand knowledge-how – knowledge how to do something? And how is it related to knowledge-that – knowledge that something is the case? In this paper, I will discuss a very important and influential aspect of this question, namely the claim – dubbed ‘Intellectualism’ by Gilbert Ryle – that knowledge-how can be reduced to knowledge-that. Recently, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson have tried to establish Intellectualism with the aid of linguistic considerations. This (...) project – Linguistic Intellectualism – will be criticized on three levels. First, I will reconstruct and object to Stanley and Williamson’s positive argument in favour of Intellectualism. Second, I will assess their view of the relationship between knowledge-how and practical ability and argue that their stance is not well-motivated. Third, I will discuss their criticism of Ryle’s objection against Intellectualism. After distinguishing between different versions of Ryle’s argument, I will show that its strongest version is both immune to the objection by Stanley and Williamson and a decisive argument against their own theory. Given that Intellectualism fails for these three reasons, I finally draw on a broader reading of Ryle in order to develop the beginnings of a positive account of knowledge-how and its relationship to knowledge-that. (shrink)

You omega know p when you possess every iteration of knowledge of p. This book argues that omega knowledge plays a central role in philosophy. In particular, the book argues that omega knowledge is necessary for permissible assertion, action, inquiry, and belief. Although omega knowledge plays this important role, existing theories of omega knowledge are unsatisfying. One theory, KK, identifies knowledge with omega knowledge. This theory struggles to accommodate cases of inexact knowledge. (...) The other main theory is skeptical, claiming that we do not omega know any ordinary claims about the world. This book develops and critically compares three new theories of omega knowledge. (shrink)

This paper takes a critical look at the idea that knowledge involves reflective access to reasons that provide rational support. After distinguishing between different kinds of awareness, I argue that the kind of awareness involved in awareness of reasons is awareness of something general rather than awareness of something that instances some generality. Such awareness involves the exercise of conceptual capacities and just is knowledge. Since such awareness is knowledge, this kind of awareness cannot play any (...) interesting role in a story about how knowledge is acquired. After arguing that reflective access to reasons is not a precondition on acquiring knowledge, I look at one motivation for introducing this kind of access requirement. I argue that the argument for the access requirement rests on a mistaken assumption about the relationship between reasons and responsibility. While the target of this critical discussion is a version of epistemological disjunctivism, the criticism applies mutatis mutandis to many traditional internalist views in epistemology. (shrink)

This paper studies the conflict between critical rationalism and critical theory in Karl Popper and Theodor Adorno’s 1961 debate by analyzing their shared rejection of Karl Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge. Despite the divergences in their respective projects of critical social research, Popper and Adorno agree that Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge is uncritical. By investigating their respective assessments of this research program I reveal a deeper similarity between critical rationalism and critical theory. Though both (...) agree on the importance of critique, they are less concerned with the development of critical consciousness as a focus of this project. In this way, Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge, particularly in its formative stages, revolves around a set of problems relatively inaccessible to critical rationalism and critical theory, since it is centrally concerned with identifying and cultivating the possibility of critique in society. In closing, I gesture to the importance of political education in Mannheim’s early work, suggesting that a return to these experimental texts will yield resources for political thought today. (shrink)

Intuitively, the knowledge of one’s own intentional actions is different from the knowledge of actions of other sorts, including those of other people and unintentional actions of one's own. But how are we to understand this phenomenon? Does it pertain to all actions, under every description under which they are known? If so, then how is this possible? If not, then how should we think about cases that are exceptions to this principle? This paper is a critical (...) survey of recent attempts to answer these questions. I consider views under three headings: "special source" views, which hold that the knowledge of one's intentional actions has a non-perceptual source; "special domain" views, which hold that some but not all aspects of one's intentional actions are known in a special way; and "special character" views, which hold that the knowledge of intentional actions is special not because of where it comes from, but because of some other respect in which it is different in kind from the knowledge of other things. (shrink)

Critical realism is a frequently mentioned, but not very well-known, late nineteenth-/early twentieth-century philosophical tradition. Having its roots in Kantian epistemology, critical realism is best characterized as a revisionist approach toward the original Kantian doctrine. Its most outstanding thesis is the idea that Kantian things-in-themselves are knowable. This idea was—at least implicitly—suggested by thinkers such as Alois Riehl, Wilhelm Wundt, and Oswald Külpe. Interestingly enough, the philosophical position of the early Moritz Schlick stands in the critical realist (...) tradition as well. As will be outlined in the course of this paper, both Schlick’s magnum opus General Theory of Knowledge (1918) and his seminal Space and Time in Contemporary Physics (1917) are based on the assumption that the objects of science are relations and that relations have the status of Kantian things-in-themselves. By way of conclusion, I shall point out that this— more or less directly—leads to the current debate over ‘structural’ realism. (shrink)

Despite Radford’s (1966) case of the unconfident examinee, many epistemologists think that knowledge entails belief. Epistemologists have levelled two sorts of criticisms: first, they point out that Radford’s case isn’t a clear case of knowledge; second, they object that even if knowledge is granted in Radford-like cases, agents therein will still have dispositional belief. This paper offers a case that improves upon Radford’s. In my case, the agent’s evidence is intuitively sufficient for knowledge. And we do (...) not need to posit dispositional belief to make the case empirically plausible. My counterexample involves a distinctive type of agent: cautious believers. Cautious believers care more about avoiding false belief. When armed with evidence that is sufficient - though only barely sufficient - to justify some proposition p, cautious believers suspend judgment about p. Nevertheless, they remain minimally behaviourally sensitive to the evidence. Ultimately, I argue that such agents are in a mental state that falls short of belief. (shrink)

This paper addresses specific concerns that emerge as a consequence to the current educational reforms in the Philippines. These concerns are philosophical and pedagogical. The philosophical concern underscores the importance to situate philosophical thought within concrete historical conditions. In this way, philosophy does not only become a pure abstract enterprise, but an intellectual struggle at the service of historical novelties. I propose a philosophical paradigm that values collective practice at the service of truth. As new situations demand new interpretations and (...) contextualization, I shall also employ a philosophical discourse and practice not only contemporary to, but also one of the bests of our times: the philosophy of Alain Badiou. The pedagogical concern elucidates the political nature of education, which is what Critical Pedagogy argues essentially. This paradigm puts importance above all on the role critical knowledge and collective practice plays in the educational and socio-political arena. The critical pedagogy which I propose is not far from the emancipation politics also embedded in Badiouian Philosophy. Hence, there is a connection between the kind of philosophy I propose and the pedagogical paradigm I present as an alternative. From the philosophical and pedagogical arguments presented, I shall argue for the need to rescue education from the influence of neoliberalism. The resistance necessitates the movement of the collective through the agency of the teacher-militant. (shrink)

Analytic theories of knowledge have traditionally maintained that the provenance of a true belief is critically important to deciding whether it is knowledge. However, a comparably widespread view is that it is our beliefs alone, regardless of their (potentially dubious) provenance which feature in psychological explanation, including the explanation of action: thus, that knowledge itself and as such is irrelevant in psychological explanation. The paper gives initial reasons why the ‘beliefs alone’ view of explanation should be resisted—arguments (...) deriving ultimately from the Meno indicate that the provenance of a true belief may be relevant to the explanation of action. However, closer scrutiny of these arguments shows that they are incapable of according provenance anything like as central a role in action explanation as provenance has traditionally been given in the theory of knowledge. A consideration of the history of science suggests anyway that all knowledge has a compromised provenance if one looks back any significant distance. It is concluded that the importance of the provenance of our beliefs is something that has been seriously over-emphasised in epistemology. (shrink)

This paper critically evaluates the classification of research-related fraudulent activities, with an emphasis on the specific misconduct falsification. The analysis begins by interrogating the assumption that all acts of fraud in research are intentional, suggesting that some instances may inadvertently arise during the course of scholarly activities. Misconducts like fabrication and falsification are categorized as fraudulent primarily due to their generation during research activities and their direct contribution to the distortion of scientific knowledge. Plagiarism, while deceptive, does not necessarily (...) originate from the research process nor lead directly to such distortion, and therefore is not classified as de facto fraud. The paper proposes that the definition of falsification – as established by the PHS – requires refinement to prevent wrongful allegations and convictions, enhance transparency, and offer clearer guidelines. This nuanced understanding is vital for safeguarding the credibility of the research process and protecting scientists from unfounded career-damaging accusations. Ultimately, this paper advocates for a clearer definition of falsification to protect the integrity of scientific research and prevent the miscarriage of justice. (shrink)

Within critical realist circles, the development of knowledge in the natural and social domains has thus far been much stronger by comparison with its respective development within the personal domain. What I want to explore here is how knowledge can be positively used to have emancipatory effects at the level of the individual. The way in which we are able to achieve this is by coming to have what Spinoza calls more adequate ideas of ourselves, other beings, (...) and our place in nature through strengthening the explanatory power and minimizing the fallibility of the knowledge we use in our judgements and progressive articulations of personal situations by making use of explanatory critique and cause-object matching techniques. This article explains what an explanatory critique actually is and does before turning to explain why it interests us in relation to Spinoza’s thought and then how it is specifically useful in connection with emotional revision and control. (shrink)

Critical thinking involves deliberate application of tests and standards to beliefs per se and to methods used to arrive at beliefs. Pedagogical license is authorization accorded to teachers permitting them to use otherwise illicit means in order to achieve pedagogical goals. Pedagogical license is thus analogous to poetic license or, more generally, to artistic license. Pedagogical license will be found to be pervasive in college teaching. This presentation suggests that critical thinking courses emphasize two topics: first, the nature (...) and usefulness of critical thinking; second, the nature and pervasiveness of pedagogical license. Awareness of pedagogical license alerts the student to the need for critical thinking. Indoctrination is done to students; education is done by students. (shrink)

In the ever-changing landscape of education, the integration of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) has emerged as a transformative force, reshaping traditional teaching methods and enhancing learning experiences. This study delves into the complexities of ICT adoption in Nigerian higher education, focusing on post-secondary technical education programs or National Diploma and Higher National Diploma (ND/HND) awarding institutions. The significance of this study lies in addressing challenges faced by developing nations like Nigeria, where harnessing ICT-driven education could resolve pressing issues in (...) the educational sector. The study identifies multifaceted challenges hindering ICT adoption, such as inadequate funding, lack of infrastructure, and resistance from faculty members. It emphasizes the pivotal role of knowledge sharing in higher education, underlining its significance in fostering continuous learning, collaboration, critical thinking, and innovation. Integrating ICT tools, supported by a robust digital infrastructure and tailored training programs, can mitigate these challenges. The study explores prominent knowledge-sharing models and theories, comprehensively understanding knowledge dissemination within post-secondary technical institutions. It emphasizes collaborative learning environments, ICT integration, and supportive policies as critical factors in enhancing knowledge exchange. The findings underscore the urgent need for policies that empower, technologies that enable, and mindsets that inspire. By addressing these challenges comprehensively, policymakers, educators, and stakeholders can create an educational landscape where every student and educator can thrive in the digital age. The insights from this research guide the evolution of post-secondary technical institutions in Nigeria and offer universal principles for educational institutions worldwide. The vision of a future with equal access to quality education for all is attainable through collaborative efforts and a commitment to embracing the potential of technology in higher education. (shrink)

This article critically examines numerous attempts to build a knowledge-first ethics of belief. These theories specify a number of potential "knowledge norms for belief".

In this paper I argue for a kind of intellectual inquiry which has, as its basic aim, to help all of us to resolve rationally the most important problems that we encounter in our lives, problems that arise as we seek to discover and achieve that which is of value in life. Rational problem-solving involves articulating our problems, proposing and criticizing possible solutions. It also involves breaking problems up into subordinate problems, creating a tradition of specialized problem-solving - specialized scientific, (...) academic inquiry, in other words. It is vital, however, that specialized academic problem-solving be subordinated to discussion of our more fundamental problems of living. At present specialized academic inquiry is dissociated from problems of living - the sin of specialism, which I criticize. (shrink)

According to G.E.M. Anscombe, an agent’s knowledge of his own intentional actions differs from his knowledge of his unintended behaviors as well as the knowledge others can have of what he intentionally does, in being secured “without observation”. I begin by posing a problem for any conception of this theory according to which non-observational knowledge must be independent of sense-perception, and criticize several recent attempts to get around the problem. Having done this, I develop an alternative (...) account of non-observational knowledge according to which its special character consists in the particular causal role of an agent’s self-awareness in bringing his intentional actions about. (shrink)

This article intends to show that the defense of “understanding” as one of the major goals of science education can be grounded on an anti-reductionist perspective on testimony as a source of knowledge. To do so, we critically revisit the discussion between Harvey Siegel and Alvin Goldman about the goals of science education, especially where it involves arguments based on the epistemology of testimony. Subsequently, we come back to a discussion between Charbel N. El-Hani and Eduardo Mortimer, on the (...) one hand, and Michael Hoffmann, on the other, striving to strengthen the claim that rather than students’ belief change, understanding should have epistemic priority as a goal of science education. Based on these two lines of discussion, we conclude that the reliance on testimony as a source of knowledge is necessary to the development of a more large and comprehensive scientific understanding by science students. (shrink)

This monograph contains the author’s initial reflections on "critical ontology." Conceived primarily as a method of doing philosophy in general and ontology in particular, critical ontology approves of the Kantian critique of knowledge, without, however, endorsing its agnosticism of metaphysics.

Epistemologists have become increasingly interested in the practical role of knowledge. One prominent principle, which I call PREMISE, states that if you know that p, then you are justified in using p as a premise in your reasoning. In response, a number of critics have proposed a variety of counter-examples. In order to evaluate these problem cases, we need to consider the broader context in which this principle is situated by specifying in greater detail the types of activity that (...) the principle governs. I argue that if PREMISE is interpreted as governing deductive reasoning, then the examples lose their force. In addition, I consider the cases, discussed by Keith DeRose, where the subject is in more than one practical context at the same time. In order to account for these latter cases, we need to further specify the scope of PREMISE. I distinguish two ways of understanding PREMISE, as a knowledge-action principle and as a knowledge-deliberation principle. I conclude by arguing for the knowledge-deliberation version of the principle and by exploring what this principle says about the practical role of knowledge. (shrink)

A critical reading of Sarah Moss's "Probabilistic Knowledge".

This paper is an attempt to understand how social knowledge affects human economic decision making. The paper discusses the nature of social knowledge in today’s context with special reference to how social knowledge influences consumers’ sentiments and their economic decisions. Social networks are being continuously flooded with various kinds of information and disinformation. Some of the information becomes knowledge for social network users who browse various kinds of content that are either entertaining or related to products (...) and marketing. Although reliability remains a critical issue regarding online information from social networks, it, however, provides some knowledge about diverse things, goods, and products being in use in different societies around the world. Some products advertised on social networks like Facebook may affect consumer decisions or provide information about new products. This paper presents a formal discussion on what social knowledge is and how it is originated, and what use it might have for such consumers. The paper designs a simplistic mathematical model for a theoretical understanding of the assumption that has practical implications regarding its utility in society. It is found that social networks generate enough social information that can influence user choice and preferences. The study has implications for both the users and the developers of social networking sites. (shrink)

Genevieve Lloyd’s Spinoza is quite a different thinker from the arch rationalist caricature of some undergraduate philosophy courses devoted to “The Continental Rationalists”. Lloyd’s Spinoza does not see reason as a complete source of knowledge, nor is deductive rational thought productive of the highest grade of knowledge. Instead, that honour goes to a third kind of knowledge—intuitive knowledge (scientia intuitiva), which provides an immediate, non-discursive knowledge of its singular object. To the embarrassment of some hard-nosed (...) philosophers, intellectual intuition has an affective component; it is a form of love, and ultimately given that human beings are finite modes of God/Nature (Deus sive Natura), it is a form of the intellectual love of God (amor Dei intellectualis). Some philosophers do not know what to make of this mysterious aspect of Spinoza’s philosophy, which is nonetheless firmly anchored in a reading of Part V of the Ethics. Nonetheless, this note will insist with Lloyd’s “Reconsidering Spinoza’s Rationalism” that such doctrine is an integral part of Spinoza’s philosophy. Moreover, it will be shown that Spinoza is well aware of the limitations of reason (ratio) in gaining scientific knowledge of the world and requires intuition precisely because of the inability of reason to represent individuals in their full particularity. Imagination too has a role to play in shaping scientific knowledge, although reason performs a vital critical role in disciplining and liberating the human mind from inadequate imaginary ideas. The result is an interpretation of Spinoza’s epistemology as both rationalist and intuitionist. DOI: 10.1080/24740500.2021.1962652. (shrink)

Aristotle, in Chapter 7 of his Categories, classifies habits and dispositions, as well as knowledge, among relatives. However, in Chapter 8 of the Categories, he affirms that habits, including knowledge, and dispositions, including unstable knowledge, are qualities. Thus, habits and dispositions in general, and knowledge in particular, seem to be subject to a ‘dual categorization’. At the end of Chapter 8 of the treatise, the issue of the dual categorization is explicitly raised. How can one and (...) the same thing be a quality and a relative? Aristotle gives two distinct solutions to this problem. Both have been criticized by some modern commentators : these solutions would amount to a rejection of the basic principles of the categorial system and, as such, to a sort of philosophical suicide. However, Aristotle’s early commentators, notably the Greek Neoplatonists and Boethius, made attempts to render both solutions plausible and compatible with the rest of the doctrine. Their attempts are not only of exegetical interest, they also contain some significant philosophical analyses concerning the categories. In what follows, I will present the abovementioned problem of dual categorization in Aristotle and the two solutions offered to it in Categories, 8, 11a20-38. I will then turn to the early reception of this text, and focus on the way the Greek Neoplatonists and Boethius tried to make Aristotle’s solutions more plausible. Throughout, I will try to establish in what sense habits and dispositions in general, and knowledge in particular, are relative. I will conclude with some remarks on the later reception of Categories, 8, 11a20-38 and on the problem of the ontological status of mental acts and states. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Externalism and Authoritative Self‐Knowledge The “Fully Cartesian” Conception Externalism and Authoritative Self‐Knowledge A Suggestion.

This article intends to show that the defense of ‘‘understanding’’ as one of the major goals of science education can be grounded on an anti-reductionist perspective on testimony as a source of knowledge. To do so, we critically revisit the discussion between Harvey Siegel and Alvin Goldman about the goals of science education, especially where it involves arguments based on the epistemology of testimony. Subsequently, we come back to a discussion between Charbel N. El-Hani and Eduardo Mortimer, on the (...) one hand, and Michael Hoffmann, on the other, striving to strengthen the claim that rather than students’ belief change, understanding should have epistemic priority as a goal of science education. Based on these two lines of discussion, we conclude that the reliance on testimony as a source of knowledge is necessary to the development of a more large and comprehensive scientific understanding by science students. (shrink)

In On Reflection, Hilary Kornblith criticizes Sosa’s distinction between animal and reflective knowledge. His two chief criticisms are that reflective knowledge is not superior to animal knowledge and that Sosa’s distinction does not identify two kinds of knowledge. I argue that Sosa can successfully avoid both of these charges.

Epistemic questions have become an important area of debate within democratic theory. Epistemic democrats have revived epistemic justification of democracy, while social scientific research has speared a significant debate on voter knowledge. An area which has received less attention, however, is the epistemic case for markets. Market advocates have developed a number of epistemic critiques of democracy which suggest that most goods are better provided by markets than democratic institutions. Despite representing important challenges to democracy, these critiques have gone (...) without reply as democratic theorists have tended to exclude markets from consideration. This article responds to these critiques and argues that there are good epistemic grounds for granting a much greater role to democracy than its market critics have claimed. It argues that there is a broad range of goods, including important ethical goods, which are better provided by democracy than markets due to the particular epistemic burdens they create. (shrink)

One distinct interest in self-knowledge concerns whether one can know about one’s own mental states and processes, how much, and by what methods. One broad distinction is between accounts that centrally claim that we look inward for self-knowledge (introspective methods) and those that claim that we look outward for self-knowledge (transparency methods). It is here argued that neither method is sufficient, and that we see this as soon as we move beyond questions about knowledge of one’s (...) beliefs, focusing instead on how one distinguishes, for oneself, one’s veridical visual memories from mere (non-veridical) visual images. Given robust psychological and phenomenal similarities between episodic memories and mere imagery, the following is a genuine question that one might pose to oneself: “Do I actually remember that happening, or am I just imagining it?” After critical analysis of the transparency method (advocated by Byrne 2010, following Evans 1982) to this latter epistemological question, a brief sketch is offered of a more holistic and inferential method for acquisition of broader self-knowledge (broadly following the interpretive-sensory access account of Carruthers 2011). In a slogan, knowing more of the mind requires using more of the mind. (shrink)

Since the outbreak of the Coronavirus disease 2019 (Covid-19), tremendous efforts have been made by scientists, health professionals, business people, politicians, and laypeople around the world. Covid-19 vaccines are one of the most crucial innovations that help fight against the virus. This paper attempts to revisit the Covid-19 vaccines production process by employing the serendipity-mindsponge-3D creativity management theory. Vaccine production can be considered an information process and classified into three main stages. The first stage involved the processes of absorbing information (...) (e.g., digital data and open science) and rejecting unhelpful information (e.g., misinformation and fake news) for effectively acquiring useful insights. Useful insights were later employed by experts, enterprises, governments, and international organizations through interdisciplinary coordinated efforts for developing vaccines within a short period. Finally, the appearance of multiple types of vaccines enabled more strategic options for vaccine distribution and administration. Findings from this vaccine creativity management process could be used as critical lessons for further improvements of vaccination programs. (shrink)