Results for 'Dualism of Practical Reasons'

967 found
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  1.  43
    Epistemic Barriers and Practical Dualism.Walter Barta - manuscript
    Here we will argue that Henry Sidgwick’s Dualism of Practical Reason, the paired imperative of being egoistic and/or utilitarian, follows from the epistemic barriers that arise when giving credence to skepticism about the external world, and particularly skepticism about other minds, and skepticism about reincarnation. We will argue that this is true whether we begin with the premises of universal utilitarianism or egoism.
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  2. Indeterminate Dualism against Repugnance.Walter Barta - manuscript
    An indeterminate version of Henry Sidgwick’s “Dualism of Practical Reason” may offer a solution to Derek Parfit’s “Repugnant Conclusion”. Here we will outline the problem of Sidgwick’s Dualism and how to resolve it within the framework of practical reason and the problem of Parfit’s Repugnance and why it is irresoluble within the framework of pure utilitarianism. Then we will argue how Sidgwick’s Dualism, under certain formulations of indeterminacy, specifically under those Indeterminacy Views advanced by David (...)
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  3. The Epistemic vs. the Practical.Antti Kauppinen - 2023 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 18:137-162.
    What should we believe if epistemic and practical reasons for belief point in different directions? I argue that there’s no single answer, but rather a Dualism of Theoretical and Practical Reason is true: what we epistemically ought to believe and what we practically ought to believe may come apart, and both are independently authoritative. I argue in particular against recently popular views that subordinate the epistemic to the practical: it’s not the case that epistemic (...) bear on what we ‘just plain ought’ to believe just to the extent we have practical reason to believe epistemically correctly. Why? Because epistemic reasons give rise to authoritative demands independently of the practical pay-off of believing accordingly. This is shown in particular by the fact that it can be fitting to epistemically ‘blame’ us just because we fail to believe as we epistemically ought, even if we don’t have sufficient practical reason to believe so. I also argue that we don’t need to come up with what we ‘just plain ought’ to believe, because contrary epistemic and practical responsibility responses can be simultaneously fitting in conflict cases, and because epistemic and practical ought judgments give rise to different enkrasia requirements, among other things. (shrink)
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  4. An epistemic modal norm of practical reasoning.Tim Henning - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6665-6686.
    When are you in a position to rely on p in practical reasoning? Existing accounts say that you must know that p, or be in a position to know that p, or be justified in believing that p, or be in a position to justifiably believe it, and so on. This paper argues that all of these proposals face important problems, which I call the Problems of Negative Bootstrapping and of Level Confusions. I offer a diagnosis of these problems, (...)
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  5. ‘Kinds of Practical Reasons: Attitude-Related Reasons and Exclusionary Reasons’.Christian Piller - 2006 - In J. A. Pinto S. Miguens (ed.), Analyses. pp. 98-105.
    I start by explaining what attitude-related reasons are and why it is plausible to assume that, at least in the domain of practical reason, there are such reasons. Then I turn to Raz’s idea that the practice of practical reasoning commits us to what he calls exclusionary reasons. Being excluded would be a third way, additional to being outweighed and being undermined, in which a reason can be defeated. I try to show that attitude-related (...) can explain the phenomena Raz appeals to equally well. Attitude-related reasons, however, are weighted against other reasons and, thus, don’t determine a third relation of defeat. On this basis, I voice some doubts about Raz’s conception of exclusionary reasons. (shrink)
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  6. Priority of Practical Reason in Kant.Sasha Mudd - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):78-102.
    Throughout the critical period Kant enigmatically insists that reason is a ‘unity’, thereby suggesting that both our theoretical and practical endeavors are grounded in one and the same rational capacity. How Kant's unity thesis ought to be interpreted and whether it can be substantiated remain sources of controversy in the literature. According to the strong reading of this claim, reason is a ‘unity’ because all our reasoning, including our theoretical reasoning, functions practically. Although several prominent commentators endorse this view, (...)
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  7.  45
    Praktischer Hylemorphismus: Ansätze zu einer Theorie praktischen Wissens im Anschluss an McDowell.Sascha Settegast - 2024 - In Jens Kertscher & Philipp Richter (eds.), Praktisches Wissen: Konzeptueller Rahmen und logische Geographie eines grundlegenden Begriffs der Praktischen Philosophie. Baden-Baden: Nomos. pp. 71-116.
    The paper aims to give an account of practical knowledge by outlining a hylomorphic and conceptualist account of intentional action in analogy to McDowell's conceptualist account of experience. On this view, practical concepts provide the ideal or formal structure that unifies a manifold of bodily movements into a single intentional action, and hence intentional actions are structured conceptually. -/- - §1 sets out the basic features of this view in contrast to a common dualistic or two-component view of (...)
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  8. (1 other version)The Conclusion of Practical Reason.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2007 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 94:323-343.
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  9. The Conclusion of Practical Reasoning.John Brunero - 2021 - The Journal of Ethics 25 (1):13-37.
    According to the Aristotelian Thesis, the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action. Critics argue against it by pointing to cases in which some interference or inability prevents the production of action, yet in which that interference or inability doesn’t impugn the success of an agent’s reasoning. Some of those critics suggest instead that practical reasoning concludes in an intention, while others suggest it concludes in a belief with normative content, such as a belief about what one has (...)
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  10. Morality and Prudence: A Case for Substantial Overlap and Limited Conflict.Roe Fremstedal - 2018 - Journal of Value Inquiry 52 (1):1-16.
    In this paper, I discuss and reject both the idea of a moral order, in which morality and prudence generally coincide, and the idea of a tragic world, in which morality and prudence generally collide. I then discuss and defend an intermediary position in which morality and prudence converge substantially. It is argued that moral agency presuppose friction that prevents morality from coinciding perfectly with prudence. Still, morality and prudence should not be thought of as being fundamentally incompatible, because this (...)
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  11. Practical Reasons: The problem of gridlock.Ruth Chang - 2013 - In Barry Dainton & Howard Robinson (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Philosophy. London: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 474-499.
    The paper has two aims. The first is to propose a general framework for organizing some central questions about normative practical reasons in a way that separates importantly distinct issues that are often run together. Setting out this framework provides a snapshot of the leading types of view about practical reasons as well as a deeper understanding of what are widely regarded to be some of their most serious difficulties. The second is to use the proposed (...)
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  12. Not-Exact-Truths, Pragmatic Encroachment, and the Epistemic Norm of Practical Reasoning.Michael J. Shaffer - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (2):239-259.
    Recently a number of variously motivated epistemologists have argued that knowledge is closely tied to practical matters. On the one hand, radical pragmatic encroachment is the view that facts about whether an agent has knowledge depend on practical factors and this is coupled to the view that there is an important connection between knowledge and action. On the other hand, one can argue for the less radical thesis only that there is an important connection between knowledge and (...) reasoning. So, defenders of both of these views endorse the view that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning. This thesis has recently come under heavy fire and a number of weaker proposals have been defended. In this paper counter-examples to the knowledge norm of reasoning will be presented and it will be argued that this viewand a number of related but weaker viewscannot be sustained in the face of these counter-examples. The paper concludes with a novel proposal concerning the norm of practical reasoning that is immune to the counter-examples introduced here. (shrink)
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  13. Review of David Phillips, Sidgwickian Ethics[REVIEW]Anthony Skelton - 2015 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 12 (6):794-797.
    This is a critical review of David Phillips's Sidgwickian Ethics. The book deserves high praise.
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  14. Egalitarian Justice as a Challenge for the Value-Based Theory of Practical Reasons.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2023 - In Andrés Garcia, Mattias Gunnemyr & Jakob Werkmäster (eds.), Value, Morality & Social Reality: Essays dedicated to Dan Egonsson, Björn Petersson & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen. Department of Philosophy, Lund University. pp. 239-249.
    In this essay, I argue that the objections that have been raised against the view that equality is intrinsically valuable also provide objections to the view that all practical reasons can be explained in terms of value. Plausible egalitarian principles entail that under certain conditions people have claims to an equal share. These claims entail reasons to distribute goods equally that cannot be explained by value if equality has no intrinsic value.
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  15. Kant - The Critique of Practical Reason - A Summary.Mike Sutton - manuscript
    There are few if any good summaries of this neglected work on the internet, or even in publication generally. The one given here is more extensive than most, and points out the wisdom and erudition of Kant's thinking about freedom of the will. It also paves the way for another article already on this website on Kant’s view of the world in general.
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  16. Practical reasoning and the concept of knowledge.Matthew Weiner - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford, GB: Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 163--182.
    Suppose we consider knowledge to be valuable because of the role known propositions play in practical reasoning. This, I argue, does not provide a reason to think that knowledge is valuable in itself. Rather, it provides a reason to think that true belief is valuable from one standpoint, and that justified belief is valuable from another standpoint, and similarly for other epistemic concepts. The value of the concept of knowledge is that it provides an economical way of talking about (...)
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  17. Robust vs Formal Normativity II, Or: No Gods, No Masters, No Authoritative Normativity.Nathan Robert Howard & N. G. Laskowski - forthcoming - In David Copp & Connie Rosati (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaethics. Oxford University Press.
    Some rules seem more important than others. The moral rule to keep promises seems more important than the aesthetic rule not to wear brown with black or the pool rule not to scratch on the eight ball. A worrying number of metaethicists are increasingly tempted to explain this difference by appealing to something they call “authoritative normativity” – it’s because moral rules are “authoritatively normatively” that they are especially important. The authors of this chapter argue for three claims concerning “authoritative (...)
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  18. Practical reasoning and the act of naming reality.Fabrizio Macagno - 2018 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 286:393-404.
    In the tradition stemming from Aristotle through Aquinas, rational decision making is seen as a complex structure of distinct phases in which reasoning and will are interconnected. Intention, deliberation, and decision are regarded as the fundamental steps of the decision-making process, in which an end is chosen, the means are specified, and a decision to act is made. Based on this Aristotelian theoretical background, we show how the decision-making process can be modeled as a net of several patterns of reasoning, (...)
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  19. Two-Stage Reliabilism, Virtue Reliabilism, Dualism and the Problem of Sufficiency.Paul Faulkner - 2013 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (8):121-138.
    Social epistemology should be truth-centred, argues Goldman. Social epistemology should capture the ‘logic of everyday practices’ and describe socially ‘situated’ reasoning, says Fuller. Starting from Goldman’s vision of epistemology, this paper aims to argue for Fuller’s contention. Social epistemology cannot focus solely on the truth because the truth can be got in lucky ways. The same too could be said for reliability. Adding a second layer of epistemic evaluation helps only insofar as the reasons thus specified are appropriately connected (...)
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  20. Practical Reason and Moral Motivation:An Analysis of Arguments Against Internalism.Rafael Martins - 2013 - Itaca 24:184-200.
    In The moral problem (1994), Michael Smith tries to link three conflicting theories that alone are intuitively plausible, nevertheless, they do not seem to work well together. The first proposes that moral judgments are in fact beliefs about objective matters. The second states the concept of “practicality requirement”. The third is a humean belief-desire psychology, i.e. if a moral judgment is sufficient to explain actions, then it must involve a desire. If that is the case, it cannot be simply a (...)
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  21. Against Scanlon's Theory of the Strength of Practical Reasons.Eric Sampson - 2015 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (3):1-6.
    We often say that one reason is stronger, or weightier, than another. These are metaphors. What does normative strength or weight really consist in? Scanlon (2014) offers a novel answer to this question. His answer appeals to counterfactuals of various kinds. I argue that appealing to counterfactuals leads to deep problems for his view.
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  22. An Explanation of the Essential Publicity of Practical Reasons.Alisabeth Ayars - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
    This paper argues that practical reasons are essentially “public” in the following sense: If R is a reason for X to Φ, then R is also a reason for other people not to interfere with X’s Φ-ing. The paper derives the Publicity Thesis from an independently motivated non-cognitivist account of normative judgment that covers both should-judgments and judgments about reasons. This account “explains” the publicity thesis in the sense if the non-cognitivist view is correct, anyone who judges (...)
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  23. Practical Reasoning.Antti Kauppinen - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.
    This chapter presents two contemporary pictures of practical reasoning. According to the Rule-Guidance Conception, roughly, practical reasoning is a rule-guided operation of acquiring (or retaining or giving up) intentions so as to meet synchronic requirements of rationality. According to the Reasons-Responsiveness Conception, practical reasoning is a process of responding to reasons we take ourselves to have, and its standards of correctness derive from what we objectively have reason to do, if things are as we suppose (...)
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  24. Practical Reasoning Arguments: A Modular Approach.Fabrizio Macagno & Douglas Walton - 2018 - Argumentation 32 (4):519-547.
    This paper compares current ways of modeling the inferential structure of practical reasoning arguments, and proposes a new approach in which it is regarded in a modular way. Practical reasoning is not simply seen as reasoning from a goal and a means to an action using the basic argumentation scheme. Instead, it is conceived as a complex structure of classificatory, evaluative, and practical inferences, which is formalized as a cluster of three types of distinct and interlocked argumentation (...)
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  25. Practical Reasons and interpretation of Customary International Law.Kostiantyn Gorobets - forthcoming - In Panos Merkouris, Jörg Kammerhofer & Noora Arjärvi (eds.), The Theory and Philosophy of Customary International Law and its Interpretation.
    When we say that we interpret customary international law, what is this thing that we actually interpret? Depending on how we answer this question, our view on interpretative methodology will change. It seems that the most promising approach is to say that interpretation of customary international law is an interpretation of certain legal practices. However, here we also encounter some problems. The dominant doctrine of customary international law requiring state practice and opinio juris assumes that only by adding a psychological (...)
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  26. Virtue, self-mastery, and the autocracy of practical reason.Anne Margaret Baxley - 2015 - In Lara Denis & Oliver Sensen (eds.), Kant's Lectures on Ethics: A Critical Guide. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 223-238.
    As analysis of Kant’s account of virtue in the Lectures on Ethics shows that Kant thinks of virtue as a form of moral self-mastery or self-command that represents a model of self-governance he compares to an autocracy. In light of the fact that the very concept of virtue presupposes struggle and conflict, Kant insists that virtue is distinct from holiness and that any ideal of moral perfection that overlooks the fact that morality is always difficult for us fails to provide (...)
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  27. Practical Reason and Respect for Persons.Melissa McBay Merritt - 2017 - Kantian Review 22 (1):53-79.
    My project is to reconsider the Kantian conception of practical reason. Some Kantians think that practical reasoning must be more active than theoretical reasoning, on the putative grounds that such reasoning need not contend with what is there anyway, independently of its exercise. Behind that claim stands the thesis that practical reason is essentially efficacious. I accept the efficacy principle, but deny that it underwrites this inference about practical reason. My inquiry takes place against the background (...)
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  28. An Instrumentalist Account of How to Weigh Epistemic and Practical Reasons for Belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Mattias Skipper - 2019 - Mind 129 (516):1071-1094.
    When one has both epistemic and practical reasons for or against some belief, how do these reasons combine into an all-things-considered reason for or against that belief? The question might seem to presuppose the existence of practical reasons for belief. But we can rid the question of this presupposition. Once we do, a highly general ‘Combinatorial Problem’ emerges. The problem has been thought to be intractable due to certain differences in the combinatorial properties of epistemic (...)
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  29. Normativity without dualism: Connecting the dots between natural and social sciences.A. N. de Brito & Adriano Naves de Brito - 2017 - Dissertatio 45 (S5):3-21.
    The normative phenomenon is ubiquitous in human interactions, emerging in a wide range of fields studied by social science and considered as one of the essential traits of human’s way of life. The modern subjectivist tradition of social science has been based on a model in which elements like self, freedom and reason play the most relevant roles in explaining normativity by connecting beliefs to behaviors by means of motives that are non-reducible to preferences, desires or impulses. In this paper (...)
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  30. Practical Reasoning In 11 Easy Steps. Gerald - manuscript
    The nature of practical reasoning is a matter of considerable philosophical interest, particularly the extent to which the process can be understood in terms of standard (i.e. deductive) reasoning, and what form it might take. Even were it to turn out, e.g. as per Aristotle, that essential elements cannot be accommodated deductively, it would still remain of interest to delimit any and all respects that can be so accommodated. -/- In the following I wish to demonstrate that the culmination (...)
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  31. Involvement and Detachment: A Paradox of Practical Reasoning.Peter Baumann - 2007 - In Allen Coates (ed.), Peter Baumann and Monika Betzler, eds., Practical Conflicts. Duke University Press. pp. 244-261.
    For each of the many goals of an agent it is true that the agent wants its realization. Given further very plausible assumptions, one can show that there is no good reason for an agent not to want the realization of all of his goals. However, it seems also true that reaching all of one’s goals would be extremely boring; most human beings would consider such a life not worth living. In this respect, leading a life is like playing some (...)
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  32. Knowledge, Practical Reasoning and Action.Peter Baumann - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (1):7-26.
    Is knowledge necessary or sufficient or both necessary and sufficient for acceptable practical reasoning and rational action? Several authors (e.g., Williamson, Hawthorne, and Stanley) have recently argued that the answer to these questions is positive. In this paper I present several objections against this view (both in its basic form as well in more developed forms). I also offer a sketch of an alternative view: What matters for the acceptability of practical reasoning in at least many cases (and (...)
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  33. Ethics and Practical Reasoning.Matthew Silverstein - 2017 - Ethics 127 (2):353 - 382.
    How is practical reasoning related to ethical reasoning? The most common view is that they are identical: practical reasoning just is ethical reasoning. I criticize this view and then propose an alternative account of the relation between ethical thought and practical thought: ethical reasoning is reasoning about sound practical reasoning. I argue that this account of the relation between ethics and practical reasoning explains various phenomena that more familiar views leave unexplained. It also entails that (...)
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  34. Symposium on David Phillips's Sidgwickian Ethics: Introduction.Anthony Skelton - 2013 - Revue d'Etudes Benthamiennes 12.
    This is a brief introduction to a symposium on David Phillips's Sidgwickian Ethics.
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  35. Epistemic Problems of Utilitarian Practical Reasoning.John Dilworth - 1998-9 - Proceedings of the Heraclitean Society 19.
    Utilitarian (U.) theories must be capable of being applied in practical reasoning, or they would have no value as a guide to rational conduct. However, I show that epistemic extensions to U. theories produce logical confusion. Basic questions about what one needs to know in order to apply a U. analysis embroil one in an infinite regress. And attempts to incrementally apply U. either are no help at all (leaving one entirely 'in the dark'), or in general constitute arbitrary (...)
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  36. The Standards of Practical Reasoning. [REVIEW]Matthew Silverstein - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):631-638.
    A critical study of Kieran Setiya's *Reasons without Rationalism*.
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  37. Will, Obligatory Ends and the Completion of Practical Reason: Comments on Barbara Herman's Moral Literacy.Andrews Reath - 2011 - Kantian Review 16 (1):1-15.
    This paper discusses three inter-related themes in Barbara Herman's Moral Literacy norm-constituted power completes’ practical reason or rational agency.
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  38. Practical reasons and mistakes of practical rationality.David Sobel - 2007 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 94 (1):299-321.
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  39. Practical Reason and the Unity of Agency.Michael Garnett - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (3):449-468.
    This is a critical review essay of Christine Korsgaard's Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity (OUP 2009).
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  40. Are all practical reasons based on value?Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2022 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 17:27-53.
    According to an attractive and widely held view, all practical reasons are explained in terms of the (instrumental or final) value of the action supported by the reason. I argue that this theory is incompatible with plausible assumptions about the practical reasons that correspond to certain moral rights, including the right to a promised action and the right to an exclusive use of one’s property. The argument is an explanatory rather than extensional one: while the actions (...)
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  41. Practical reason and motivational scepticism.Paul Russell - 2006 - In Heiner F. Klemme, Manfred Kühn & Dieter Schönecker (eds.), Moralische Motivation: Kant und die Alternativen. Meiner Verlag.
    In her influential and challenging paper “Skepticism about Practical Reason” Christine Korsgaard sets out to refute an important strand of Humean scepticism as it concerns a Kantian understanding of practical reason.1 Korsgaard distinguishes two components of scepticism about practical reason. The first, which she refers to as content scepticism, argues that reason cannot of itself provide any “substantive guidance to choice and action” (SPR, 311). In its classical formulation, as stated by Hume, it is argued that reason (...)
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  42. ART(S) OF BECOMING: PERFORMATIVE ENCOUNTERS IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL ART.İbrahim Okan Akkin - 2017 - Dissertation, Middle East Technical University
    This thesis analyses Deleuze & Guattari’s notion of becoming through certain performative encounters in contemporary political art, and re-conceptualizes them as “art(s) of becoming”. Art(s) of becoming are actualizations of a non-representational –minoritarian– mode of becoming and creation as well as the political actions of fleeing quanta. The theoretical aim of the study is, on the one hand, to explain how Platonic Idealism is overturned by Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche and Leibniz, and on the other hand, how Cartesian dualism (...)
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  43. Incommensurability, incomparability, and practical reason.Ruth Chang (ed.) - 1997 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard.
    Can quite different values be rationally weighed against one another? Can the value of one thing always be ranked as greater than, equal to, or less than the value of something else? If the answer to these questions is no, then in what areas do we find commensurability and comparability unavailable? And what are the implications for moral and legal decision making? This book struggles with these questions, and arrives at distinctly different answers.".
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  44. Assertion, practical reasoning, and epistemic separabilism.Kenneth Boyd - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1907-1927.
    I argue here for a view I call epistemic separabilism , which states that there are two different ways we can be evaluated epistemically when we assert a proposition or treat a proposition as a reason for acting: one in terms of whether we have adhered to or violated the relevant epistemic norm, and another in terms of how epistemically well-positioned we are towards the fact that we have either adhered to or violated said norm. ES has been appealed to (...)
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  45. On believing indirectly for practical reasons.Sebastian Https://Orcidorg Schmidt - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1795-1819.
    It is often argued that there are no practical reasons for belief because we could not believe for such reasons. A recent reply by pragmatists is that we can often believe for practical reasons because we can often cause our beliefs for practical reasons. This paper reveals the limits of this recently popular strategy for defending pragmatism, and thereby reshapes the dialectical options for pragmatism. I argue that the strategy presupposes that reasons (...)
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  46. Practical reasons to believe, epistemic reasons to act, and the baffled action theorist.Nomy Arpaly - 2023 - Philosophical Issues 33 (1):22-32.
    I argue that unless belief is voluntary in a very strict sense – that is, unless credence is simply under our direct control – there can be no practical reasons to believe. I defend this view against recent work by Susanna Rinard. I then argue that for very similar reasons, barring the truth of strict doxastic voluntarism, there cannot be epistemic reasons to act, only purely practical reasons possessed by those whose goal is attaining (...)
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  47. Believing for Practical Reasons.Susanna Rinard - 2018 - Noûs (4):763-784.
    Some prominent evidentialists argue that practical considerations cannot be normative reasons for belief because they can’t be motivating reasons for belief. Existing pragmatist responses turn out to depend on the assumption that it’s possible to believe in the absence of evidence. The evidentialist may deny this, at which point the debate ends in an impasse. I propose a new strategy for the pragmatist. This involves conceding that belief in the absence of evidence is impossible. We then argue (...)
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  48. Metaethical Agnosticism: Practical Reasons for Acting When Agnostic About the Existence of Moral Reasons.Joseph Len Miller - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (1):59-75.
    There has been little discussion about how to act when uncertain about the existence of moral reasons in general. In this paper I will argue that despite being uncertain about the existence of moral reasons, someone can still have a practical reason to act in a particular way. This practical reason is morally relevant because it will have an impact on whether we’re making the correct moral decision. This practical reason will result from a principle (...)
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  49. (1 other version)Aesthetics, ethics, and the role of Teleology in the third Critique.Nythamar de Oliveira - 2012 - Revista de Filosofia Aurora 24 (34):189.
    Kant’s dualism in anthropology and morality is said to be bridged only by means of a teleology that seems to betray the historical constitution of its subjectivity. And yet the Kantianarticulation of problems of theoretical and practical reason can be explored only insofar as they help us understand the correlated issues of the unity of reason, the relation of aesthetics and ethics in the light of the three Critiques, and the teleological conception of history. In this paper, I (...)
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  50. Ethics, Fitting Attitudes, and Practical Reason: A Theory of Normative Facts.Howard Nye - 2009 - Dissertation, University of Michigan
    I present and defend (1) an account of ethical judgments as judgments about our reasons to feel specific motivationally laden attitudes, (2) an account of what an agent should do in terms of what would achieve ends that she has reason to be motivated to pursue, and (3) an account of an agent’s reasons for motivation (and thus action) in terms of the prescriptions of the most fundamental principles that guide her deliberations. Using these accounts, I explain the (...)
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