This book’s goal is to give an intellectual context for the following manuscript. -/- Includes bibliographical references and an index. Pages 1-123. 1). Philosophy. 2). Metaphysics. 3). Philosophy, German. 4). Philosophy, German -- 18th century. 5). Philosophy, German and Greek Influences Metaphysics. I. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich -- 1770-1831 -- Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus. II. Rosenzweig, Franz, -- 1886-1929. III. Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von, -- 1775-1854. IV. Hölderlin, Friedrich, -- 1770-1843. V. Ferrer, Daniel Fidel, 1952-. (...) [Translation from German into English of the-- Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus.]. -/- Note: the manuscript is in the handwriting of G.W.F. Hegel, but the actual authorship is disputed. No date is given. Franz Rosenzweig made up the title as it is known today. He published the text in 1917. At that time, F. Rosenzweig thought F.W.J. Schelling was the author. No one has read this book for errors. As always, any errors, mistakes or oversights etc. are mine alone. Given a couple more years, I could improve this book. This is a philosophical translation and not a philological translation. Martin Luther who did the famous early translation of the Bible into German wrote in a letter, “If anyone does not like my translation, they can ignore it… (September 15, 1530)”. There are no ‘correct’ translations. Some are just better than other translations. -/- The Oldest Systematic Program of German Idealism. The German title is: Das Älteste Systemprogramm Des Deutschen Idealismus. This title was made up by Franz Rosenzweig in 1917, when he first published the manuscript. He found the manuscript in the Royal Library in Berlin in 1913. The manuscript suggested date is around 1796 and was done by handwriting research. However, the manuscript is not dated. The Prussian State Library auctioned in March 1913 from the auction of the house Liepmannssohn in Berlin a single sheet on the front and back with Hegel's cursive handwriting. The manuscript was lost during WWII. But Dieter Henrich found it again in 1979 in the “Biblioteka Jagiellonska” in Krakow (Poland), where it is today. Address: Jagiellonian Library, Jagiellonian University, al. Mickiewicza 22, 30-059 Cracow, Poland. Later research suggests that manuscript had come from the estate of Hegel’s student Friedrich Christoph Förster (1791-1868). He was one of the editors of Hegel’s posthumous works and most likely had access to a number of Hegel’s manuscripts. This text actually being one of them. Hegel traveled around Bohemia with Marie and Friedrich Christoph Förster around the year 1820-21 (see Klaus Vieweg). -/- Philosophical mystery -- who is the author or authors of this text? -/- Take a plunge into the deep and cold waters. Maybe a quagmire or quandary, but decidedly interesting. This project is to contextualize an old handwritten manuscript which is about 225 years old. The actual author is a mystery. I offer my own assessment. You can make your own assessments. The mystery has continued to unfold since 1917. There is plenty to read. Otherwise, think about the authorship and read more of the German philosophers and authors from this period and enjoy the depth of thinking and philosophizing. On one hand, there is just the sheer fun in the puzzle of the authorship questions; and on the other hand, these are the alluring thoughts that lead to the nascent stage of German Idealism and our intellectual heritage. There is no end to the accolades for this group of philosophers. A heritage that we still hear in in our attempts to move forward into our future. -/- Do your own astute exegesis (ἐξήγησις) as all paths are still open. Let your thought take to the wings of what is called thinking with this text. Critical encounters (Auseinandersetzung, or a Gegenüberstellung) with at least: Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843) Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775-1854), and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) --- starts here! German Idealism. We are not going to study this situation endlessly, instead we make some broad strokes and provide you a general context. You are allowed to read between the lines too. Goal: to understand the overall affinity and differences between the intellectuals of this period in German history; and to come to grips with this demanding text within its large scholarly context in the last 100 years. There are no final answers. (shrink)

740 page life in letters, including all Hegel's available letters at time of publication by Indiana University Press in 1984 tied together by a running commentary by Clark Butler. The volume is in a searchable PDF format. Publication was supported by a Major Grant by the National Endowment of the Humanities (NEH).

Philosophy has long been seen as a crucial instrument for living a meaningful life. Nonetheless, for more than a decade, systematic philosophical study in Africa has been dominated by a single compound question: Is there an African philosophy, and if so, what is its nature? When it comes to Africa and philosophy, there is a lot of debate about whether or not Africans have a philosophy. Africans have long been accused of being irrational. Some Western scholars’ interpretations of African philosophy (...) may help us comprehend it better. The Aime Cesaire-led Negritude movement, the Harlem Revolution, the South African Apartheid movement, and others are all examples of recent literature expressing opposition to the perspective of black inferiority and various insults directed at black Africans. Some European scholars did accuse Africans of being irrational beings. These claims provided the impetus for the spread of various beliefs and ideologies masquerading as African philosophy. In light of this, the purpose of this essay is to disprove prejudicial claims made against Africans and African philosophy. The works of Western thinkers such as Immanuel Kant, Georg W. F. Hegel, and Lucien Levy-Bruhl would be highlighted. (shrink)

The thought of G. W. F. Hegel (1770 -1831) has had a deep and lasting influence on a wide range of philosophical, political, religious, aesthetic, cultural and scientific movements. But, despite the far-reaching importance of Hegel's thought, there is often a great deal of confusion about what he actually said or believed. G. W. F. Hegel: Key Concepts provides an accessible introduction to both Hegel's thought and Hegel-inspired philosophy in general, demonstrating how his concepts were (...) understood, adopted and critically transformed by later thinkers. The first section of the book covers the principal philosophical themes in Hegel's system: epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, ethical theory, political philosophy, philosophy of nature, philosophy of art, philosophy of religion, philosophy of history and theory of the history of philosophy. The second section covers the main post-Hegelian movements in philosophy: Marxism, existentialism, pragmatism, analytic philosophy, hermeneutics and French poststructuralism. The breadth and depth of G. W. F. Hegel: Key Concepts makes it an invaluable introduction for philosophical beginners and a useful reference source for more advanced scholars and researchers. (shrink)

This article proposes to present, in general, the thought of the German philosopher G. W. F. Hegel about history. Using mainly the work Philosophy of History, I seek first to analyze and to explain the different modes of historical approaches elaborated by Hegel, which are: the original history, the reflective history and its subdivisions and, finally, the philosophical history. After that, I center my studies on the concept of progress or, more precisely, historical progress. According to Hegel, (...) philosophical history appears when we perceive that rationality governs the world, and therefore the actions and events that have occurred, occur and will occur are part of this rationality. Such a perception – that is, understanding that history develops and progresses according to rationality – is possible when we turn to the study of history, using it as material, and carefully observing and analyzing past historical events. According to Hegel, this historical process is the course of the spirit, constantly seeking a greater awareness of freedom and, therefore, a greater understanding of itself, because freedom is already in it, and it is not something alien, distant or external, it is in its center and is its substance. According to Hegel, nature, despite its polymorphic transformations, is only a repetitive and monotonous cycle, where there is nothing new under the sun. However, in the process of development of the spirit, that is, the spirit knowing itself, the new appears, this is progress, which, in turn, is aimed at the realization of freedom, with a view to its concretization in the State. (shrink)

Desde Platón el arte ha sido deslegitimado filosóficamente porque su elemento y su medio es la apariencia. De tal manera que, el ser y la verdad, según la antigua teoría, se encuentran en las ideas y no en las apariencias sensibles. Hegel está lejos de este platonismo en sus Lecciones sobre estética y, por el contrario, va a realizar una reivindicación de la apariencia en el arte. El interés de este artículo es indagar por la distinción entre apariencia que (...) engaña, vinculada al no–ser, y la apariencia necesaria de las obras de arte que, para Hegel, es la apariencia de la esencia. El artículo aprovecha tanto la oposición planteada por Hegel entre belleza natural–belleza espiritual, como el modo de ser del arte como ideal, para indicar que es la apariencia del arte una de las formas donde el espíritu se hace concreción, donde revela su conciencia activa, pensante, y puede manifestar sensiblemente las determinaciones e intereses más altos para su cultura. (shrink)

In this paper, I contest increasingly common "realist" interpretations of Hegel's theory of "the concept" (der Begriff), offering instead a "isomorphic" conception of the relation of concepts and the world. The isomorphism recommended, however, is metaphysically deflationary, for I show how Hegel's conception of conceptual form creates a conceptually internal standard for the adequacy of concepts. No "sideways-on" theory of the concept-world relationship is envisioned. This standard of conceptual adequacy is also "graduated" in that it allows for a (...) lack of fit between concept and world. The possibility for a "maximally isomorphic" fit between concept and world obtains through the teleological realization of concepts, which marks especially the "artificial" world of human culture (law, art, religion, etc.). Some of the most seemingly exaggerated claims Hegel makes about the concept, I contend, can be understood when we consider the significance Hegel ascribes to human making, which is provided for in his conceptual theory. But my framework provides an interpretive key for the way Hegel sees concepts imperfectly realized in the natural world as well. (shrink)

German Philosophers: Kant, Hegel, Schelling, Nietzsche, and Heidegger By Daniel Fidel Ferrer. -/- Includes bibliographical references. Index. 1. Ontology. 2. Metaphysics. 3. Philosophy, German. 4.Thought and thinking. 5. Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804. 6. Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von, 1775-1854. 7. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831. 8. Philosophy, Asian. 9. Philosophy, Indic. 10. Philosophy, Modern -- 20th century. 11. Philosophy, Modern -- 19th century. 12. Practice (Philosophy). 13. Philosophy and civilization. 14. Postmodernism. 15. Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844-1900. 16. Heidegger, (...) Martin, 1889-1976. -- 17. Nagarjuna, 2nd cent. I. Ferrer, Daniel Fidel, 1952-. -/- Table of Contents -/- Preface (page 4). -/- 1). Heidegger and the Purpose of Kanťs Critique of Pure Reason (p. 5 to p. 29). 2). Martin Heidegger's Encounter Methodology: Kant (p. 31 to p. 44). 3). Metahistories of philosophy: Kant and Nietzsche (p. 45 to p. 63). 4). Martin Heidegger and Hegeľs Science of Logic (p. 64 to p. 79). 5). Heidegger and Purpose of Hegeľs Phenomenology of Spirit (p. 80 to p. 102). 6). Analysis of the "Preface" to Hegeľs Phenomenology of Spirit (p. 103 to p. 110). 7). Hegeľs Dialogue with Lesser Known Philosophers (p. 111 to p. 121). 8). Heidegger's Encounter with F.W.J. Schelling: The Questions of Evil and Freedom, and the end of Metaphysics (p. 123 to p. 135). 9). Martin Heidegger contra Nietzsche on the Greeks (p. 136 to p. 148). 10). Martin Heidegger and Nietzsche on Amor Fati (p. 149 to p. 156). (1 1). Martin Heidegger's ontotheological problems and Nägärjuna solutions: Heidegger's Presuppositions and Entanglements in Metaphysics (p. 157 to p. 165). Index (p. 166 to p. 235). (shrink)

Understood in its widest sense, the term “hermeneutics” can be taken to refer to the theory and/or practice of any interpretation aimed at uncovering the meaning of any expression, regardless of whether such expression was produced by a human or non-human source. Understood in a narrower sense, the term “hermeneutics” can be taken to refer to a particular stream of thought regarding the theory and/or practice of interpretation, developed mainly by German-speaking theorists from the late eighteenth through to the late (...) twentieth century. “Hermeneutics” in its broadest sense dates at least as far back as the ancient Greeks and is linked etymologically to the ancient Greeks’ mythological deity Hermes, who was said to deliver and interpret messages from the gods to mortals. “Hermeneutics” in its narrower sense emerged in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, initially for the purpose of addressing problems in the interpretation of classical and biblical tests and then later for the purpose of articulating a more “universalized” theory of interpretation of general. This chapter traces the development of hermeneutics in its narrow sense through the work of Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (1768-1834), Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) and Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002), and then concludes with some observations about what Hegel’s own hermeneutical thought might mean against the backdrop of this development. (shrink)

This essay defends a reading of Hegel as a metametaphysical antirealist. Metametaphysical antirealism is a denial that metaphysics has as its subject matter answers to theoretical questions about the mind-independent world. Hence, on this view, metaphysical questions are not, in principle, knowledge transcendent. I hold that Hegel presents a version of metametaphysical antirealism in the Science of Logic because he pursues his project by suspending reference to all supposed objects of metaphysical theory as practiced before him. Hegel (...) introduces reference in his theory only by the self-reference of thought to itself in the Doctrine of the Concept. I motivate the relevance of Hegel’s approach to metaphysics by comparing it to Kit Fine’s (2017) concept of “naïve metaphysics.” I argue that Hegel’s theory results from a comprehensively naïve metaphysics. (shrink)

Hegel often says that his "logic" is meant to replace metaphysics. Since Hegel's Science of Logic is so different from a standard logic, most commentators have not treated the portion of that work devoted to logical forms as relevant to this claim. This paper argues that Hegel's discussion of logical forms of judgment and syllogism is meant to be the foundation of his reformation of metaphysics. Implicit in Hegel's discussion of the logical forms is the view (...) that the metaphysical concepts discussed in Books I and II of the Science of Logic supervene on the role of subject and predicate terms in the logical forms discussed in Book III. Hegel thus has an explanation for the nature and significance of metaphysical concepts that resembles Kant's "metaphysical deduction," according to which the categories can be derived from the table of judgments. Though Hegel's metaphysics is often supposed to be influenced by Kant, prevailing interpretations do not show how Hegel's fine-grained treatment of logical forms is relevant to his critical view of metaphysics. The present interpretation provides a model for Hegel's explanation of metaphysical concepts, as well as a new picture of the structure of his Science of Logic that emphasizes the priority of its Doctrine of the Concept. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe close connection often cited between Hegel and Wilfrid Sellars is not only said to lie in their common negative challenges to the ‘framework of givenness,’ but also in the positive less...

While the idea of philosophy as conceptual analysis has attracted many adherents and undergone a number of variations, in general it suffers from an authority problem with two dimensions. First, it is unclear why the analysis of a concept should have objective authority: why explicating what we mean should express how things are. Second, conceptual analysis seems to lack intersubjective authority: why philosophical analysis should apply to more than a parochial group of individuals. I argue that Hegel’s conception of (...) social ontology, focused on his concept of “ethical life” (Sittlichkeit), helps to explain how concepts (and their explication) have both objective and intersubjective authority in the social domain. Hegel claims that modern institutions are the product of self-conscious purposes, so that they are conceptually constituted. Concepts do not just represent these objects and so depend on a contingent relation to them. As many contemporary social ontologists agree, this means that our concepts of these institutions are uniquely epistemically “transparent.” They have objective authority. Concepts have intersubjective authority in the modern world as well, according to Hegel. However, I show that this feature of Hegel’s account does not rely on the solution to a philosophical problem. Rather, since the concepts of modern ethical life are “essentially contested,” their content depends on the practical and political agreement of modern subjects. This means that concepts can only have objective authority if some prior intersubjective agreement has been reached. The role of philosophy as conceptual analysis is thus importantly dependent on political developments. (shrink)

HISTÓRIA DA SOCIOLOGIA: O DESENVOLVIMENTO DA SOCIOLOGIA I -/- A SOCIOLOGIA NA ALEMANHA -/- -/- HISTORY OF SOCIOLOGY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOLOGY I -/- SOCIOLOGY IN GERMANY -/- -/- -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva – IFPE-BJ, CAP-UFPE e UFRPE. E-mail's: [email protected] e [email protected]. WhatsApp: (82)9.8143-8399. -/- PREMISSA -/- Na Alemanha, a Sociologia foi profundamente influenciada pela discussão filosófica, histórica e metodológica que se desenvolveu entre o final do século XIX e o início do século XX. Em seus fundamentos encontra-se (...) o pensamento de vários filósofos, como Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762 -1814), Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling (1775 -1854), Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (1768 -1834), Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770 -1831) e Friedrich W. Nietzsche (1844-1900). -/- O representante mais expressivo da Sociologia alemã é Max Weber (1864-1920). Outros pensadores, entretanto, contribuíram significativamente para a formação e o desenvolvimento da Sociologia na Alemanha, entre os quais Ferdinand Tönnies (1855 -1936), Werner Sombart (1863-1941), Georg Simmel (1858-1918) e os estudiosos que a partir da década de 1920 constituíram a chamada Escola de Frankfurt. -/- A obra desses autores liga-se fortemente ao processo de unificação alemã, promovido somente após o triunfo de Otto von Bismarck na Guerra Franco-Prussiana (1871), e à aceleração da industrialização alemã. Esses dois fatores conferiram à Alemanha uma situação muito diferente da de outros países europeus. -/- A alteração nas estruturas de poder, na Alemanha, não ocorreu por meio de uma revolução, como na França, mas por um acordo entre a bur-guesia industrial e os grandes proprietários de terra, tendo em vista uma transição mais adequada aos seus interesses. -/- Vale salientar, em nota, que após a Guerra Franco-Prussiana (1870-71), os príncipes alemães se reuniram no palácio de Versalhes (França), onde aclamaram Guilherme I, da Prússia, como o imperador alemão. Assim surgia o Império da Alemanha, em 1871. -/- A burguesia industrial não estava preocupada em alterar de modo significativo a estrutura fundiária, e os grandes proprietários, que se encastelaram na burocracia estatal, não permitiram a formulação de uma legislação trabalhista que prejudicasse os interesses da burguesia. Assim se fez uma mudança “por cima”, sem levar em conta os interesses dos trabalhadores urbanos ou rurais. Destacam-se aqui dois importantes soció-logos alemães: Georg Simmel e Max Weber, pela presença no Brasil. Depois, brevemente, falar-se-á aqui da famosa Escola de Frankfurt. -/- 1. Georg Simmel (1858-1918) -/- Nascido em Berlim, Georg Simmel é um pensador difícil de enquadrar em alguma tendência ou campo específico do conhecimento. Vamos ler um trecho do que escreveu sobre ele o sociólogo brasileiro Leopoldo Waizbort: -/- Quem tentar esboçar a fisionomia de Georg Simmel (1858-1918), logo se encontra em meio a dificuldades que são características próprias daquilo que se quer apreender. Simmel sempre postulou para seu próprio pensamento uma mobilidade e uma plasticidade para se adaptar ao seu objeto – uma multiplicidade de direções, uma defesa do fragmento –, que se opõem a toda tentativa de fixação e acabamento, a toda pretensão de sistema. Por isso todos os rótulos que lhe são atribuídos, apesar de possuírem seu teor de verdade, sempre soam tão falsos: vitalismo, relativismo, esteticismo, formalismo, irracionalismo, psicologismo, impressionismo e tantos mais. Disto também é exemplo o fato de Simmel, hoje considerado, ao lado de Max Weber e Ferdinand Tönnies, um dos “pais” da sociologia alemã, não poder ser classificado sem mais como “sociólogo”, sob pena de se perderem várias outras dimensões que são essenciais ao seu pensamento (WAIZBORT, 2000. p. 11). -/- G. Simmel foi o último dos sete filhos de um próspero comerciante judeu convertido ao cristianismo. Com a morte do pai, herdou uma fortuna considerável que lhe permitiu independência para desenvolver a vida acadêmica. Estudou História e Filosofia na Universidade de Berlim, onde foi aluno das mais importantes figuras acadêmicas da época. Em 1881, defendeu uma tese sobre Immanuel Kant e recebeu o título de doutor em Filosofia. Entre 1885 e 1914, lecionou Filosofia, Ética e Sociologia na Universidade de Berlim, mas nunca foi incorporado formalmente à universidade. -/- Ocupou o cargo de professor titular de Filosofia somente em 1914, em Estrasburgo, cidade onde permaneceu até a morte, em 1918. -/- Na virada do século XIX para o século XX na Alemanha, houve uma intensa efervescência filosófica, cultural e artística, cenário em que se desenvolveram a psicanálise, a teoria da relatividade, o positivismo lógico e a música atonal. Nesse cenário, Simmel tornou-se um conferencista muito aclamado e escreveu artigos e ensaios sobre os mais variados temas da Filosofia, como lógica, teoria do conhecimento, ética, estética ou metafísica, além de temas da Psicologia, da Sociologia, da História e da religião. -/- Escreveu também muitas biografias (de Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, de Friedrich Nietzsche, de Immanuel Kant e de Rembrandt, entre outros). -/- Suas obras sociológicas mais importantes são: Da diferenciação social (1890), A filosofia do dinheiro (1907), Sociologia (1908) e Questões fundamentais da Sociologia (1917). Georg Simmel teve influência marcante no desenvolvimento da Sociologia na Alemanha, nos Estados Unidos (em especial na Escola de Chicago) e na França (em Durkheim e seus colaboradores diretos). Suas obras foram traduzidas para o francês e o inglês, muitas vezes antes de ser publicadas em alemão. -/- 2. Max Weber (1864-1920) -/- Max Weber nasceu em 21 de abril de 1864, em Erfurt, e morreu em Munique, em 1920. De família abastada, teve uma educação formal de boa qualidade, o que lhe permitiu uma erudição notável. Com 18 anos, ingressou na Universidade de Heidelberg, onde escolheu como área de concentração o Direito e como correlatas a História, a Filosofia e a Economia. Nessa universidade, teve o primeiro contato com os escritos de Immanuel Kant e com neokantianos, os quais nunca deixou de lado em seus estudos. -/- Em 1889, concluiu o doutorado em Direito Comercial com uma tese sobre a história das sociedades comerciais da Idade Média. Em 1891, defendeu outra tese: A importância da história agrária romana para o direito público e privado. Em 1894, tornou-se professor de Economia na Universidade de Freiburg e, dois anos depois, transferiu-se para a Universidade de Heidelberg. -/- A partir de 1897, acometido de uma depressão profunda, não conseguiu desenvolver as atividades acadêmicas. Entre 1902 e 1903, retomou as atividades intelectuais, mas fora da universidade, pois não tinha condições psicológicas para ministrar aulas. No ano seguinte, tornou-se coeditor do Arquivo de Ciências Sociais, publicação muito importante para o desenvolvimento dos estudos sociológicos na Alemanha. -/- Entre agosto e dezembro de 1904, viajou, com Ferdinand Tönnies e Werner Sombart, aos Estados Unidos, por ocasião da Exposição Universal de Saint-Louis, onde entrou em contato com as igrejas e seitas protestantes daquele país e também com vários escritos de Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790), o que foi fundamental para suas pesquisas sobre a relação entre a ética protestante e o capitalismo. -/- Em 1907, recebeu uma herança significativa. A partir de então, dedicou-se exclusivamente à investigação histórica e sociológica. Em 1909, colaborou na fundação da Sociedade Alemã de Sociologia. Ao ser deflagrada a Primeira Guerra Mundial, em 1914, Weber foi convocado como oficial da reserva para dirigir um hospital militar. Entre as atividades no hospital encontrou tempo para continuar a escrever partes do livro que foi publicado postumamente por sua esposa, com o título Economia e sociedade. Além disso, desenvolveu estudos sobre ética econômica e as religiões universais e escreveu uma série de artigos para os grandes jornais da Alemanha. Nesses artigos, criticou a estrutura partidária do país e a burocratização das esferas políticas na Alemanha, afirmando que aquela situação ainda era a herança de Otto von Bismarck. -/- Em 1917, pronunciou uma conferência – A ciência como vocação – e produziu um escrito, no qual explicitou seu método – Ensaio sobre neutralidade axiológica nas ciências sociológicas e econômicas. -/- Pelas ideias expostas em debates e nos jornais e por sua erudição, Max Weber, após a derrota alemã na Primeira Guerra Mundial, fez parte da comissão que redigiu, em 1919, a nova constituição política alemã, conhecida como a Constituição de Weimar. -/- Pode-se afirmar que a vida de Max Weber foi dedicada aos estudos, à pesquisa e à participação ativa na política alemã de seu tempo, por meio de conferências e artigos para jornais e revistas. -/- Weber não media esforços para analisar e com-preender mais profundamente os temas que elegia. Aprendeu grego e hebraico para ler a Bíblia no original, espanhol para ler os documentos sobre as companhias de navegação e comércio espanhol, russo para ler os jornais sobre os acontecimentos na Rússia de 1905 até a revolução de 1917, inglês para ler os textos estadunidenses sobre a vida religiosa e a ética dos protestantes. -/- Para Max Weber, o indivíduo é o núcleo de análise por ser o único que pode definir intenções e finalidades para seus atos. Desse modo, o ponto de partida da Sociologia é a compreensão da ação dos indivíduos, atuando e vivenciando situações sociais com determinadas motivações e intenções. Instituições como Estado e família só ganham sentido quando vistas da perspectiva das relações sociais. Assim, Max Weber não concebe a sociedade como um bloco, uma estrutura una, mas como uma teia de relações capazes de produzir sentido. -/- A obra de Max Weber é vasta e engloba história, direito e economia, passando pelas questões religiosas, pelos processos burocráticos, pela análise da cidade, da música e, enfim, pela discussão metodológica das ciências humanas e dos conceitos sociológicos. -/- Entre os seus escritos, podemos destacar: A ética protestante e o “espírito” do capitalismo (1904-1905/1920), A ciência como vocação (1917), A política como vocação (1919), Economia e sociedade (1920), História geral da economia (1923) e Ensaios reunidos de sociologia da religião (1917/1920). -/- Outros sociólogos alemães mantiveram-se em atividade após a Primeira Guerra Mundial, como Ferdinand Tönnies, Leopold von Wiese (1876 -1969), Hans Freyer (1887-1969) e Franz Oppenheimer (1864 -1943), que fundou, em 1919, a primeira cátedra de Sociologia na Alemanha, em Frankfurt. -/- 3. A Escola de Frankfurt -/- Logo após a morte de Max Weber, abriu-se um novo horizonte para a Sociologia alemã com a fundação do Instituto de Pesquisa Social, vinculado à Universidade Johann Wolfgang Goethe de Frankfurt, que ficou conhecido como Escola de Frankfurt. Em 1923, um grupo de intelectuais – entre eles Friedrich Pollok (1894-1970), Leo Löwenthal (1900-1993), Karl August Wittfogel (1896-1988), Max Horkheimer (1895-1973) e Theodor Adorno (1903-1969) – desenvolveu uma análise da sociedade contemporânea com base em concepções filosóficas de Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Hegel e Friedrich Nietzsche, em visões sociológicas de Karl Marx e de Max Weber e no pensamento de Sigmund Freud. -/- Os integrantes do grupo de Frankfurt pretendiam desenvolver uma teoria crítica da sociedade capitalista e buscavam explicar fenômenos que iam da análise da personalidade autoritária à indústria cultural. Mantiveram a crítica ao positivismo e ao pragmatismo, procurando demonstrar a necessida-de de refletir sobre as condições que permitiram a emergência do nazismo e sobre o significado dessa ideologia. As reflexões desses intelectuais culminaram com uma crítica à razão instrumental e às formas de controle sobre a sociedade contemporânea. -/- Além dos estudiosos citados, são representantes desse pensamento Walter Benjamin (1892-1940), Erich Fromm (1900-1980) e Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979), entre outros. Todos os integrantes da Escola de Frankfurt precisaram sair da Alema-nha por causa da perseguição nazista. Adorno e Horkheimer voltaram ao país depois do fim da Segunda Guerra Mundial. Deram continuidade à Escola de Frankfurt, entre outros, Jürgen Habermas (1929-), da segunda geração, e Axel Honneth (1949-), da terceira e atual geração. -/- REFERENCIAL TEÓRICO -/- CUIN, C. H.; GRESLE, F. História da Sociologia. Trad. Roberto Leal Ferreira. São Paulo: Ensaio, 1994. -/- CULTURAL, A. Max Weber. Textos selecionados. 2ª ed. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1980. (Col. Os Pensadores). -/- NOVA, S. V. Introdução à Sociologia. 6ª ed. São Paulo: Atlas, 2004. -/- SILVA, A. et al. Sociologia em movimento. 2ª ed. São Paulo: Ática, 2016. -/- VANDENBERGHE, F. As sociologias de Georg Simmel. 1ª ed. Petrópolis: Vozes, 2018. -/- WAIZBORT, L. As aventuras de Georg Simmel. São Paulo: USP, Curso de Pós-Graduação em Sociologia/Editora 34, 2000. -/- SBS - Sociedade Brasileira de Sociologia PUCRS - PPG em Ciências Sociais Avenida Ipiranga, 6681 - Partenon CEP: 90619-900 - Porto Alegre, RS [email protected] Emanuel Isaque © 2019. (shrink)

The history of holography, the technology of three-dimensional imaging that grew rapidly during the 1960s, has been written primarily by its historical actors and, like many new inventions, its concepts and activities became surrounded by myths and myth-making. The first historical account was disseminated by the central character of this paper, George W. Stroke, while a professor of Electrical Engineering at the University of Michigan. His claims embroiled several workers active in the field of holography and information processing during the (...) 1960s, but transcended personality conflicts: they influenced the early historiography of holography and the awarding of the Nobel Prize for Physics to Dennis Gabor in 1971. An extended discussion of these episodes, based on archival research, publications analysis and interviews with participants, reveals the importance and extraordinary allure of intellectual priority for practicing scientists, and how its history and explanations are woven from multiple accounts and contemporary interpretations. (shrink)

A widespread view about early social functionalism is that its account of functional explanation was underpinned by an analogy between biological organisms and societies that suggested pseudo-explanations about the latter. I will challenge this view through a case study of the use G.W.F. Hegel made of the organismic analogy for the purpose of concept development in his theory of the state. My claim will be that the dismissal of this analogy is premature for two reasons. First, to claim that (...) the organismic analogy figured among the premises of an analogical argument and, thus, as explanans in an explanation misses its point. For Hegel made use of the analogy to model the apparent close cooperation among the parts of the state and, thus conceptualize its characteristic structure in terms of organization: the mutual dependence among distinct structures generated by the state as a whole. Second, the organizational view of social functions thus suggested by the organismic analogy has not obviously been made obsolete by evolutionary theory. Instead, reconsidering the organismic analogy in light of contemporary philosophy of biology puts an account of social functions that has fallen from view (and from grace) in the contemporary discussion back in focus: the organizational account. -/- . (shrink)

G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831) has commonly been seen as Europe’s leading philosopher since Kant. His influence extended across the globe down to the Second World War – not least through his dissident disciple, Karl Marx. Since then, despite intermittent revivals, his importance has tended to be eclipsed by a rising tide of anti-modernist polemic, extending from Heidegger to postmodernism. Central to Hegel’s political thought was his view of the French Revolution. But notwithstanding its pivotal role in the (...) development of his ideas, his reaction to that event has been systematically misconstrued. In presenting a more faithful account of Hegel’s interpretation of his own era, the argument presented here places his response to contemporary developments in the context of a series of World Revolutions which framed the meaning of his age. This approach serves to illustrate the unique combination of historical and philosophical reasoning on which Hegel’s thought depended. In the process, reconstructing his arguments raises challenging questions about the applicability of bygone political ideas to later historical periods. (shrink)

Der folgende Artikel gibt einen Überblick, wie gegenwärtige chinesische Philosophen über die intellektuelle Beziehung von Hegel und Marx forschen – und möchte damit einen Eindruck vermitteln, in welcher Weise in China über die denkerischen Ursprünge des geistigen Vaters der eigenen sozialistischen Ideologie nachgedacht wird. Die intellektuelle Beziehung zwischen Karl Marx und G. W. F. Hegel ist seit langem ein Schlüsselthema auf dem Gebiet der marxistischen Philosophie. Dabei geht es um das Verständnis der Quelle von Marx' Denken, sowie der (...) Art und Weise, wie er seine eigene Theorie auf der Grundlage der Hegelschen Philosophie entwickelte. Diese Verhältnisbestimmung berührt wichtige Strömungen sowohl der Hegelschen als auch der marxistischen Studien. Die Wiederbelebung der Hegelforschung und der Bedeutungszuwachs der Marxforschung im zwanzigsten Jahrhundert drängen dazu, die intellektuellen Ursprünge dieser beiden Denker neu zu fassen. Die chinesischsprachige Forschung zur Marx-Hegel-Beziehung basiert auf der Grundidee, das Denken von Marx durch das Denken von Hegel zu verstehen ("von Hegel zu Marx"). Dabei lassen sich drei Ansätze identifizieren: den Weg über die Phänomenologie des Geistes, den Weg über die Wissenschaft der Logik und den Weg über die Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Streng genommen ließe sich auch der Ansatz der "Ent-Hegelisierung" von Marx, einschließlich der Versuche, Kant als seine entscheidende Inspirationsquelle zu positionieren, als eine Spielform der Marx-Hegel-Beziehung betrachten und als weiterer wichtiger Forschungsweg nennen. Jedem dieser Wege entspricht eine relativ fixe Gruppe an Texten von Marx und Hegel. Entwicklungsgeschichtlich fand Marx‘ erste Auseinandersetzung mit Hegel in der Philosophie des Rechts statt. Rezeptionsgeschichtlich wurde diese Auseinandersetzung in China jedoch als letzte diskutiert, was vor allem auf zwei Gründe zurückzuführen ist: Zum einen wurde die moderne politische Philosophie in China erst in den 1990er Jahren als Disziplin eingeführt. Zum anderen haben chinesische Wissenschaftler erst allmählich die Bedeutung und vielfältigen Dimensionen von Marx' frühem Denken erkannt und näher zu erforschen begonnen. (shrink)

This paper investigates the significance of filmic analysis in the contemporary theoretical paradigm inspired by Slavoj Žižek, which we term ‘Transcendental Materialism’. After characterising its distinct peculiarities within the history of psychoanalysis and film theory, we demonstrate the limitations of previous (possible) answers, arguing they are partly formulated in response to confrontations with other paradigms. Our own approach is then informed by a study of another popular object of analysis in Transcendental Materialism – the joke. We show how Freud’s understanding (...) of the joke was adapted by the paradigm and supported further by certain philosophical insights by (among others) G.W.F. Hegel. Finally, we demonstrate how parallels can be drawn between this adaptation and the significance of the filmic form within Transcendental Materialism, inspired in part by Alain Badiou’s reading of Hegel. (shrink)

While Hegel's metaphysics was long reviled, it has garnered more interest in recent years, with even the so-called non-metaphysical Hegelians starting to explicitly discuss Hegel’s metaphysical commitments. This brings up the old question: what are the social-philosophical implications of Hegel’s metaphysics? This chapter provides a unique answer to this question by contrasting the former non-metaphysical reading (as developed by Robert Pippin) with a traditional way of interpreting Hegel’s metaphysics and social philosophy, whose lineage includes not Wittgenstein, (...) Sellars, or Brandom, but rather Schelling, Marx, and Adorno. After discussing the two varieties of metaphysics (Sections 1–3), I will argue that a traditional metaphysical Hegel is more realist when it comes to assessing the power of social structures (Section 4), focused on structural freedom rather than agency (Sections 5 and 6), and more empowering for and lenient towards individuals who can make their interests count and are free to be irrational and egoist (Section 7). (shrink)

G.W.F. Hegel argues that a philosophy of history should engender comprehension of evil in the world. And yet some commentators have charged his philosophy with transcending mere explication by justifying the existence of these evils. In defense of his words, Hegel famously characterizes evil as a modal mismatch; namely, as the incompatibility between what is given and what ought to be the case. Unfortunately, some readers of Hegel’s grand narrative either continue to struggle with or overlook this (...) fine distinction. Against such readings, I organize my paper into three sections that speak directly to these concerns. In §1, against the concern that Hegel’s view of the “actual world” justifies suffering, it is shown that his philosophy does not endorse the merely extant world, which is a whole world apart from the actual world. In §2, I articulate the premises of Hegel’s Doppelsatz to argue that the famous slogan is not, as some commentators take it, an endorsement of “things as they are.” And in §3, I expose a category error that mistakes an epistemological claim made by Hegel about contingency as a metaphysical assertion in support of evil. Ultimately, I argue that Hegel views evil as neither actual nor necessary nor justified. (shrink)

With Hegel’s metaphysics attracting renewed attention, it is time to address a long-standing criticism: Scholars from Marx to Popper and Habermas have worried that Hegel’s metaphysics has anti-individualist and authoritarian implications, which are particularly pronounced in his Philosophy of History, since Hegel identifies historical progress with reason imposing itself on individuals. Rather than proposing an alternative non-metaphysical conception of reason, as Pippin or Brandom have done, this article argues that critics are broadly right in their metaphysical reading (...) of Hegel’s central concepts. However, they are mistaken about what Hegel’s approach entails, when one examines the specific types of states discussed by the philosopher in his Philosophy of History. Even on a traditional metaphysical reading, Hegel is not only non-authoritarian; he also makes a powerful argument concerning freedom, whereupon the freest society involves collective oversight and the shaping of social structures so as to ensure that they benefit everybody. (shrink)

This essay aims to contribute comparative points of contact between two influential figures of nineteenth century aesthetic reflection; namely, Victor Hugo’s artful considerations on architecture in his novel Notre-Dame de Paris and G.W.F. Hegel’s philosophical appraisal of the artform in his Lectures on Fine Art. Although their individual views on architecture are widely recognized, there is scant comparative commentary on these two thinkers, which seems odd because of the relative convergence of their historically situated observations. Owing to this shortage, (...) I note that, while certainly not identical, Hugo and Hegel share an aesthetic family resemblance in how they hold similar ideas on architecture’s symbolic function, cognitive content, and, ultimately, how the artform’s ability to remain a standing paragon of meaning was razed by successive modes of cultural communication. Consequently, the essay works to show some congruent aesthetic affinities between these two great figures, but which appears to be overlooked in the literature. (shrink)

Usually regarded as a 1970s phenomenon, this article demonstrates that the debate between Jürgen Habermas and Niklas Luhmann continued until Luhmann’s death in 1998, and that the development of the two theorists’ positions during the 1980s and 1990s was characterised by convergence rather than by divergence. In the realm of legal theory, the article suggests, convergence advanced to the extent that Habermas’ discourse theory may be characterised as a normative superstructure to Luhmann’s descriptive theory of society. It is further shown (...) that the debate’s result was an almost complete absorption of Habermas’ theory by Luhmann’s systems theoretical complex – an outcome facilitated by Luhmann’s deliberate translation of central Habermasian concepts into systems theoretical concepts. The article argues that both the debate and Habermas’ conversion were made possible because not only Habermas’ but also Luhmann’s work can be considered a further development of the German idealist tradition. What Luhmann did not acknowledge was that this manoeuvre permitted the achievement of Habermas’ normative objectives; nor did he notice that it could eradicate a central flaw in the system theoretical construction, by allowing the context within which distinctions are drawn to be mapped – an issue of pivotal importance for grasping relationships between different social systems, and coordinating them, via the deployment of legal instruments. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to explore the uses made of the calculus by Gilles Deleuze and G. W. F. Hegel. I show how both Deleuze and Hegel see the calculus as providing a way of thinking outside of finite representation. For Hegel, this involves attempting to show that the foundations of the calculus cannot be thought by the finite understanding, and necessitate a move to the standpoint of infinite reason. I analyse Hegel’s justification for (...) this introduction of dialectical reason by looking at his responses to Berkeley’s criticisms of the calculus. For Deleuze, instead, I show that the differential must be understood as escaping from both finite and infinite representation. By highlighting the sub-representational character of the differential in his system, I show how the differential is a key moment in Deleuze’s formulation of a transcendental empiricism. I conclude by dealing with some of the common misunderstandings that occur when Deleuze is read as endorsing a modern mathematical interpretation of the calculus. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 29, Issue 4, Page 864-886, December 2021.

Dans cet article, j’examine comment Augustin Dibi Kouadio répond à la question du début de l’histoire de la philosophie. En suivant son argumentation telle qu’elle se déploie dans son livre majeur et dans d’autres textes, je découvre que Dibi Kouadio est influencé d’une part par G. W. F. Hegel lorsqu’il s’agit de définir la philosophie, et d’autre part par Paulin Hountondji, pour ce qui concerne la critique de l’ethnophilosophie. Combinées, ces deux influences conduisent Dibi Kouadio à tenir, en rapport (...) avec la philosophie africaine, une position que je me propose de dévoiler et de critiquer, à savoir l’absence de philosophie dans le passé du continent. (shrink)

This paper examines G. W. F. Hegel’s interpretation of Plato from his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, situating his interpretation historically and noting features that resonate with contemporary Plato scholarship. Hegel forms his interpretation prior to stylometric studies of the dialogues, and distinguishes his Plato from Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann and Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher’s views. Hegel responds to important interpretive concerns: 1) the relationship between Socratic and Platonic thought, 2) the dialogue form, 3) Platonic Anonymity and (...) 4) Platonic myth. His treatment of these issues is illustrative with respect to understanding Hegelian philosophy and the history of Plato interpretation. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that there are two more or less distinct theories of the State in Hegel. The first, and better known, is developed in the Philosophy of Right, wherein Hegel endorses the notion of a coercive, centralised, and hierarchical 'Ideal State'. This is precisely the theory which certain radical Hegelians of the nineteenth century (e.g., Marx and Bakunin) viewed with such deep suspicion. The second, which has not received as much attention by commentators, appears in (...) the Phenomenology and other early writings. Although this theory introduces many of the key components of Hegel's later political philosophy, it is nonetheless far more radical in its political implications--most important, in its gesturing toward a society which makes room for the realisation of the stateless, classless vision of anarchist communism. The point is not to demonstrate that Hegel is inconsistent or self-contradictory, but show that there are elements of creative tension within his political theory which are not only sufficient to vindicate him from the criticisms of Marx and Bakunin, but also to re-contextualise him as a radical precursor. As I shall argue, the kind of society that emerges in the final chapters of the Phenomenology need not contain the elements of coercion and class struggle which appear in the Philosophy of Right and repulse Marx and Bakunin. On the contrary, such a society may be understood as prefiguring the classless, stateless society which both Marx and Bakunin ultimately endorse. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant's description of humans' first encounter with each other depicts a peaceful recognition of mutual worth. G.W.F. Hegel's by contrast depicts a struggle to the death. I argue in this paper that Hegel's description of conflict results in an ethical theory that better preserves the distinctness of the other. I consider Christine Korsgaard's description of first encounters as a third alternative but conclude that Hegel's approach better accounts for the specific commitments we make--as family members, works, (...) and citizens --in ethical life. (shrink)

Twentieth-century Canadian philosopher Bernard J. F. Lonergan and nineteenth-century German philosopher G. W. F. Hegel regarded themselves as Aristotelian thinkers. As Aristotelians, both affirmed that human knowing is essentially a matter of knowing by identity: in the act of knowing, the knower and the known are formally identical. In spite of their common Aristotelian background and their common commitment to the idea that human knowing is knowing by identity, Lonergan and Hegel also differed on a number of crucial (...) points. This essay discusses some key similarities and differences between Lonergan and Hegel on the issue knowing, in the hope that such a discussion might uncover a few possible avenues for further philosophical dialogue about these two important thinkers. (shrink)

This dissertation examines the relationship of skepticism and philosophy in the work of G.W.F. Hegel. Whereas other commentators have come to recognize the epistemological significance of Hegel's encounter with skepticism, emphasizing the strength of his system against skeptical challenges to the possibility of knowledge, I argue that Hegel develops his metaphysics in part through his ongoing engagement with the skeptical tradition. As such, I argue that Hegel's interest is not in refuting skepticism, but in defining its (...) legitimate role within the project of philosophical science. Hegel finds that historical forms of skepticism have misunderstood their own activity and thus have drawn the wrong conclusions from the epistemological challenges that they raise. For Hegel, these challenges lead not to the suspension of judgment, as many skeptics have assumed, but to an insight into the fundamental nature of reality itself. For this reason, I argue that it is important to distinguish between historical forms of skepticism (e.g., Pyrrhonism) and the "self-completing skepticism" that Hegel describes in the Phenomenology of Spirit. It is the latter sense of skepticism, I argue, that one finds at work in Hegel's own philosophical project at nearly every stage of his career. (shrink)

This article seeks to articulate an interpretation of Fanon’s engagement with G.W.F. Hegel that does not either assume that Fanon rejects Hegel’s normative conclusions or that Fanon’s engagement is incidental to his larger philosophical projects. I argue that Fanon’s take on the master-slave dialectic allows us to better understand the normative claims that undergird Fanon’s calls for violence and revolution in Black Skin, The Wretched of the Earth, and A Dying Colonialism.

Picking up on Marx’s and Hegel’s analyses of human beings as social and individual, the article shows that what is at stake is not merely the possibility of individuality, but also the correct conception of the universal good. Both Marx and Hegel suppose that individuals must be social or political as individuals, which means, at least in Hegel’s case, that particular interests must form part of the universal good. The good and the rational is not something that (...) requires sacrificing one’s interests for the community or denying one’s particular character so as to become an equal rational agent. Very much to the contrary, the rational or the common good is nothing but the harmonious structuring of particular interests. While Section I introduces Marx’s and Hegel’s conceptions of individual and social beings, Sections II and III discuss their respective views of individuality, and Sections IV and V discuss the notion of a universal good containing individual interests. (shrink)

Questo breve volume prende in considerazione, analizza e commenta alcune interpretazioni magistrali della filosofia di Giordano Bruno, che hanno attraversato l'800 ed il '900, indirizzandone l'orizzonte di comprensione. Il testo inizia con l'interpretazione di G.W.F. Hegel e di B. Spaventa, per poi accedere a quella di G. Gentile. Il volume si conclude con l'analisi ed il commento dell'interpretazione fornita da N. Badaloni. Una piccola bibliografia bruniana conclude il testo.

Menschen können missachtet werden. Woher aber rührt diese symbolische Verletz-barkeit? Und welche Folgen hat sie für unser soziales Zusammenleben? Im Ausgangvon den Theorien der Anerkennung und den Theorien der Alterität geht Steffen Herrmann diesen beiden Fragen nach. Er argumentiert im Anschluss an G.W.F. Hegel dafür, dass eine asymmetrische Abhängigkeit von der Anerkennung von Anderendie Ursache von symbolischer Verletzbarkeit bildet. Sodann zeigt er im Anschluss an E. Levinas, dass die Folge dieser Verletzungsoffenheit eine asymmetrische Ausge-setztheit an die Verantwortung für Andere (...) ist. Aus den Arbeiten von Hegel und Levinas wird so die Grundthese der vorliegenden Untersuchung gewonnen: Die Begegnung zwischen Ich und Anderem ist strukturiert durch die doppelte Asymmetrie des Sozialen. (shrink)

This article examines the ways in which Adam Smith and G. W. F Hegel conceptualize the identity of workers in a market economy. Although both see human beings as shaped in and through social rela- tionships, the relation between the worker and his work is seen in different ways. For Smith, workers “have” human capital, while for Hegel workers “are” brewers, butchers or bakers;; their profession is part of their identity. This conceptual difference, which is reflected in different (...) “varieties of capitalism” today, shows that not only degrees, but also kinds of embeddedness need to be taken into account in discussions of the relation between individual and society. (shrink)

The role of mathematics in the development of Gilles Deleuze's (1925-95) philosophy of difference as an alternative to the dialectical philosophy determined by the Hegelian dialectic logic is demonstrated in this paper by differentiating Deleuze's interpretation of the problem of the infinitesimal in Difference and Repetition from that which G. W. F Hegel (1770-1831) presents in the Science of Logic . Each deploys the operation of integration as conceived at different stages in the development of the infinitesimal calculus in (...) his treatment of the problem of the infinitesimal. Against the role that Hegel assigns to integration as the inverse transformation of differentiation in the development of his dialectical logic, Deleuze strategically redeploys Leibniz's account of integration as a method of summation in the form of a series in the development of his philosophy of difference. By demonstrating the relation between the differential point of view of the Leibnizian infinitesimal calculus and the differential calculus of contemporary mathematics, I argue that Deleuze effectively bypasses the methods of the differential calculus which Hegel uses to support the development of the dialectical logic, and by doing so, sets up the critical perspective from which to construct an alternative logic of relations characteristic of a philosophy of difference. The mode of operation of this logic is then demonstrated by drawing upon the mathematical philosophy of Albert Lautman (1908-44), which plays a significant role in Deleuze's project of constructing a philosophy of difference. Indeed, the logic of relations that Deleuze constructs is dialectical in the Lautmanian sense. (shrink)

This paper looks at dialectical inferences as they relate to Hegel’s modal metaphysics, closely examining the Actuality section of Hegel’s Science of Logic and positing a reading of Hegel’s modal actualism that engages with two strains of secondary commentary. Responding to commentators, we make the case that Hegel’s ‘das Logische’ avoids presupposing possibility’s being prior to actuality insofar as actuality and the derivation of possibility is considered as the in-itselfness of actuality, an implicit inner moment whereby (...) actuality further determines itself. Actuality is immediate yet derived as an identity from the logic of inner and outer. If actuality as immediacy is explicit/outer, then its opposition, its implicitness/innerness, has to be possibility in the logic of modality. In order to conceive of actuality as existence, and particularly as an emerging process, we must already conceive the problem of presupposing an alien form within the logic of actuality. (shrink)

The majority of studies on absorptive capacity (AC) underscore the importance of absorbing technological knowledge from other firms to create economic value. However, to preserve moral legitimacy and create social value, firms must also discern and adapt to (shifts in) societal values. A comparative case study of eight firms in the food industry reveals how organizations prioritize and operationalize the societal value health in product innovation while navigating inter- and intravalue conflicts. The value-sensitive framework induced in this article extends AC (...) by explaining how technically savvy, economic value–creating firms diverge in their receptivity, articulation, and reflexivity of societal values. (shrink)

En este texto se trata la relación entre el principio de subjetividad y el principio de soberanía que emerge de la obra Filosofía del derecho de G. W. F. Hegel. Esta correspondencia se establece dentro del marco de la Eticidad [Die Sittlichkeit], que se expone en la tercera parte de la Filosofía del Derecho. Para el autor mencionado, la libertad del individuo, como rasgo característico del Estado moderno, supone una dialéctica entre derechos y deberes que es la base fundamental (...) en la que se presenta la relación entre subjetividad y soberanía. De esta manera, a partir del cumplimiento de los deberes y la exigencia de derechos, los individuos de la sociedad moderna alcanzan su libertad sin dejar de lado la de los demás, entendiendo que el deber es derecho y el derecho es deber. (shrink)

Las fuentes principales para la reconstrucción de la teoría del conocimiento de Hegel en su Sistema maduro son la filosofía del espíritu subjetivo y la Lógica subjetiva o Lógica del Concepto. En este respecto, la filosofía del Espíritu Absoluto ocupa en principio, dentro de la estrategia general adoptada por Hegel para exponer su pensamiento gnoseológico, un lugar periférico; sin embargo, toda vez que las formas del Espíritu Absoluto, esto es, el Arte, la Religión y la Filosofía, son para (...) Hegel resultados de la progresiva explicitación del tipo de contenidos que implica la lógica interna de los sucesivos actos cognitivos del sujeto, en el marco de la exposición de la filosofía del Espíritu Absoluto Hegel desarrolla y precisa ulteriormente su teoría general sobre los actos de conocimiento. En este contexto, el tratamiento del concepto de la religión en las lecciones berlinesas sobre filosofía de la religión ofrece una oportunidad privilegiada -por regla general inadvertida- para profundizar en el análisis de las reflexiones de Hegel sobre el fenómeno del conocimiento humano. En sus cuatro cursos berlineses -1821, 1824, 1827 y 1831- sobre filosofía de la religión, Hegel divide a esta disciplina en tres partes, a saber: el Concepto de la Religión, la Religión Determinada y la Religión Consumada; en la primera de esas partes, esto es, en la que dedica al concepto de la religión, Hegel desarrolla las diferentes formas subjetivas de la conciencia religiosa sin considerar su contenido (de su contenido versarán las dos partes siguientes), es decir, analiza los actos cognitivos del sujeto de un modo puramente formal, tal como lo había hecho antes en el marco de la filosofía del espíritu subjetivo. En esta medida, la exposición del concepto de la religión ofrece una verdadera filosofía del espíritu subjetivo en compendio en la que se retoman, pero también se complementan las tesis expuestas en la filosofía del espíritu subjetivo -más precisamente, en la Psicología- en sentido estricto. El objetivo de nuestro trabajo es analizar la teoría de los actos de conocimiento presente en las Lecciones sobre Filosofía de la Religión; en razón de los requisitos de extensión que debe cumplir este trabajo, nos limitaremos a analizar los desarrollos que Hegel ofrece en el manuscrito que usa como texto base para el dictado de su primera Lección sobre Filosofía de la Religión en el semestre de verano de 1821 (cf. G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen. Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte. Bd. 3. Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion. 1. Einleitung und Begriff der Religion, Hamburg, Felix Meiner, 1983, pp. 95-163). (shrink)

While traces of a post-metaphysical political theory are to be found throughout his oeuvre, Nietzsche himself never explicitly elaborates any such comprehensive theory. Yet, this chapter argues, it is possible to discern a politics beyond ressentiment and the ascetic ideal, which must be both experimental and pluralist. Inspired by Nietzsche, Foucault thinks the political as a play of force relations immanent to a concrete strategic field, and thus as a multiplicity of power relations existing in agonistic tension rather than as (...) a duality in antagonistic opposition. This makes him one of the most significant inheritors of the Nietzschean challenge to overcome the politics of ressentiment and to think instead a politics of affirmation that makes difference constitutive of the political. (shrink)

In this article, Shea aims to overturn Jürgen Habermas’s characterization of Nietzsche in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity as a postmodern irrationalist. On Habermas’s account, Nietzsche employs Wille zur Macht both as a principle by which to invalidate the claims of metaphysics and as a primordial “other” to reason that unmasks reason as an expression of domination. If Habermas’s reading is correct, Nietzsche’s work is ultimately incoherent since it either lapses back into metaphysics or puts forward a self-refuting anti-metaphysics. Contrary (...) to Habermas, Shea argues that Nietzsche’s theoretical inquiries result from a considered methodological decision on the part of Nietzsche to suspend metaphysical interpretations. For this reason, Wille zur Macht can be read as the fabrication of a post-metaphysical principle for interpreting life rather than as a purported insight into the ultimate nature of reality and thus as a genuine alternative to the trappings of both metaphysical and anti-metaphysical philosophies. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I seek to explain G.W.F. Hegel’s view that human accessible conceptual content can provide knowledge about the nature or essence of things. I call this view “Conceptual Transparency.” It finds its historical antecedent in the views of eighteenth century German rationalists, which were strongly criticized by Immanuel Kant. I argue that Hegel explains Conceptual Transparency in such a way that preserves many implications of German rationalism, but in a form that is largely compatible with Kant’s (...) criticisms of the original rationalist version. After providing background on Hegel’s relationship to the traditional rationalist theory of concepts and Kant’s challenge to it, I claim that Hegel’s central task is to provide a theory of conceptual content that allows a relationship to the objective world without being dependent on the specifically sensory aspect of the world, which Kant’s theory of concepts required. Since many interpreters deny that Hegel’s use of the term “concept” is comparable to other historical philosophers (or our own), I first show that Hegel’s critique of standard conceptions of concepts presupposes an agreement of subject matter. I then show how Hegel’s account of the “formal concept” provides the skeleton for a view of conceptual content that relies on negative relations between terms, rather than a relation to sensibility, to provide content. Hegel’s account of conceptual content is completed when he shows how a universal term is further specified so that it can determine singular objects. This occurs in its adequate form in a teleological process. I argue that Hegel’s account of teleology in the Science of Logic is an attempt to explain how and where Conceptual Transparency obtains. A teleological process is one in which a concept constitutes an object, and this means that a concept is perfectly adequate to express that thing’s nature and not merely to represent it. However, in the final chapter, I show that Hegel’s concept of teleology is meant paradigmatically to illuminate how human purposive processes have constituted a social world that is conceptually accessible to us. In this way, the primary “province” of Hegel’s rationalism is the human constructed world. (shrink)

This study compares Philip Pettit’s account of freedom to Hegelian accounts. Both share the key insight that characterizes the tradition of republicanism from the Ancients to Rousseau: to be subordinated to the will of particular others is to be unfree. They both also hold that relations to others, relations of recognition, are in various ways directly constitutive of freedom, and in different ways enabling conditions of freedom. The republican ideal of non-domination can thus be fruitfully understood in light of the (...) Hegelian structure of ‘being at one with oneself (Beisichsein) in another’. However, while the Hegelian view converges with Pettit on non-domination and recognition, their comprehensive theories of freedom are based on radically different metaphysics. One key difference concerns the relationship between freedom and nature, and there is a further difference between Pettit’s (ahistorical) idea of the concept dependence of freedom, and the Hegelian (historical) idea of the conception dependence of freedom. -/- Keywords: Pettit; Hegel; freedom; non-domination; mutual recognition; republicanism; ‘being at one with oneself’; social freedom. (shrink)

In this rich and impressive new book, Henry Somers- Hall gives a nuanced analysis of the philosophical relationship between G. W. F. Hegel and Gilles Deleuze. He convincingly shows that a serious study of Hegel provides an improved insight into Deleuze’s conception of pure difference as the transcendental condition of identity. Somers- Hall develops his argument in three steps. First, both Hegel and Deleuze formulate a critique of representation. Second, Hegel’s proposed alternative is as logically consistent (...) as Deleuze’s. Third, Deleuze can account for evolution, whereas Hegel cannot. (shrink)

Hegel, Husserl and the Phenomenology of Historical Worlds by Tanja Staehler is an effort of integration between the phenomenological thinking of two of the most influential philosophers in the contemporary tradition: G.W.F. Hegel and Edmund Husserl. The author main intention is the radicalisation of Hegel's phenomenology by the overcoming of a prescribed teleology with a more open and horizonally constituted historical development.

In contemporary discussions on identity, difference and subjectivity, the thinking of Judith Butler has played a significant role, viewing identity as a problematic question of how the subject is constituted by historical structures of power that deprives it of original ownness and substantiality. As this situation for Butler stems neither from a historical occurrence, nor is clearly ontological, the question of the origin of this problem of identity and power remains. Through the thinking of Martin Heidegger, the present study develops (...) the argument that this problem indicates the completion of subject metaphysics, not its overcoming. When identity is thought and lived in terms of subjectivity, power will be its condition. This argument is first developed through a comparison of Butler’s and Heidegger’s respective appropriations of He-gel’s philosophy, together with an independent account of Hegel’s thinking. For Hegel, identi-ty involves a strive for being as a mediation of subjectivity and objectivity, where conscious-ness incorporates both beyond their split. According to Butler, this is impossible, as subjectivi-ty and objectivity are multiple, temporal and shared. For Heidegger however, the problem lies in the very thought of being as a connection of subjectivity and objectivity, and the under-standing of the human as the ground of this reconciliation. I will thereafter examine Heidegger’s “The Principle of Identity” (1957) as a response to this metaphysical comprehen-sion of identity. Here, Heidegger develops his notion of a belonging-together of man and be-ing, as a Sameness grounded in an enduring of the ontological difference between being and beings. In holding out this difference, man discovers that his primary belonging is that to the very being of his existence as such, rather than beings of subjective or objective kind. The no-tion of belonging-together is closely connected to the notion of the event (Ereignis), signify-ing Sameness as occurrence. The study covers Butler’s central writings up to 2006, Hegel’s Encyclopedia Logic, Science of Logic and Phenomenology of Spirit, as well as the whole of Heidegger’s late thought on this topic from the 30’s and onward together with a selection of his earlier works, among them Being and Time. (shrink)