This article began as a review of a conference, organized by Gerhard Schlosser, entitled “Modularity in Development and Evolution.” The conference was held at, and sponsored by, the Hanse Wissenschaftskolleg in Delmenhorst, Germany in May, 2000. The article subsequently metamorphosed into a literature and concept review as well as an analysis of the differences in current perspectives on modularity. Consequently, I refer to general aspects of the conference but do not review particular presentations. I divide modules into three (...) kinds: structural, developmental, and physiological. Every module fulfills none, one, or multiple functional roles. Two further orthogonal distinctions are important in this context: module-kinds versus module-variants-of-a-kind and reproducer versus nonreproducer modules. I review criteria for individuation of modules and mechanisms for the phylogenetic origin of modularity. I discuss conceptual and methodological differences between developmental and evolutionary biologists, in particular the difference between integration and competition perspectives on individualization and modular behavior. The variety in views regarding modularity presents challenges that require resolution in order to attain a comprehensive, rather than a piecemeal and fragmentary, evolutionary developmental biology. (shrink)

Alfred Mele’s zygote argument is widely considered to be the strongest version of the manipulation argument against compatibilism (about free will and determinism). Opponents have focused largely on the first of its two premises and on the overall dialectic. My focus here will be on the underlying thought experiment—the Diana scenario—and on the second premise of the argument. I will argue that reflection on the Diana scenario shows that the second premise does not hold, and we will see that my (...) objection to the second premise helps to defend the claim that manipulation arguments face, in general, a dilemma. (shrink)

Like all causal theories in philosophy, the causal theory of action is plagued by the problem of deviant causal chains. I have proposed a solution on the basis of the assumption that mental states and events are causally efficacious in virtue of their contents. This solution has been questioned by Torbjörn Tännsjö (2009). First, I will reply to the objection, and then I will discuss Tännsjö’s alternative.

This paper proposes and defends an account of what it is to act for reasons. In the first part, I will discuss the desire-belief and the deliberative model of acting for reasons. I will argue that we can avoid the weaknesses and retain the strengths of both views, if we pursue an alternative according to which acting for reasons involves taking something as a reason. In the main part, I will develop an account of what it is to take something (...) as a reason for action. On the basis of this, I will then offer a new account of what it is to act for reasons. (shrink)

The luck argument raises a serious challenge for libertarianism about free will. In broad outline, if an action is undetermined, then it appears to be a matter of luck whether or not one performs it. And if it is a matter of luck whether or not one performs an action, then it seems that the action is not performed with free will. This argument is most effective against event-causal accounts of libertarianism. Recently, Franklin (Philosophical Studies 156:199–230, 2011) has defended event-causal (...) libertarianism against four formulations of the luck argument. I will argue that three of Franklin’s responses are unsuccessful and that there are important versions of the luck challenge that his defense has left unaddressed. (shrink)

According to radical versions of embodied cognition, human cognition and agency should be explained without the ascription of representational mental states. According to a standard reply, accounts of embodied cognition can explain only instances of cognition and agency that are not “representation-hungry”. Two main types of such representation-hungry phenomena have been discussed: cognition about “the absent” and about “the abstract”. Proponents of representationalism have maintained that a satisfactory account of such phenomena requires the ascription of mental representations. Opponents have denied (...) this. I will argue that there is another important representation-hungry phenomenon that has been overlooked in this debate: temporally extended planning agency. In particular, I will argue that it is very difficult to see how planning agency can be explained without the ascription of mental representations, even if we grant, for the sake of argument, that cognition about the absent and abstract can. We will see that this is a serious challenge for the radical as well as the more modest anti-representationalist versions of embodied cognition, and we will see that modest anti-representationalism is an unstable position. (shrink)

Benjamin Libet’s work paved the way for the neuroscientific study of free will. Other scientists have praised this research as groundbreaking. In philosophy, the reception has been more negative, often even dismissive. First, I will propose a diagnosis of this striking discrepancy. I will suggest that the experiments seem irrelevant, from the perspective of philosophy, due to the way in which they operationalize free will. In particular, I will argue that this operational definition does not capture free will properly and (...) that it is based on a false dichotomy between internal and external causes. However, I will also suggest that this problem could be overcome, as there are no obvious obstacles to an operationalization of free will that is in accord with the philosophical conception of free will. (shrink)

Empirical evidence challenges many of the assumptions that underlie traditional philosophical and commonsense conceptions of human agency. It has been suggested that this evidence threatens also to undermine free will and moral responsibility. In this paper, I will focus on the purported threat to moral responsibility. The evidence challenges assumptions concerning the ability to exercise conscious control and to act for reasons. This raises an apparent challenge to moral responsibility as these abilities appear to be necessary for morally responsible agency. (...) I will argue that this challenge collapses once the underlying conditions on moral responsibility are specified in sufficient detail. I will argue, in other words, that the empirical evidence does not support a challenge to the assumption that we are, in general, morally responsible agents. In the final section, I will suggest that empirical research on human agency is nevertheless relevant to various questions about moral responsibility. (shrink)

The causal theory of action has been the standard view in the philosophy of action and mind. In this chapter, I will present responses to two challenges to the theory. The first says, basically, that there is no positive argument in favour of the causal theory, as the only reason that supports it consists in the apparent lack of tenable alternatives. The second challenge says that the theory fails to capture the phenomenon of agency, as it reduces activity to mere (...) happenings (events and event-causal processes). This is often referred to as the problem of "disappearing agency". My main aim is to show that there is no problem of disappearing agency, and we will see that my response to the first challenge will be conducive to this end. I will present a positive argument for the causal theory on the basis of considerations concerning the metaphysics of agency, and I will suggest that we "own" the agency that springs from our mental states and events "by default". (shrink)

Benjamin Libet's empirical challenge to free will has received a great deal of attention and criticism. A standard line of response has emerged that many take to be decisive against Libet's challenge. In the first part of this paper, I will argue that this standard response fails to put the challenge to rest. It fails, in particular, to address a recent follow-up experiment that raises a similar worry about free will (Soon, Brass, Heinze, & Haynes, 2008). In the second part, (...) however, I will argue that we can altogether avoid Libet-style challenges if we adopt a traditional compatibilist account of free will. In the final section, I will briefly explain why there is good and independent reason to think about free will in this way. (shrink)

According to the standard view in philosophy, intentionality is the mark of genuine action. In psychology, human cognition and agency are now widely explained in terms of the workings of two distinct systems (or types of processes), and intentionality is not a central notion in this dual-system theory. Further, it is often claimed, in psychology, that most human actions are automatic, rather than consciously controlled. This raises pressing questions. Does the dual-system theory preserve the philosophical account of intentional action? How (...) much of our behavior is intentional according to this view? And what is the role of consciousness? I will propose here a revised account of intentional action within the dual-system framework, and we will see that most of our behavior can qualify as intentional, even if most of it is automatic. An important lesson will be that philosophical accounts of intentional action need to pay more attention to the role of consciousness in action. (shrink)

The conditional analysis of dispositions is widely rejected, mainly due to counterexamples in which dispositions are either “finkish” or “masked.” David Lewis proposed a reformed conditional analysis. This view avoids the problem of finkish dispositions, but it fails to solve the problem of masking. I will propose a reformulation of Lewis’ analysis, and I will argue that this reformulation can easily be modified so that it avoids the problem of masking. In the final section, I will address the challenge that (...) some dispositions appear to lack any stimulus condition, and I will briefly turn to the issue of reductionism. (shrink)

Given some reasonable assumptions concerning the nature of mental causation, non-reductive physicalism faces the following dilemma. If mental events cause physical events, they merely overdetermine their effects (given the causal closure of the physical). If mental events cause only other mental events, they do not make the kind of difference we want them to. This dilemma can be avoided if we drop the dichotomy between physical and mental events. Mental events make a real difference if they cause actions. But actions (...) are neither mental nor physical events. They are realized by physical events, but they are not type-identical with them. This gives us non-reductive physicalism without downward causation. The tenability of this view has been questioned. Jaegwon Kim, in particular, has argued that non-reductive physicalism is committed to downward causation. Appealing to the nature of actions, I will argue that this commitment can be avoided. (shrink)

Traditional compatibilism about free will is widely considered to be untenable. In particular, the conditional analysis of the ability to do otherwise appears to be subject to clear counterexamples. I will propose a new version of traditional compatibilism that provides a conditional account of both the ability to do otherwise and the ability to choose to do otherwise, and I will argue that this view withstands the standard objections to traditional compatibilism. For this, I will assume with incompatibilists that the (...) mere possession of a general ability to do otherwise is not sufficient for having the ability that is required for free will. This concession distinguishes the view from the traditional conditional analysis and from recent dispositional accounts of the ability to do otherwise, and we will see that this concession enables a straightforward response to the counterexamples. This, in turn, will play a crucial role in my response to the strongest version of the consequence argument for incompatibilism. (shrink)

Empirical evidence, it has often been argued, undermines our commonsense assumptions concerning the efficacy of conscious intentions. One of the most influential advocates of this challenge has been Daniel Wegner, who has presented an impressive amount of evidence in support of a model of "apparent mental causation". According to Wegner, this model provides the best explanation of numerous curious and pathological cases of behavior. Further, it seems that Benjamin Libet's classic experiment on the initiation of action and the empirical evidence (...) concerning the confabulation of reason explanations provide further support for this view. In response, I will propose an alternative model of "real mental causation" that can accommodate the empirical evidence just as well as Wegner's. Further, we will see that there is plenty of evidence in support of the assumption that intentions are causally efficacious. This will provide us with ample reason to endorse the model of real mental causation. (shrink)

Libertarianism appears to be incoherent, because free will appears to be incompatible with indeterminism. In support of this claim, van Inwagen offered an argument that is now known as the “rollback argument”. In a recent reply, Lara Buchak has argued that the underlying thought experiment fails to support the first of two key premises. On her view, this points to an unexplored alternative in the free will debate, which she calls “chance-incompatibilism”. I will argue that the rollback thought experiment does (...) support the second key premise of the argument, and, more importantly, that libertarianism is committed to the first premise for independent reasons concerning the relationship between the normative and causal strength of the agent’s reasons. The upshot will be that chance-incompatibilism is not a promising new alternative in the free will debate, and we will see that the debate around those issues can benefit from more attention to the role of the agent’s reasons for action. (shrink)

In the first part I argue that Buddhism and Hinduism can be unified by a Pure Consciousness thesis, which says that the nature of ultimate reality is an unconditioned and pure consciousness and that the phenomenal world is a mere appearance of pure consciousness. In the second part I argue that the Pure Consciousness thesis can be supported by an argument from quantum physics. According to our best scientific theories, the fundamental nature of reality consists of quantum fields, and it (...) seems that quantum fields have merely particle-like appearances—particles seem to be mere epiphenomena. This interpretation can be generalized. There appear to be individual entities, small and large, and their ontological reality is precisely what it appears to be—they are mere appearances. (shrink)

It is widely thought that philosophical behaviorism is an untenable and outdated theory of mind. It is generally agreed, in particular, that the view generates a vicious circularity problem. There is a standard solution to this problem for functionalism, which utilizes the formulation of Ramsey sentences. I will show that this solution is also available for behaviorism if we allow quantification over the causal bases of behavioral dispositions. Then I will suggest that behaviorism differs from functionalism mainly in its commitment (...) to anti-representationalism, and I will offer two new objections to anti-representationalism. The first will be based on considerations concerning the contents of desires and intentions. The second objection concerns inner speech and mental imagery. We will see that the objections are of relevance to contemporary debates, as they apply with equal force to the currently popular anti-representationalist versions of embodied and enactive cognition. (shrink)

This paper is about the causal exclusion argument against non-reductive physicalism. Many philosophers think that this argument poses a serious problem for non-reductive theories of the mind — some think that it is decisive against them. In the first part I will outline non-reductive physicalism and the exclusion argument. Then I will distinguish between three versions of the argument that address three different versions of non-reductive physicalism. According to the first, the relation between mental and physical events is token-identity. According (...) to the second, mental events are distinct from physical events, but the latter metaphysically include and determine the former. And on the third version, mental and physical events are entirely distinct. I will argue that the causal exclusion argument is not decisive against non-reductive physicalism in any of the three versions. According to non-reductive physicalism, mental events are dependent on physical events. Causal exclusion and overdetermination, however, requires distinct and independent causes. I will argue that the burden of proof lies with the opponents of non-reductive physicalism, who have to explain how metaphysically dependent events can possibly overdetermine an effect or exclude each other from being causally efficacious. (shrink)

Summary The article substantiates the possibility and meaningfulness of a coherent theoretical system for psychotherapy, as it is strived for in Gestalt Theoretical Psychotherapy and presented in several articles in this issue of the journal "Gestalt Theory". The necessity of consistency in the theoretical assumptions and concepts of a psychotherapy method is not derived from scientific considerations alone, but already arises from the elementary role of consistency in human life. This also results in the requirements for the consistency of theoretical (...) foundations of psychotherapy. It is not fulfilled in a mere internal, logical consistency of its models, but only in the actual fitting together with the critical-phenomenal and naive-phenomenal worlds of the therapists and their clients in the reality test of life. (shrink)

Research on Sebastian Franck (1499 – 1543) has so far mainly focused on the topics “Sebastian Franck as a historian” or “Sebastian Franck as a critic of theology,” while Gnosticism in the philosophy of the radical reformer has received less attention. Since the beginning of the new millennium, the interest in a certain movement of Gnosticism, namely Hermeticism, has increased however. This paper examines the question of the parallels in content between Gnostic representatives such as the Carpocratians, the Ebionites, and (...) Sebastian Franck. Irenaeus of Lyon is used as a source for the Carpocratians and the Ebionites. Substantial similarities can be found in the fragmentary reports of Irenaeus on the Carpocratians and Ebionites and the teachings of Franck. The parallels between the Carpocratians and Franck can be identified in the concept of the Divine, the tripartite nature of the soul, and the doctrine of salvation. Unlike orthodox Christianity, both Franck and the Carpocratians believed in the self-salvation of people from their sins. Through the discovery of their spirit, all people can access the abilities that Yeshua had in his incarnation. The rejection of both the doctrine of original sin and the doctrine of grace is what Franck has in common with the Ebionites. However, the doctrine of grace would not make any sense for the Carpocratians either, as, according to their conviction, the soul is redeemed by the enlightenment of the spirit. (shrink)

The article outlines the Multiple-Field-Approach ("Mehr-Felder-Ansatz") in Gestalt Theoretical Psychotherapy and in psychotherapy in general. This Gestalt theory based approach deals 1) with the conditions under which a secondary phenomenal field (containing a secondary phenomenal ego and a secondary phenomenal environment) segregates within the primary phenomenal field, 2) with the dynamic field interaction between primary and secondary field and their role in psychotherapy, 3) with psychotherapeutic techniques favouring the segregation and favouring the dissolution of a secondary field . Some of (...) these phenomena have been discussed as mind-wandering, daydreaming, or - in a pathological context - as dissociation. But it seems that the Gestalt psychological approach presented in this paper has to offer a more promising framework for these phenomena and their dynamics. (shrink)

Die Sebastian Franck-Forschung hat sich bisher recht ausführlich mit den Themen "Sebastian Franck als Historiker" oder "Sebastian Franck als Kritiker der Theologie" beschäftigt. Weniger Aufmerksamkeit bekam bisher der Gnostizismus im Denken des radikalen Reformers. Seit der Jahrtausendwende ist allerdings ein stärkeres Interesse an einer bestimmten Strömung des Gnostizismus zu erkennen, nämlich der Hermetik. Es gab einige Arbeiten, die den Einfluss von Hermes Trismegistos bzw. der hermetischen Schriften auf Franck aufzeigen konnten. Dieser Aufsatz geht der Frage des Einflusses des christlichen Gnostizismus (...) auf die Metaphysik von Franck nach. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass speziell Basilides und Valentinus einen starken Einfluss auf Franck hatten, der bisher nicht gesehen wurde. Eine große Bedeutung kommt dabei der gnostischen Soteriologie zu. Genauso wie Basilides und Valentinus nimmt Franck die platonische Dreiteilung der Seele in Geist, Seele und Körper an. Der Geist ist göttlich und ist weder entstanden noch kann er vergehen. Diesen Geist oder Christus findet man im Inneren von allen Kreaturen. Durch die Erkenntnis des Geistes oder Christus im Menschen, (=Gnosis) kann sich der Mensch von der Welt befreien. Ebenfalls christlich-gnostisch inspiriert ist der Gottesbegriff und die Lehre von Christus. Franck´s Christologie ist stark von der Nous-Christologie von Basilides beeinflußt, wobei er nicht exakt dem gleichen Doketismus folgt wie Basilides. Dass die Welt vom Demiurgen und nicht von Gott erschaffen wurde, wie Valentinus glaubt, sagt Franck nicht explizit. Franck glaubt aber der Teufel (Demiurg oder böser Engel) habe den Tod und damit die Seele erschaffen, während der unsterbliche Geist des Menschen nicht erschaffen wurde. (shrink)

Sebastian Franck commented and translated parts of Agrippa´s De Vanitate Scientiarum, confirming that Franck knew at least some of this philosopher’s work. However, there is no detailed research on the influence Agrippa had on Franck—a gap this paper tries to fill. In a paper of Keefer, the author advocates that Franck was much influenced by Agrippa. The major claim of this paper is that Agrippa’s influence on Franck should not be overestimated, primarily because Franck deliberately did not cite from the (...) Occulta philosophia. Only De Vanitate Scientiarum and one paragraph of Oratio habita papiae are shown to have had a direct influence on Franck. The influence on Franck`s philosophy has to be analyzed very carefully to avoid such fallacies. In a comparison of the metaphysical belief systems of both Franck and Agrippa, important parallels concerning the soul and Christology can be found. Notably, Agrippa and Franck were both believers in the Platonic doctrine of the tripartite soul. However, Franck did not cite this concept from Agrippa. A difference between Agrippa and Franck was that Agrippa had a cosmological perspective that was strongly influenced by Neoplatonism and Hermeticism. In contrast, the Neoplatonic concept of the world soul did not make sense in Franck’s philosophical system of beliefs because Franck denies the idea that the world is conducted by rationality. His pessimistic view of the world and the human being did not blend with this idea of the world soul. These differences demonstrate that Franck did not agree with many concepts found in the Occulta philosophia. The Corpus Hermeticum was also not as important for Franck as it was for Agrippa. Franck focused primarily on the Pimander and to a certain extent on the thirteenth book (rebirth), whereas for Agrippa many parts were relevant. Research on the influence of the Hermetic books on Franck just began in the 21st century and this paper further contributes to a better understanding of how the Hermetic books affected Franck. Franck used Agrippa to convey his understanding of the Corpus Hermeticum to his readers. However, it remains an open question why Franck integrated only a small part of the Corpus Hermeticum and the writings of Agrippa into his philosophy. (shrink)

There is a widespread belief in the academic world—above all in the United States and in the scientific communities around the world accepting U.S. mainstream science as their standard —that »schools« have lost their grounds and their legitimacy in psychology and other sciences.»Schools of thought« are seen as hampering freedom of thought and research, progress in science would have a better chance when free of such affiliations, and »objectivity« in science is seen to be best granted by some sort of (...) disinterested eclecticism.If you agree with such a premise, it is clear that it would not make much sense to run an international scientific society like the GTA, which explicitly feels committed to such a »school«. I am not the first one to object to such a view, more meritorious people have done so before me. (shrink)

Sebastian Franck hat Teile von Agrippas De Vanitate Scientiarum übersetzt und kommentiert. Von daher ist der Einfluss der Philosophie von Agrippa auf Franck bekannt. Es gab allerdings bisher keine ausführlichen Untersuchungen zu den Einflüssen von Agrippa auf Franck. Diese Lücke versucht dieser Aufsatz zu schließen. Beim Vergleich der metaphysischen Systeme von Franck und Agrippa stellt sich heraus, dass es bedeutende Einflüsse im Bereich der Seelenlehre und der Christologie gab. Sowohl Agrippa als auch Franck sind Anhänger der platonischen Lehre der drei (...) Seelenteile. Die Seele besteht nach dieser Lehre aus Geist, Seele und Körper. Der Geist ist der unsterbliche göttliche Teil im Menschen. Der Hauptunterschied zwischen Agrippa und Franck kann darin gesehen werden, dass Agrippas Synkretismus stärker den Neuplatonismus betont und Franck`s Synkretismus die Gnosis. Die Weltseele ergibt im Konzept von Franck nur wenig Sinn, während diese bei Agrippa ganz zentral ist. Franck lehnt den Gedanken ab, die Welt werde durch eine Vernunft geleitet. Sein pessimistisches Bild von der Welt und vom Menschen verträgt sich nicht mit diesem Gedanken. Da es keine Vernunft gibt, ist auch die Astrologie, die Mantik oder die Kabbalistik nicht wichtig für Franck. Daher ist es nicht verwunderlich, dass Franck nirgends die Occulta philosophia zitiert, sondern immer nur De Vantitate Scientiarum Der Synkretismus von Agrippa beinhaltet Astrologie, Mantik, Kabbala und Neuplatonismus. Am ehesten spielt bei Franck noch die Hermetik eine Rolle. Franck meint, Christus habe im Pimander mit Hermes Trismegistos kommuniziert. Diesen Gedanken findet man nicht nur bei Franck, sondern auch bei Agrippa. Die für Franck so wichtige Lehre des inneren Christus ist ebenfalls Teil der Seelenlehre von Agrippa. Wenn der Mensch seinen Geist oder seinen inneren Christus erkennt, dann erkennt er Gott. Die Untersuchung zeigt, dass Franck nur diejenigen Dinge von dem „weisen Agrippa“ übernommen hat, die in sein Konzept passen. (shrink)

The paper presents basic Gestalt psychological concepts of ego and self. They differ from other concepts in the way that they do not comprehend ego and self as fixed entities or as central controlling instances of the psyche, but as one specific organized unit in a psychological field in dynamic interrelation with the other organized units—the environment units—of this field. On this theme, well-known representatives of Gestalt theory have presented some general and special theories since the early days of this (...) approach that could partly be substantiated experimentally. They illuminate the relationship between ego and world in everyday life as well as in the case of mental disorders. Not only the spatial extension of the phenomenal ego is subject to situational changes, but also its place in the world, its functional fitting in this world, its internal differentiation, its permeability to the environment, and much more. The German Gestalt psychologist Wolfgang Metzger emphasizes the significant functional role that this dynamic plasticity of the phenomenal world and its continuously changing segregation of ego and environment have for human life by designating the phenomenal world as a “Central Steering Mechanism.” In this article, ego and self as part of this field in their interrelation with the total psychological field will be illuminated from the perspective of the thinking of the Gestalt psychologists Max Wertheimer, Kurt Koffka, Wolfgang Köhler, Kurt Lewin, Wolfgang Metzger, Mary Henle, Edwin Rausch, and Giuseppe Galli. (shrink)

Summary Giancarlo Trombini presents the continuation of his research on the question of which criteria can be used to assess the progress of therapy in an objectively verifiable way and to make the decision on the completion of therapy. In the first phase of his research, the phenomenological criterion of a qualitative change in the patient’s relations toward the positive and higher complexity was proposed for this purpose. In terms of the working method in analytic therapy, this meant concretely: attention (...) should be paid to what development is shown in the comparison of the relationships that occur in the dream narrative and in the subsequent associations. This criterion was therefore given the name manifest dream/association comparison (MDAC)—comparison between the manifest dream and the subsequent associations. The idea can easily be transferred to those therapy methods, which do not primarily work with reports of dream memories and subsequent associations—also, in other ways of working, it is possible to pay attention, in the way suggested by Trombini, to the qualitative development of the relationships which are thematized by the clients in the course of an hour. To this first criterion, another phenomenological criterion is now added in the present article: that of the “concluding therapeutic turn” (CTT). If the patient’s development reaches this turn in the course of the therapy in one session, this indicates, according to Trombini, that the therapy can soon be concluded. The fulfillment of this criterion can be recognized by the fact that in the sequence of dream narration and subsequent associations in a session, a relational dynamic toward the positive and higher complexity becomes recognizable and that is, at the same time, connected with a reconciliation of the three temporal reference systems (past, present, and future). The achievement of this CTT indicates that the patient is aware of the changes made in therapy and makes it evident to the therapist that the therapy is nearing completion. (shrink)

Dieser Beitrag erörtert die „übersinnlichen Erkenntnisse“ von Rudolf Steiner zum Thema der Beziehungen von Jesus zu den Essenern. Steiner beschäftigte sich in seinem Vortragszyklus „Das fünfte Evangelium“ mit dieser Frage und präsentierte Erkenntnisse seiner Forschungen aus der Akasha-Chronik. Um die Unabhängigkeit der Akasha-Forschungen von Steiner herauszufiltern, stellt der Autor die Forschungen der Theosophin Blavatsky den Erkenntnissen von Steiner gegenüber. Die Gegenüberstellung verfolgt das Ziel, die Grenzen und Möglichkeiten der Akasha-Forschungen Steiners zu erkunden. Die Arbeit zeigt, dass das fünfte Evangelium von (...) Steiner einige Grundaussagen über die Beziehung von Jesus zu den Essenern enthält, die man bereits bei Blavatsky in „Isis entschleiert“ findet. Dass Steiner die Forschungen ganz unabhängig von bereits vorhandenen Ergebnissen (von Blavatsky) betrieben hat, ist daher unwahrscheinlich. Steiner berichtet über persönliche Begegnungen von Jesus mit den Essenern, die man nirgendwo sonst in dieser Detailliertheit in der Literatur finden kann, und daher hat er einen zusätzlichen Beitrag zur esoterischen Forschung geliefert, der nicht übersehen werden sollte. Eine These, die sich aus dieser Arbeit ergibt, ist, dass Steiner methodisch sowohl den theosophischen Mediumismus als auch die meditative Schau der Akasha-Chronik, die er als exakter empfand, in seine Forschungen einfließen ließ. (shrink)

Buddhism and Hinduism appear to be separated by irreconcilable differences. I argue that this apparent gulf can be overcome. The argument has three main parts. First, I argue that the Buddhist doctrine of dependent arising is not a metaphysical principle of real causation, but a principle of fabrication. Second, I argue that this interpretation of dependent arising enables a unification of the main schools of Buddhism. Third, I argue that Buddhism can be unified fully with Advaita Vedānta, the most important (...) philosophical school of Hinduism, and I argue that a substantial unity can be established between Buddhism and the three main schools of Vedānta. In particular, Buddhism and Vedānta can agree that the highest aim and good consists in the direct realization of an unconditioned and pure mind or consciousness. (shrink)

La théorie de l’organisme social était une approche foncièrement et largement répandue au début du 20ème siècle, qui était acceptée par de nombreuses orientations théoriques dans la sociologie et l’économie. L’approche de Rudolf Steiner s’y rapportant est bien connue. La théorie de Gerhard Stolzmann ne l’est pas autant. Ce dernier était un représentant de ce qu’on appelle le « mouvement des droits sociaux de l’économie politique » et au plan philosophique, il défendait le néo-kantisme (école de Marburg, de l’Allemagne (...) du sud-ouest). Stolzmann a connu et cité les écrits de Steiner sur l’organisme social, comme on peut le prouver. Dans cet essai, on va mettre au jour les communautés et tendances dans le concept de l’organisme social chez Stolzmann et Steiner. Tous deux ont mis en exergue l’importance du spirituel et en conséquence de la sphère du droit, pour la société et l’économie dans leur théorie. Mais Steiner eut essentiellement une amorce plus pratique. Son concept d’organisme social est plus une proposition de réforme pour l’économie et la société, alors que Stolzmann fait ressortir la signification théorique générale toujours valable de sa théorie. (shrink)

Der menschliche Verstand, sagt Kant, „kann nur d e n k e n und muss in den Sinnen die Anschauung suchen“ [KrV, §16]. Da der Verstand nur denken kann, ist denken und Anschauung suchen nicht zweierlei. Denn auch die Anschauung suchen muss man können. Daher sieht Kant das Besondere „unseres discursiven, der Bilder bedürftigen Verstandes (intellectus ectypus )“ [KdU §77] im „Vermögen, den Gegenstand sinnlicher Anschauung zu denken“ [KrV B75/A51]. Daher ist Verstand primär ein Erkenntnisvermögen. Denn ohne „den Stoff zum (...) Denken“ aus empirischer Anschauung „würde der Actus, Ich denke, doch nicht stattfinden“ [B423], und indem er sucht, findet er (cum quaerit, invenit): „Ich, der ich denke und anschaue, ist die Person“ [Preisschrift]. In diesem Aufsatz werden in einem ersten Ausblick einige grundlegende Textstellen auf dieser Basis analysiert. -/- Short summary: What is it like to be human understanding, according to Kant? Understanding is in search of intuition (intellectus ectypus quaerens sensibilitatem), and happens to be pretty successful, at least everywhere and anytime. The IQ (intellectus quaerens) project is a Kant interpretation which takes Kants talk of understanding seeking intuition as a serious thing in itself. Let‘s see how it works, with a few examples. (shrink)

Pakṣilasvāmin's introduction to his Nyāyabhāṣyam is perhaps one of the most interesting texts of the older Nyāya indispensable to the understanding of the system. This is not because the ideas expressed therein were not to be surpassed at a later period, but because in it the development of the school appears fixed, as it were, in a "transitory moment" (transitorisches Moment), and we see there for the first time that line of thought, which historically took form in the Nyāya philosophy, (...) becoming aware of itself in a clear, though archaic, manner. Furthermore, if we bear in mind to what extent such an interpretation of a school (given by itself) determines its development, the importance of Pakṣilasvāmin's text for the history of Nyāya cannot be over-estimated. (shrink)

Albrecht von Wachters Studie Eine philosophische Untersuchung des Neuen Coronavirus (von Anfang Juni 2020) zufolge kann selbst ein gut informierter Laie erkennen, dass das Neuartige Coronavirus nicht besonders gefährlich ist. Ohne Widerspruch dazu lässt sich behaupten, dass ein Virus, das eine wichtige, sine qua non Bedingung einer weltweiten Krise ist, zurecht als hochgradig gefährlich beurteilt wird. Denn der Neuartige Coronavirus ist nicht nur gefährlich für die Gesundheit, sondern auch für Politik und Wirtschaft, wobei letzteres natürlich maßgeblich von der Beurteilung des (...) ersteren abhängt. Aber auch betreffend der Gefährlichkeit des Virus für ein und dasselbe kann man auf Basis derselben Informationen zu verschiedenen Ergebnissen kommen, und zwar, wenn verschieden Maß genommen wird, und dieses Maß ist der angewandte Gefahrenbegriff. In diesem Aufsatz werde ich argumentieren, dass der Gefahrenbegriff der genannten Studie zu eng ist, um die mit dem Neuartigen Coronavirus verbundenen Gefahren für die menschliche Gesundheit korrekt beurteilen zu können. Menschen mussten schon immer auf der Hut sein und wir verstehen uns ganz gut auf Gefahren im allgemeinen. Von diesem allgemeinen Gefahrenbegriff ausgehend werden einige Binsenweisheiten zur Gefährlichkeit des Neuartigen Coronavirus vorgetragen. (shrink)

This addendum presents results that confound some commonly made claims about the sorts of environments in which the performance of TTB exceeds that of Franklin's rule, and vice versa.

Die Theorie des sozialen Organismus war zur Zeit des Beginns des 20. Jahrhunderts ein durchaus weit verbreiteter Ansatz der von vielen verschiedenen theoretischen Richtungen in der Soziologie und Ökonomie aufgenommen wurde. Bekannt ist der diesbezügliche Ansatz von Rudolf Steiner. Eher nicht so bekannt ist die Theorie von Rudolf Stolzmann. Letzterer war ein Vertreter der sogenannten sozialrechtlichen Richtung der Nationalökonomie und philosophisch war er ein Vertreter des Neukantianismus (Marburger Schule, Südwestdeutsche Schule). Stolzmann hat Steiners Schriften zum sozialen Organismus nachweislich gekannt und (...) auch zitiert. In diesem Aufsatz sollen Gemeinsamkeiten und Trennendes im Konzept des sozialen Organismus bei Stolzmann und Steiner gefunden werden. Stolzmann und Steiner haben die Bedeutung des Geistigen und in weiterer Folge des Rechtlichen für die Gesellschaft und Wirtschaft in ihrer Theorie hervorgehoben. Steiner hatte aber den wesentlich praktischeren Ansatz. Sein Konzept des sozialen Organismus ist mehr ein Reformvorschlag für Ökonomie und Gesellschaft, während Stolzmann die theoretische und immer gültige Bedeutung seiner Theorie hervorhebt. (shrink)

Diese Arbeit behandelt die Frage, ob die Christengemeinschaft aus dogmatischer Perspektive Teil der Ökumene sein könnte. Es wurden dazu mehrere Hypothese überprüft und die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Christengemeinschaft inhaltlich zu weit von der Dogmatik der Ökumene abweicht. Eine Hypothese ist, dass die Christengemeinschaft zum gnostischen Strang innerhalb des Christentums gezählt werden kann. Die Hypothese wurde bejaht. Die größten Differenzen finden sich in der Christologie und beim Thema Reinkarnation. Die Christengemeinschaft ist eng an die Philosophie Rudolf Steiners orientiert und 90 (...) Prozent der Gläubigen glauben an die Reinkarnation und an die gnostische Inkarnationschristologie. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss the new Tweety puzzle. The original Tweety puzzle was addressed by approaches in non-monotonic logic, which aim to adequately represent the Tweety case, namely that Tweety is a penguin and, thus, an exceptional bird, which cannot fly, although in general birds can fly. The new Tweety puzzle is intended as a challenge for probabilistic theories of epistemic states. In the first part of the paper we argue against monistic Bayesians, who assume that epistemic states can (...) at any given time be adequately described by a single subjective probability function. We show that monistic Bayesians cannot provide an adequate solution to the new Tweety puzzle, because this requires one to refer to a frequency-based probability function. We conclude that monistic Bayesianism cannot be a fully adequate theory of epistemic states. In the second part we describe an empirical study, which provides support for the thesis that monistic Bayesianism is also inadequate as a descriptive theory of cognitive states. In the final part of the paper we criticize Bayesian approaches in cognitive science, insofar as their monistic tendency cannot adequately address the new Tweety puzzle. We, further, argue against monistic Bayesianism in cognitive science by means of a case study. In this case study we show that Oaksford and Chater’s (2007, 2008) model of conditional inference—contrary to the authors’ theoretical position—has to refer also to a frequency-based probability function. (shrink)

We investigate a lattice of conditional logics described by a Kripke type semantics, which was suggested by Chellas and Segerberg – Chellas–Segerberg (CS) semantics – plus 30 further principles. We (i) present a non-trivial frame-based completeness result, (ii) a translation procedure which gives one corresponding trivial frame conditions for arbitrary formula schemata, and (iii) non-trivial frame conditions in CS semantics which correspond to the 30 principles.

In this essay we argue that an agent’s failure to assist someone in need at one time can change the cost she can be morally required to take on to assist that same person at a later time. In particular, we show that the cost the agent can subsequently be required to take on to help the person in need can increase quite significantly, and can be enforced through the proportionate use of force. We explore the implications of this argument (...) for the duties of the affluent to address global poverty. (shrink)

Crises in therapist-patient relationship can also become a challenge in clinical supervision. However, success and failure in establishing and maintaining constructive relationships in therapy and supervision is not only subject to a lucky fit of personal characteristics (therapist A gets along well/badly with client B; supervisee A gets along well/badly with supervisor C). Rather, we can identify determining field conditions in the overall therapeutic and supervisory situation for this outcome. We do not only focus on the persons involved, but also (...) on their environment, the task to be accomplished together, further framework conditions and the power relations resulting from their mutual influence-in the supervised case of therapy as well as in supervision itself. We want to examine the structure and dynamics of these relationships from a genuine Gestalt psychological perspective. What contributes to a cooperative atmosphere? When do goals get out of sight? What can make the atmosphere hostile? How do such developments become accessible in supervision? (shrink)

Schon der Titel von Kants Aufsatz kann als Hinweis darauf verstanden werden, zu lügen könne, wenn überhaupt, dann nur vermeintlich rechtens sein. Doch geht es um Lügen, die vermeintlich rechtens sein können, ist Kant notorisch unklar, mit Ausnahme dieses Aufsatzes. Denn die Klärung dieser Unklarheit ist gerade Kants systematischer Grund seiner Abfassung. Dieser These folgend wird versucht, Kants Argumentation in Anschluss an Die Metaphysik der Sitten nachzuzeichnen, und das, wofür argumentiert wird, ist: Genau dann, wenn einmal gesprochen werden muss, widerspricht (...) die Lüge, was auch ihr Inhalt sein mag, also formal, dem allgemeinen Sittengesetz in seinen inneren und äußeren Gesetzen. Der paradigmatische Fall für das menschliche Sprechenmüssen ist die äußere Gesetzgebung selbst. (shrink)

This book explores the nature of moral responsibilities of affluent individuals in the developed world, addressing global poverty and arguments that philosophers have offered for having these responsibilities. The first type of argument grounds responsibilities in the ability to avert serious suffering by taking on some cost. The second argument seeks to ground responsibilities in the fact that the affluent are contributing to such poverty. The authors criticise many of the claims advanced by those who seek to ground stringent responsibilities (...) to the poor by invoking these two types of arguments. It does not follow from this that the affluent are meeting responsibilities to the poor. The book argues that while people are not ordinarily required to make large sacrifices in assisting others in severe need, they are required to incur moderate costs to do so. If the affluent fail consistently to meet standards, this fact can substantially increase the costs they are required to bear in order to address it. (shrink)

In recent years it has often been claimed that policies such as subsidies paid to domestic producers by affluent countries and tariffs on goods produced by foreign producers in poorer countries violate important moral requirements because they do severe harm to poor people, even kill them. Such claims involve an empirical aspect—such policies are on balance very bad for the global poor—and a philosophical aspect—that the causal influence of these policies can fairly be characterized as doing severe harm and killing. (...) In this essay, we examine the philosophical aspect of this issue. We conclude that these policies do not do harm to the poor, but rather enable harm to them in various ways, and explore the moral implications of this fact. (shrink)

Upon separation of the protein from the nucleic acid component of tobacco mosaic virus by phenol, using a fast and gentle procedure, the nucleic acid is infective in assays on tobacco leaves. A series of qualitative and quantitative control experiments demonstrates that the biological activity cannot depend on residual proteins in the preparation, but is a property of isolated nucleic acid which is thus the genetic material of the virus.

Systems of logico-probabilistic (LP) reasoning characterize inference from conditional assertions interpreted as expressing high conditional probabilities. In the present article, we investigate four prominent LP systems (namely, systems O, P, Z, and QC) by means of computer simulations. The results reported here extend our previous work in this area, and evaluate the four systems in terms of the expected utility of the dispositions to act that derive from the conclusions that the systems license. In addition to conforming to the dominant (...) paradigm for assessing the rationality of actions and decisions, our present evaluation complements our previous work, since our previous evaluation may have been too severe in its assessment of inferences to false and uninformative conclusions. In the end, our new results provide additional support for the conclusion that (of the four systems considered) inference by system Z offers the best balance of error avoidance and inferential power. Our new results also suggest that improved performance could be achieved by a modest strengthening of system Z. (shrink)

Ovid versteht seine Metamorphosen als zusammenhängende Dichtung (perpetuum carmen). Für die Syrinx-Erzählung ist dieser Zusammenhang offensichtlich: Im ersten Buch wird erzählt, wie es zur Erfindung der Panflöte (Syrinx) gekommen ist, im elften Buch tritt Pan auf der Syrinx gegen Apollon an. Die unmittelbar anschließende Geschichte vom Barbier des Midas wird dagegen gegenwärtig nur selten mit der Syrinx verknüpft. Zu Unrecht, wie in diesem Aufsatz dargestellt werden soll. Denn diese Geschichte ist der eigentliche Schlusspunkt des musikalischen Wettstreits zwischen Pan und Apollon, (...) worin er sich, quasi in einer Zugabe, zugleich als Gott der Wahrheit präsentiert. Die vordergründig groteske Handlungsweise des Dieners ist durchgängig eine semantische Komposition zum Thema Syrinx. Nun wird Ovids Geschichte vom Barbier des Midas bekanntlich gerne mit dem Wort Binsenweisheit verknüpft und umgekehrt. Das geschieht durchaus unorthodox, nämlich nicht gestützt auf etymologische Wörterbücher, die meist andere Quellen bevorzugen, wenn sie die Wortbildung nicht gleich ungeklärt sein lassen. Zu dieser Verbindung gehört also eine gute Portion Einfalt. 2 Vor dem oben genannten Hintergrund müsste diese Beziehung zudem als besonders glückliche Fügung betrachtet werden. Ich kann nicht umhin, es so zu sehen und werde dafür argumentieren, dass Binsenweisheit ein Wort mit Geschichte ist, weil es ein Wort mit Geschichte ist. Gut, der Barbier des Midas wird darin zum Prototyp eines Whistleblowers. Das sieht nach einer hausgemachten Schwierigkeit aus, denn Binsenwahrheiten sind gerade keine Geheimnisse. Dieser Aspekt wird durch Bezug auf antike Interpreten, Ausonius und Persius, näher untersucht. All dies ist nicht möglich ohne kurze Streifzüge durch die Semantik von Binsenweisheit vermittels der stets griffbereiten Vergewisserungsformel Es ist eine Binsenweisheit, dass ... Zwischen Binsenwahrheit und Binsenweisheit wird im Aufsatz nicht weiter unterschieden. Wer möchte, kann sie jeweils Syrinx und Apollon, den beiden Hintergrundakteuren der Barbiergeschichte, zuordnen. (shrink)

Climate change and other harmful large-scale processes challenge our understandings of individual responsibility. People throughout the world suffer harms—severe shortfalls in health, civic status, or standard of living relative to the vital needs of human beings—as a result of physical processes to which many people appear to contribute. Climate change, polluted air and water, and the erosion of grasslands, for example, occur because a great many people emit carbon and pollutants, build excessively, enable their flocks to overgraze, or otherwise stress (...) the environment. If a much smaller number of people engaged in these types of conduct, the harms in question would not occur, or would be substantially lessened. However, the conduct of any particular person (and, in the case of climate change, of even quite large numbers of people) could make no apparent difference to their occurrence. My carbon emissions (and quite possibly the carbon emissions of much larger groups of people dispersed throughout the world) may not make a difference to what happens to anyone. When the conduct of some agent does not make any apparent difference to the occurrence of harm, but this conduct is of a type that brings about harm because many people engage in it, we can call this agent an overdeterminer of that harm, and their conduct overdetermining conduct. In this essay we explore the moral status of overdetermining harm. (shrink)